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ABSTRACT
The people of Mobile, Alabama, supported the seces
sion of their state from the Union in January 1861, and
thousands of her able-bodied men served in the Confederate
army from 1861 to 1865.

Recognizing the city's strategic

importance as a port and major railroad center connecting
the eastern and western sections of the new nation, the
Confederate government moved quickly to provide adequate
defenses for Mobile.

Confederate soldiers occupied and

began to strengthen Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines, which
guarded the main channels leading into Mobile Bay.

The

Confederate Navy Department converted several steamers
into gunboats and began construction of four ironclads,
all designed to support the land defenses of Mobile.
As the war progressed, Union land and naval forces
moved into the Gulf of Mexico, and the Confederate
authorities realized that Mobile required more defensive
works than the two forts at the mouth of the bay.
Engineers, using slave labor, designed and constructed
earthern forts along the bay shore near the city and on

vi
various islands at the mouths of the rivers which emp
tied into the bay.

They intended all of these batteries

to protect the water approaches to Mobile in the event of
an enemy naval force running past Fort Morgan and Fort
Gaines.

To protect the city from a land attack, the

engineers erected a series of earthen redoubts con
nected by infantry entrenchments around Mobile.

By war's

end, three separate lines of forts and trenches sur
rounded the city.

Mobile undoubtedly possessed fortifi

cations as extensive and strong as almost any city in the
Confederacy.
Confederate President Jefferson Davis personally
chose for assignment as commanding general at Mobile men
whom he knew had the qualifications needed to push the
construction of all of these defensive works and whom he
could rely on to conduct a successful defense against an
enemy attack.

Confederate brigades, regiments, and

artillery batteries moved in and out of the city through
out the war.

Although the garrison at times shrank in

size to levels which alarmed its commanders, the Confed
erate military authorities in Richmond made a commitment
to see that enough men manned the fortifications to put
up a stiff resistance to an actual enemy attack.

The

War Department also always made sure that the territorial
command to which Mobile belonged, whether a department or
a district, had the defense of the city as its objective.

The Union high command did not seriously contemplate
an attack against the Mobile defenses until relatively
late in the war.

While strategic objectives in other

areas caused the Union military authorities to delay a
move against Mobile, the strength of the defenses around
the city played a part in the decision.

A naval demon

stration against an earthen fort at Grant's Pass in
February 1864 resulted in little damage to that work.
Admiral David G. Farragut successfully led a squadron of
monitors and wooden gunboats past Fort Morgan and Fort
Gaines in August 1864 and captured the lower bay
defenses.

The commitment of land forces elsewhere pre

vented the Union navy from proceeding at that time in a
campaign against Mobile itself.

Such a campaign finally

got under way in March 1865, but it had defensive works
on the eastern shore as its primary objective.

After

brief sieges, these Confederate fortifications fell.
Faced by overwhelming numbers, Mobile's commander evacu
ated the city on April 12, 1865, and the city's govern
mental authorities surrendered Mobile to the enemy that
same day.

CHAPTER I
"...A SEAPORT SUSCEPTIBLE OF IMPREGNABLE DEFENSE..."
Mobile on the eve of the Civil War was the leading
city of Alabama and one of the most important cities in
the South.

It was also an old town, the French, under

Pierre LeMoyne, Sieur d'Iberville, having established a
settlement there in 1711.

From then until 1814, when it

fell to General Andrew Jackson, Mobile belonged succes
sively to the French, British, and Spanish governments.
When the Americans took possession, the population num
bered a mere handful, but it grew steadily and stood at
29,258 persons in 1860.^

One observer described the

city in 1861:
...With a population of thirty thousand the
city contains many pleasant residences, em
bowered in shade trees, and surrounded by
generous grounds.
It is rendered attrac
tive by its tall pines, live oak, and Prideof-China trees....

Joseph Wheeler, "Alabama," Confederate Military
History, ed. by Clement A. Evans, 12 vols. (Atlanta:
Confederate Publishing Co., 1899), VII, 7-12; Bureau of
the Census, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860,
Population (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1864), 9.
2
Albert D. Richardson, The Secret Service, the
Field, the Dungeon, and the Escape (Hartford, Conn.:
American Publishing Co., 1865), 95.
1

2
Located on a sandy plain near the northwest corner of
Mobile Bay, the city enjoyed excellent drainage and had
no problems with mud.

The inhabitants found this sand

difficult to cross, however, so they established over
the years a system of oyster-shell roads.

These roads

became a favorite carriage route and were well-known
throughout the Gulf South.

3

Partly because of the various countries which had
owned the area and partly due to her status as a major
port, Mobile boasted a significant number of foreign born
persons in her population.

The 1860 census recorded

7,733 foreigners in the city, one-fourth of the total
4
population and 37 percent of the white population.
A
visitor to Mobile felt that her society was "more cosmo
politan than that of any city in the South, save perhaps, New Orleans."

5

When British correspondent William

Howard Russell made a brief inspection of the city in
May 1861, he wrote in his diary some interesting

3
William Rix, Incidents of Life in a Southern City
During the War (privately printed, 1865), [1]; Fitz
gerald Ross, Cities and Camps of the Confederate States,
ed. by Richard B. Harwell (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1958), 201.
4
Eighth Census, Population, 10.
5
Thomas Cooper DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel Capitals;
An Inside View of Life in the Southern Confederacy, from
Birth to Death TNew York: Collier Books, 1962 reprint),
72.

observations on this aspect of Mobile's society.

One of

the first things he noticed upon his arrival was "a
fringe of tall warehouses, and shops alongside

[the

wharf], over which were names indicating Scotch, Irish,
English, many Spanish, German, Italian, and French
owners."

Later Russell found the market "crowded with

Negroes, mulattoes, quadroons, and mestizos of all sorts
Spanish, Italian, and French, speaking their own tongues
or a quaint lingua franca, and dressed in very striking
and pretty costumes."

7

Two colleges operated in or near Mobile in 1860:
the Medical College of Alabama and Spring Hill College.
The former was a branch of the University of Alabama,
O
the latter a private school run by the Jesuit order.
Mobile had seven public schools and several private
academies, all of which had reputations for their fine
educational standing.

9

With five hospitals, the city

could provide excellent care for its sick.

The Protest-

and Orphas Asylum, the Catholic Orphan Asylum, the

^William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South,
ed. by Fletcher Pratt (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
106.
^Ibid., 108.
0
Sister Esther Marie Goodrow, Mobile During the
Civil War (Mobile:
Historic Mobile Preservation
Society, 1950), 11.
9
Ibid.

4
Female Benevolent Society, the Samaritan Society, and
the "Can1t-Get-Away-Club" constituted the city's chari
table institutions.

Twenty-four Christian places of

worship and two Jewish synagogues ministered to the
spiritual needs of the populace.

Mobile also had one of

the finest fire departments in the South, consisting of
eight engine companies and one hook-and-ladder company.
Mobile was a prosperous city primarily because of
its status as a center for trade and commerce.

As a

port, Mobile stood second only to New Orleans in the
South.

More than 330 vessels cleared and over 200 ves

sels entered the port in 1860.

The value of articles

exported totalled $38,670,183.

Foreign imports amounted

to $1,050,310."^

Much of Mobile's trade moved up and

down the rivers which converged on the city, primarily

Ibid., 11-12; "Mobile— Its Past and Presnt,"
DeBow's Review, XXVIII (1860) , 310-11.
The "Can't-GetAway-Club" was the most famous of the city's charitable
organizations.
Formed in 1839, it had as its goal the
aiding of victims of yellow fever epidemics.
The name
derrived from the fact that the original members were
citizens who could not get away from the city during the
1839 epidemic.
Frances Annette Isbell, "A Social and
Economic History of Mobile, 1865-1875" (unpublished
master's thesis, University of Alabama, 1951), 75;
Mobile Press Register, Oct. 17, 1948.
"^Robert L. Robinson, "Mobile in the 1850s: A
Social, Cultural and Economic History" (unpublished
master's thesis, University of Alabama, 1955), 66; U. S.
Treasury Department, Commerce and Navigation of the
United States, 1860 (Washington, D. C.: Geo. W. Bowman,
Printer, 1860), 350, 522, 556, 560.

5
the Tombigbee and Alabama river systems.

Alabama is

said to have had "more navigable river miles than any
state in the nation," and most flowed into Mobile Bay.
Alabama produced more cotton than any other Southern
state except Mississippi by 1860, and the majority of
these bales were sold in Mobile.

In exchange for this

cotton coming down the rivers, Mobile's merchants sent
to the planters and farmers of the interior such goods
as pork, corn, flour, and whiskey.

12

Mobile was never a center of Southern radicalism
during the antebellum period.

Her commercial ties with

the North and her fairly large population of foreigners
seemed to argue for continued ties with the North.

In

the presidential election of November 1860, Mobile
County voters cast 1,823 votes for Stephen A. Douglas;
1,629 for John Bell; and 1,541 for John C. Breckinridge:
a better than two-to-one majority against the secessionist candidate.

13

Apparently the election of Abraham

Lincoln pushed Mobilians toward the secessionist camp.

12

Weymouth T. Jordan, "Ante-Bellum Mobile: Ala
bama's Agricultural Emporium," Alabama Review, I (1948),
180-81; Agriculture of the United States in 1860; Com
piled from the Original Returns of the Eighth Census
(Washington, D. C . : Government Printing Office, 1864) ,
xciv; Robinson, "Mobile in the 1850s," 66-67.
13

Clarence P. Denman, The Secession Movement in
Alabama (Montgomery: Alabama State Department of
Archives and History, 1933), 120.

6
On December 7, 1860, the city's leading newspaper
stated:

"The rapid progress of events within the last

few weeks leaves little ground for hope that the Union
can be preserved upon any basis, just, equitable, and
satisfactory to the Southern people."

This article

expressed the hope that the separation would be
peaceful.^
Mayor Jones M. Withers of Mobile issued a procla
mation on December 8 in which he stated:

"We are in the

midst of a revolution, and are invoking the sovereignty
of our State against wrong and oppression."

15

Two days

earlier Governor Andrew B. Moore had issued a call, in
accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly,
for an election of delegates on the twenty-fourth to a
state convention to consider the course Alabama would
follow.

In meetings at Temperance Hall, the secession

ists nominated their delegates, and the cooperationists
met at Odd Fellows Hall to select their slate.

16

The

news of the secession of South Carolina reached Mobile
late on December 20 and, "though not unexpected, caused

14

Mobile Daily Advertiser, Dec. 7, 1860.

15Ibid., Dec. 9, 1860.
^Whee l e r , "Alabama," 34; Mobile Daily Advertiser,
Dec. 4, 19, 1860; William L. Barney, The Secessionist
Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975), 253-54.

7
considerable excitement, and a salute of 100 guns was
v 17
fxred...xn honor of the event."

Coming as xt did just

prior to the election of delegates in Alabama, the seces
sion of South Carolina undoubtedly affected the vote in
Mobile.
Clarence P. Denman, in studying the secession of
Alabama, wrote:

"The returns

delegates election]

[of the state convention

from Mobile County came as quite a

surprise to those who regarded the cooperationist party
as the successor of the Bell and Douglas parties;..."

18

Those returns showed 2,297 votes cast for the secession
ists and 1,229 for the cooperationists:
1,068 for the former.

19

a majority of

In analyzxng these results,

Denman concludes:
...The cooperationists of the county had advo
cated a method of withdrawing so closely akin
to straight-out secession that they should
have received the votes of all those not
strongly in favor of separate state action;
therefore, the large majority for the straightouts indicates that the people of Mobile County
were in harmony with the interior of the
state.

17
18

Mobxle Daily Advertiser, Dec. 21, 1860.
Denman, The Secession Movement in Alabama, 120.

19

Ibxd.; Leavy Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama
From 1850 Through 1860 (Wetumpka, Ala.: Wetumpka Printxng Co., 1935), 194; Barney, The Secessionist Impulse,
253 .
20

Denman, The Secession Movement in Alabama, 120.

8
The Alabama convention began its meetings in Mont
gomery on January 7, 1861.

Four days later the dele

gates voted sixty-three to thirty-nine to take the state
out of the Union.

Business establishments in Mobile had

closed down awaiting the decision of the convention.
During the afternoon of the eleventh, the news of seces
sion reached the city.
out in Mobile.

Widespread celebrations broke

The militia fired one hundred guns in

salute, and bands struck up joyful tunes.

All of

Mobile's military companies turned out to parade through
the streets.

That night the citizens lit lamps and

candles in homes and businesses and tar barrels along
Government Street so that the revelry might continue.
A huge fireworks display in Bienville Square highlighted
the night celebration.

A large element of the populace

obviously supported secession.

21

The city's newspapers picked up the popular
enthusiasm.

The leading daily, anticipating the forma

tion of a Southern nation, recommended that Mobile be
established as the capital of the Confederacy.

The

article expressed the view that the Confederacy would
expand in time to Mexico and the West Indies.

21

If this

New Orleans Daily Picayune, Jan. 13, 1861; Cald
well Delaney, The Story of Mobile (Mobile: Gill Print
ing Co., 1953), 111; Goodrow, Mobile During the Civil
W a r , 16.

9
occurred, the reasons for placing the center of govern
ment at Mobile would be obvious:
...Mobile is, to a degree, the convenient cen
ter of the present and the geographical center
of the future, is a seaport susceptible of
impregnable defence, is healthful, and in every
respect eligible for the honor of being ^
elected the capital city of the South....
Should Mobile not be chosen, the Daily Advertiser article
stated that Montgomery would be the next logical choice.
Before the secession convention met in Montgomery,
Governor Moore had begun seizing federal installations
and property near Mobile.

On January 3 he called out six

Mobile companies of the First Alabama State Troops for
this purpose.

Two companies moved by steamer on January

4 to seize Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines at the mouth of
Mobile Bay, while four companies moved at the same time
against the Mount Vernon Arsenal, thirty miles north of
Mobile.

Ordnance Sergeant S. Patterson turned over all

of the property under his supervision at Fort Morgan to
Colonel John B. Todd.

Not until January 18, however,

did Colonel Todd take formal possession of Fort Gaines
from Lieutenant C. B. Reese of the United States Corps
of Engineers.

Both forts were still in an unfinished

state, and United States engineer troops had worked to

^ Mobile Daily Advertiser, Jan. 11, 1861.

10
strengthen them.

The property seized included some 5,000

shot and s h e l l . ^
Captain Jesse L. Reno, commanding at Mount Vernon
Arsenal, reported that he surrendered his post after
being surprised and overwhelmed by the Mobile soldiers.
He had only seventeen men under his command and could
not have resisted.

The arsenal's stores included

twenty thousand stands of arms, fifteen hundred barrels
of powder, a few cannon, and other munitions.

24

In

reporting the seizure of all this property to President
James Buchanan, Governor Moore explained that he had
acted in self-defense, as he had information that the
Federals intended to reinforce the forts and place a

23

Ordnance Sergeant S. Patterson to the Adjutant
General, Jan. 5, 1861, in U. S. War Department, War of
the Rebellion; Official Records of the Union and Confed
erate Armies, 128 parts in 70 vols. (Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series 1, Vol. I,
327, hereinafter cited as O.R., all references are to
Series 1 unless otherwise noted; Governor A. B. Moore to
President James Buchanan, Jan. 4 [?], 1861, ibid.,
327-28; Lieutenant C. B. Reese to General J. G. Totten,
Jan. 19, 1861, ibid., 329-30; Thomas A. Smith, "Mobili
zation of the Army in Alabama, 1859-1865" (unpublished
master's thesis, Auburn University, 1953), 13; Lee F.
Irwin Memoirs, Irwin Collection, City of Mobile Museum
Department; "Report of the Engineer Bureau, Nov. 30,
1861," Report of the Secretary of W a r , Sen. Exec. Doc. 1,
37th Cong., 2nd Session, Vol. II, 103; J. Thomas Scharf,
History of the Confederate States Navy (New York;
Rogers & Sherwood, 1887), 21.
24

Captain Jesse L. Reno to Captain William Maynadier, Jan. 4, 1861, O . R . , I, 327; Montgomery Weekly
Post, Jan. 9, 1861; Irwin Memoirs.

11
strong guard at the arsenal.

He hoped, he said, to

avoid bloodshed and hostilities.

Moore closed his letter

by stating:
An inventory of the property in the forts
and arsenal has been ordered, and the strict
est care will be taken to prevent the injury
or destruction of it while peaceable relations
continue to subsist, as I trust they will.
The forts and arsenal will be held by my order
only for the precautionary purpose for which
they were taken,...
After the seizure of the forts, Mobile's citizens
continued to form military companies, and the newspapers
urged them to begin thinking about the possibility of
war,

At least one paper suggested that the city's fire

companies follow an example set in Charleston and organ
ize themselves for military duty.

This would not be

difficult to do since the companies were already
enlisted, were accustomed to obeying orders, and could
adapt quickly to drill.

These companies would act pri

marily as a home guard, maintaining their present
uniforms.

The paper expected that no more than one-

third of the men would be used for duty outside the city
at one time.

26

The firemen took these suggestions to

^ M o o r e to Buchanan, Jan. 4 [?], 1861, O.R., I,
328.
26
Mobile Daily Advertiser, Jan. 9, 1861.

12
heart and did organize for home defense.

A Fire Brigade

formed and used the engine houses as armories.

27

Governor Moore acted quickly after Alabama seceded
to provide for the defense of Mobile.

On his own

authority he gave permission to his assistant quarter
master, Colonel Duff C. Green, to make a draft of
$10,000 against the Executive Department.

The money

would be used to strengthen the forts below the city.
At the time neither the General Assembly nor the seces
sion convention had appropriated funds for that purpose.
Green wrote to Moore that the people of Mobile intended
to raise $100,000 for the same purpose.

This money

could later be reimbursed by the State.

Moore wrote

that "Mobile must be defended at whatever cost," but he
urged his military subordinates to use public monies
economically and efficiently.

28

The four Mobile companies which had seized Fort
Morgan remained there under Colonel Todd to garrison and
strengthen the post.

In a short time, however, new com

panies from the city and companies from the interior and
Mississippi would take turns of duty at Morgan.

A tug

boat steamed back and forth from Mobile to keep the men

27Ibid., Jan. 22, 1861.
28

Moore to Colonel Duff C. Green, Jan. 12, 1861,
O. R . , LII, Pt. 2, p. 5.

13
supplied with fresh food and other goods.

As the force

in Morgan grew in size, the men boarded up some of the
casemates and converted them into barracks rooms.

The

officers drilled the men and gave some artillery
instruction.

The men's health remained good, and their

spirits were high.

They usually took twenty-four to

forty-eight hours to adjust to the new military
routine.

29

Planters in the interior of Alabama offered the
services of some of their slaves to help construct
defenses.

At one time the engineers employed as many as

150 laborers at Fort Morgan.

On another occasion the

authorities expected some 400 slaves to arrive in the
city.

The volunteers and laborers cleaned all of the

cisterns in the fort so that fresh rain water could be
put in them.

With the carriages available, the men

mounted all of the artillery pieces they could.

They

also used sandbags to sod the ramparts facing the ship
channel.

In time the rest of the fort would receive the

same treatment, but for the time being, the men cut
grass sod for the outer faces.

After the men dug

trenches at the base of the scarp, water filled the

29

Mobile Daily Advertiser, Jan. 13, 17, 1861; New
York Herald, Jan. 14, 1861; Daily Picayune, Jan. 24,
1861; W. H. Fowler to William M. Brooks, Jan. 15, 1861,
O . R . , LII, Pt. 2, p. 8.

14
trenches from the soil and added a little to the defen
sive posture of the f o r t . ^

Much more work needed to be

done, however, to ready Morgan for an attack.
Throughout the remainder of January and much of
February 1861, military companies from Mobile and elsewhere shuffled in and out of Fort Morgan.

31

Some of

Mobile's volunteers went to Pensacola, Florida, to help
garrison that town.

As all of these military companies

moved through Mobile, the businessmen of the city did
what they could to help the men.

The owners of the

Battle House Hotel made rooms available at moderate
rates and gave the soldiers as much attention as possible
despite boarders who objected to the hotel being used as
a barracks.

32

Citizens continued to rejoice as news of

the secession of other Southern states arrived.

When

Louisiana left the Union, the soldiers fired an artillery
salute, but there had been too much previous celebrating
for the city to be illuminated again.
stated:

One newspaper

"The rejoicing on the part of our people is,

however, just as deep, sincere and pervading as if the

3fl

Daily Picayune, Jan. 24, 1861.

^^Mobile Daily Advertiser, Feb. 7, 22, 24, 28, 1861.
32

Ibid., Jan. 24, 1861; Pensacola Tri-Weekly
Gazette, Jan. 24, 1861, quoted in ibid., Jan. 27, 1861.
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demonstrations were of the most extensive and noisy
33
character."
The new Confederate government became involved in
the defense Of Mobile almost immediately after its
formation.

Secretary of War Leroy Pope Walker tele

graphed Colonel John H. Forney at Barrancas Barracks,
Florida, on February 26 and asked if any columbiads
(large siege artillery pieces) could be spared from
Fort McRae to be used in Fort Morgan.

When Forney

replied that two such guns could be spared, Walker
informed him to make the transfer "without delay, so as
not to excite suspicion and report."

34

Forney reported

on March 4 that two eight-inch columbiads, with complete
carriages, chasis, equipment, and implements, had been
sent to Morgan that day.

35

Several days later, on

March 7, the military authorities at Mobile received by
rail two ten-inch columbiads from the Tredegar Iron
Works in Richmond, Virginia.

These guns also had Morgan

33Ibid., Jan. 27, 1861.
34

Leroy P. Walker to Colonel John H. Forney, Feb.
26, 1861, Telegrams Sent by the Confederate Secretary of
War, 1861-1865, Chap. IX, Vol. 33, p. 2, RG 109, National
Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C.; Walker
to Forney, Feb. 28, 1861, ibid., 4.
33Forney to Walker, Mar. 4, 1861, O.R., LII, Pt. 2,
p. 23.
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as their destination.

Their mile and a half range made

these columbiads the most powerful guns at the fort.

36

On March 18, 1861, the Confederate War Department
assumed supervision of Fort Morgan by assigning Colonel
William J. Hardee to command of the post.

Hardee,

author of the standard text on infantry tactics, would
have the services of two artillery officers to help
train the men.

37

Nine and a half companies, about 800

men, comprised the garrison.

Hardee found that the

officers and men alike lacked discipline and had had
little instruction.
little by himself.

He began a program but could do
On March 28 he wrote to Secretary

Walker to request officers capable of conducting both
infantry and artillery instruction, warning that if such
instructors were not provided the Alabama volunteers
would in battle "disgrace themselves and the Confederacy."

38

A visitor to the fort reported shortly

^ Mobile Daily Advertiser, Mar. 8, 1861; Mobile
Daily Tribune, Mar. 8, 1861.
37

Special Order No. 4, War Department, Adjutant
General's Office, Mar. 18, 1861, O.R., LII, Pt. 2,
p. 27; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of the
Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State
University Press, 1959), 124.
38

Major General Jeremiah Clemens to Secretary of
War, Apr. 4, 1861, O . R . , LII, Pt. 2, p. 35; Colonel
William J. Hardee to Walker, Mar. 28, 1861, ibid.,
30-31.
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afterwards, however, that Hardee seemed to have put the
place "in thorough repair and readiness."

39

As Hardee's force at Fort Morgan grew, crowded con
ditions compelled him to move most of the men outside
the fort into tents.

He did this for fear that

yellow

fever or some other epidemic sickness might strike in the
close quarters.

The troops still faced problems in their

new situation, however.

The only tents available were

small, and the men had to remain out in the hot sun much
of the time.

Hardee had ordered the sand hills leveled

and the few trees around cut down for defensive reasons.
This action resulted in what an observer called "a huge,
unbroken waste of sand, nearly as white as snow and
intensely h o t . " ^

By this time most of the south Ala

bama companies had been relieved by units from the
northern part

of the state. These men were not

tomed to such exposure.

The observer mentioned

accus
above

recommended that the government provide larger tents
equipped with flies to allow the sea breeze to blow
41
through.

39
40

DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel Capitols, 73.

John T. Morgan to Walker, Apr. 4, 1861, O . R . ,
LII, Pt. 2, p. 48.
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Mobile's defenses suffered other problems at this
time.

Some people thought Fort Morgan capable of repel

ling an attack by enemy vessels but not a land assault.
More serious than this weakness, however, the approaches
to Mobile from Mississippi Sound through Grant's Pass
stood completely unprotected.

The closest work to the

pass, Fort Gaines, had no garrison and could not have
prevented vessels of light draft from using the approach
anyway.

Some of the citizens in Mobile expressed under

standable concern.

Robert H. Smith, Mobile's represen

tative in the Confederate Congress, suggested that
H ardee's command be extended to include Fort Gaines,
Grant's Pass, and all other approaches to Mobile.

42

About this same time, Major General Jeremiah Cle
mens of the Alabama militia suggested a further measure
for the defense of Mobile.

He recommended that guns

from Fort Morgan be placed in defensive works on Dauphin
Island and Sand Island at the mouth of the bay and at
Spanish River and Choctaw Point near the city.

43

The

Confederate authorities responded quickly to these
requests.

Major Danville Leadbetter, a noted engineer

officer, received orders to inspect the defenses and make

^ R o b e r t H. Smith to Jefferson Davis, Apr. 13, 1861,
ibid., 45-46.
43

General Samuel Cooper to Hardee, Apr. 17, 1861,
ibid., 52.
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a full report.

General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant General

of the Confederacy, authorized Hardee to transfer guns to
the points suggested by Clemens, saying that the guns
would be replaced by others from the arsenal at Baton
Rouge, Louisiana.

Finally, Cooper extended Hardee's

command to include Fort Gaines, Grant's Pass, and all
approaches to Mobile.

Hardee would also have the ser-

44
vices of the revenue cutter Lewis Cass.
In Mobile itself the war spirit rose to a fever
pitch.

This was especially true following the fall of

Fort Sumter to Confederate forces.

The news reached the

city by telegraph and spread quickly.

Bells rang,

artillery salutes echoed over the bay, and the citizens
turned out into the streets to celebrate.

45

Five days

later word of the secession of Virginia reached Mobile.
This created even more excitement among the people.

As

one newspaper put it, the tidings "rose from the lips of

44

John Tyler, Jr. to Percy Walker, Apr. 16, 1861,
Letters Sent by the Confederate Secretary of War, 18611865, Chap. IX, Vol. 1, p. 196, RG 109, National
Archives; Cooper to Danville Leadbetter, Mar. 19, 1861,
Letters and Telegrams Sent by the Confederate Adjutant
and Inspector General, 1861-1865, Chap. I, Vol. 35, p. 8,
RG 109, National Archives; Cooper to Hardee, Apr. 17,
1861 (two communications), O.R., LII, Pt. 2, pp. 52, 53;
Hardee to Walker, Apr. 21, 1861, ibid., 60; Walker to
Hardee, Apr. 22, 1861, ibid., 61; Walker to Captain J. J.
Morrison, Apr. 22, 1861, ibid.; Morrison to Walker,
Apr. 22, 1861, ibid.
45 .
Richardson, The Secret Service, 97-98.

20
the few who had first caught the news" and "was taken up
and re-echoed by the voices of hundreds and thousands."

46

There were speeches, the clanging of bells, artillery
salutes, and fireworks.
stores.

Most proprietors closed their

That night the people burned lights and candles

in every window.

Crowds gathered for a two-and-one-half

hour fireworks display, and the celebration continued
until after eleven o'clock.

47

All of this excitement led to an increased militantcy among the city's male population.
in Mobile commented on the phenomenon.
of the New York Tribune noted:

Several visitors
A correspondent

"Hand-bills, headed

'Sol

diers wanted,' and 'Ho! for volunteers,' met the eye at
every corner; uniforms and arms abounded, and the voice
of the bugle was heard m

the streets."

48

Captain

Raphael Semmes, who passed through the city about this
time, recalled later that "the young merchants had drop
ped their daybooks and ledgers, and were forming, and
drilling companies, by night and day,..."

49

Thomas C.

Mobile Daily Advertiser, Apr. 20, 1861.
47
48

Ibid.; Rix, Incidents of Life, [5].
Richardson, The Secret Service, 95.

49
Admiral Raphael Semmes, Memoirs of Service Afloat
During the War Between the States (Baltimore:
Kelly,
Piet, & Co., 1869), 95.
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DeLeon reported that "the mechanics, the stevedores and
men of every class" followed the example of the upper
classes in v o lunteering.^
The Confederate War Department detailed First
Lieutenant Edward Ingraham for recruiting duty at Mobile
and ordered him to report there immediately.

His

recruits would receive orders for Fort Morgan after
enlistment.

Under his instructions, Ingraham was to

issue to the volunteers the following clothing items:
"one blue shirt (to be made into a blouse), three under
shirts, two pairs of overalls, two pairs of drawers, two
pairs of stockings, one pair of booties, one blanket, one
leather stock."

51

.
While DeLeon exaggerated in commenting

that more than two regiments were recruited, it may well
have seemed, as Semmes put it, that the city "was thronged
with young men in military costume, and all seemed going
52
'as merrily as a m a r n a g e - b a l l . 1"
On April 16 President Jefferson Davis issued a call
for volunteers, and four Mobile companies— -the Mobile
Cadets, Gulf City Guards, Mobile Rifles, and Washington

50

DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel Capitals, 72.

51

General Order No. 6, Adjutant and Inspector Gen
eral's Office, Apr. 22, 1861, O . R . , 4, I, 229.
52

DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel Capitals, 72; Semmes,
Memoirs of Service Afloat, 95.
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Light Infantry-'Offered their services to Governor
Moore.

He accepted the offer and notified the companies

on April 23 to move to Montgomery for formation into a
regiment.

Crowds of people filled the streets, balcon

ies, wharves, and boats in the harbor to watch the young
soldiers march off to war.

Late in the afternoon the

first two companies paraded through the streets to the
wharf.

Rather than the bright uniforms they had worn in

the past, the men now "were clad in a stout, serviceable
gray, specially selected for a rough campaign."

53

The men enjoyed a brief halt at the wharf to rest.
One of the soldiers recalled later:
...then came the last leave-taking of mothers,
sisters, sweethearts, wives; the hand-shakings
of friends and companions, the blessings of
old men, the final exhortation of father tp^
son, the sobs and tears of agonized women.
Then the two companies boarded the steamer St. Nicholas
for the journey up river to Montgomery.

As the vessel

pulled out into the stream, church and ships' bells
rang, an artillery unit fired a salute, and the crowds
cheered and waved farewell.

The Gulf city's first war

volunteers were on their way to the conflict which would

53

Irwin Memoirs; Mobile Daily Advertiser, Apr. 24,
1861; Henry Hotze, Three Months in the Confederate A r m y ,
ed. by Richard B. Harwell (University, A l a . : University
of Alabama Press, 1952), 13.
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Hotze, Three Months in the Confederate A r m y , 13.
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claim many of their lives;
the elite of her youth."

"the city of Mobile had lost

55

During succeeding months this scene of departing
troops reoccurred many times in Mobile.
boat and train.

The men went by

They wore a variety of uniforms and car

ried a variety of flags.

One of the most colorful com

panies was the Emerald Guards, the members all being
firemen and predominently natives of Ireland.

When they

left Mobile, the Emerald Guards wore uniforms of dark
green.

An observer described the flag these men bore as

having a harp in the center "encircled with a wreath of
shamrock and the words

' E r i n - g o - B r a g h a n d the words

"Faugh-a-ballagh!" (Irish for "clear the way") below
C f.

that.

Other foreign companies from Mobile joined the

Confederate service, units with nicknames like the
Scotch Guards, Gardes Lafayette, French Guards, and German Fusiliers.

57

Mobile's home guard units contained

numerous foreigners as well, even though these men may

^"*Ibid.; Mobile Daily Advertiser, Apr. 24, 1861.
C

C

Kate Cumming, K a t e ; The Journal of a Confederate
Nurse, ed. by Richard B. Harwell (Baton Rouge!
Louisiana
State University Press, 1959), 53.
57

Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Confederacy (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1940),
96-98.
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have volunteered only to escape being conscripted into
,
.
58
regular servxce.
There are no figures on how many men Mobile fur
nished to the Confederate armies.

By July 1861 some

2,000 men had gone into service, but many of these had
enlisted for only one year.

59

Mobile County's white male

population between the ages of 15 and 40 in 1860 was
8,053.

If the white males between 40 and 50 are added

to this figure, the total number of men liable to mili
tary service during the war was approximately 9,682.88
Some sixty companies from Mobile County served in the
regular Confederate Army, and men from the county made up
part of at least five other companies.8'*' Assuming a
strength of from 75 to 100 men per company, Mobile
County's contribution to the regular army would have
been between 4,500 and 6,000 men at the least.

The men

in home guard, militia, or reserve units may have
raised total enlistments by as many as 1,000 men.
In the months following the firing on Fort Sumter,
the Confederates continued to strengthen Fort Morgan.

58Ibid., 98-99.
59
60
61

Mobile Advertiser and Register, July 17, 1861.
Eighth Census , Population, 2.

Willis Brewer, Alabama: Her History, Resources,
War Record and Public M e n , From 1540 to 1872 (Montgom
ery: Barrett & Brown, 1872) , 589-705.

Troops occupied and built up the defenses of Fort Gaines
as well.

Grant's Pass became the site of a small earthern

fortification.

These works guarding the entrances to

Mobile Bay were not the only obstacles to enemy vessels.
Confederate engineers drove pilings and floated torpe
does to block all but a narrow channel left open for
blockade runners.

To protect the water approaches to the

city itself, the Confederates erected earthworks on vari
ous islands and peninsulas and placed floating batteries
to support these forts.

Again the engineers used pilings

and torpedoes near the bay batteries, as they were
called, and the combination of forts and obstructions
here made it virtually impossible for enemy vessels to
reach Mobile itself if they passed the forts at the bay
entrances.
The Confederate defenses of Mobile did not neglect
the land approaches to the city either.

In the spring of

1862, engineer officer Captain Charles F. Liernur
designed and supervised the beginning of construction of
a line of earthworks surrounding the city.

Brigadier

General Danville Leadbetter began erecting a second line
of fortifications closer to Mobile in 1863.

This line

consisted of strong forts flanked by redoubts, all con
nected by rifle pits.

Then in 1864 engineers under the

direction of Lieutenant Colonel Victor von Sheliha com
menced a third and even stronger series of forts and
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entrenchments between the other two.

Even though engi

neers and laborers worked on these defenses up until the
time the city surrendered in 1865, the enemy considered
them so formidable that Union forces did not attempt to
assault them.
With the land fortifications and bay batteries
effectively protecting Mobile from direct enemy approach,
the enemy could get at the city in only one way:
water from the north.

by

If a hostile force could make its

way through the rivers near the northeastern shore of
Mobile Bay, it could move circuitously and either
approach Mobile from its exposed side or isolate the
city from above.

The Confederates attempted to impede

movement in this area as well, although their efforts
did not progress in earnest until the last months of the
war.

They built several forts or batteries to protect

the rivers and a series of fortifications and rifle pits
on the eastern shore to cover the flanks of these water
batteries.

This area, too, had torpedoes and pilings

in the water to render it even more hazardous for ves
sels to approach.
In addition to all of the defensive preparations
outlined above, the Confederates had a small naval force
stationed in the bay.

The squadron began modestly with

two vessels which had been converted into gunboats.
Eventually the squadron numbered eight warships:

the
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ironclad Tennessee, ironclad ram Nashville, armored
floating batteries Tuscaloosa and Huntsville, armored
ram Baltic, and lightly armored gunboats Selma, Gaines,
62
and Morgan.

While only one of these vessels was

actually very strong (the Tennessee) , the presence of a
naval squadron of unknown capabilities undoubtedly was a
factor in deterring an attack on Mobile Bay by the Union
navy.

Mobile's overall defenses were thus among the

strongest in the Confederacy and resulted in the city
being "the last important place in the Confederacy which
was captured.

62

Confederate naval forces and operations are
thoroughly covered in two publications by William N.
Still, Jr.— "The Confederate States Navy at Mobile, 1861
to August, 1864," Alabama Historical Quarterly, XXX
(1968) , 127-44, and Iron Afloat; The Story of the Con
federate Armorclads (Nashville: Vanderbilt University
Press, 1971), 187-212, 223-26— so this paper will not
treat the naval aspect of the defense of Mobile in
great detail except as it relates to active operations
in Mobile Bay or nearby streams.
63

C.
(New York:

C. Andrews, History of the Campaign of Mobile
D. Van Nostrand, 1867), 10.

CHAPTER II
"...A HERCULEAN TASK WITH MOST INADEQUATE MEANS..."
On the same day that Mobile's war volunteers left
for Montgomery, Major Danville Leadbetter sent a report
of his inspection of the city's defenses to Colonel Har
dee at Fort Morgan.

Leadbetter also made several recom

mendations for strengthening the defenses.

He suggested

that a floating battery commanded by a naval officer
would suffice to protect Grant's Pass.

Most of Lead-

better 's concern focused on Fort Gaines and the main ship
channel between Gaines and Fort Morgan.

Naturally, he

urged that heavy guns be placed in Gaines, but he recog
nized that they would not be able to defend effectively
the bay entrance.

This area was three and a quarter

miles wide, and no cannons in the forts could completely
cover the middle of the area.

Leadbetter recommended

that a floating battery of strong timber covered with
iron bars should be placed in the center of the channel.
This, with the guns of the two forts, should prove suf
ficient to prevent enemy vessels from entering.'*'

■^Leadbetter to Hardee, Apr. 23, 1861, O . R . , LII,
Pt. 2, p. 65.
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29
At this early stage of the war, the Confederate
command gave no thought to defensive works near Mobile
itself.

Leadbetter wrote Hardee that if the bay

entrances were properly protected, the only way the city
could be approached was by a force marching overland from
somewhere on Mississippi Sound.

According to Leadbetter,

a landing on the coast could not be prevented.

The

answer to such a movement would be strong defense by "the
stout hearts and strong arms of the military forces which
can be concentrated at the city."

2

Leadbetter felt that

the urgency of the situation required that he begin work
on his recommendations "without waiting for formal
authority."

3

Hardee forwarded Leadbetter's report to

Montgomery and told the Secretary of War that he had
ordered Leadbetter to work on the defenses at Fort
4
Gaines.
Many of the leading citizens of Mobile were very
concerned about the safety of their city, and they began
contacting the Confederate War Department concerning
their fears.

The concensus seemed to be that the city

was defenseless and likely to be attacked by Northern

2Ibid., 65-66.
3Ibid., 66.
4
Hardee to Secretary of War, Apr. 23, 1861, ibid.,
66.
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forces.

A three-man committee appointed by the citizens

of Mobile travelled to Montgomery to present personally
a request to Leroy P. Walker for arms and ammunition.
These men also protested an order directing the only
field artillery unit in Mobile to move to Pensacola.
Colin J. McRae, Mobile's representative in the Provi
sional Confederate Congress, urged Walker to do some
thing to calm the fears of the city.

He suggested in

particular that cannon in Fort Morgan be mounted in
batteries at Choctaw Point, Grant's Pass, and the eastern
end of Dauphin Island.

5

The Confederate government

reacted favorably to these requests but did so slowly.
Although Mobilians showed apprehension, their ardor
for the Confederate cause and their militantcy had not
diminished.

The noted British journalist William Howard

Russell visited Mobile about this time and found the
people supporting what he called "the most ultraSecessionist doctrines" and determined "to repel the
'Lincolnite mercenaries' to the last."^

Russell recorded

in his diary that there was a great deal of marching,

5

John Forsyth, T. J. Butler, and L. W. Lawler to
Walker, May 4, 1861, ibid., 85; Robert H. Smith to Wal
ker, May 5, 1861, ibid., 86; Colin J. McRae to Walker,
May 6, 1861, ibid., 87.
g
William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South,
ed. by Fletcher Pratt (New York:
Harper & Row, 1965),
107-108.
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drilling, and drum-beating going on.

Every steeple and

spire in the city seemed to have a Confederate flag atop
it.

When he checked into the Battle House Hotel, he

discovered that a vigilance committee had headquarters
there and scrutinized all visitors.

Russell concluded:

...It was fortunate they did not find traces
of Lincolnism about us, as it appeared by the
papers they were busy deporting 'Abolition
ists' after certain preliminary processes
supposed to
'Give them a rise, and open thei^ eyes
'To a sense of their situation.'
Russell visited Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines while at
Mobile, and his impressions present a telling portrait of
the weaknesses of these works.

He described Gaines as

"a shell of masonry" and noted that the small garrison
had only a few small cannons set up on the beach and the
sand hills nearby to defend the fort.

Morgan seemed

only slightly stronger, the Confederates having mounted
there a number of guns of varying calibers.

Russell

was impressed with the men of the garrison, the Second
Alabama Infantry Regiment, and the unit's commander,
Colonel Henry Maury.

Yet the fort had grave weaknesses.

Russell felt that in a heavy bombardment Morgan would
suffer great damage and that the magazines were vulnerable

7Ibid., 107.
8

Ibid., 109-110.
Fort Morgan had, in fact, a total
of 107 guns mounted at this time. Major Josiah Gorgas to
, Apr. 20, 1861, O.R., 4, I, 227.
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to enemy fire.

Recalling his observations of Fort Sum

ter after its fall, he recommended that the wooden
buildings and barracks be destroyed to avoid fires.

9

Mobile soon received new attention to its defenses.
On May 27, 1861, the Confederate government assigned
southern Alabama to Department No. 1, commanded by Major
General David E. Twiggs, whose headquarters were in New
Orleans.^

The day before, Lieutenant Colonel Franklin

Gardner had assumed command of Fort Gaines after receiv
ing orders to report to Hardee on May 7.

Gardner con

ducted an inspection of his new post and sent a report
to Hardee.

The recommendations and plans for improving

Gaines' situation adopted by Leadbetter received endorse
ment from Gardner.

He felt that as soon as the work was

completed and some heavy guns mounted, the fort would be
"in a tolerably fair state for defense."'^

Gardner

requested at least two companies to reinforce his small
garrison.

When Hardee forwarded Gardner's report to

Montgomery, he stated that he had no men to send Gardner

9

Russell, My; Diary North and South, 111.

^ P a r a II, Special Order No. 61, Adjutant and
Inspector General's Office, May 27, 1861, O.R., LIII,
690.
^ C o m p i l e d Service Record of Franklin Gardner, RG
109, National Archives? Gardner to Lieutenant C. P.
Ball, May 30, 1861, O . R . , LII, Pt. 2, p. 110.
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and asked that the government order additional companies
to Fort Gaines.

12

Governor Moore and his staff, accompanied by a
large group of men and women from Mobile, conducted an
inspection tour of the lower bay defenses on June 11,
1861.

Hardee acted as guide, and the entourage stopped

first at Grant's Pass.

The eighty-man garrison of Fort

Grant received the governor in a formal line of inspec
tion.

A newspaper correspondent expressed the impression

that the troops made:

"The men looked healthy, in trim

order as to apparel and discipline, and showed that they
were commanded by officers who knew their dity."

13

After

a quick lunch aboard the steamer, Moore's party spent
about an hour at Fort Gaines.

They then went across to

Fort Morgan, and a portion of the garrison there led them
into the fort with the band playing and flags flying.
From the ramparts of Morgan, the visitors observed the
Federal warship Niagara and witnessed the firing of a
columbiad.

The garrison next conducted battalion drill

on the parade ground behind the fort.

Although the men's

performance seemed a little ragged, the correspondent

12

Hardee to General Samuel Cooper, May 30, 1861,
O . R . , L I I , Pt. 2, p. 110.
13

Advertiser and Register, June 1 2 ,

1861.
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felt that with two more months of training "they will
pass muster with any troops."'*'4
Several days later the command arrangements at
Mobile changed.

The Confederate War Department ordered

Hardee to go to Memphis, Tennessee, on June 17, 1861.
There he received a promotion to brigadier general and an
assignment to command troops in northern Arkansas.

15

In

ordering Hardee to Memphis, Cooper informed him that
Gardner would succeed him in command.

Two days later,

Colonel Henry Maury telegraphed Cooper asking if Gardner's
assignment was a mistake since he outranked Gardner.
Cooper replied by ordering Maury to assume command at
Fort Morgan and Gardner to retain his command at Fort
Gaines.
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The loss of Hardee did not help Mobile's

defensive situation.

Maury, although described by

14Ibid.
15

Cooper to Hardee, June 17, 1861, Letters and Tele
grams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol.
35, p. 198; Advertiser and Register, June 20, 1861;
Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray; Lives of the Confed
erate Commanders ( B a t o n R o u g e ; Louisiana State Univer
sity Press, 1959), 124.
16

Maury to Cooper, June 19, 1861, Telegrams Received
by the Confederate Secretary of War, 1861-1865, RG 109,
National Archives; Cooper to Hardee or "officer command
ing Fort Morgan," June 20, 1861, Letters and Telegrams
Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 35,
p. 205.
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Russell as "an ingenious and clever officer."
best an average commander.

17

was at

Later in the war he was

arrested and tried for drunkenness.

Available evidence

indicates that after receiving command at Fort Morgan,
Maury did not exercise responsibility for the rest of the
bay defenses as Hardee had before him.
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Toward the end of June 1861, Mayor John Forsyth and
some of the city's governmental leaders succeeded in
gathering a large number of artillery pieces and small
arms for the use of the Mobile militia.

Five hundred

muskets came from the state authorities and an additional
500 muskets from the Confederate government.

The Confed

erate authorities also informed Forsyth that as many as
600 more muskets would be available if needed.

Plenty of

powder and musket balls existed to supply these and other
weapons in the city.

In addition to these muskets,

Forsyth obtained between 25 and 30 artillery pieces, most
of them smoothbores but some being rifled guns.

The

mounting of the artillery proceeded slowly, but the
authorities believed that half of the cannon would be on
carriages and ready for action by early July.

19

■^Russell, My; Diary North and South, 111.
18

Dabney H. Maury, Recollections of a Virginian
(New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), 200.
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Advertiser and Register, June 30, 1861.
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A meeting of most of the prominent citizens of
Mobile resulted in a number of resolutions supporting the
efforts of Forsyth and other civil authorities of the
city.

On June 29 a committee of five men presented the

resolutions to the meeting at Odd Fellows Hall.

These

men recognized that the city government might have to
"take the responsibility of exercising unusual powers"
and pledged themselves to support "all such measures as
they may deem proper and necessary for the efficient
defense of Mobile."

20

One resolution created a Committee

of Safety to assist the civil authorities.

Another reso

lution authorized the city fathers to use the Harbor
Improvement Fund or any other funds, to levy taxes, and
to accept contributions for defense of Mobile.

The citi

zens hoped the Confederate government would repay all
expenditures but expressed willingness to have the city
bear the burden.

Forsyth, the Aldermen, and the Common

Council received authority to hire or purchase transpor
tation, laborers, tools, and equipment and to construct
necessary fortifications.

Those men attending the meet

ing promised to use their influence to gain the support
of the entire city population for the measures they had
21
adopted.

20Ibid., July 2, 1861.
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Mobile's militia units spent short periods of time
in camps of instruction to improve their training and
discipline should they be called upon for active duty.
One of these camps, located at Bayou La Batre on the
coast southeast of the city, bore the name Camp Garnett.
Camp Moore, named for Alabama's governor, stood nearer
Mobile.

The First Alabama State Volunteers of the Fire

Brigade established the camp about one mile from the city
on the north side of the road to Spring Hill.

One of the

soldiers at Camp Moore reported that they were drilled by
companies during the afternoon.

A problem with the camp

which this soldier recognized was its proximity to
M obile:
...After drill, all want to go home.
It is
difficult for a man to realize the necessity
of sleeping on hard boards in a tent, when
his home, family, and a comfortable bed, are
within a few minutes walk; therefore, it is
but natural that he should want to 'go h o m e , '
and enjoy his domestic comforts, or go and
see his sweetheart.
!
Commanders of Mobile would experience this problem and
similar ones with troops stationed close to home as the
war years passed.

77

Ibid., July 4, Aug. 9, 20, 1861; Special Order
No. 16, Headquarters Army of Alabama, Adjutant General's
Office, Aug. 5, 1861, quoted in ibid., Aug. 7, 1861;
Orders No. 8, Headquarters 1st Regiment, Alabama State
Volunteers, Fire Brigade, Aug. 5, 1861, quoted in ibid.,
Aug. 6, 1861.
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Government authorities received information on
Mobile's situation in early August 1861.

Major Leadbet-

ter reported on August 4 to Congressman Robert H. Smith
about the status of Mobile's defenses and made recommen
dations for improving them.

Fort Morgan, garrisoned by

ten companies of the 2nd Alabama, seemed to be in good
shape.

Approximately seventy cannons were mounted in the

fort, but few of them were heavy guns.

Leadbetter did

not think the fort would survive a regular siege.
Gaines remained weak.

Fort

Five companies of state artillery

comprised the garrison, but these men had only ten ser
viceable guns, all 32-pounders.

Many more guns would

have to be mounted before the fort would be in decent
shape.

One company of state artillery manned the three

32-pounders whichT guarded Grant's Pass.
ier guns seemed needed.

Here, too, heav

No defenses existed to prevent

an enemy force from landing on Mississippi Sound and
marching right into Mobile.

23

Most of Leadbetter's recommendations dealt with the
works guarding the bay entrances.

To protect Fort Morgan

^ L e a d b e t t e r to Smith, Aug. 4, 1861, O . R . , LII,
Pt. 2, pp. 125-26; "Statement of posts and troops in
Department No. 1, C.S.A.," July 12, 1861, U. S. Navy
Department, War of the Rebellion; Official Records of
the Union and Confederate Navies, 30 vols. (Washington,
D. C . : Government Printing OfTTce, 1894-1922), Series 1,
Vol. XVI, 582, hereinafter cited as O.R.N., all refer
ences are to Series 1 unless otherwise noted.
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from approach by land,, he suggested extensive earthworks
on the peninsula east of the fort to keep an enemy force
far enough away that it could not reach the fort with
long-range cannon fire.

Even at this early stage of the

war, Leadbetter anticipated the use of ironclad steamers
by the United States against the forts.

He recommended a

heavy chain supported by rafts as a means of blocking the
main ship channel near Fort Morgan.

For the channel near

Fort Gaines, he felt crib-work obstructions would suffice.
Delayed by these obstacles, any enemy ironclads could
then be destroyed or crippled by the fire of columbiads
in the forts.

Leadbetter suggested the construction of

fourteen batteries connected by rifle pits in a semi
circular line around the city to protect Mobile's land
approaches.

To cover the water approaches to the city,

he favored strong batteries at Choctaw Point and the
mouth of Spanish River.

The cost of all of these defen

sive works would be tremendous, but Leadbetter concluded:
...we must, if necessary, spend our all in this
business, certainly hundreds of millions, and
I know of no point more worthy the application
of a half of one million than Mobile Bay.
Congressman Smith passed Leadbetter's report on to
the War Department, where it received immediate
attention.

24

Secretary Walker ordered sixteen 10-inch

Leadbetter to Smith, Aug. 4, 1861, O . R . , LII,
Pt. 2, pp. 125-26.
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columbiads sent to Mobile as soon as the Ordnance Bureau
could have them ready.

He also wrote to Governor Henry

T. Clark of North Carolina requesting that he send thirty
32-pounder guns to Mobile.

Walker authorized the rifling

of the 32-pounder smoothbores already at Mobile and their
placement in the best positions to repel an attack.

He

asked Leadbetter to prepare cost estimates for each
defensive site at Mobile.

Finally, Walker wrote to

Governor Moore and asked him to accept for active duty
six companies which would go to Fort Gaines to strengthen
its garrison.

25

About this time Leadbetter received orders to go to
Richmond to assume command of the Engineer Bureau.

The

War Department ordered Captain Samuel H. Lockett to
Mobile to succeed Leadbetter as engineer officer.

26

Leadbetter addressed a long letter to Lockett to inform
him of what he had recommended for the Mobile defenses
and to make suggestions for possible action.

In the let

ter, Leadbetter elaborated on his ideas for defensive
works surrounding Mobile.

He thought the line should be

^ W a l k e r to Leadbetter, Aug. 15, 1861, ibid., 130;
Walker to Clark, Aug. 16, 1861, ibid., 131; Walker to
Moore, Aug. 15, 1861, ibid., 130.

2g

Cooper to Major General Braxton Bragg, Aug. 27,
1861, ibid., 133; Para V, Special Order No. 136, Adjutant
and Inspector General's Office, Aug. 28, 1861, ibid.;
Compiled Service Record of Samuel H. Lockett.
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located approximately two and a fourth miles out from the
courthouse, which stood near the riverfront.

The

redoubts would be placed about one mile apart and would
all mount heavy guns.

Redans with smaller guns would be

built between the redoubts.

The whole line would be con

nected with entrenchments suitable for field guns and
infantry weapons.

Leadbetter expressed some doubt about

his ideas for obstructions in the ship channels and asked
for Lockett's thoughts.

In closing, Leadbetter estimated

that the proposed defenses would cost about $500,000.

27

Mobile's civic authorities realized the deficiencies
in the city's defenses and expressed willingness to spend
the money in the city treasury to remedy the weaknesses.
They proposed a voluntary tax to raise $50,000 "for the
purpose of placing the city in a posture of defense."

28

The proposal met such opposition from the people that
the government dropped it before it could be voted on.
The Advertiser and Register ran an editorial entitled
"Look to Our Homes" to call attention to the city's weak
defensive state.

This editorial emphasized the need for

large, long-range guns which would be expensive to buy.
Richmond and Montgomery could not furnish the necessary

^ L e a d b e t t e r to Lockett, Aug. 22, 1861, O . R . , L I I ,
Pt. 2, pp. 131-33.
28

Advertiser and Register, Aug. 29, 1861.
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artillery, so Mobile might have to purchase some guns
herself.

The paper issued this warning:

"The time may

soon come when those who smothered this appeal to the
patriotism of the citizens of Mobile will discover that
they have been 'penny wise and pound foolish1 in mounting
that favorite hobby of demagogues— resistance to
taxation."

29

On the following day, the Advertiser and

Register renewed the appeal to the people to put up
$50,000 for "Home Defence," but there is no evidence of
a favorable response.

30

Much of the correspondence between Mobile and Rich
mond during the next month or so dealt with the defense
of the city and attempts to obtain and mount the artil
lery necessary to strengthen the forts and batteries
guarding the water approaches to the city.

Leadbetter

talked over and over again of the thirty guns requisi
tioned from the governor of North Carolina, all the time
expecting them to be forthcoming.

31

Governor Clark, how

ever, had advised Richmond when the requisition reached

30Ibid., Aug. 30, 1861.
3"^Leadbetter to Lockett, Sept. 2, 1861, O . R . , VI,
726-27; Leadbetter to Lockett, Sept. 4, 1861, ibid.,
727-28; Leadbetter to H. B. Warren, Sept. 11, 1861,
ibid., 728-29; Brigadier General Jones M. Withers to
Walker, Sept. 11, 1861, ibid., 729; Walker to Stephen R.
Mallory, Sept. 12, 1861,~T b T d .; Leadbetter to Withers,
Sept. 19, 1861, ibid., 740.

him that he had no spare guns but that the navy y a r d a t
Norfolk, Virginia, had some.

Efforts by the Mobile
By

authorities to secure guns from the navy yard failed.
early October, Leadbetter finally admitted defeat.

He

wrote Lockett:
...From present appearances I would not recom
mend you to rely on getting any more heavy
guns or carriages from this quarter.
The
demands from all directions are urgent, and
the Secretary says he cannot give what he h a s
not got.
The acute need for cannons at Fort Gaines, in p a r t i c u l a r ,
is reflected in a report by one of the units s t a t i o n e d
there:
The company has two 6 pounder Field
Pieces one a U. S. Brass Gun patent 1845, t h e
other an Iron 4 pounder Gun boared [sic] t o
a 6 Pounder captured from the British^at F o r t
Boyer [sic] in 1814 and made in 1777.
As previously mentioned, at this time no o n e c o m 
mander had charge of the overall defense of M o b i l e .

The

area belonged to Twiggs' Department No. 1, but t h a t g e n 
eral concentrated all of his attention on New O r l e a n s .
On September 3, 1861, Congressman Smith recommended t o
Secretary Walker that Brigadier General Jones M . W i t h e r s , ,

Clark to Walker, Aug. 20, 1861, ibid., L I I . P t . 2.,
p. 131; Withers to Walker, Sept. 11, 1861, ibid., V I , 7 1 9 ;
Leadbetter to Lockett, Oct. 7, 1861, ibid ., "7'SO.
33Roll for Aug. 31-Oct. 31, 1861, Record o f E v e n t s
Cards, Company A, 1st Battalion Alabama Artillery, Com
piled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who S e r v e d
in Organizations from Alabama, RG 109, National A r c h i v e s .
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a former mayor of Mobile, be assigned to command the
city's defenses.

The War Department responded by creat

ing the District of Alabama and assigned Withers to head
the new district.

34

Although he had graduated from West

point and had served in the Creek and Mexican wars,
Withers' chief qualification for this command seems to
have been his familiarity with the city.

News of his

assignment leaked out and reached Mobile before the War
Department issued formal orders.

Some people in the

city expressed dissatisfaction with and opposition to the
assignment.

Mayor Forsyth and others spoke out in favor

of Withers, however, and he seems to have entered his
command without major opposition from the citizens.

35

Toward the end of September the Confederates began
constructing the earthworks around Mobile which Leadbet
ter had proposed.

The city's Council of Defense issued

34

Smith to Walker, Sept. 3, 1861, O . R . , LII, Pt.
2, p. 137; Para XVIII, Special Order No. 151, Adjutant
and Inspector General's Office, Sept. 12, 1861, ibid.,
VI, 738; Cooper to Withers, Sept. 5, 1861, Letters and
Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I,
Vol. 36, p. 65; Advertiser and Register, Sept. 13, 1861.
The district consisted of the entire state of Alabama
plus the portion of coastal Mississippi east of the
Pascagoula River.
35

Smith to Walker, Sept. 12, 1861 (with endorsement
by Jefferson D a v i s ) , Telegrams Received, Secretary of
War; Forsyth to Walker, Sept. 16, 1861, O . R . , VI, 738.
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an appeal to the citizens to furnish one thousand of
their slaves as laborers to help white volunteer workmen
and Confederate engineers do the work.

Although the own

ers would receive no remuneration, the Council did offer
to provide rations for the slaves.

The Council requested

that the slave owners provide their chattels with spades,
shovels, and picks, and whites had to furnish their own
tools.

Both the owners and white volunteers received

assurances that the laborers would work in separate
parties based on their race.

As the construction got

under way, the Council of Defense again asked any whites
"who wish work" to report to the race track at the edge
of town where the workers were being organized.

36

When the War Department ordered Withers to Mobile,
it approved requisitions for three new infantry regime its
to serve at the city.

This news preceded Withers to Ala

bama, and the state .authorities initiated steps to muster
in several Mobile regiments.

Withers learned of this

action when he stopped at Montgomery on his way south.
He protested immediately against using organizations of
city men.

Withers renewed his protest several days later

with these words:

36
Leadbetter to Secretary of War, Sept. 23, 1861,
O.R., VI, 743; Advertiser and Register, Sept. 14, 28,
T861.
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...The expectation is to play soldier at home,
not to neglect their private interests, nor
endure fatigue, exposure, or discipline.
Such
material is most costly and least serviceable
to Government, and I desire to be responsible
for none of it.
After expressing his desire to have regiments from north
Alabama, Withers eventually got two such units, but he
had to accept two Mobile regiments also.

38

As one of his first acts as commander at Mobile,
Withers issued the first of a series of orders regulating
the movement of vessels in and around Mobile Bay.

The

first of these orders required fishermen, oystermen, and
other boat owners to obtain permits in order to move
their vessels in the waters under the jurisdiction of the
District of Alabama.

Those applying for permits were

obliged to be "well endorsed by true and reliable
citizens."

39

Later Withers issued orders that no vessels

of any type could pass by the forts at the mouth of the

37

Endorsement by Walker, Sept. 12, 1861, on Leadbet
ter to Withers, Sept. 11, 1861, O . R . , LII, Pt. 2, p. 175;
Advertiser and R e g i s t e r , Sept. 20, 1861; Withers to
Cooper, Sept. 27, 1861, O.R., VI, 747; Withers to
[Cooper], Sept. 30, 1861, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 156.
38

Withers to [Cooper], Sept. 30, 1861, O . R . , LII,
Pt. 2, p. 156; Withers to [Cooper], Oct. 15, 1861, i b i d .,
173-74; Cooper to Withers, Oct. 6, 1861, ibid., 175";
Advertiser and R e g i s t e r , Oct. 13, 1861; Special Order
No. — , Headquarters Department of Alabama, Oct. 12,
1861, quoted in i b i d .
39

General Order No. 3, Headquarters Department of
Alabama, Sept. 30, 1861, quoted in Advertiser and Regis
ter , Oct. 1, 1861.
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bay without permits and that vessels then outside the
forts had to come into the bay.

40

Finally, Major Gen

eral Braxton Bragg, who later became Withers' depart
mental commander, ordered the closure of Grant's Pass
"effectually and unconditionally" to prevent a coastal
trade along Mississippi Sound that was benefitting the
41
enemy.
Mobile's command situation underwent the change
hinted at above in early October 1861.

On the seventh of

that month, the War Department realigned the command
structure of the Gulf coast.

It extended Bragg's com

mand at Pensacola to include the entire state of Ala
bama, designating the new entity as the Department of
Alabama and West Florida.

Bragg established his new

headquarters on the fourteenth, choosing to stay in
Pensacola.

He retained Withers as commander of the Dis-

t n c t of Alabama.

42

Withers obviously thought his com

mand was an independent department and wrote to Richmond
of the "humiliation and mortification" he felt when he

40

Special Order No. 14, Headquarters District of
Alabama, Oct. 29, 1861, quoted in ibid., Oct. 31, 1861.
41

Withers to Major George G. Garner, Dec. 9, 1861,
O . R . , VI, 779; Bragg to Benjamin, Dec. 11, 1861, ibi d.
42

Para IX, Special Order No. 173, Adjutant and
Inspector General's Office, Oct. 7, 1861, ibid., 751;
General Orders No. 1, Headquarters Department of Alabama
and West Florida, Oct. 14, 1861, ibid., 752.
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learned he had been placed under Bragg's command.
Because of what he called "this sudden manifestation of
change in estimate of my fitness for the position to
which I was then assigned," Withers asked to be relieved
of duty.

43

After several visits with Bragg and assur

ances from Davis that his competentcy was not in question,
Withers withdrew his request.

44

With the proximity of

Mobile to Pensacola, this new command situation represent
ed a logical step in the Confederacy's defensive strategy.
The authorities in Richmond had placed Mobile and
the rest of Alabama under Bragg, in part, to placate him.
He had grown tired of his rather stagnant situation at
Pensacola and desired a more active field, so he could
prove himself as a commander.

In a letter to a friend,

Bragg stated that President Davis had promised him com
mand of the Gulf Coast from Pensacola to New Orleans.
When Twiggs made it known that he would retire, Bragg
expected Davis would "show his sincerity and confer this

43

Withers to Cooper, Oct. 15, 1861, ibid., LII,
Pt. 2, p. 174.
44

Bragg to Davis, Oct. 22, 1861, in the William P.
Palmer Collection of Braxton Bragg Papers, Western
Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio, hereinafter
cited as Bragg Papers, Western Reserve; Bragg to Adju
tant General C.S. Army, Oct. 25, 1861, O . R . , VI, 756;
Withers to Benjamin, Nov. 2, 1861, Letters Received by
the Confederate Secretary of War, 1861-1865, RG 109,
National Archives.
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command on me."

45

Instead, the president gave New

Orleans and Department No. 1 to Major General Mansfield
Lovell, a northerner who had just recently joined the
southern cause.

Bragg was naturally upset.

In a letter

to Governor Thomas 0. Moore of Louisiana he complained:
"The command at New Orleans was rightly mine.

I feel

myself degraded by the action of the government...."

46

Bragg in a series of letters spoke harshly of Lovell,
saying the "eleventh-hour" convert had been "purchased in
the open market by the highest bidder."

47

Yet he deter

mined to make the best of the situation and do a good job
in his new c o m m a n d . ^
Bragg devoted much of his attention to Mobile itself
after receiving it under his jurisdication.

He sent his

45

Benjamin to Bragg, Oct. 8, 18 61, Bragg Papers,
Western Reserve; Bragg to "My dear Doctor," undated,
ibid.
46

Bragg to Thomas 0. Moore, Oct. 31, 1861, in
Thomas 0. Moore Papers, Louisiana State University
Department of Archives and Manuscripts.
47

Bragg to Ben 3 amxn, Oct. 30, 1861, O . R . , VI, 759;
Bragg to Moore, Nov. 14, 18 61, Moore Papers; Bragg to
"My dear Doctor," undated, Bragg Papers, Western
Reserve.
Thomas Bragg, Braxton's brother and the Con
federate Attorney G e n e r al, later recorded in his diary
that Davis had "seemed disposed" to place the Gulf Coast
under Braxton's command but that Benjamin persuaded
Davis to give it to Lovell.
Entry Jan. 6, 1862, Thomas
Bragg Diary, 1861-1862, Southern Historical Collection,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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Bragg to Elise Bragg, Oct. 14, 1861, Bragg Papers,
Western Reserve.

51
engineer officer on an inspection tour when he assumed
command and made a visit himself from October 23 to 27.
At Mobile, Bragg found that Withers had halted construc
tion of the earthworks on the land side of the city.

He

concurred with W i t h e r s ' decision and criticized the
"grand scheme for squandering money by digging ditches...
which would have required 40,000 men to defend them."

49

Bragg felt that more troops should be ordered to Mobile
to back up the essentially untrained and undisciplined
forces then there.

To protect Mobile adequately, Bragg

decided to put his force at Pensacola on the defensive
and to concentrate men and material at Mobile.

Perhaps

the best summary of Withers' position at Mobile lies in
Bragg's comment that "he has a hurculean
most inadequate means."

[sic] task with

50

Bragg found shortcomings connected with both the
troops and subordinate commanders at Mobile.

The men

suffered from measles, and Bragg felt that their proxim
ity to the city encouraged a lack of discipline.

He

suggested that their camp be moved to a point fifteen or
twenty miles from the city.

To improve their diet, Bragg

49

Bragg to Davis, Oct. 22, 1861, ibid.; Bragg to
Adjutant General, Oct. 25, 1861, O . R . , VI, 755-56.
50

Bragg to Davis, Oct. 22, 1861, Bragg Papers,
Western Reserve; Bragg to Adjutant General, Oct. 25,
1861, O . R . , VI, 755-56; Bragg to Adjutant General,
Oct. 28, 1861, ibid., 757.
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ordered that the men's rations of meat would be ten
ounces of bacon or salt pork or sixteen ounces of beef.
He also ordered that "one gill

[four fluid ounces] of good

Louisiana Molasses will be added to the ration."

51

Bragg

complained that the officers commanding Fort Morgan and
Fort Gaines, Maury and Gardner, were "very competent, but
sadly addicted to drinking, and therefore unsafe for
those exposed positions."

52

Hoping to find abler com

manders for the forts, he recommended several officers
for promotion to brigadier general.

Gardner received

orders relieving him of duty on November 14.

To replace

him, the War Department promoted William L. Powell to
colonel in the Provisional Army and ordered him to
Mobile.

Bragg assigned Powell to overall command of

both forts and Grant's Pass as well.

53

In late October 18 61, Bragg learned that an enemy
expedition was on its way to the Gulf.

He began looking

"^Bragg to Adjutant General, Oct. 23, 1861, O . R . ,
VI, 757; Bragg to Cooper, Oct. 31, 1861, ibid., 761;
General Order No. 6, Headquarters Department of Alabama
and West Florida, Oct. 31, 1861, General and Special
Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida, Oct. 15,
1861-Feb. 28, 1862, RG 109, National Archives.
52

Bragg to Adjutant General, Oct. 28, 1861, O . R . ,
VI, 757.
53

I b i d . ; Compiled Service Record of Franklin Gard
ner; Benjamin to Davis, Nov. 24, 1861, Letters Received,
Secretary of War; Benjamin to Bragg, Nov. 24, 1861,
O . R . , LII, Pt. 2, p. 219; Bragg to Adjutant General,
Jan. 4, 1862, i b id., VI, 793.
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around for troops to reinforce Mobile and Pensacola.
Brigadier General Leroy P. Walker, who had recently
resigned as Secretary of War, commanded a new brigade at
Huntsville, and Bragg requested that two of his regiments
be ordered south.

On arriving, the men would receive

weapons of sick and wounded soldiers on the coast.

After

receiving permission to use some of Walker's brigade,
Bragg ordered one regiment to Mobile.

He also ordered

two armed regiments at Montgomery to Withers.

When

Bragg ordered a second of Walker's regiments to Mobile,
that general wrote to Richmond that he, too, would go to
Mobile.

Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin approved

Walker's move.

Walker reported to Bragg at Pensacola

and received formal assignment to Withers' command.
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In addition to these infantry units, a newly formed
artillery company reported to Mobile, where it obtained
guns and equipment.
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Bragg to Cooper, Oct. 29, 1861, O.R., VI, 758;
Bragg to Cooper, Oct. 31, 1861, ibid., 761; Benjamin to
Bragg, Oct. 31, 1861, i b i d .; Walker to Benjamin, Nov. 4,
1861, ibid., 764; Benjamin to Walker, Nov. 5, 1861,
ibid.; Bragg to Adjutant General, Nov. 5, 18 61, ibid.,
764-65; Benjamin to Walker, Nov. 6, 1861, ibid., LII,
Pt. 2, p. 198; Walker to Benjamin, Nov. 6, 1861, ibid.,
VI, 765; Moore to Bragg, Nov. 8, 1861, ibid., LII, Pt. 2,
pp. 202-203; Benjamin to Walker, Nov. 10, 1861, ibid.,
203; Special Order No. 14, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, Dec. 1, 1861, ibid., VI, 772.
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Dr. George Little and James R. Maxwell, A History
of L u m s d e n 's Battery C.S.A. (Tuscaloosa, Ala.:
R. E.
Rhodes Chapter, United Daughters of the Confederacy,
1905) , 5.
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Part of Mobile's value to the Confederacy during
the war years lay in its railroad connections.

Just

before the firing on Fort Sumter, the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad opened its line to traffic.
nected Mobile with Columbus, Kentucky.

This road con
At Corinth it

crossed the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which ran
east and west.

56

On November 15. 1861, the Mobile and

Great Northern Railroad began operations, completing
Mobile's rail system.

This latter railroad ran from

Tensas Landing to Pollard, Alabama, where it joined the
Alabama and Florida Railroad to provide service to Mont
gomery to the north and Pensacola to the south.

The

Mobile and Great Northern had been constructed fairly
quickly.

The workers laid the first rails in late March

1861, and the company promised that it would be finished
57
by September.
By early October, however, the work was still
incomplete.

Company president William D. Dunn wrote

Withers that although grading, bridging, and laying of
cross ties was complete, half of the rails remained to be
put down.

The company had exhausted its money supply,

and Dunn requested a loan of $15,000.

With this money,

"^Robert C. Black III, Railroads of the Confederacy
(Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press,
1952), 5.
57I b i d ., 75.
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he said, the road should be finished between November 10
and 15.

Dunn hoped Withers would use his influence with

the government to get the loan approved.

Dunn also con

tacted Congressman McRae to ask for his assistance.

The

government approved the loan, and, as promised, the road
opened on November 15.

58

After the fall of Corinth to

Union forces, the Mobile and Ohio-Mobile and Great North
ern systems made Mobile the only rail link between Con
federate armies in the east and west.

The sole problem

in the system was that men and supplies had to be
detrained and transported by steamer between Mobile and
Tensas Landing.

Even so, this trip could be completed in

about one and a half to three hours.

59

One facet of Mobile's defenses received attention
from Richmond in early December 1861.

Secretary of War

Benjamin wrote to Bragg and inquired if any measures had
been taken to prevent an enemy force from landing at Pas
cagoula and marching to Mobile.

He feared that now the

enemy was in the Gulf he would land and march by night to
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Dunn to Withers, Oct. 2, 1861, Letters Received,
Secretary of War; Dunn to McRae, Oct. 3, 1861, O.R.,
LII, Pt. 2, p. 165; McRae to Davis, Oct. 3, 1861, ibid.,
164-65; Bragg to Benjamin, Nov. 1, 1861, ibid., VI, 762;
Bragg to Cooper, Nov. 11, 1861, ibid., 766; Dunn to Ben
jamin, Nov. 16, 1861, ibid., 4, I, 732.
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Circular, Office of Chief of Bureau of Transpor
tation, Aug. 20, 1864, quoted in Mobile Daily Tribune,
Aug. 25, 1864.
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surprise the city.

Bragg replied that he had cavalry

pickets on the coast where landings might take place.
The infantry and light artillery not on duty in the forts
were prepared to concentrate quickly to meet any threat.
Bragg also expected that reinforcements from Pensacola
could reach Mobile in ten hours' time.

After receiving

Bragg's letter, Benjamin took steps toward strengthening
Bragg's hand in the area.

The War Department issued

orders transferring the area of Mississippi between Pas
cagoula and the Alabama line from Department No. 1 to
Bragg's department.

Bragg then assigned the area to

Withers' d i s t r i c t . ^
Controversy between the army and navy at Mobile
sprang up in late December 1861 and early January 1862.
Early in December Withers had expressed open contempt
for the naval force:
...The idea of our caricature gunboats being
a protection to the coast trade is to me
simply ridiculous.
In truth I should look
on our Navy Department as an amusing fancy
sketch but for the waste of money agtjl cor
ruption for which it is the excuse.

Benjamin to Bragg, Dec. 2, 1861, O . R . , VI, 774;
Bragg to Benjamin, Dec. 11, 1861, ibid., 779; Bragg
Diary, Dec. 31, 1861; Para XVI, Special Order No. 264,
Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Dec. 12, 1861,
ibid., 780; General Order No. 18, Headquarters Depart
ment of Alabama and West Florida, Dec. 20, 1861, ibid.,
785.
^ W i t h e r s to Garner, Dec. 9, 1861, O.R., VI, 780.
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Bragg, however, carried on the controversy.

He reported

to Richmond that Lieutenant James D. Johnston of the navy
refused to acknowledge any authority by Withers.

An

incident which occurred several days later brought more
wrath by Bragg.

Federal blockade vessels had run a

blockade runner ashore and tried to capture her by send
ing in sailors on small boats.

Fort Morgan's guns opened

fire on the enemy boats, driving them off, and an unarmed
Confederate steamer finally braved enemy fire to help the
runner into the bay.

Bragg was angry because the gunboat

Florida had remained at Mobile "unoccupied and indepen
dent" and the gunboat Alert had been "lying in the harbor
here utterly useless.
In Richmond Secretary Benjamin took Bragg's com
plaints to Davis, who agreed that there should be more
harmony between the services.

Benjamin recognized that

he confronted a delicate problem of authority and advised
Bragg that he would talk the matter over with Secretary
of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory.

When Benjamin referred

Bragg's letter to Mallory, he suggested that it might be
good policy to make small craft in coastal waters subject
to the orders of the appropriate department commander.
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Bragg to Adjutant General, Dec. 24, 1861, ibid.,
787; Captain Levin M. Powell to Flag Officer W. W.
McKean, Dec. 27, 1861, O.R.N., XVII, 14; Lieutenant
A. K. Hughes to Powell, Dec. 27, 1861, ibid., 15; Bragg
to Adjutant General, Dec. 29, 1861, O.R., VI, 790.

58
Then he made a telling observation:

"...as you cannot

have chose your best officers for such unimportant com
mands , I think it not improbably that there is ground for
the complaints."
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Mallory answered Bragg's charges by

saying that the Florida was in Mobile refitting after a
recent engagement with enemy vessels and thus too far
away to have lent aid and that the Alert was only a
small schooner with one gun.

He had confidence in John

ston and promised that there would be greater cooperation
in the f u t u r e . ^
Mobile's militia forces remained quite weak toward
the end of 1861.

In a letter to Governor John Gill

Shorter, Bragg stated:
I find, on enquiry here, that no organi
zation, equipment, or drill of the militia
exists.
The people are quietly pursuing
their ordinary daily avocations, attending
to their private interests, whilst the
defence of the city is left to the army
alone.
As far as I know or can learn, no
other threatenedcPoint in the Confederacy
is thus exempt.
Bragg asked Shorter to use his influence to get the

C. O

Benjamin to Bragg, Jan. 5, 1862, O . R . , VI, 795;
Benjamin to Mallory, Jan. 6, 1862, ibid., 796 (emphasis
added).
64

Mallory to Benjamin, Jan. 9, 1862, O.R.N., XVIII,

17.
^ B r a g g to Shorter, Dec. 24, 1861, quoted in Anne
Kendrick Walker, "Governor John Gill Shorter: Miscel
laneous Papers, 1861-1863," Alabama Review, XI (1958),
214.
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thousands of able-bodied men in the city to respond to
the possible threat to Mobile.

Militia routine in the

city did step up, with company muster and drills occurring
three times each week.

In a few weeks Bragg could

report an improved situation:
...With the cheerful and cordial aid of Gov
ernor Shorter we shall probably get out at
least 1,000 armed militia— men who have held
back, but will come out rather than give up
their army.
On December 27, 1861, Benjamin wrote Bragg about a
possible change of command.

It is possible that Bragg's

earlier desire for more active service or the hope of
further smoothing Bragg's feelings about not being given
command over New Orleans and the Gulf Coast prompted the
Secretary of War.

Whatever the reason, Benjamin stated

that he and Davis had been looking for someone to go to
the trans-Mississippi region and take charge of all Con
federate troops in Missouri and Arkansas.

Bragg was

their choice, and Benjamin asked if he would agree to
take the assignment.

While this letter was on its way,

Davis received a letter from Mayor R. H. Slough and other
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Ibid.; General Order No. 1, Headquarters 1st Bat
talion, 45th Regiment Alabama Militia, Jan. 16, 1862,
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Jan. 18, 1862; Gen
eral Order No. 1, Headquarters 95th Regiment Alabama
Militia, Jan. 15, 1862, quoted in ibid.; General Order
No. 1, Headquarters 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment Alabama
Militia, Jan. 14, 1862, quoted in ibid.; Bragg to Benja
min, Jan. 17, 1862, O.R., VI, 810.
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prominent citizens of Mobile asking that he establish
Bragg's headquarters in the city.
and stated:

They feared an attack

"The presence of General Bragg here would

greatly inspire our troops and people, and would consol
idate and bring to perfection our military
organization,.. .
Bragg responded to Benjamin's letter by declining
the offer tendered.

The facts that the troops in the

trans-Mississippi area were largely unorganized and
undisciplined and that there seemed little prospect for
success there influenced his decision.

Most of his argu

ment, however, Bragg centered around his concern for
Mobile.

He pointed out that a large enemy force had

landed on Ship Island.

The people of Mobile expressed

alarm for the safety of the city.

Because of lack of

military resources and weakness in troop strength, Bragg
did not feel the city was at all safe.

He stated that his

influence with the people and troops was such that he did
not think "any other could now fill my place to their
satisfaction."
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Benjamin learned of the enemy landing

before he got Bragg's letter and quickly wrote that Bragg
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Bragg Diary, Jan. 8, 1862; Benjamin to Bragg,
Dec. 27, 1861, O . R . , VI, 788-89; Mayor R. H. Slough,
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should no longer consider the offered command since his
own seemed threatened.

He informed Bragg of the petition

from the citizens of Mobile but left to him the choice of
headquarters location.

After receiving Bragg's letter

turning down the offer, Benjamin wrote:
...The people there would have every reason
to complain of your withdrawal under such
circumstances, and the dissatisfaction would
be such as to produce a very bad gfcate of
feeling as regards their defense.
Although Bragg had shifted Walker's brigade to
Mobile, he found some morale problems with the unit, most
of them attributable to its commander.

While his men

remained in a crowded, unhealthy camp some miles from
Mobile, lacking discipline and instruction, Walker lived
in the city with his staff and ignored his brigade.
Bragg had absolutely no confidence in Walker and thought
him unfit for command.

He wrote Richmond requesting

proper generals for his troops.

In response, the War

Department ordered Brigadier General Samuel Jones to
Pensacola from the Army of the Potomac and nominated
Colonel John K. Jackson for promotion to brigadier gen
eral for duty at Mobile.
moves.

Bragg seemed pleased with these

He wrote Benjamin that he planned to place Jones

in command at Pensacola so that he could spend more
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Benjamin to Bragg, Jan. 9, 1862, ibid., 803;
Benjamin to Bragg, Jan. 12, 1862, ibid.
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time at Mobile.

Even though Walker outranked Jackson,

Bragg promised to make arrangements to employ both to
best advantage.

The command at Mobile stood on the

verge of several changes in organization and subordinate
commanders.70

70

Bragg to Adjutant General, Jan. 4, 1862, ibid.,
793; Benjamin to Bragg, Jan. 9, 1862, ibid., 802; Bragg
to Benjamin, Jan. 17, 1862, ibid., 810; Dr. Josiah C.
Nott to Dr. Samuel H. Stout, Dec. 29, 1861, in Samuel H.
Stout Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

CHAPTER III
"THE WORK WILL NOT ADMIT OF DELAY..."
On January 27, 1862, Bragg issued orders changing
the command structure in his department.

He placed Brig

adier General Samuel Jones in charge at Pensacola so that
he could move departmental headquarters to Mobile.

All of

the troops in and around Mobile received the new designa
tion the Army of Mobile, to be commanded by Withers.

The

responsibility of the army would be the defense of the
Gulf Coast between the Pascagoula and Perdido rivers.
Relieving Walker of command of the infantry brigade at
Mobile, Bragg ordered him to Montgomery and transferred
Brigadier General Adley H. Gladden from Pensacola to take
over the brigade.

Bragg expected Gladden to correct the

demoralization and drunkenness in Walker's brigade
through discipline and instruction.

On February 5 Bragg

arrived in Mobile and established his headquarters.^-

"^General Order No. 23, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, Jan. 27, 1862, O . R . , VI,
815-16; Bragg to Adjutant General, Feb. 1, 1862, ibid.r
Advertiser and Register, Feb. 1, 6, 1862; Bragg to Adju
tant General, Feb. 8, 1862, O . R . , LII, Pt. 2, p. 265;
James S. Deas to ------ , Feb. 6, 1862, in ChestnutMiller-Manning Collection, South Carolina Historical
Society, Charleston.
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Bragg set about almost immediately to improve con
ditions at Mobile.

He wrote Benjamin:

"It is difficult

to conceive the state of affairs here and almost as dif2
ficult to apply a remedy."
Bragg succeeded in getting
all stores and businesses to close their doors at three
o'clock in the afternoon.

Able-bodied men could then

spend the remainder of the daylight hours drilling or
performing other military duties.

To aid in the disci

plining of the regular soldiers in camp, Bragg ordered
all saloons and drinking establishments in Mobile and
Baldwin counties closed.

This order also forbade sales

of alcohol "except for medicinal purposes, by regular
apothecaries, upon the written prescription of
physicians."^

Owners of supplies of alcohol were

required to pack and store these supplies where they
could be inspected.

Many of the citizens of Mobile

approved of these efforts by Bragg, and, according to one

2

Bragg to Benjamin, Feb. 11, 1862, Letters Received,
Secretary of War.
3
Advertiser and Register, Feb. 7, 1862; (London) The
Index, May 1, 1862; General Order No. 34, Headquarters
Department of Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 20, 1862,
General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and
West Florida, Oct. 15, 1861-Feb. 28, 1862, RG 109,
National Archives.
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observer, the regulations "worked a great reformation
among the soldiers."

4

About the time Bragg took over immediate supervision
at Mobile, his forces at that point numbered slightly
more than 7,000 men present for duty.

Most of these

troops were newly organized, and none had faced enemy
fire.

Some units had only pikes as weapons, and others

had no arms at all.

Bragg ordered the 1st Louisiana

Regulars from Pensacola, where it had fought in several
actions, to Mobile and a raw regiment from Mobile to
Pensacola.

He also ordered a company of marines from

the Florida town to Mobile.

These troops he expected to

serve as examples of discipline for the men of the Army
5
of Mobile.
On February 13, the navy launched the gun
boat Gaines, which was being constructed at Mobile.

She

would soon join the small naval force already in the bay.

4
General Order No. 34, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 20, 1862, General and
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida;
The Index, May 1, 1862.
5
Abstract from Field Return, Department of Alabama
and West Florida, Feb. 1, 1862, O . R . , VI, 819; Deas to
------ , Feb. 6, 1862, Chestnut-MTller-Manning Collection;
Para I, Special Order No. 51, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 11, 1862, General and
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida;
Para II, Special Order No. 52, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 12, 1862, ibid.; Para III,
Special Order No. 39, Headquarters Army of Pensacola,
Feb. 13, 1862, in A. C. Van Benthuysen Papers, Special
Collections Division, Tulane University Library.
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It appeared to Bragg that he might need these experienced
troops and naval assistance soon.

He had received

reports that a large Federal naval expedition was headed
for the Gulf and feared it might attack Mobile.

Bragg

admitted in a confidential letter that Fort Morgan and
Fort Gaines could not "prevent their entrance of a dark
night," and he pushed the construction of water batteries
near the city.*’
Events in Kentucky and Tennessee soon intruded to
break the relative calm existing at Mobile.

Following

the Confederate defeats at Mill Springs and Fort Henry,
the War Department began scouring the lower South for
troops to reinforce General Albert Sidney Johnston's
army.

Bragg had to furnish at least four regiments.

He

responded by ordering two regiments each from Mobile and
Pensacola to Knoxville.

7

Bragg also took the opportunity

to make some suggestions to the authorities in Richmond
on the Confederacy's future strategy.

His ideas con

tained some of the earliest, if not the earliest

C.

Advertiser and Register, Feb. 13, 14, 1862; Bragg
to Brigadier General Samuel Jones, Feb. 12, 1862, O . R . ,
VI, 825.
^Benjamin to Bragg, Feb. 8, 1862, O . R . , VI, 823;
Bragg to Jones, Feb. 12, 1862, ibid., 824-25; Bragg to
Benjamin, Feb. 18, 1862, ibid., 894; Para I, Special
Order No. 54, Headquarters Department of Alabama and West
Florida, Feb. 14, 1862, General and Special Orders,
Department of Alabama and West Florida; Bragg Diary,
Feb. 19, 1862.

67
considerations of the place of Mobile in the overall
strategy of the Southern war effort.

According to Bragg,

all resources should be concentrated so that the enemy
could be attacked in Kentucky.

He advocated abandoning

!

all points on the Gulf except Mobile, New Orleans, and
Pensacola.

He did not feel that the loss of the aban

doned territory would prove significant.

From this

point onward, Bragg continued to support the defense of
the city because of the strategic significance of its
rail and telegraph links with the eastern and western
portions of the Confederacy.

8

The command and troop situation at Mobile soon
changed again.

On February 18, 1862, Benjamin sent Bragg

instructions to withdraw his forces from Mobile and
Pensacola and "hasten to the defence of the Tennessee
g
line."
He advised Bragg to abandon Pensacola completely
but to leave garrisons in the forts in Mobile Bay.
Benjamin hoped these garrisons would discourage an attack
on Mobile.

The Confederate high command did not agree

initially with Bragg's advocacy of defending Mobile or
his idea of its importance.

Benjamin told Bragg "the

risk of its capture must be run by u s . " ^

Bragg did not

®Bragg to Benjamin, Feb. 15, 1862, O . R . , VI, 826.
^Benjamin to Bragg, Feb. 18, 1862, ibid., 828.
~^Ibid.y Bragg Diary, Feb. 19, 1862.
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receive these instructions until February 27, but he made
immediate arrangements to comply.

He ordered most of his

infantry and Generals Withers and Gladden to Corinth.
Colonel John B. Villepigue replaced Withers in command of
the Army of Mobile.

After arranging to turn over the

department to Jones at Pensacola, Bragg left Mobile for
Corinth on March 1."^
The departure of Bragg and Withers deprived Mobile
of two able generals.

Withers served capably as a divi

sion commander in the Army of Tennessee until late sum
mer 1863, when failing health forced him out of active
duty.

His performance in several battles resulted in

praise from Bragg and Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk.
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Bragg to Benjamin, Feb. 27, 1862, O.R., VI, 834;
Bragg to Jones, Feb. 27, 1862, ibid., 835; Bragg to
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Para II, Special Order No. 62, Headquarters Department of
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and III, General Order No. 37, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, Feb. 27, 1862, General Orders,
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eral Order No. 38, Headquarters Department of Alabama and
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Although his tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee
was an almost continuous record of failures, Bragg's
service at Mobile can hardly be faulted.

Bragg had been

a hero in the Mexican War and an outstanding artillery
officer in the old army.

His appointment as a general in

the Confederate army had received widespread applause:
...no one doubted Bragg's ability when the
Civil War began....he was one of the most dis
tinguished soldiers to join the Confederacyand for a time one of the most impressive.
Davis demonstrated his confidence in Bragg by assigning
him to command at Pensacola, a site where war might break
out because the Federals held Fort Pickens.

As I stated

previously, Bragg recognized Mobile's strategic signifi
cance and pushed the defensive preparations there.

He

won the respect of his men and the people of the city.
His interest in the city's welfare continued until the
end of the war.

The only criticism of his command at

Mobile might be that his underestimation of the impor
tance of entrenchments caused him to delay the construction of earthworks around the city.

14

13

Grady McWhiney, Braxton Bragg and Confederate
Defeat: Field Command (New York:
Columbia University
Press, 1969), ix, 155-56.
14Ibid., 155, 195, 202-203; Josiah C. Nott to Bragg,
Nov. 1, 1862, Bragg Papers, Western Reserve; John For
syth to Bragg, Nov. 3, 1862, ibid.

Bragg had not

hesitated in

turning over

toJones

the command of the

Department of Alabama and

Florida.

A native

of Virginia,

Jones graduated from

West Point in 1841

and received

a commission

artillery corps.

West

inthe

For seven years he served as an

instructor at the Military Academy, an assignment which
included courses in tactics and artillery.

Jones' first

Confederate service came as chief of artillery to Beaure
gard at First Manassas, and his performance brought him a
promotion to brigadier general.

His experience as an

artillery officer undoubtedly led Davis and Benjamin to
choose him to go to Bragg in January 1862.

That experi

ence impressed Bragg, as did his "high character as an
officer."

15

Even after only a short time observing Jones

at Pensacola, Bragg had confidence in his abilities and
gave him what Bragg felt to be "the most important com
mand in this army..., and the one on which the general
[Bragg] considers the safety of our cause d e p e n d s . " ^
Bragg's new assignment caused the Advertiser and
Register to declare that his leaving would probably stir
up the "croakers and panic makers" even though there was

15

Warner, Generals in Gray, 166; Mark M. Boatner III,
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no cause for alarm.

17

Jones had assumed command shortly

after Bragg left, but he kept his headquarters at
Pensacola.

Perhaps with the idea of reassuring the

people of Mobile, Bragg on March 4 issued an order at
Jackson, Tennessee, resuming command of the Department of
Alabama and West Florida and adding to his jurisdiction
the troops in northern Mississippi and southwestern
Tennessee.

This order apparently never took actual

force, but Jones and other commanders at Mobile continued
to correspond with Bragg and seek his advice or ask
instructions.

18

To calm further the fears of Mobilians,

Jones ordered an experienced unit from Pensacola to man
the batteries protecting the upper bay, and he also
ordered reinforcements to Fort Gaines.

19

The defenses at Grant's Pass received renewed
attention from the Confederate engineers.

17

Lockett had

Advertiser and Register, Mar. 2, 1862.
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O . R . , VII, 920-21.
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staked out gun positions at Cedar Point to help protect
the pass.

Villepigue visited Cedar Point and revised

Lockett's plan.

Henry B. Warren, a civilian engineer

with responsibility for erecting the battery, found an
infantry company at the point, but the men received
orders to go to Corinth before he could put them to work
mounting guns.

Warren did get foundations laid for three

guns but had to await a force of laborers to complete
construction of the battery.

By April, Warren had

finished his work, and a company of the 1st Alabama Battalion Artillery had occupied the earthwork.

20

Warren

also began driving piles into the waters of the pass.
He had the piles prepared on Dauphin Island and trans
ported them by steamer to the pass.

The men assigned to

this task drove some 250 piles into the water about a
quarter of a mile out from Grant's Island.

To protect

the pile driver from enemy vessels, the Confederate com
mand stationed a steamer nearby where it could pull the
barge to safety if necessary.

21

Two new militia regiments entered active service in
Mobile at this critical juncture in early March 1862—

on

Henry B. Warren to Lockett, Feb. 27, 1862, William
P. Palmer Collection of Civil War Manuscripts, Western
Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio; Roll dated
Apr. 23, 1862, Record of Events Cards, Company D, 1st
Alabama Battalion Artillery, Compiled Service Records.
^ W a r r e n to Lockett, Feb. 27, 1862, Palmer Civil War
Collection.
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the 2nd Volunteer Regiment, Colonel John H. Higley, and
3rd Volunteer Regiment, Colonel John Forsyth.

The two

units joined the 9th Brigade, Alabama Militia, already on
duty in the city.

Both were organized specifically for

the defense of the city and were
regiment

well armed.

22

Forsyth's

performed provost guard duty in Mobile while

Higley's went into camp at Hall's Mills.

On Dog River

near Mobile, this site became the main camp of instruc
tion for Alabama militia troops.

From time to time regu

lar Confederate units encamped there also.

The men con

structed wooden houses arranged in regular rows as their
quarters.

A soldier stationed there provided this

description of the camp:
...Some of the buildings are quite spacious
and two stories high.
Others again are mere
log huts.
The timber for a mile all around
has been cleared away, forming a large and
splendid drill ground, the terror of the
soldiers.
Bragg soon requested that Jones send Villepigue to
report to Jackson.

In complying with Bragg's telegram,

Jones felt compelled to go personally to Mobile and

22
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assume command there.

He ordered Villepigue to Tennes

see, and the latter officer turned over command of the
Army of Mobile to Colonel Powell at Fort Morgan until
Jones could reach the city.

Jones arrived on March 14

and almost immediately telegraphed Cooper in Richmond
asking that Davis declare martial law in and around
Mobile.

He assured Cooper that "the best citizens

desire it and have petitioned that it be done."

24

Secretary of War Benjamin informed Jones on March 23 that
Davis approved his request.

The next day Jones proclaimed

martial law in Mobile and Baldwin counties and that part
of Jackson County, Mississippi, east of the Pascagoula
River.

His order suspended "the jurisdiction of the

civil courts...so far only as it may conflict with the
military requirements of the Government."

25

The command situation at Mobile remained in flux
during late March 1862.

Jones received an order from

Bragg on March 24 instructing him to turn over command to
Colonel Powell and to report to him in Tennessee.
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When word of this order got out, Governor Shorter and the
Mobile Committee of Safety requested Benjamin to allow
Jones to remain.

Benjamin telegraphed back that Jones

would be ordered to remain but sent no instructions to
Jones.

William M. Dunn, chairman of the Committee of

Safety, told Jones of this latter telegram, and the gen
eral determined to stay in Mobile and await official con
firmation of Dunn's telegram.

Several days passed with

no word from Richmond, so Jones decided to join Bragg.
Upon leaving, Jones turned over command of the Army of
Mobile to Brigadier General Thomas J. Butler, commander
of the 9th Brigade, Alabama Militia.

After a day or so

with Bragg at Corinth, Jones received orders to return to
Mobile.

Bragg may have sent him back so that a competent

officer would have charge of the department.

Jones

resumed command of the department and Army of Mobile on
April 2, but his position remained unsettled.

26
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While these events occurred, several official acts
transpired which involved Mobile's military situation.
On March 24, 1862, the Confederate Congress appropriated
$1,200,000 to be used in the defense of Mobile Bay and
the Alabama River.

This money would go a long way toward

providing needed defensive construction.

27

General Butler

issued an order requiring the registration of all white
males over eighteen years old living in and around Mobile
who had not already joined Confederate or state military
service.

The desire to "determine who may be entitled to

exemption from military service and to fix the status of
all men" prompted the order.

28

Butler also ordered all

government employees not currently enlisted in volunteer
companies to organize themselves into military companies.
These units would be expected to drill whenever possible.
Both of Butler's orders aided in placing the eligible men
of the city on a better footing if they had to be used to
defend Mobile.
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Some confusion still remained in Mobile's command
arrangements.

Brigadier General John H. Forney, having

been ordered to the city nine days earlier, arrived in
Mobile on April 11, 1862.

The War Department intended

Forney to replace Jones so that the latter could join the
army at Corinth.

Forney, however, suffered from a wound

and poor health, and he applied for and received a
fifteen-day leave to recuperate.

Under these circum-

stances Jones felt compelled to remain m

command.

30

The

situation confronting him did not seem an encouraging
one.

In all, only about 2,400 men were present for duty

in the Mobile defenses, most of them stationed in Fort
Morgan and Fort Gaines.

Following the battle of Shiloh,

Jones had sent several units to Corinth and would soon
send several more.

He felt that the forts at the bay

entrances stood in fairly good shape, and although he did
not think the enemy would attack, Jones warned that a
strong assault would capture Mobile.

To help defend the

city, Jones requested that Richmond either send weapons
to arm several thousand men to be recruited in Alabama

30

Cooper to Brigadier General John H. Forney, Apr.
2, 1862, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspec
tor General, Chap. I, Vol. 36, p. 557; Cooper to Forney,
Apr. 9^ 1862, ibid., 566; Para XVI, Special Order No. 75,
Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Apr. 2, 1062,
O . R . , LII, Pt. 2, p. 295; Jones to General Robert E.
Lee, Apr. 12, 1862, Letterbook, Bragg Papers, Western
Reserve; Jones to Cooper, Apr. 20, 1862, O . R . , VI, 880.
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or order troops from Corinth to Mobile.
that a general officer be sent to Mobile.

He also asked
31

A new military unit from Mobile was offered to the
Confederate army in April 1862.

On the twenty-third,

G. Huggins Cleveland wrote to Secretary of War George W.
Randolph asking if he succeeded in raising a battalion
or regiment would the War Department accept it for Con
federate service.

The request would not have sounded

unusual except that the men Cleveland wished to organize
were "Creoles," free men of mixed white and black blood.
They were property-owning slaveholders and, according to
Cleveland,
race."

32

"as true to the South as the pure white
He also stated that the "Creoles" were anxious

to go to war and would form a battalion or regiment in a
few days' time.

Congressman Edmund S. Dargan of Mobile

endorsed Cleveland's application and stated:

I know the

character of the population he proposes to enlist, and

^ J o n e s to Cooper, Apr. 15, 1862, O . R . , VI, 875-76;
Para I, Special Order No. 79, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 13, 1862, General and
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida;
Para V, Special Order No. 80, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 14, 1862, ibid.; Jones to
Cooper, Apr. 20, 1862, O . R . , VI, 879-80.
32

G. Huggins Cleveland to [George W. Randolph],
Apr. 23, 1862, O.R., 4, I, 1088.
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think they will render as efficient aid as any class we
have."

33

The War Department denied Cleveland authority

to raise his unit on the ground that "the law does not
permit the Department to accept any new corps."

34

Mobile's "Creoles" did not give up the idea of getting
into Confederate service, however, and would offer again
to form military units for active duty.
Forney returned to duty from sick leave and assumed
command of the Department of Alabama and West Florida on
April 28, 1862.

Forney's main qualification for command

at Mobile was his experience at Pensacola early in the
war.

Governor Moore appointed him as a special aide with

the rank of colonel and sent him to the Florida town in
January 1861 to assist in drilling the Alabama troops
there.

He later received a commission as colonel of the

1st Regiment of Artillery, Army of Alabama, and in this
capacity commanded a portion of the troops at Pensacola.
When Bragg assumed command there in March, he assigned
Forney to duty as acting inspector general and used him
to superintend the construction of works and the mounting
of artillery.

In June 1861, Forney left Pensacola to

take command of an Alabama infantry regiment on its way

33

Ibid.; Edmund S. Dargan to Randolph, Apr. 23,
1862, iEIdT, 1087-88.
34

A. T. Bledsoe to Dargan, May 5, 1862, ibid., 1111.
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north to Virginia.

He led his unit at First Manassas and

in a skirmish at Dranesville in December and received a
severe wound in the latter action.

Both General Joseph

E. Johnston and Brigadier General James E. B. Stuart
recommended Forney for promotion because of his bravery
in the skirmish.

Forney was in Alabama recovering from

his wound when he received his promotion and orders to
report to Mobile.

35

The situation Forney inherited from Jones was poor
but apparently not discouraging.
still remained rather weak.

Mobile's defenses

A private in Fort Gaines

confided in a letter to his sister that if a large enemy
force attacked the bay:

"my opinion is we will not be

able to hold the fort tho the officers think we can."

36

On assuming command Forney directed that obstructions be
placed on Dog River bar to prevent enemy vessels from
approaching the city if they should get into the bay.

35

Forney to Beauregard, Apr. 28, 1862, Letterbook,
Bragg Papers, Western Reserve; Bragg to Cooper, Mar. 12,
1862, ibid.; General Order No. 4, Headquarters Troops
Confederate States near Pensacola, Mar. 18, 1861, quoted
in Daily Advertiser, Mar. 20, 18 61; Moore to Colonel
William H. Chase, Jan. 22. 1861, O.R., LII, Pt. 2, p. 13;
Colonel J. J. Seibels to Forney, Feb. 7, 1861, ibid., 17;
Brigadier General James E. B. Stuart to Major Thomas A.
Pratt, Dec. 23, 1861, ibid., V, 493; General Joseph E.
Johnston to Cooper, Feb. 2, 1862, ibid., 1058; Boatner,
Civil War Dictionary, 288.
36
James R. Vickers to Miss Morell Vickers, Apr. 26,
1862, in Fort Gaines Collection, Mobile Museum
Department.
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The engineers left a small passage over the
their own naval vessels to use, but

bar for

the gap could be

closed quickly by sinking a wreck in it.

Forney also

issued the following order:
That all cotton at or near navigable
waters within this Military Command shall be
forthwith removed by the owner to some point
in the interior of the country near to which
no approach-can be made by water, or shall
be burned.
He took this action to discourage an enemy attack on
Mobile.

Any cotton not removed promptly the military

would burn without compensation to the owner.

38

Following the fall of New Orleans, Forney feared
that the Federals would attack Mobile next.

He evidently

felt that Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines would be passed by
the enemy fleet as had been Fort Jackson and Fort St.
Philip on the Mississippi River.

Obviously, if this

occurred, much more than obstructions over the Dog River
bar would be necessary to protect the city.

Accordingly,

Forney revived the idea of defensive works near Mobile.
On April 30 he ordered the construction of entrenchments

37

Forney to Beauregard, Apr. 28, 1862, Palmer Civil
War Collection; General Order No. 50, Headquarters
Department of Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 30, 1862,
General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and
West Florida.
38
General Order No. 50, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 30, 1862, General and
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida.
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for light artillery and infantry to surround the city.
The soldiers of the Army of Mobile would furnish the
labor involved, but willing citizens could volunteer
their services.

Forney also instructed his men to

strengthen the batteries which covered the Dog River
obstructions and to erect other batteries to bear on the
obstructions.

39

Captain Charles F. Liernur, whom Jones

had assigned as chief engineer of the department on April
15, took charge of the construction of all of these
defensive works and received assistance from a number of
other engineer officers.

40

The defensive posture of the city did not satisfy a
number of persons besides Forney.

One resident wrote

that things were "in a bad state" in the city and that
"many families" had begun moving to the interior of the
state.

41

Some of the military men expressed apprehension

39

Para VIII, Special Order No. 95, Headquarters
Department of Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 30, 1862,
ibid.; Aberdeen (Miss.) Examiner, Feb. 7, 1890; Forney to
Beauregard, May 8, 1862, Palmer Civil War Collection;
Forney to Beauregard, May 10, 1862, ibid.
40

Para II, Special Order No. 81, Headquarters Depart
ment of Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 15, 1862, General
and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West
Florida; Para VIII, Special Order No. 95, Headquarters
Department of Alabama and West Florida, Apr. 30, 1862,
ibid.
^ T h e Index, June 12, 1862.
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about the city also.

The troops in Mobile lacked suffi

cient arms and ammunition.

Forney's exact feelings are

difficult to discern from available evidence, but the
opinions of Flag Officer Victor M. Randolph on the naval
force at Mobile seem clear.

He did not expect his

"cockleshell gunboats" to survive an attack on the bay
and thought the Confederate military would be forced to
defend the rivers above Mobile.

One of Randolph's sub

ordinates wrote home that the flag officer took his
squadron to the city whenever the enemy appeared off the
bay.

42

Although he gave some thought to evacuating the

city, Forney promised the people that he would defend
Mobile.

He asked them to furnish tools and workers for

the entrenchments.

He also appealled to them to avoid

"all undue excitement" and to preserve "strict order."

43

Work on the entrenchments began more slowly than
Forney had hoped.

Units at times worked in shifts, one

42

Forney to Randolph, May 5, 1862, Telegrams
Received, Secretary of War; Flag Officer Victor M. Ran
dolph to Shorter, May — , 1862, O.R.N., XVIII, 847-48;
Ed. Harleston Edwards to his mother, May 11, 1862, in
E. H. Edwards Letters, South Caroliniana Library, Uni
versity of South Carolina, Columbia.
43

Captain Charles F. Liernur to Superintendent,
Mobile and Spring Hill Railroad, May 4, 1862, in Letters
Sent, Engineer Office, Department of Alabama and West
Florida, Apri1-May 1862, Chap. Ill, Vol. 15, p. 62, RG
109, National Archives; Orders, Headquarters Department
of Alabama and West Florida, May 3, 1862, quoted in
Advertiser and Register, May 6, 1862.
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occupied during the day and another at night.

Forney

quickly authorized his officers to impress white and
black laborers alike to speed construction.

A private

in the Alabama Cadet Corps wrote his mother:
...the officers send a squad of men in town
and if they see an idle man on the streets or
more than one clerk in a store they order
them to 'Fall i n , ' and march him down and
give him^| hoe or shovel and put him to
w o r k ....
At least a partial reason for the lack of progress seems
to have been that many of the men laboring on the bat
teries would leave work and go into the city.

Liernur

requested the provost marshal in Mobile to set up a guard
to prevent the men from leaving.

Forney soon issued an

order requiring commanding officers to keep their men at
work and away from the city.

45

To facilitate construction of the works, Liernur
decided to practically strip the forts at the bay
entrances of engineering property and laborers.

He sent

44

Para XIII, Special Order No. 98, Headquarters
Department of Alabama and West Florida, May 3, 1862,
General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and
West Florida; Advertiser and Register, May 6, 1862;
Harden P. Cochrane to Sophie Sarah Louisa Perkins
Cochrane, May 7, 18 62, quoted in Harriet Fitts Ryan
(arranger), "The Letters of Harden Perkins Cochrane,
1862-1864," Alabama Review, VII (1954) , 283.
45
Liernur to Major H. 0. Humphries, May 5, 1862,
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Chap. Ill, Vol. 15, p. 63;
General Order No. 51, Headquarters Department of Alabama
and West Florida, May 6, 1862, General and Special Orders,
Department of Alabama and West Florida.
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Captain William R. Neville to bring the "papers, maps,
furniture, building material

(not needed for defence and

which can be used by the troops to restore breaches and
damages during action), horses, carts, provisions, tools,
cooking utensils &c" to Mobile.

Neville also had orders

to transfer all Negro laborers to the city.

Apparently

some of the cannon and ammunition in the forts were to be
moved as well, as Forney mentioned them in Neville's
instructions.

46

The owners of the Mobile and Ohio Rail

road turned over some of their railroad iron to Liernur
for use in bombproof shelters in some of the bay
batteries.

Again Forney aided Liernur by ordering Cap

tain Junius A. Law's Company D, 1st Alabama Artillery
Battalion, from the battery at Cedar Point to the city
47
defenses.
The governmental authorities and press of Mobile
appreciated the efforts of Forney and Liernur.
Recognizing the urgency of the work in progress, the
Advertiser and Register appealed to the people of the
city to provide the needed labor which the military could

46

Liernur to Captain William R. Neville, May 4,
1862, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Chap. Ill, Vol. 15,
pp. 61-62.
^ L i e r n u r to Firnan (?) Hurtel, May 5, 1862, ibid.,
66; Para XII, Special Order No. 103, Headquarters Depart
ment of Alabama and West Florida, May 8, 1862, General
and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West
Florida.
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not furnish itself.

It urged the men to volunteer their

services at Liernur's offices in the customhouse.
paper closed its editorial with these words:

The

"The work

will not admit of delay, and Gen. Forney will not permit
it to drag when there are idle men in town capable of
doing service."

48

Adding its praise, the city council

passed a series of resolutions commending Forney and
asking the populace to get involved in the defense of
the city.

The town fathers promised to help in every

way they could.

Their resolutions expressed their

determination "to stand by the authorities in their
efforts to beat back the invading foe, and to hold the
city to the last extremity."

49

Forney's fears of an attack on Mobile had some basis
in fact.

Union interest in capturing the city dated back

to early 1862.

When he received orders to assume command

of the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron, Flag Officer
David G. Farragut also received instructions to capture
the forts at the bay entrance after he had taken New
Orleans.

At about the same time, Major General George B.

McClellan told Major General Benjamin F. Butler that
after his expedition accomplished its objective of

48
49

Advertiser and Register, May 7, 1862.

"Joint Resolutions by President Forsyth, Relating
to the Defence of Mobile," May 14, 1862, quoted in ibid.,
May 15, 1862.
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capturing New Orleans and Baton Rouge he was expected to
attack Mobile.

50

Once the Crescent City had actually

fallen, Farragut began making plans to attack Fort
Morgan.

Butler, however, favored continued operations up

the Mississippi River against Vicksburg and Memphis.
Although these latter operations took precedence, Farra
gut sent Commander David D. Porter's squadron of mortar
boats and gunboats toward Mobile.
attack Fort Morgan on May 7, 1862.

Porter planned to
While he made pre

parations for the attack, one of his gunboats ran aground
near the fort, and the Confederate gunners fired about
ten rounds at her.

The gunboat succeeded in getting

afloat again, but Porter never carried out the attack.

51

From this point on, the Union high command gave no more

50

Gideon Welles to Flag Officer David G. Farragut,
Jan. 20, 1862, O.R.N., XVIII, 7-8? Major General George
B. McClellan to Major General Benjamin F. Butler, Feb.
23, 1862, O . R . , VI, 695.
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Farragut to Captain Thaddeus Bailey, Apr. 29,
1862, O.R.N., XVIII, 147; Farragut to Welles, Apr. 29,
1862, ibid., 148? Butler to Edwin M. Stanton, Apr. 29,
1862, quoted in Jessie Ames Marshall (ed.), Private and
Official Correspondence of G e n . Benjamin F. Butler During
the Period of the Civil W a r , 5 vols. (Norwood, Mass.:
The Plimpton Press, 1917), I, 428; Commander David D.
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serious thought to attacking the forts, as the Mississippi River became the scene of the naval effort.

52

One result of this feint attack on Mobile was the
evacuation of Pensacola by the Confederates.

Colonel

Thomas M. Jones had been removing artillery, ammunition,
and other property from the twon for several months in
anticipation of evacuation of the forts and naval yard.
General Robert E. Lee in Richmond had advised Jones that
if the enemy attacked Mobile he should move his forces to
that city.

When Jones received a telegram from one of

Forney's staff officers that shots had been fired on Fort
Morgan, he began withdrawing from Pensacola.
pleted the evacutaion on the night of May 9.

He com53

Forney

maintained Jones' troops near Pollard, Alabama, as an
"army of observation" to protect the railroad between
Mobile and Montgomery.

He originally assigned Colonel

J. R. F. Tatnall of the 29th Alabama to command the
troops.

Tatnall's men had instructions to remove the

railroad iron between Pensacola and Pollard in addition
to scouting the countryside.

Gustavus V. Fox
Robert M. Thompson and
dential Correspondence
York:
Printed for the
313.

In late May Forney

to Farragut, May 12, 1862, xn
Richard Wainwright (eds.), Confi
of Gustavus Vasa F o x , 2 vols. (New
Naval History Society, 1918), I,

^ J o n e s to Forney, May 14, 1862, O . R . , VI, 660.
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assigned Jones, by then an acting brigadier general, to
command the troops at Pollard.

54

From May 1862 until

early 1865, the Confederates stationed troops at Pollard
to watch the Union forces in Pensacola and help protect
Mobile from that direction.
The Confederate authorities in Mobile remained con
cerned about the city's defensive posture.

In late May

1862 Liernur still worked feverishly on the line of
earthworks surrounding Mobile.

He directed only a small

number of laborers, however, and appealed to the citizens
to volunteer their "Negro Laborers, Cooks and Waiters,
who can be spared, to work on the entrenchments and perfeet the works."

55

Those persons willing to contribute

would have their names registered with the provost mar
shal along with the number of laborers furnished.

To

strengthen the armed forces around the city, Forney
urged the men of Mobile and nearby counties to form
military companies and arm themselves as best they could.
These companies would form themselves into regiments, and
once organized they would drill so as to be prepared for

54

Paras V and VI, Special Order No. 107, Head
quarters Department of Alabama and West Florida, May 12,
1862, General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama
and West Florida; Para III, Special Order No. 124, Head
quarters Department of Alabama and West Florida, May 29,
1862, ibid.
^ Advertiser and Register, May 25, 1862.
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service when needed.

Forney promised to try to supply

ammunition to those who could not supply themselves.

56

In early June Forney moved several of his units
around to have his most experienced men in his most
strategic defensive works.

He transferred the 27th Mis

sissippi Infantry from Pollard to relieve the 1st Confed
erate Infantry, then in charge of the bay batteries and
the shore batteries at the southern end of the line of
entrenchments.

The 1st Confederate Infantry moved to

Fort Gaines and relieved some ninety-day troops manning
the guns in that fort.

Both the 27th Mississippi and 1st

Confederate had occupied batteries at Pensacola and had
engaged in several duels with Federal gunners in Fort
Pickens.

57

When not drilling or on guard duty, the men

passed the time bathing in the bay or playing marbles
under nearby live oaks.
varied.

The living quarters for the men

Some slept on cots arranged under large, open,

56Ibid., May 25, 27, 1862.
57

Para IV, Special Order No. 122, Headquarters Army
of Mobile, June 3, 1862, in Special and General Orders,
Army of Mobile, March-June 1862, RG 109, National
Archives; Aberdeen Examiner, Feb. 7, 1890; Paras IV and
V, Special Order No. 128, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, June 3, 1862, General and
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida.
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cotton storage sheds.
next to the sheds.

These men also did their cooking

58

Liquor still provided a problem for the military
authorities even though Bragg had attempted to remove the
supply months before.

Forney issued orders prohibiting

the sale or delivery of intoxicating beverages to offi
cers or enlisted men in Confederate service on steamboats
or vessels on the rivers near the city or on any of the
railroads near the city.

This order also forbade sale of

liquor to civilians who would then allow soldiers to
drink it.

Anyone caught violating the order would be

arrested and have his liquor supplies destroyed.

59

The

men had little or no coffee to drink because of the
blockade of Mobile Bay.

Forney eventually had to

restrict the supply of coffee to use by men in the hospitals of the city.

60

This shortage of Coffee was at"

best only a partial excuse for the excessive use of

CO

Aberdeen Examiner, Feb. 7, 1890; James ------ to
mother, May 18, 1862, quoted in Caldwell Delaney, Confed
erate Mo b i l e : A Pictorial History (Mobile:
The Haunted
Book Shop, 1971), 30.
59

General Order No. 62, Headquarters Department of
Alabama and West Florida, June 20, 1862, General and
Special Orders, Department of Alabama and West Florida;
Advertiser and Register, June 26, 1862.
60

Para IV, Special Order No. 124, Headquarters
Department of Alabama and West Florida, May 29, 1862,
General and Special Orders, Department of Alabama and
West Florida.
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liquor at Mobile.

The frequent boredom and monotony of

military life has often driven soldiers in a garrison
situation to seek relief in alcohol.
At this time the Confederate command began to give
attention to the defensive situation along the rivers
which emptied into Mobile Bay at its northeastern corner.
Part of Forney's plans for the area included something
new to Mobile— a floating battery.

In May 1861, the state

authorities had seized the ship Danube from her owners.
The Confederates later converted her into a floating bat
tery mounting four 42-pounder cannons.

Forney ordered

her stationed at the point where the Blakely and Appalachee rivers diverged so that her guns would command
the latter river.

He also wanted a battery erected on

the western bank of the Blakely River to protect that
stream.

61

The Confederates needed to have defensive

works covering these two rivers.

If left unobstructed,

enemy vessels could ascend them and, then make their way
I
through the maze of streams at the head of Mobile Bay to
approach Mobile from the rear.

Eventually the engineers

build another earthwork to help prejvent such an enemy
I
/
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Para III, Special Order No.I 146,
Department of Alabama and West Flqrida,
ibid.; U. S. Navy Department, Civiil War
1861-1865, 6 parts (Washington, D. C . :
ing-Office, 1961-1966), Pt. VI, 218.
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move in the area.

The Confederates usually referred to

the defenses in this area as the Appalachee Batteries.
In late May and again in late June 1862, the War
Department issued a series of orders attempting to clarify
the command situation in the West and to reorganize the
departments there.

Beauregard at Corinth had requested a

clear definition of the boundaries of his Department
No. 2.

The War Department responded by placing those

parts of Mississippi and Alabama north of the thirtythird parallel, east of the Mississippi River, and west
of Alabama's eastern boundary in Beauregard's command.

62

After Bragg succeeded Beauregard, Richmond extended the
eastern boundary of the department "to the line of rail
road from Chattanooga via Atlanta to West Point, on the
Chattahoochee River, and thence down the Chattahoochee
and Apalachicola Rivers to the Gulf of Mexico."

63

Four

days after the War Department issued this last order,
new Secretary of War George W. Randolph wrote Bragg that
his department included all of the state of Alabama.

62
Paras II and III, General Order No. 39, Adjutant
and Inspector General's Office, May 26, 1862, O . R . , XV,
746.
63
Para XVI, Special Order No. 146, Adjutant and
Inspector General's Office, June 25, 1862, ibid., 766.
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This decision placed Mobile in a new command, and the
city's status in this command would receive clarifica
tion before long.

64

CA

Randolph to Bragg, June 29, 1862, ibid., 770.

CHAPTER IV
"...IT SHOULD BE DEFENDED FROM STREET TO STREET..."
General Braxton Bragg assumed command of the
extended Department No. 2, also referred to as the West
ern Department, on July 2, 1862.

He reorganized several

of the subdivisions of his new department.

One of these

became the District of the Gulf, which consisted of the
territory between the thirty-second parallel and the Gulf
from the Pearl River to the Apalachicola River.

Forney

remained at Mobile as commander of the new district.'1'
The District of the Gulf remained the territorial com
mand responsible for the defense of Mobile from this time
until the end of the war, although for a brief period the
War Department upgraded the district to a department.
The district's boundaries changed slightly several times,
but the protection of Mobile and Mobile Bay stood as top
priority of the generals in charge of the district.

As

commander of a subdivision of a larger territorial unit,
Mobile's general-in-chief lacked complete control over
the troops in his district but could draw supplies freely
from other areas in the department.

District status

^"General Order No. 89, Headquarters Department No.
2, July 2, 1862, O . R . , XV, 771; Advertiser and Register,
July 6, 1862.
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connected with the states of Alabama and Mississippi
seems to have been the best position for Mobile because
the area surrounding the city could never furnish enough
foodstuffs.

The War Department would always see that

Mobile had a sufficient garrison.
A demonstration of Mobile's strategic importance to
the Confederacy occurred shortly after creation of the
District of the Gulf.

In what one author calls "the

largest single Confederate troop movement by rail,"
twenty-five thousand men of the Army of the Mississippi
moved in railroad cars from Tupelo, Mississippi, through
Mobile to Chattanooga, Tennessee.

2

A smaller troop trans

fer preceded this movement by about a month.

Following

the occupation of Corinth by Union forces, Major General
Don Carolos Buell's Federal army began operations aimed
toward Chattanooga.

Major General Edmund Kirby Smith,

whose department included Chattanooga, asked Bragg at
Tupelo to send troops to help defend the city.

Bragg

responded by ordering Major General John P. McCown's
division to report to Kirby Smith by rail via Mobile.
The three thousand men of this division left on June 28,
1862, and their lead elements reached Chattanooga on
July 3.

2

Transit through Mobile went smoothly, but the

Robert C. Black III, The Railroads of the Confed
eracy (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press,
1952) , 180.
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men encountered difficulties between Montgomery and
Chattanooga, thus delaying their arrival slightly.

3

By late July 18 62 Bragg had decided that he could
not attack Middle Tennessee from Tupelo as he desired
and that Kirby Smith could not hold Buell out of
Chattanooga.

Knowing that this city and its railroad

connections through eastern Tennessee were strategically
more important than northern Mississippi, Bragg deter
mined to go to Kirby Smith's aid.

On July 21 he ordered

the infantrymen of the three divisions of the Army of
the Mississippi to proceed by rail through Mobile to
Chattanooga.

He sent his artillery and wagons overland

through central Alabama.

To get troops to Chattanooga

quickly, Bragg also ordered available units at Mobile and
Pollard to start for the city.

These latter troops

departed on July 22, and Bragg's first units left Tupelo
the next day.

The Mobile units reached Chattanooga on

the twenty-seventh, while the lead units of the Army of
4
the Mississippi did not arrive for several more days.

3

Ibid., 181; Major General Edmund Kirby Smith to
Bragg, June 27, 1862, O . R . , XVI, Pt. 2, p. 709; Paras
II and III, Special Order No. 96, Headquarters Department
No. 2, June 27, 1862, ibid., XVII, Pt. 2, p. 626; Smith
to Davis, July 14, 1862, ibid., XVI, Pt. 2, p. 727.
^Bragg to Smith, July 22, 1862, O . R . , XVI, Pt. 2,
p. 732; Bragg to Cooper, July 23, 186/T, ibid., XVII, Pt.
2, p. 656; Special Order No. 4, Headquarters of the
Forces, July 21, 1862, ibid., 657; Lieutenant Edward
Cunningham to Brigadier General Carter L. Stevenson,
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If Mobile had not still been in Confederate hands, the
transfer of Bragg's army from Tupelo in time to save
Chattanooga would not have been possible.

The subse

quent Confederate campaign into Kentucky would not have
been possible either.

5

Bragg once again expressed his concern for the
defense of Mobile as he moved his army through the city.
Even though he ordered infantrymen from Mobile to rein
force Kirby Smith ahead of the Army of the Mississippi,
g
he planned to leave "a sufficient garrison" at Mobile.
Four infantry regiments and a light artillery battery
entrained at Mobile and proceeded to Chattanooga.

In

addition to being closer to Chattanooga than Bragg's
units, these regiments had more men present for duty than
Bragg's regiments.

The latter had suffered casualties at

Shiloh and in the skirmishes around Corinth and had lost
men to disease both at Corinth and Tupelo.

To replace

the units from Mobile, Bragg ordered three Alabama and

July 28, 1862, ibid., XVI, Pt. 2, p. 739; Aberdeen
Examiner, Feb. 7, 1890; Black, Railroads of the Confed
eracy , 182.
5
I am indebted to my colleague Lawrence L. Hewitt,
who cleared up some misconceptions about Bragg's
strategy during the summer of 1862 in discussions con
cerning Hewitt's "Braxton Bragg and the Invasion of
Kentucky: A Campaign of Maneuver" (unpublished seminar
paper, Louisiana State University, 1975).
^Bragg to Cooper, July 23, 1862, O . R . , XVII, Pt. 2,
p. 656.
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two Louisiana regiments detached from the Army of the
Mississippi.

He also ordered a light battery from Colum

bus, Mississippi, to Mobile.

The two Louisiana units

moved on to duty at Pollard while the Alabama regiments
remained at the city where they could recruit.

7

While engaged in shifting troops from Mobile to
Chattanooga and from Tupelo to Mobile, Bragg was planning
to change commanders at Mobile.

Forney apparently wanted

to be relieved so that he could resume duty in the field.
It is well known that Bragg had little confidence in the
major generals and brigadier generals under his command.
Perhaps with these two factors in mind, Bragg ordered
Samuel Jones, now a major general, to relieve Forney in
command of the District of the Gulf.

What position

Bragg had in mind for Forney is unknown, but he probably
would have succeeded to command of Jones' division.

Word

of this planned change reached Richmond (and possibly
Mobile) before Bragg issued the order.

Jefferson Davis

sent the following telegram to him:
The confidence felt in General Forney,
at Mobile, and the knowledge he has acquired
as the successor of General Jones, render

7
Aberdeen Examiner, Feb. 7, 1890; Special Order No.
6, Headquarters Department No. 2, July 23, 1862, O.R.,
XVII, Pt. 2, p. 657; Paras II, III, and V, Special
Order No. 133, Headquarters Department No. 2, July 26,
1862, ibid., 659; Kate Cumming, K a t e ; The Journal of a
Confederate N u r s e , ed. by Richard B. Harwell (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1959), 57.
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the propriety of withdrawing him very
doubtful.
Please reconsider your purpose
in that regard....
In response to this wire, Bragg revoked his order and
left Forney in command at Mobile.

9

The troops left by Bragg at Mobile settled into
their new duties in a short period of time.

Two of the

regiments— the 17th and 18th Alabama— remained near the
city.

The 18th Regiment established Camp Beulah on the

Spring Hill Road four miles from Mobile.

Forney ordered

the 17th Alabama into camp on the Bay Shell Road near
the city.

This regiment had charge of the bay batteries.

The men were unfamiliar with the handling of artillery so
Forney assigned some of his experienced artillery offi
cers to instruct the officers and drill the men in their
new d u t i e s . ^

The camp of the 17th Alabama was known as

Camp Forney, and one soldier described it as "beautiful

Bragg to Cooper, July 24, 1862, O . R . , LII, Pt. 2,
p. 332; Bragg to Cooper, June 29, 1862, ibid., XVII,
Pt. 2, p. 628; Bragg to Randolph, Aug. 9, 1862, ibid.,
673; Para I, Special Orders No. 133, Headquarters Depart
ment No. 2, July 26, 1862, ibid., 659; Davis to Bragg,
July 26, 1862, ibid.
9
Special Order No. 134, Headquarters Department No.
2, July 27, 1862, ibid.
■^Roll for Apr. 30-Aug. 31, 1862, Record of Events
Cards, Company A, 18th Alabama Infantry, Compiled Service
Records; Roll for Sept. and Oct. 1862, Record of Events
Cards, Company G, 18th Alabama Infantry, ibid.; "Diary of
Captain Edward Crenshaw of the Confederate States Army,"
Alabama Historical Quarterly, I (1930) , 438-39.
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and healthy."

Some of the officers and men had wooden

houses for their quarters, but most of the regiment lived
in walled tents with plank floors.

As winter and cold

weather approached, the soldiers bought stoves to put in
the tents for warmth.

Many of the men probably would

have agreed with the diarist who wrote:

"I spent decid-

edly the most pleasant winter of the War, at Mobile."

11

Two units— the 18th and 19th Louisiana Infantry
regiments— became a part of the force at Pollard after
detaching from Bragg's army.

Men of the two units had

mixed reactions to the area around Pollard.

A private of

the 19th Louisiana found the camp pleasing with its
nearby springs providing fresh water and a nearby river
furnishing good fishing.

12

On the other hand, a lieu

tenant of the 18th Louisiana remembered little to compli
ment the village on:

"There was no evidence of any cul

tivation of the soil in the vicinity, the general appear
ance of the country and the inhabitants thereof indicat
ing that the principal food was composed of Pine top

■^Roll for July 1862-Aug. 1863, Record of Events
Cards, Field and Staff, 17th Alabama Infantry, Compiled
Service Records; "Diary of Captain Edward Crenshaw," 438.
12

Private John A. Harris to Rebecca Harris, Aug. 11,
1862, in John Achilles Harris Letters, 1861-1864, Louisi
ana State University Department of Archives and Manu
scripts.
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whiskey and gophers."

13

The Louisianians had not been

at Pollard long when Secretary of War Randolph asked
Forney if he could spare them to be sent to western
Louisiana.

Forney protested that detaching the regiments

would seriously reduce his infantry force.

Eventually

Randolph and Forney reached a compromise, and Forney gave
up only the 18th Louisiana.

14

By October 1862 the Confederate troops stationed in
Fort Morgan had settled into a regular routine of duties.
With no signs of an enemy attack, the men's daily life
remained uneventful.

Before breakfast every morning the

men drilled by company.

They held guard mount at eight

o'clock and then dress parade.
afternoon varied.

Activities during the

On Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, the

men of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Alabama Infantry Regiment,
went through battalion infantry drill.

The troops of the

1st Alabama Artillery Battalion drilled at the guns on
those afternoons.

On Tuesday and Thursday the battalions

switched, the artillerymen drilling as infantry and the
infantrymen as artillery.

The only duty on Saturday

was cleaning, and on Sunday the men had company

"^Weekly Thibodaux Sentinel, July 11, 1868.
"^Randolph to Forney, Sept. 1, 1862, O . R . , XV, 804;
Forney to Randolph, Sept. 3, 1862, Telegrams Received,
Secretary of War; Weekly Thibodaux Sentinel, July 25,
1868.
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inspections and inspections of kitchens and quarters.
Only about 900 to 1,000 men occupied Fort Morgan, and at
least some of the officers thought the position a weak
one.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Stewart wrote to his

wife that the fort could not keep enemy ironclads from
running through into the bay.

He felt that only in

cooperation with the Confederate ironclads under con
struction at Selma could the fort's garrison achieve any
success against attack.

15

In mid-October the Confederates feared that an
attack on Mobile was imminent.

Scouts near Pensacola

sent word to Forney that thousands of new Union troops
had landed at the Florida town with the intention of
undertaking a campaign into southeastern Alabama.

Forney

quickly sent requests for reinforcements to Richmond and
Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, commanding in
Mississippi.

He did not think he had enough men to

defend both Mobile and Pollard.

Governor Shorter also

asked Jefferson Davis to send more men to Mobile, saying:
"General Forney is worn down and wants help."

X6

■^Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Stewart to Julia
Stewart, Oct. 16, 20, 1862, in Charles S. Stewart Let
ters, 1862-1863, Fort Morgan Museum.
"^Forney to Cooper, Oct. 18, 18 62, O.R./ XV, 833;
Forney to Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, Oct. 18,
1862, ibid., 833-34; Shorter to Davis, Oct. 18, 1862,
ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 377.
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Pemberton sent a brigade to Meridian to be used if the
enemy did advance on Mobile.

The War Department promised

Forney that Brigadier General Leadbetter would receive
orders to report to Mobile as chief engineer and that the
Department would send a brigadier general to command some
of Forney's troops.

Davis authorized Forney to enroll all

militiamen between the ages of thirty-five and forty for
Confederate service.

The fear of attack passed quickly,

however, and Forney received no troop reinforcements.

17

This threatened enemy attack caused Forney to push
the completion of defensive works around the city.
asked Mayor Slough to furnish laborers.

He

Slough, in turn,

urged the citizens to volunteer their services, and he
announced that white laborers would receive $2.50 a day
plus rations.

Shortly after this plea, Governor Shorter

issued an appeal for 600 slaves for use in working on the
Mobile defenses.

He called for 100 slaves each from

Montgomery, Lowndes, Dallas, Marengo, Perry, and Wilcox
counties.

The request for slaves read in part:

The owners will be allowed a dollar a day
for each slave, to commence from his embarka
tion on river or railroad; transportation,

■^Pemberton to Forney, Oct. 18, 1862, ibid., XV,
834; Randolph to Shorter, Oct. 19, 1862, ibid., LII,
Pt. 2, p. 378; Cooper to Forney, Oct. 19, 1862, ibid.;
Cooper to Jones, Oct. 19, 1862, ibid., XVI, Pt. 2, p.
968; Major J. R. Waddy to Forney, Oct. 23, 1862, ibid.,
XV, 842.
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subsistence and medical attendance will be
furnished.
Each slave must be provided with
either a spade or shovel, axe or pick, cloth-^g
ing, bedding and provision to last to Mobile.
Any owner who sent twenty-five slaves could select a
white man to go with them to care for them and help
supervise their work."^
Shorter estimated that the defenses could be com
pleted in about sixty days.

Newspapers throughout Ala

bama and in other southern states published the governor's
appeal.

The Montgomery Daily Mail urged the citizens of

the capital city to give their aid cheerfully "in pro
moting a move so necessary for the protection and safety
of our interests and our homes."

20

This paper's editor

realized how important the defense of Mobile was to the
rest of the state.

The Charleston Mercury also expressed

its concern for the safety of Mobile but found some
things in Shorter's call to criticize.

In particular,

the Mercury's editor felt that Shorter was too calm and
that he was being too slow in getting necessary laborers.
Why ask for only 600 slaves, stated the paper, when he
should have requested several thousand to finish the
work quickly.

The Mercury also wondered:

"...why in a

18

Advertiser and Register, Oct. 22, 29, 1862; Mont
gomery Daily Mail, Oct. 25, 1862.
^
1Q

\
Montgomery Daily M a i l , Oct. 25, 1862.
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vital matter of this sort, there should be any dislike
to resort immediately to impressment."

21

No information

is available on how many slaves went to Mobile in response
to Shorter's appeal, but Forney apparently did not
receive a large number.
About October 20, 1862, Shorter visited Mobile to
survey the situation there for himself.

After this trip

he reported to Davis in a lengthy letter and talked of
the problems he found and the importance of Mobile.
First, he indicated that Forney needed the assistance of
some regular army officers as subordinates.

Second,

Shorter found the troops at Mobile to be primarily
"fresh, undisciplined, and unskilled."

Third, and most

importantly, the forces in the District of the Gulf seemed
too weak in numbers adequately to protect the territory
for which they had responsibility.

In speaking of the

importance of Mobile, Shorter called the city "the only
Gulf port of any importance which is left us and one of
the most important lines of communication in the
Confederacy."

22

He then reminded Davis that the fall of

Mobile and its railroad connections would result in the
isolation of the Trans-Mississippi Department.

^ Charleston Mercury, Oct. 28, 1862.
^ S h o r t e r to Davis, Oct. 22, 1862, O . R . , LII, Pt.
2, p. 379.
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In Shorter1s mind there was no such thing as too much
money spent in the defense of the city.

He felt that the

Confederacy would not survive long if the city fell to
the enemy.

Shorter advocated rather drastic action

should Mobile face capture:
...If Mobile is to fall, I earnestly hope
that orders will be given that not one stone
be left upon another.
Let the enemy find
nothing but smoking and smouldering ruins to
gloat over....
Davis replied to Shorter's letter in a short note.
He agreed with the Alabama governor on Mobile's impor
tance and the probable consequence of its fall.
However, he stated that the Confederacy did not have any
troops to spare from other places to send to Mobile.
Davis did not seem to think that the enemy seriously
threatened Mobile enough to increase its garrison.

He

did say that the War Department was looking for some men
to send.

In the meantime he suggested that conscripts

be used to fill the depleted Alabama units then at
Mobile.

24

Some assistance for Forney in the form of sub

ordinate brigadier generals soon came.

Alfred Cumming,

whom the War Department had already ordered to Mobile,
assumed command of a brigade of four regiments shortly
after his arrival.

Davis also instructed the War

23I b i d ., 380.
2^Davis to Shorter, Oct. 29, 1862, ibid., XV, 848.
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Department to order James E. Slaughter from Jackson,
Mississippi, to Mobile.

Forney assigned Slaughter to

the command of the Army of Mobile, which then consisted
of the troops in the city entrenchments and bay batteries,
including Cumming's brigade.

Forney himself received a

promotion to major g e n e r a l . ^
In addition to the possibility of enemy attack and
the weakness of his own force, Forney faced a couple of
additional problems in early November 1862.
concerned the civilian population in Mobile.

One of these
Apparently

Forney felt that some of the people were passing informa
tion to the enemy and asked for the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus in Mobile.

Davis acquiesed and

suspended the writ both in the city and the territory
within ten miles.

He did not object to civilians being

held for offenses but did not want military courts to
try them.

26

Forney's second problem concerned drunken

ness among the officers and men of his command.

25

History of Company B, 40th Alabama Regiment, Con
federate States A r m y , 1862 to 1865 (Anniston, A l a . (?):
The Colonial Press, 1963), 12; Davis to Shorter, Oct. 29,
1862, O . R . , XV, 848; "Organization of troops in the
District of the Gulf, commanded by M a j . Gen. John H.
Forney," Oct. 31, 1862, ibid., 850; Cooper to Forney,
Oct. 27, 1862, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and
Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 37, p. 331.
^ C o o p e r to Forney, Oct. 19, 1862, O . R . , LII, Pt.
2, p. 378; Cooper to Forney, Nov. 10, 1862, ibid., XV,
859.
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He issued orders prohibiting the sale of liquor in and
around Mobile and closing all bars and liquor shops.

In

addition to the seizure of liquor supplies of those who
violated the order, Forney threatened to send guilty
parties outside the district and forbid them to return.

27

Some of the people at Mobile did not trust com
pletely the Confederate military authorities in the city.
To a few merchants it seemed that certain officers used
their positions to give preferential treatment to indi
viduals in the shipment of supplies on the railroads and
riverboats.

Other merchants and boat owners showed

reluctance to bring fuel and food supplies to the city
on their vessels for fear that the military would impress
the boats or articles.

As a result of this slowing of

trade, prices of items such as firewood and corn rose
sharply.

Several persons wrote to Davis and the War

Department to complain about the state of affairs.
Acting Secretary of War James A. Campbell sent a long
letter to Forney outlining the complaints which he had
received.

Campbell advised that seizures of private

property were justified only in cases of extreme neces
sity and warned against officers using their influence

27

General Order No. 84, Headquarters District of the
Gulf, Nov. 10, 1862, quoted in Advertiser and Register,
Nov. 11, 1862; General Order No. 85, Headquarters Dis
trict of the Gulf, Nov. 13, 1862, quoted in Daily
Tribune, Nov. 13, 1862.
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for personal gain.

Before he received Campbell's letter,

Forney had already published a notice that he and the
Confederate authorities did not contemplate the seizure
of any boats or supplies.

He did state, however, that

railroads and steamboats would be expected "to give
preference to the transportation of Government stores."

28

Mayor Slough initiated a possible solution to the
problem existing between the military and civilians.

In

early November 18 62 he appointed a Committee of Safety
for Mobile.

The twenty-five-man group included Price

Williams, Peter Hamilton, Daniel Wheeler, and Dr. G. A.
Ketchum, all leading citizens of the city.

These men

were to work with the governor and the Confederate
authorities at Mobile in two areas.

They would collect

information relating to the city's defenses which the
civilian populace needed to know about.

The committee

also had authority to make plans that would lead to coop
eration between the civilians and the military if the
enemy threatened the city.

In announcing the formation

of the committee, Slough reaffirmed that Mobile would be
defended.

He felt that his duty as mayor compelled him

to let the people know what he expected of them.

He

pointed to the examples of Vicksburg and Richmond where

28

James A. Campbell to Forney, Nov. 23, 1862, O.R. ,
XV, 874-76; Notice, District of the Gulf, Nov. 13, 1862,
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Nov. 16, 1862.
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the people had cooperated with the armies in turning back
enemy attacks and stated that he was sure Mobilians would
"help save to the Confederacy one of the most important
bases of military operations."

29

On November 4, 1862, Leadbetter finally arrived in
Mobile.

He had received orders to go there in mid-

October but had been delayed by ill health.

Even after

reaching the city Leadbetter still suffered from a cold
and jaundice.

Despite his sickness, he conducted a ten-

day inspection of the defenses in the district.

He did

not find matters to his liking and began looking for
means to strengthen the defenses.

In a report to the War

Department, Leadbetter stated that he felt time was of
the essence but that "the means available in anchors and
chains for rafts and in iron for general use is extremely
limited."

30

Obstructing the various channels near Fort

Morgan, Fort Gaines, and the bay batteries stood as his
first priority.

29
30

He hoped that the obstructions would

Advertiser and Register, Nov. 11, 1862.

Leadbetter to Cooper, Nov. 14, 1862, O . R . , XV,
867; Cooper to Jones, Oct. 19, 1862, ibid., XVI, Pt. 2,
p. 968; Cooper to Leadbetter, Nov. 7, 1862, in Danville
Leadbetter Papers, Dr. Thomas M. McMillan Collection,
Mobile Museum Department, hereinafter cited as Leadbetter
Papers; Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer to Captain George E.
Walker, Nov. 14, 1862, Letters and Telegrams Sent by the
Engineer Bureau of the Confederate War Department, 18611864, Chap. Ill, Vol. 2, p. 51, RG 109, National
Archives.
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slow enemy vessels so that they would receive a pounding
by artillery fire.

Another of Leadbetter's priorities

was to complete the line of defenses around the city.
The entrenchments remained unfinished and weak.

As

opportunity presented itself, he intended to strengthen
works already partially constructed.

31

The Alabama legislature took several actions rela
tive to the defense of Mobile during November.

On the

seventeenth it approved two joint resolutions.

The first

stated:
...the city of
Mobile shall never be sur
rendered; that
it should be defended from
street to street, from house to house, and
inch by inch, until, if taken, the victgjj's
spoils should be alone a heap of ashes.
The second resolution called for an appropriation to help
pay for the evacuation from Mobile of women and children
and to maintain them in a safe place m

the interior.

33

Three days later the legislature passed a bill authoriz
ing the enrollment of Creoles

(free Negroes) between the

ages of eighteen and fifty in Mobile as part of the
militia.

The mayor

would accept interested men, form

them into companies, and appoint

white officers to

"^Leadbetter to Cooper, Nov. 14, 1862, O . R . , XV,
867.
32

"Joint Resolution in relation to the defense of
Mobile," Nov. 17, 1862, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 389.
33Ibid.
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command the units.
to defend Mobile.

These companies would only be used
Thus, the Creoles of Mobile finally

got the opportunity for service which the Confederate
government had denied them.

Mayor Slough issued a call

for Creoles to report for enlistment in accordance with
the legislative act in mid-December.

34

No evidence is

available to show their response, however.
Leadbetter began working in earnest to upgrade
Mobile's defenses in late November.

He assigned one of

his engineer officers to the task of placing obstructions
in the entrances to Mobile Bay.

This officer began driv

ing wooden piles into the sea floor on the twenty-fourth.
Although the work was difficult, he reported to Leadbet
ter that he hoped his crew could put in around fifty
piles a day.

Another of Leadbetter's subordinates super

vised the erection of earthworks on the land face of Fort
Morgan and the sodding of the fort's walls.

Leadbetter

asked Forney for permission to take up eight miles of the
railroad between Pollard and Pensacola so that he could
use the iron in the defensive works around Mobile.
Forney gave his permission but furnished only a guard to

34

"An Act to authorize the enrollment of the
Creoles of Mobile," Nov. 20, 1862, ibid., 4, II, 197;
Advertiser and Register, Dec. 18, 1862.
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protect the operation.

Leadbetter had to provide the

necessary labor and transportation.

35

Although Leadbetter could see some progress, he and
the Confederate command at Mobile still had to contend
with shortages of men and material.

Leadbetter had to

request more laborers from the state government because
previous appeals had not resulted in a sufficient number
of men coming in.

Governor Shorter promised to impress

slaves and forward them to Mobile as soon as possible.
Leadbetter also asked Shorter and the Confederate Engi
neer Bureau for more spades and shovels for the laborers
to use, but there were none to be had.

A shortage of

artillery pieces also plagued Leadbetter.

The Mobile

Committee of Safety wrote to Shorter asking him to use
his influence to try to get more cannons from the Confed
erate authorities in Richmond.

Shorter forwarded their

letter to the Secretary of War, reminding him that he
(Shorter) had made similar requests for guns several
times in the past.

In closing, the governor stated his

conviction that if guns arrived he felt certain that they
would enable the land and naval forces at Mobile to
defend the city successfully.

35

The Engineer Bureau did

1st Lieutenant John W. Glenn to Leadbetter, Nov.
24, 1862, Leadbetter Papers; Captain William R. Neville
to Liernur, Nov. 25, 1862, ibid.; Forney to Leadbetter,
Nov. 24, 1862, ibid.
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send two heavy guns to the city in response to Shorter's
36
and Leadbetter's requests.
About this time another change in command occurred
at Mobile.

Forney's health apparently began failing in

late October 1862.

Dr. Josiah C. Nott and former mayor

John Forsyth wrote to Bragg expressing concern for
Forney and the safety of the city.
a letter to Davis.

Forsyth also addressed

In Nott's opinion, Forney's would and

the weight of his responsibilities had proven too much
for him.

Forney's personal physician and many of the

officers around the commanding general felt that "he is
not in condition for such an important command, & ought
to be relieved from command until his health is
restored...."

37

Forsyth intimated that Forney might be

suffering mental as well as physical problems.

The lack

of proper direction from the top had supposedly thrown
affairs in and around Mobile into a state of near chaos:

O C.

Shorter to Leadbetter, Nov. 24, 1862, ibid.;
Shorter to Leadbetter, Nov. 30, 1862, ibid.; Sam Tate to
Liernur, Dec. 10, 1862, ibid.; Peter Hamilton, et al, to
Shorter, Dec. 1, 1862, O . R . , XV, 889-90; Shorter to
James A. Seddon, Dec. 5, 1862, ibid., 888; Gilmer to
Leadbetter, Dec. 10, 1862, Letters and Telegrams Sent,
Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 2, p. 119; Endorsement
of Gilmer on letter from Leadbetter, Dec. 10, 1862,
ibid., 121; Gilmer to Leadbetter, Dec. 11, 1862, ibid.,
124; Gilmer to Leadbetter, Jan. 5, 1863, ibid., 181.
37

Josiah C. Nott to Bragg, Nov. 1, 1862, Bragg
Papers, Western Reserve; Forsyth to Bragg, Nov. 3, 1862,
ibid.
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...The town is full of officers & soldiers;
the rifle guns are rusting in the batteries;
1200 cavalry on both sides of the bay are
doing nothing....Every thing is wrong & full
of peril....
Forsyth concluded:

"...Mobile is lost if the existing

administration lasts until the enemy comes."

39

Bragg began looking for assistance for Forney after
receiving these reports.

Slaughter, too, apparently suf

fered from some illness and could not provide the support
Forney needed.

In a letter to Cooper, Bragg stated that

for a general assigned to duty at Mobile "acquaintance
with artillery and engineering is essential."

40

He had

hoped to order Brigadier General Johnson K. Duncan,
recently exchanged after his capture at Fort Jackson,
Louisiana, to Mobile, but Duncan was also ill.

In mid-

November, Bragg asked for and received the services of
Brigadier General William W. Mackall.

The latter had

graduated eighth in his class at West Point and entered
the artillery corps.

Mackall had experience with both

artillery and engineering as commander of Island No. 10.
At Mobile, he assumed command of the former Army of
Mobile, now a division consisting of Slaughter's and

38
39

Forsyth to Bragg, Nov. 3, 1862, ibid.
Ibid.

^ B r a g g to Cooper, Nov. 14, 1862, O.R., XX, Pt. 2,
p. 403; Surgeon A. J. Foard to Bragg, Jan. 31, 1863,
Bragg Papers, Western Reserve.
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Cumming's brigades.

41

Bragg issued an order on December

8 relieving Forney of command of the District of the Gulf,
and the latter relinquished temporary command to Mackall
on the fourteenth.

Forney then began a much-needed leave

to recover his health.

He had served competently while

at Mobile but his failing physical condition somewhat
restricted his effectiveness in his last days in command
of the district.

42

The only events of consequence occurring during
Mackall's temure as head of the District of the Gulf
involved Grant's Pass.

Leadbetter decided to erect a

strong earthwork there to protect that vital entrance
into the bay.

The few guns placed there early in the

war had been removed.

To guard the pass, the Confeder

ate engineers had driven piles in the channel and sta
tioned one or more of their gunboats there to bar passage

Cooper to Bragg, Nov. 5, 1862, O . R . , XX, Pt. 2,
p. 389; Bragg to Cooper, Nov. 15, 1862, ibid., 403;
Cooper to Bragg, Nov. 16, 1862, ibid., 405; Special
Order No. — , Headquarters Department No. 2, Nov. 17,
1862, in Compiled Service Record of William W. Mackall.
42

Para II, Special Order No. 57, Headquarters
Department No. 2, Dec. 8, 1862, in Compiled Service
Record of John H. Forney; General Order No. 99, Head
quarters District of the Gulf, Dec. 14, 1862, O.R. ,
XV, 899; Bragg to Davis, Nov. 24, 1862, ibid., XX, Pt. 2,
p. 423; William W. Mackall, A S o n 's Recollections of His
Father (New York:
E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1930),
174-75.
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by the enemy.

43

. . . .
Thomas H. Millington, a civilian engi

neer, took charge of the construction of an earthwork
designed to mount at least three guns.
his men worked rapidly.

Millington and

He began work on a shell bank

in Grant's Pass on December 7.

Leadbetter instructed him

to transport dirt from Dauphin Island or Mobile Point
near Fort Morgan to use in the construction.

Millington

found it more expedient to use oyster shells and sand
from the immediate vicinity, however, and by December 13
had the battery ready for guns to be mounted.

The chief

of artillery for the District of the Gulf had selected
one 10-inch columbiad, one 8-inch columbiad, and one 32pounder rifled piece as armament for the work.
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The Confederates at Fort Gaines had little time to
rest.

They moved artillery pieces in, and Captain J. M.

Cary's Company C, 1st Alabama Artillery Battalion, trans
ferred from Fort Morgan to man the g u n s .

On December 14

two Union sidewheel steamer gunboats sailed to within
about two miles of the battery to see what the
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Thomas H. Millington to Liernur, Dec. 19, 1862,
Leadbetter Papers; Commodore Henry H. Bell to Lieutenant
Commander Pierce Crosby, Oct. 10, 1862, O.R.N., XIX,
296; Bell to Farragut, Oct. 12, 1862, ibid., 297; Bell to
Lieutenant Commander Homer C. Blake, Dec. 10, 1862,
ibid., 401.
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Millington to Liernur, Dec. 12, 1862, Leadbetter
Papers; Millington to Liernur, Dec. 19, 1862, ibid.;
Major Daniel Trueheart to Leadbetter, Nov. 24, 1862,
ibid.

119
Confederates had done.

The gunboats stopped and opened

fire on the battery and the Confederate gunboat Selma
stationed nearby.

All of the shells from the enemy

vessels fell short of their marks.

The Selma replied to

this fire first, but her shots fell short also.

Cary's

Alabamians manned their guns and opened on the enemy
gunboats.

One of their shells burst before it reached

the vessels, and another passed over them.
two sidewheelers withdrew.

With this the

Millington and his engineers

continued their work unmolested until its completion on
December 17.

45
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"Extracts from private diary of Commodore H. H.
Bell, U. S. Navy, 1862— No. 5," O.R.N., XIX, 734;
Advertiser and Register, Dec. 16, 1862.

CHAPTER V
"CANNOT GENL. BEAUREGARD SEND ME REINFORCEMENTS!"
Jefferson Davis needed a competent officer to
replace Forney at Mobile, and he searched for such a man
during a trip to the West in December 1862.

While visit

ing Bragg's army at Murfreesborough, he received a recom
mendation from Major General William J. Hardee.

The

latter, whom it will be remembered had been Mobile's
first commander, suggested Major General Simon B. Buck
ner, one of Hardee's division commanders.

The desire to

see Brigadier General Patrick R. Cleburne promoted at
least partially motivated Hardee's recommendation.

Davis

did select Buckner and directed Bragg to appoint Cleburne
as a major general to take over Buckner's division.
Bragg issued the pertinent orders on December 14.^
Despite Hardee's maneuvering, Buckner had qualifications

"Liddell's Record and Impressions of the Civil War
in North America 1860 to 1866," in Moses and St. John R.
Liddell Family Papers, Louisiana State University Depart
ment of Archives and Manuscripts; Special Order No. 62,
Headquarters Department No. 2, Dec. 14, 1862, O.R., XV,
899-900; Enclosure No. 5„ Bragg to Cooper, Nov. 22,
1862, ibid., XX, Pt. 2, pp. 508-509; Para III, Special
Order No. 24, Headquarters Army of Tennessee, Dec. 14,
1862, ibid., 449; Colonel George W. C. Lee to Bragg,
Dec. 13, 1862, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 396; Leonidas Polk
to wife, Dec. 25, 1862, in Leonidas Polk Papers, Southern
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill.
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for command of the District of the Gulf.

He had gradu

ated from West Point, served bravely in the Mexican War,
and taught tactics at the Military Academy.

After

resigning from the army in 1855, Buckner worked for a
while as a construction superintendent.

In Confederate

service, he had led a division at Fort Donelson and in
the Kentucky Campaign and had a reputation as "an excel2
lent organizer."
Mobile's new commander assumed his duties on Decem
ber 23, 1862.

A Montgomery newspaper, in noting Buck

ner's arrival, stated:

"He is well qualified for the

position, and will inspire the utmost confidence in his
3
ability, and military skill,..."
Buckner found only
about 7,600 men present for duty in his district.

He

soon issued an appeal to the men of Mobile to aid in
defense of the city.

2

He asked them to come out and either

Mark M. Boatner III, Civil War Dictionary (New
York:
David McKay Co., Inc., 1959), 95-96; Thomas
Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of
Tennessee, 1861-1862 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni
versity Press, 1967) , 66.
3
General Order No. 105, Headquarters District of the
Gulf, Dec. 23, 1862, O . R . , XV, 905; Advertiser and
Register, Dec. 27, 1862; Daily M a i l , Dec. 30, 1862.
Shortly after Buckner's arrival, the District of the Gulf
was renamed Department of the Gulf but remained under
Bragg's Department No. 2. Some authorities in Richmond
apparently never officially recognized the new status.
Major General Simon B. Buckner to Seddon, May 12, 1863,
O . R . , XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 833.
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form new companies or fill up existing units.

The troops

when organized would be placed under competent officers
for drill and instruction.

Buckner intended to use the

men only in actual defense of the city and only if the
city seemed in real danger.

William Dunn, president of

the Committee of Safety, urging the populace to respond
to Buckner's call, said:

"...let no resident of Mobile

able to wield an arm refuse to take his place in the
ranks of its defenders."^
Davis visited Mobile shortly after Buckner took over
the District of the Gulf.

The president arrived by train

on the afternoon of December 30 and moved into a room at
the Battle House Hotel.

A number of people gathered near

the hotel with the expectation of hearing him speak.
However, Davis left soon with Buckner, several other
generals, and the staff officers of these generals to
inspect the 17th Alabama Infantry and the fortifications
they manned on the bay shore.

The reviewing party

visited each battery and inspected the company respon
sible for each one.

After this phase of the proceedings

had ended, the entire 17th Alabama marched in review.
That night the regiment's band serenaded Davis at the
Battle House, and he made a short address to the crowd.

4

"Abstract from Report of Troops, District of the
Gulf," Dec. 20, 1862, O . R . , XV, 903; Advertiser and
Register, Jan. 1, 1863.
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The next day Davis visited Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines
with Buckner and the new naval commander at Mobile,
Admiral Franklin Buchanan.

On January 1, 1863, Davis

left Mobile to return to Richmond.

5

No extraordinary events occurred in the Mobile
defenses between the time Buckner arrived and the end of
January 1863.

The troops assigned to the various bat

teries and earthworks drilled several times a day as both
infantry and artillery.

Their officers expected them to

keep their batteries and quarters clean and in good
order.

The engineers needed more shovels for use in

construction of the fortifications, and Buckner appealed
to both the Quartermaster General and the Engineer
Bureau for some to be sent.

The Engineer Bureau could

furnish only about half the number of shovels he
requested.

Many of the laborers available to the Con

federate engineers were unsatisfactory.
complained:

One officer

"The Irishmen sent me by the Bureau is a

lazy set and I return them having only permitted them to

5
Daily M a i l , Jan. 4, 1863; Ephraim M c D . Anderson,
Memoirs: Historical and Personal; Including the Cam
paigns of the First Missouri Confederate Brigade (St.
Louis: Times Printing Co., 1868) , 257.
r
Order No. 3, Headquarters Batteries Huger and
Tracy, Dec. 28, 1862, Records of the Department of the
Gulf, 1861-1865, Louisiana Historical Association Col
lection, Special Collections Division, Tulane University
Library; Order No. 9, Headquarters Batteries Huger and
Tracy, Dec. 28, 1862, ibid.
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work but one day."

7

In addition to having to deal with

poor labor, the Confederate officers also had to cope
with problems created by the elements.

For example, high

tides and winds eroded away about ten feet of the front
parapet of the Pinto Island Battery.

The commander of

the bay batteries recommended the erection of pilings in
front of the battery to act as a breakwater.

8

The Confederate command established a series of reg
ulations concerning Negro laborers on January 26, 1863.
Leadbetter ordered his superintendents to have overseers
and laborers at work promptly at seven o'clock every
morning.

The overseers were to keep the men under their

charge busy at all times so that they would lose no time.
No overseer could excuse a man from work unless a medi
cal officer approved his remaining in quarters.

The

superintendents issued all tools to the overseers, who
would have responsibility for these tools after they
issued them to the work gangs.

If the laborers damaged

any property, such as flatboats, tools, pile drivers,

7
Buckner to Colonel Abraham C. Myers, Dec. 29, 1862,
in Compiled Service Record of Simon B. Buckner; Endorse
ment, Dec. 30, 1862, by Gilmer on Buckner to [Myers?],
Dec. 29, 1862, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer
Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 2, p. 168; Gilmer to Leadbetter,
Jan. 2, 1863, ibid., 173; Glenn to Leadbetter, Jan. 6,
1863, Leadbetter Papers.
O
Captain William Y. C. Humes to Trueheart, Jan. 16,
1863, Leadbetter Papers.
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or wagons, the superintendents had to report the damage
to engineer headquarters.

Leadbetter's regulations

expressed some concern for the health of the laborers.
He wanted their rations to be as good as possible, and
he ordered an assistant surgeon to check the men daily.
How well all of these regulations would work had yet to
receive testing, however.

9

A minor foray by the Confederates against the Sand
Island lighthouse occurred on the last day of January
1863.

Sand Island is situated near the main ship chan

nel into Mobile Bay southwest of Fort Morgan, and a
lighthouse located on the island helped guide vessels
into the bay.

After the Union navy established the

blockade off the bay, the blockaders would sometimes use
the lighthouse to observe movements of the Confederates
within the bay.

To deprive the enemy of this observation

post, the engineer officer for the lower bay defenses,
Lieutenant John W. Glenn, led a small group of Confed
erates from Fort Gaines to the island by boat.

Glenn and

his men set fire to five frame buildings near the
lighthouse.

Lookouts aboard the U.S.S. Pembina detected

Glenn's activity, and the gunboat fired a few shots at

9
General Order No. 3, Engineer Office, Jan. 26, 1863,
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Department of the Gulf,
Jan. 1863-April 1864, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, pp. 3-4, RG
109, National Archives.
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the island.

The Confederates withdrew after having

destroyed only the buildings set afire, but Glenn planned
to return to destroy the lighthouse later.
The Confederates attempted to conduct another offen
sive operation in early February 1863.
officers had control of this sortie.

Mobile's naval
They hoped to make

a night attack on the blockading squadron and capture at
least one of the vessels by boarding.

On the night of

February 5, between sixty and one hundred men from other
vessels transferred to the Selma for the attack.

Armed

with cutlasses and pistols, they wore white handker
chiefs around their caps so that they could distinguish
one another from the enemy during the boarding.

The

Selma left Mobile in a dense fog, weather which should
have aided the operation.

Near Dog River bar, however,

the gunboat struck a snag or piling and began to sink
rapidly.

The crew got her pumps going and kept her

afloat until she could be steered into shallow water.
There the Selma ran aground.

Ship carpenters came down

to patch the hole, and the Confederates used a steam fire
engine to get the Selma afloat.

She then sailed to the

"^Thomas M. Owen, History of Alabama and Dictionary
of Alabama Biography, 4 vols. (Chicago:
The S. J. Clarke
Publishing Co., 1921), II, 1006; Glenn to Leadbetter,
Feb. 1, 1863, Leadbetter Papers; Commodore R. B. Hitch
cock to Captain Thornton A. Jenkins, Feb. 3, 1863,
O.R.N., XIX, 599.
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dry dock for permanent repairs.
marized the operation:

One naval officer sum

"...now we are once more afloat,

not having boarded the blockaders and 'nobody hurt.1" ^
Work to improve the battery at Grant's Pass had con
tinued since the skirmish there in December.

Captain

Cary's Alabamians replaced the carriage of their 8-inch
columbiad to make it more serviceable.

When they dis

covered the magazine leaking and covered with too little
dirt, Lieutenant Glenn's engineers made the necessary
repairs.

To supply the garrison in the event of extended

operations, the Confederates constructed a casemated
storeroom for foodstuffs and water tanks to hold about
3,800 gallons.

Cary still had several recommendations

for further improvements.

He asked for a supply of tim

ber to build a small hospital for his men.

To protect

his men from the weather, he proposed that a building
be erected as company quarters.

Finally, Cary requested

that the engineers build a wharf on the island to
facilitate resupply and reinforcement of the garrison.

^ M e m o r a n d u m by Hitchcock, Feb. 24, 1863, O.R.N.,
XIX, 627; T. L. Moore to Cousin Blannie, Mar. 7, 1863, in
Southall and Bowen Papers, Southern Historical Collec
tion, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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In time the engineers completed all of the construction
12
Cary asked for.
The Confederate engineers had continued to work on
their defenses nearer Mobile as well as at Grant's Pass
during January.

Buckner had ordered a four-gun battery

erected on Choctaw Point Spit because the earthern bat
teries near Choctaw Point could not effectively cover the
main ship channel to the city or the Dog River bar
obstructions.

As the spit was under water, the engineers

would have to use crib work filled with dirt as the base
for the battery.

Leadbetter assigned this task to

Liernur, who began driving piles for the crib work.

The

Confederates carried out minor improvements at the Pinto
Island and Spanish River batteries.

The former mounted

six guns and covered Choctaw Pass and Spanish River.
Spanish River Battery contained eight guns, the heaviest
of which bore on the channel of Spanish River.

Leadbet

ter also strengthened the line of obstructions from
Choctaw Point to Spanish River.

These piles stood in the

water in eight rows five to ten feet apart.

The openings

■^Cary to Colonel William L. Powell, Feb. 6, 1863,
Leadbetter Papers; Trueheart to Leadbetter (with endorse
ment by Leadbetter to Glenn), Feb. 2, 1863, ibid.; Glenn
to Leadbetter, Feb. — , 18 63, ibid.
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left at the Spanish River and Choctaw Pass channels
would be closed by rafts when necessary.

13

Leadbetter's engineers also remained busy near the
eastern shore of the upper bay.

They had already com

pleted Apalachee Battery on the west side of the fork of
the Apalachee and Blakely rivers and mounted six guns in
it.

Leadbetter expressed dissatisfaction with the loca

tion and layout of the battery, however.

He began erect

ing a four-gun work at the head of Apalachee Island.
Here the Confederate artillerymen could better cover the
two rivers than they could from the Apalachee Battery.
Unfortunately the engineers had no guns readily available
to place in the new battery.

Leadbetter planned to put

the four 42-pounders then in the ironclad battery Danube
in the work if no other cannon could be found.

He did

not think the Danube was strong enough to withstand heavy
enemy fire.

In the meantime, he directed stationing of

the Danube near Apalachee Battery for use if needed.

In

the channels on each side of the new earthwork the Con
federate engineers put in several lines of pilings to
obstruct passage.

14

13

Leadbetter to Liernur, Jan. 3, 1863, ibid.;
"Report of operations for the defense of Mobile, Ala.,
for the month of January, 1863," Mar. 11, 1863, O . R . ,
XV, 1010-1011.
14

"Report of operations...," Mar. 11, 1863, O.R. ,
XV, 1011.
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The entrenchments around the city occupied much of
Leadbetter's attention.

Work had ceased on the line of

fortifications begun by Liernur in 1862.
that line was nine miles long.

By early 1863

Buckner had come to the

conclusion that he would not be able to obtain a suffi
cient number of troops properly to man such extensive
works.

He ordered Leadbetter to build a second line of

earthworks between Liernur's and Mobile.
would prove easier to man adequately.

A shorter line

Leadbetter plan

ned to begin his work at Choctaw Point and extend the
fortifications around to the mouth of One Mile Creek.
There a series of earthworks and a swamp would block any
enemy advance.

In this line Leadbetter hoped to con

struct square redoubts approximately 600 yards apart
with trenches for infantrymen between each redoubt.

In

concluding his report of work done on these works Leadbetter stated:
The line is too near the city to save it
from bombardment, but such an attack would
prove a lesser evil than the capture of the
place.
It is hoped that the line j^n be held
until the place shall be relieved.
Living and health conditions of the Negro labor
force at Mobile underwent close scrutiny by both engi
neers and medical officers in early February 1863.

Many

of the workers suffered from illness much of the time,

15Ibid., 1012.
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and rumors circulated that the mortality rate among them
was very high.

At least one engineer officer complained

that he could not keep enough laborers to do the work he
had orders to do.

16

Dr. D. E. Smith, the assistant sur

geon in charge of the Engineer Hospital, conducted an
investigation into the rations and living quarters of
the Negroes.

He found the food issued anything but suf

ficient for their good health:
...Upon investigation of their rations I find
them to consist of Corn Meal, rice, Molasses
and fresh beef, the latter article often fall
ing short and according to evidence of over
seers for as many as five and six days in
succession the negroes [sic] have lived upon
Bread and Molasses.
The Corn Meal is issued
in sufficient quantities, but there being no
lard or fat of any kind issued it makes very
unpalatable bread.
Bacon is issued for one
day only in every fifteen days |^d salt
meats are not issued at all,...
To correct these deficiencies, Smith recommended that
the engineer commissaries issue to the workers more
salted meat and large quantities of fresh vegetables.
Smith also observed problems with the workers'
quarters.

Most of the Negroes stayed in Hitchcock's

Cotton Press where they were crowded together in

^ G l e n n to Leadbetter, Feb. 1, 1863, Leadbetter
Papers.
17

Assistant Surgeon D. E. Smith to Surgeon F. A.
Ross, Feb. 11, 1863, ibid.
18Ibid.
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uncomfortable quarters.

The Press stood near the Choctaw

Point swamps, a traditionally unhealthy area of the city
because of dampness and mosquitoes.

Dr. F. A. Ross,

Medical Director of the District of the Gulf, had
appointed three medical officers to attend to the labor
ers in addition to Dr. Smith at the hospital.

According

to Smith, the primary diseases affecting the Negroes
were typhoid fever, measles, pneumonia, Erysispe.las, and
"swamp fever."

19

Ross admitted that the physicians had

not been able to treat some of the ill Negroes success
fully but stated that the laborers received the same
care as the soldiers and that deaths among the laborers
were fewer than among a similar number of raw troops.
Although Ross could do little about the food issued, he
did recommend the erection of barracks for the Negroes
along the line of earthworks.

The Confederates also

constructed a larger hospital for the laborers who
worked on Dauphin Island and the other lower bay
defenses.^
In late February 1863 the Confederates completed
the destruction of the Sand Island lighthouse.

Despite

the burning of the wooden buildings, the men of the

1Q
on

Ibid.; Advertiser and Register, Feb. 17, 1863.

Advertiser and Register, Feb. 17, 1863; Glenn to
Leadbetter, Mar. 3, 1863, Leadbetter Papers.
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blockading squadron continued to land on the island and
use the lighthouse to observe Confederate movements.
Writers in the past have given credit for destroying the
lighthouse to Captain N. J. Ludlow, but Lieutenant Glenn
actually carried out the mission.

He and a small party

of men proceeded by boat to Sand Island on the night of
February 22.

The next morning the Confederates placed a

total of seventy pounds of powder at various places in
the structure.

By three o'clock that afternoon Glenn had

completed his work, and he fired the charges.
and his men returned to Fort Gaines.

Then he

In his report of

the operation, Glenn described the results of his mines:
...Nothing remains but a narrow shred [?]
about fifty feet high & from one to five feet
wide.
The first storm we have will blow that
d o w n ....
During February the Confederate engineers continued
to work at strengthening the Mobile defenses.

No great

endeavor had been required at Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines
since they seemed practically complete.

Leadbetter's men

took up the iron rails from the road between Fort Morgan
and Navy Cove because they needed the iron for a floating
battery under construction at Mobile.
rails to replace the iron taken up.

They laid wooden
At Grant's Pass the

engineers erected a wharf in accordance with Capatin

21

Owen, History of Alabama, II, 1006; Glenn to Leadbetter, Feb. 24, 1863, Leadbetter Papers.
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Cary's earlier request.

Leadbetter continued work at the

Choctaw Point Spit battery but felt construction should
be suspended for two reasons.

First, he did not think

cannons were available to mount there, and second, he
wanted to use the boats employed there to complete the
new battery on Apalachee Island.

A good deal of work

had been done at the latter battery, but earth had to be
brought in by boat because little dirt was available on
the low, swampy island.

The engineers placed no further

piles in the channels near this battery during the
22

month.

Leadbetter's men conducted other engineering opera
tions at the bay batteries and city entrenchments.

They

had practically completed Pinto Island Battery even
though the tide eroded part of the parapet.

At Spanish

River Battery the engineers did work to reinforce the
parapet and expand the flanks to contain two additional
guns.

The engineers drove further pilings near these

batteries to obstruct the channels.

To help reinforce

the earthworks, the Confederates moved a floating battery
into the area.

This battery mounted two 10-inch guns,

and railroad iron covered her front.

The gunboat Selma

fired some of her guns at the battery to test the iron's

22

Leadbetter to Gilmer, Mar. 15, 1863, O . R . , XV,
1014-1015.
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strength, and although several shells broke on the hard
surface, none of the shots hurt the iron.

23

On Leadbet

ter 's new line of entrenchments, the laborers began
redoubts on either side of Government Street and worked
outward from there.

They completed each earthwork to the

point where it seemed defensible, and the laborers then
moved on to begin a new work.
ing touches later.

They would add the finish

Leadbetter placed Colonel P. J.

Pillans in charge of the construction of the city
24
entrenchments.
The rations drawn by the troops at Mobile in early
1863 contained more varieties of foods than those issued
to troops in the field.

Commissary officers furnished

the following items most regularly— fresh beef, corn
meal, rice, molasses, and salt.

The troops received one

pound of beef eight days in ten, one and a quarter pounds
of corn meal seven days in ten, fifteen pounds of rice
per hundred rations daily, one gallon of molasses daily,
and four and a half pounds of salt daily.

If molasses

23

Ibid.,1015; Humes to Captain L. G. Aldrich, Feb.
20, 1863, Leadbetter Papers; "Report of operations...,"
Mar. 11, 1863, O . R . , XV, 1012; Moore to Cousin Blannie, Mar. 7, 1863, Southall and Bowen Papers; Memorandum
by Hitchcock, Feb. 24, 1863, O.R.N., XIX, 627; Lieu
tenant George Gift to ----- , June 13, 1863, quoted in
Harriet Gift Castlen, Hope Bids Me Onward (Savannah, Ga.:
Chatham Publishing Co., 1945), 128.
^ L e a d b e t t e r to Colonel P. J. Pillans, Feb. 26, 1863,
Leadbetter Papers.
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was not available from the commissaries, those officers
would make up for it by doubling the sugar ration.
Issued less often, but nonetheless available, were bacon,
flour, potatoes, and vegetables.

To supplement rations

drawn, many of the soldiers planted gardens to raise
vegetables.

These gardens not only provided food but

also relief from the daily drill routine.

At least one

regiment planted a field with corn and melons in addition
to its garden.

As the war wore on, this abundance of

foodstuffs did d w i n d l e . ^
In order to defend Mobile properly in case of
attack, Buckner and Leadbetter realized they needed ade
quate artillery and ammunition.

Buckner sent his chief

of artillery, Major Victor von Sheliha, to Richmond to
try to get more heavy artillery pieces for Fort Morgan,
Fort Gaines, and Fort Grant.

Leadbetter sent with Von

Sheliha a letter to Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer, chief of
the Engineer Bureau, and called Gilmer's attention to
Mobile's needs.

He stated:

"The liberality accorded in

this behalf to the city of Charleston and the good effect

25

General Order No. 130, Headquarters District of
the Gulf, Mar. 1, 1863, Orders, District of the Gulf,
1862-1865, RG 109, National Archives; Harris to C. L.
Hays, Feb. 23, 1863, Harris Letters; Advertiser and
Register, Mar. 20, 1863.
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of it, will plead in our favor."

26

In a letter to Gen

eral Cooper, Buckner asked for more ammunition for his
artillery pieces.

He complained that the Ordnance

Bureau had limited him to 175 rounds per gun.

Buckner

also stated:
The object of the fortifications now in
progress is to compel the enemy, should he
appear in large force, to besiege this place,
and reduce him to the necessity of making
regular approaches.
The works will be need
less unless a proper supply of ammunition is
provided.
The requisition I send is for not
exceeding a half-supply for a siege 2 ^ It is
indispensable to a good defence....
Secretary of War Seddon assured Buckner that he would
receive enough ammunition to give him 200 rounds per
gun.

The supply bureaus in Richmond had no more than

that at the time, but Seddon said he would keep Buckner
in mind when supplies became more plentiful.

28

On April 18, 1863, the Confederates once again made
an offensive move against the enemy.

Union blockading

vessels were accustomed to lying in as close to Mobile
Point east of Fort Morgan as possible to try to catch
blockade runners going out or coming in through the

26
Leadbetter to Gilmer, Apr. 24, 1863, Letters Sent,
Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 162.

27

Buckner to Cooper, Mar. 20, 1863, in Simon B.
Buckner Papers, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino,
California.
^^Seddon to Buckner, Apr. 4, 1863, O . R . , XV, 10351036.
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Swash Channel.

In this operation, the Confederate troops

had as their objective discouraging the blockaders from
coming in so close to land.

Major James T. Gee left Fort

Morgan with two lieutenants and forty-two enlisted men of
his 1st Alabama Artillery Battalion and two rifled field
pieces on the night of April 17.

The detachment marched

nine miles along the point until they found a blockader
lying about one mile from the beach.

At daylight the

Confederates opened fire with their cannons.

After being

struck several times the Union vessel withdrew from
range.

Two other gunboats came up, and all three fired

at the Confederate position.

The Union fire did no dam

age except to hit and destroy a stack of muskets.

After

two and a half hours the Union vessels sailed off, and
Gee's men returned to Fort Morgan.

From this time on the

blockaders did stay farther out from the land.

29

During April 1863 Buckner lost several of his gen
erals and many of his troops.

Through the last two weeks

of March he received repeated requests from Pemberton in
Mississippi to send one or two cavalry regiments to the
northern part of that state to aid planters in getting
their crops out of the region and to combat enemy raids.

29

Roll for Feb. 28-Apr. 30, 1863, Record of Events
Cards, Company B, 1st Alabama Artillery Battalion, Com
piled Service Records; Stewart to Julia Stewart, Apr. 21,
1863, Stewart Letters.

139
On March 28 Buckner finally agreed to send the 2nd Ala
bama Cavalry to Pemberton even though he did not feel he
could spare any troops.

The regiment reached Pemberton

about April 29 with less than half of its men armed.

30

President Davis telegraphed Buckner on April 7 asking
what troops he could spare for Bragg in Middle Tennessee.
Buckner replied that he could send Cumming's brigade of
about 2,200 men if Pemberton would reinforce Mobile in
case of attack.

By April 20 Buckner had sent Cumming's

brigade of three regiments, one additional regiment, two
infantry battalions, and a battery to Tullahoma— in all
about 4,000 men.

Buckner thus lost practically all of

his infantry, except for several regiments serving as
heavy artillery.

31

In addition to the loss of General

Cumming, who accompanied his brigade to Tennessee, Buck
ner lost General Mackall, who became Bragg's chief of
staff.

In response to a request for his services by

30

Pemberton to Buckner, Mar. 20, 1863, O . R . , XXIV,
Pt. 3, p. 679; Pemberton to Buckner, Mar. 24, 1863,
ibid., 687; Pemberton to Buckner Mar. 26, 1863, ibid.,
691; Pemberton to Buckner, Mar. 28, 1863, ibid.; Pember
ton to General Joseph E. Johnston, Apr. 29, 1863, ibid.,
803.
^ D a v i s to Buckner, Apr. 7, 1863, in Dunbar Rowland
(ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist; His Letters,
Papers and Speeches, 10 vols. (Jackson, Miss.:
Depart
ment of Archives and History, 1923), V, 469; Buckner to
Davis, Apr. 8, 1863, O . R . , XXIV, Pt. 3, p. 724; Johnston
to Buckner, Apr. 11, 1863, ibid., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 750;
"Diary of Captain Edward Crenshaw," 441.

140
General Edmund Kirby Smith, the War Department ordered
General Slaughter to Texas, but it quickly revoked the
order rather than deprive Buckner of his last brigadier.
Slaughter retained command of the troops in the immediate vicinity of Mobile.

32

The War Department on April 27, 1863, ordered Buck
ner to turn over command of the District of the Gulf to
his ranking subordinate and go to Knoxville, Tennessee,
and assume command of the Department of East Tennessee.
The reason for this order is not clear, but the War
Department possibly hoped Buckner would end the confused
command situation in East Tennessee and work closely
with Bragg in Middle Tennessee.

Major General Dabney H.

Maury, who had just assumed command at Knoxville,
received orders to await Buckner and then go to Mobile
to assume Buckner's place.

33

The latter had succeeded

in improving the condition of the Mobile defenses by

32

Para I, Special Order No. 9, Headquarters Depart
ment No. 2, Apr. 17, 1863, O.R., XXIII, Pt. 2, p. 777;
Para X V I , Special Order No. 96, Adjutant and Inspector
General's Office, Apr. 20, 1863, ibid., XV, 1048; Para
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General's Office, Apr. 27, 1863, quoted in Compiled
Service Record of James E. Slaughter.
33
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his energetic action.

Admiral Buchanan, no doubt express

ing the sentiment of many in Mobile, wrote to Richmond
asking that Buckner's orders be revoked:

"...he has the

confidence of all here...and his absence will cause much
regret to the whole community."

34

Others in Mobile

accepted the loss of Buckner and asked Seddon to assign
Mackall in his place.
situation and wants.

They felt that Mackall knew their
Since his arrival at Mobile, these

citizens had found him "uniformly courteous, and always
attentive to all his duties— and firm and prompt in their
discharge.
Before Buckner could leave Mobile, he once again
received requests to send troops to Mississippi.
Originally Pemberton had asked several of his subordi
nates to request some cavalry from Buckner to combat a
Union cavalry force conducting a raid through Mississippi.
Buckner replied to these requests by saying that he had
sent all of his available troops to Tennessee.

Pemberton

then went to Davis and the War Department to get their
assistance.

The War Department ordered a cavalry regi

ment from Montgomery to Pollard and ordered Buckner to

34

Buchanan to Mallory, Apr. 28, 1863, Telegrams
Received, Secretary of War.
35

Committee of Safety of Mobile to Seddon, Apr. 30,
1863, in Compiled Service Record of Mackall; William W.
Mackall, A S o n 's Recollections of His Father (New York:
E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1930), 175.
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send some cavalry from either Pollard or Mobile to
Pemberton.

To this Buckner replied that he had very few

men left in his district and practically no cavalry to
spare.

He did agree to send the only cavalry battalion

he had left, about 300 men in all.

There was a plaintive

note in Buckner's closing remarks:

"Cannot Genl. Beaure-

gard send me reinforcements!"

36

The 15th Alabama Cavalry

Battalion proceeded from Mobile to Meridian, but it
arrived too late to be used against the enemy raid.

37

Buckner's last action prior to departing for Knox
ville was to issue a call for the citizens to organize
themselves for local defense.

He urged them to form

companies, battalions, and regiments so as to be ready
if needed to man the defenses.

The organization of the

troops he turned over to General Slaughter.

After arriv

ing in Knoxville, Buckner reported that his appeal "was

36
Pemberton to Brigadier General John Adams, Apr.
24, 1863, O . R . , XXIV, Pt. 3, p. 781; Pemberton to
Adams, Apr. 25, 1863, ibid., 785; Major General William
W. Loring to Pemberton, Apr. 25, 1863, ibid., 787; John
ston to Pemberton, Apr. 27, 1863, ibid., 791; Loring to
Pemberton, Apr. 27, 1863, ibid., 793; Pemberton to Davis,
Apr. 28, 1863, ibid., 797; Pemberton to Cooper, Apr. 29,
1863, ibid., 801; Davis to Pemberton, May 1, 1863, ibid.,
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ibid., XV, 1069; Cooper to Buckner, May 1, 1863, ibid.;
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"^Buckner to Pemberton, May 2, 1863, ibid., XXIV,
Pt. 3, p. 817; Brigadier General Abraham Buford to
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responded to in a proper spirit, and with a promise of
fair success."

38

Governor Shorter made a final appeal

on behalf of the citizens of Mobile to Richmond to have
Mackall appointed to replace Buckner.

Seddon replied

that the authorities in Richmond had already chosen
Buckner's successor before the receipt of the April 30
letter from the Mobile Committee of Safety or Shorter's
telegram and that the decision would not be changed.
Slaughter assumed temporary command of the District of
the Gulf on May 8, 1863, when Buckner left by rail.

The

War Department instructed Slaughter to continue the
organization of local defense troops while he awaited
Maury's arrival.

His only other action of consequence as

temporary commander seems to have been to issue an order
to obstruct completely the channel at Grant's Pass.

39
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39Shorter to Seddon, May 6, 1863, O . R . , XV, 1077;
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May 7,
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CHAPTER VI
"...AN INTERESTING AND AGREEABLE COMMAND..."
On May 19, 1863, Major General Dabney H. Maury
assumed command of the District of the Gulf, a position
he would retain until the end of the war.'*'

A native of

Virginia, Maury graduated from West Point in 1846 and
fought in the Mexican War.

His Confederate service began

as chief of staff to Major General Earl Van Dorn in
Arkansas.

Promoted to brigadier general, Maury led a

division of the Army of the West at the battles of Iuka
and Corinth.

His division moved to Snyder's Bluff on the

Yazoo River above Vicksburg in late December 1862 and
defended that position against attacks by Union gunboats.
In April 1863 Davis chose Maury to assume command in East
Tennessee, desiring "an efficient officer of rank" for
that "important command."

2

There is no evidence indicating

■^General Order No. 192, Headquarters Department of
the Gulf, May 19, 1863, quoted in Daily Tribune, May 23,
1863.
2
Ezra J. Warner, Generals in G r a y : Lives of the Con
federate Commanders (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State Uni
versity Press, 1959), 215; Mark M. Boatner III, Civil War
Dictionary (New York:
David McKay Co., Inc., 1959), 519;
Cooper to Pemberton, Apr. 9, 1863, O . R . , XXIV, Pt. 3, p.
729; Pemberton to Maury, Apr. 15, lB63, ibid., 743.
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why Davis so soon switched Maury and Buckner, but he
specifically selected Maury to take over at Mobile and
would not allow any senior major generals to be assigned
to the district.

Maury's primary qualification for the

command was his experience in supervising heavy artillery
against gunboats at Snyder's Bluff, but his record in
Arkansas and northern Mississippi had marked him as an
3

able general.

Former Confederate Congressman Edmund S. Dargan pro
vided his home as a residence for Maury and his wife when
they arrived in Mobile.

In later years Maury remembered

his tenure at the city as "altogether an interesting and
agreeable command."

4

He had not been particularly anxi

ous to go to Mobile and for a long time did not under
stand why he had been assigned there.

He had hoped for

an assignment to take over a division in his native
Virginia.

When he received orders for Mobile, however,

Maury welcomed the prospect of leaving Knoxville.
letter to the Secretary of War he wrote:

In a

"...I shall

3
Cooper to Maury, Apr. 29, 1863, Letters and Tele
grams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol.
38, p. 219; Johnston to [Hardee], Aug. 31, 1863, O . R . ,
XXX, Pt. 4, p. 573; Johnston to Cooper, Sept. 13, 1863,
ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 222; Cooper to Johnston, Sept. 16,
1863, ibid., XXX, Pt. 4, p. 653.
4

Dabney H. Maury, Recollections of a Virginian
(New York:
Scribners, 1894), 190.

146
enter upon its duties with more satisfaction than I find
here...."

5

Maury became very popular with the people of

Mobile and the soldiers under his command.

One of

Maury's men remembered him:
...Our commander was Dabney H. Maury, 'every
inch a soldier, ' but then there were not many
inches of him.
The soldiers called him 'puss
in boots,' because half of his diminuitive
person seemed lost in a pair of the immense
cavalry boots of the day. He was a wise and
gallant officer....
Shortly after arriving in Mobile, Maury attempted to
augment his weak garrison.

Thousands of refugees from

New Orleans had arrived in the city to avoid swearing the
oath of allegiance to the United States government.

The

group of refugees included large numbers of men of mili
tary age.

Maury telegraphed the War Department to seek

authority to organize eligible men into companies and
form battalions or a regiment.

He inquired whether the

men should be accepted as conscripts or with the privi
leges of volunteers.

Secretary Seddon replied several

days later that Maury could organize the New Orleans ref
ugees into military units but only for temporary service.

5Maury to Seddon, May 7, 1863, O . R . , XXIII, Pt. 2,
p. 822.
^Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction:
Personal Experiences of the Late W a r , ed. by Richard B.
Harwell (New York:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), 247;
P. D. Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," Southern
Historical Society Papers, XXXIX (1914), 119.
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The conscript laws demanded that the men remain liable to
being drafted and placed in existing organizations.

After

receiving Seddon's instructions, Maury tried to form the
Louisianians into companies, but he had to admit defeat.
The refugees resisted his efforts to form a battalion.
Many of the men did eventually enter Louisiana units
stationed at Mobile, however.

7

In a letter of May 23, 1863, President Davis reas
sured Governor Shorter about his concern for Mobile and
explained the government's policy on the defense of the
area.

Davis had recently received letters from Shorter

and the citizens of Mobile that had expressed concern
about Mobile's weak condition.

He told Shorter that the

government intended to protect the safety of the city
because "any misfortune which should befall it would be
o

deeply felt by the Confederacy."

In 1862 the authorities

in Richmond had begun formulating their strategy on
coastal defense, and by May 1863 had established this
strategy.

Davis explained that due to the enemy's

7
Maury to Seddon, May 22, 1863, Telegrams Received,
Secretary of War; Seddon to Maury, May 26, 1863, Tele
grams Sent, Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, p. 43;
Maury to Seddon, June 16, 1863, Telegrams Received,
Secretary of War.
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Davis to Shorter, May 23, 1863, quoted in Dunbar
Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His
Letters, Papers and Speeches, 10 vols. (Jackson, Miss.:
Department of Archives and History, 1923), V, 494.
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numerical superiority, the Confederates could not leave
large numbers of men in unthreatened coastal garrisons.
All available men had to go to important places under
attack or actually threatened.

If the enemy attacked

Mobile, then troops would move there from other areas.
Davis suggested that both state and city officials fully
organize local defense troops to back up the regulars in
the event of a sudden assault.

9

The Confederate engineers continued work on the
Mobile defenses during May 1863, although they had com
pleted many of their tasks already.

On the forts guard

ing the bay entrances, they had little work to do.

The

engineers sodded the embankment at Fort Gaines and com
pleted the wharf at Fort Grant.

Leadbetter reported the

Choctaw Point, Pinto Island, Spanish River and Apalachee
batteries all complete.

He suspended work on the Choctaw

Spit battery in order to put his full effort on the bat
tery on Apalachee Island.

The latter battery Leadbetter

expected to complete in June.

Despite a severe shortage

of laborers, the Confederate engineers finished construc
tion of most of Leadbetter's line of redoubts around the
city.

Fourteen redoubts stood ready to be manned, and

Leadbetter planned only two more redoubts and several

9

Ibid., 494-95; Samuel R. Bright, Jr., "Confederate
Coast Defense" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke
University, 1961), 210-11.
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smaller works between some of the redoubts.

His men

mounted cannon in practically all of the defensive works.
The only other work of consequence carried out by the
engineers involved the placing of additional obstructions
between Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines and near Apalachee
and Blakely islands near the eastern s h o r e . ^
A new weapon in Mobile's defensive arsenal made its
appearance during May.

Maury, having witnessed their

effectiveness near Vicksburg, ordered the procurement of
one hundred fifty torpedoes

(mines) for placement in the

waters around and in Mobile Bay.

At Grant's Pass the

engineers put ten or twelve torpedoes in the channel west
of the battery.

Other torpedoes they floated near the

Spanish River Battery.

Leadbetter informed Admiral

Buchanan that he intended to place torpedoes in two loca
tions not usually visited by naval or civilian vessels—
the channels of Apalachee and Blakely rivers below Apa
lachee Island Battery and the area of Garrow's Bend near
the city.

Leadbetter also warned that he would eventu

ally put the devices in the channel near Fort Morgan,
extending from the western edge of the channel toward the
fort to obstruct three-fourths of the passage.

All ves

sels moving through the area would need to sail close to

"^"Report of operations for the defense of Mobile,
Ala., for the month of May, 1863," May 31, 1863, O . R . ,
XXVI, Pt. 2, pp. 26-27.

150
the wharf at the fort.

Leadbetter advised Buchanan:

"This will cause little trouble and may prevent acci
dents.""^

By war's end, the torpedoes at Mobile would be

responsible for the sinking of ten enemy vessels.

12

In early June 1863 Mobile's command designation
changed again.

The War Department formally created the

Department of the Gulf on June 8.

The department con

sisted of Mobile and the approaches to the city.
Technically the new department remained under the juris
diction of General Joseph E. Johnston's Western Department, headquartered in Mississippi.

13

Governor Shorter

and the Mobile Committee of Safety had urged Richmond to
make Mobile an independent command and expressed their
displeasure about its status as a "mere dependency" of
Bragg's Army of Tennessee.

Most of the credit for per

suading the War Department to take the actual step
belongs to Buckner.

After his arrival at Knoxville, he

sent Seddon a lengthy letter discussing Mobile's situation

^ Ibid., 27; Leadbetter to Buchanan, May 22, 1863,
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12,
pp. 222-23; Buchanan to Lieutenant George W. Harrison,
May 25, 1863, O.R.N., XX, 828.
12

Milton F. Perry, Infernal Machines: The Story of
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Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 200-201.
■^Para XXII, Special Order No. 136, Adjutant and
Inspector General's Office, June 8, 1863, O.R./ XXVI,
Pt. 2, p. 40.
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and making several suggestions.

Buckner recommended

that the city be separated from B r a g g ’s command because
the two had no close relationship.

He recounted command

problems which had occurred during his tenure at Mobile
and stressed the connection between the defense of Mobile
and Vicksburg.

In concluding, Buckner urged Seddon to

issue orders similar to those which actually appeared on
June 8.

]4

This new arrangement did not, in the long run, prove
beneficial to the defense of Mobile.

Davis had created

the Confederate departmental system "as a means to organ
ize and to administer military forces within every inch
of southern terrain."

15

The departments each had respon

sibility of defending a certain area or location.

Davis

allowed the departmental commanders wide discretionary
powers in the defense of their area, and, as stated
previously, the general exercised virtually complete
control over the units under him.

Only in this regard

did establishment of the Department of the Gulf work in
Maury's and Mobile's favor.

Davis had hoped that

14
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departments would supply their own needs for food and
other supplies.

Here the Department of the Gulf suffered

because the territory within its limits simply could not
provide a sufficient amount of food for Mobile and its
army.

As will be seen later, Buckner experienced prob

lems with another department commander in trying to
obtain supplies, and Maury faced the same situation for
a time.

The creation of a separate department at Mobile

also made more difficult coordination of the city's
defense with defense of the areas Mobile needed to be
connected with— the states of Alabama and Mississippi.

X6

Maury renamed eight of the fortifications in his
department in early June 1863.

All of the batteries so

involved received names of Confederate officers who had
died in the line of duty.

Apalachee Battery became Bat

tery Tracy, named for Brigadier General Edward D. Tracy
of Alabama who died in the battle of Port Gibson.

The

battery on Blakely Island, sometimes referred to as
Gindrat Battery, became Battery Huger, after Lieutenant
Commander Thomas B. Huger, killed April 25, 1862, on the
C.S.S. McRae below New Orleans.

Pinto Island Battery had

its name changed to Battery Gladden in memory of
Brigadier General Adley H. Gladden, who received a mortal
wound at Shiloh shortly after leaving Mobile.

16Ibid., 88-92.

One of the
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floating batteries Maury named for Brigadier General
Lloyd Tilghman, who died at the battle of Champion's
Hill.

He placed the name of one of the generals killed

at Elkhorn Tavern on one work— the Light House Battery
became Battery McCulloch for Ben McCulloch.

Spanish

River Battery was renamed Battery McIntosh to honor Com
mander Charles F. McIntosh, who died aboard the C.S.S.
Louisiana near New Orleans.

Two relatively new fortifi

cations on the Alabama River above Mobile also received
new names.

A work at Choctaw Bluff was called Fort

Stonewall for Stonewall Jackson, and the work at Oven
Bluff was named Fort Sidney Johnston after Albert Sidney
Johnston who died at the battle of Shiloh.

17

While Maury contended with the problem of too few
troops, he also faced an excess of officers in the city.
These officers had come to Mobile on leave or recruiting
duty.

Maury felt that they were a discredit to the army

and a bad example to soldiers and civilians alike
because most seemed to wander the streets with nothing
to do and seemingly under no one's authority.

Maury

wrote to Joe Johnston saying that the officers there on
recruiting duty served no purpose, that the enrolling

17
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officer of the department, Major Jules C. Denis, was
"fully capable of performing all the duty."

Maury

requested permission to order all officers assigned to
units in Johnston's department back to their commands.

18

Some hope existed for partial relief of the troop short
age at Mobile.

Davis had called upon Alabama to muster

7,000 militiamen into Confederate service.

The com

mander of the militia forces of the state ordered the
enlistment of 500 men in Mobile County.

These troops

would not be available until August at the earliest,
however.^
Not only did Maury face a shortage of troops, but he
also found the defenses short of Negro laborers.

The

Engineer Bureau no longer encouraged the use of soldiers
on fortifications, possibly for fear of the demoralizing
effects of having them doing the same work as slaves.
Thus Leadbetter could rely only on slave labor and a
small number of officers and men in engineer service.
The planters of Alabama remained reluctant to send their
slaves away when they needed them to work the fields.
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At one point Leadbetter had only about 150 slaves working
on the city entrenchments.

Maury authorized him to try

to hire laborers for two dollars a day plus subsistence.
Leadbetter had little luck with his efforts to hire men.
When the engineer in charge at Choctaw Bluff asked for
laborers to work there, Leadbetter wrote that he had none
to spare.

Toward the end of June 1863 Maury sent some of

his troops into nearby counties to impress slaves.

One

of the officers, who came from one of Alabama's hill
counties, enjoyed the impressment work he carried out
near Greenville:
...You can imagine that I have a good deal of
fun. At first I thought it a very unpleasant
business to impress Negroes, but the planters
oppose it so much that my ambition makes
more a pleasure to take them than not....
The fall of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, caused Maury
to adopt new measures to improve his defenses.

He felt

that the enemy would attack the city now that they had
the Mississippi River in their possession.

In a circular

to the citizens of Mobile and surrounding areas, he

20
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called upon the able-bodied men to form local defense
units and the owners of slaves to send laborers to work
on the fortifications.

Slaughter received the responsi

bility of organizing, issuing arms to, instructing, and
making assignments for the new units formed.

To Lead-

better, Maury assigned the task of arranging employment
for any slaves sent to the city.

Leadbetter then took

several measures to speed up work on the fortifications.
First, he ordered construction of the city entrenchments
carried on on Sundays as well as on other days in the
week.

Second, under instructions from Maury, Leadbetter

closed down construction at Choctaw and Oven bluffs and
moved all of the laborers and tools from there to Mobile.
In addition to these actions, Maury revoked the leaves of
all officers, ordering them back to their units, and
announced that only sick leaves would be granted in the
future.^
When the Port Hudson garrison surrendered on July 9,
1863, Maury became more concerned about a possible attack

21
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on Mobile.

He realized few factors existed to prevent

Banks' Union army from moving against the city.

In a

letter to the War Department, Maury outlined the condi
tion of his command.

The forts at the bay entrances

appeared defensible to him.

Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines

both had provisions for six months.

Seventeen of the

proposed nineteen redoubts in the city entrenchments were
ready, and the two remaining would be ready soon.

Maury

anticipated that he would need 20,000 men, plus appro
priate ordnance supplies for his guns, to withstand a
siege.

The problem imposed by the defensive line was

that it was so close to the city that if an attack came
the city would suffer from enemy fire.

Because of the

active trade in Mobile and the city's status as a refugee
center, Maury estimated that the city contained some
15,000 non-combatants whom he would have to evacuate.

In

response to Maury's letter, Davis instructed the War
Department to push the collection of supplies for Mobile
and study the reinforcement of the garrison if an attack
came.

He preferred to postpone removing non-combatants

until an assault seemed certain.

22

Fears on the part of the Confederate command of an
attack on Mobile continued through the remainder of July.

22

Maury to Cooper, July 16, 1863, with endorsements,
O . R . , XXVI, Pt. 2, pp. 111-12.
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Cognizant of the situation, Davis warned Johnston that
the enemy might move from New Orleans against the city.
Johnston apprised Davis that he had obtained the same
information from Union prisoners.

He also contacted

Maury to learn the condition of Maury's troops and
supplies.

In responding to Johnston's inquiry, Maury

stated that his force of 2,500 men was entirely inade
quate to withstand an attack.

He felt he needed 15,000

men and four additional field batteries.

Several days

later Maury sent a telegram to Richmond saying that he
expected to receive an attack and needed more men and
ordnance supplies.

Cooper, in the meantime, had received

information from Johnston that Johnston's scouts had
learned that the Union command did not intend to move
immediately against Mobile.

He passed this news on to

Maury and stated that in view of this development no
troops would be sent to Mobile.

Knowing that an assault

might come in the near future, Seddon advised Maury to
continue to collect supplies and ammunition and to
strengthen the defenses.

23
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Union authorities had given some thought to an
attack on Mobile.

Major General William T. Sherman,

after capturing Jackson, Mississippi, following the fall
of Vicksburg, suggested to Major General Ulysses S. Grant
an attack on Mobile from New Orleans.

When Mobile fell,

he wanted to conduct operations against Selma.

Banks

also urged a move to capture Mobile:
The capture of Mobile is of importance
second only in the history of the war to the
opening of the Mississippi....Mobile is the
last stronghold in the West and Southwest.
No pains sljguld be spared to effect its
reduction.
Perhaps prodded by these missives, Grant telegraphed
Major General Henry W. Halleck and suggested an attack on
Mobile from the vicinity of New Orleans.

The Union high

command had other objectives in mind, however.

Halleck

informed Grant that remaining Confederate armies in Mis
sissippi, Arkansas, and western Louisiana should be
broken up first.

When these things had been accomplished,

the Union command would have enough men to go against
either Mobile or Texas.

25

24

Major General William T. Sherman to Major General
Ulysses S. Grant, July 12, 1863, O . R . , XXIV, Pt. 2,
p. 523; Banks to Grant, July 18, 1863, ibid., Pt. 3,
p. 528.
25

Grant to Major General Henry W. Halleck, July 18,
1863, ibid., 530; Halleck to Grant, July 22, 1863, ibid.,
542.
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Banks continued to press Washington about an attack
on Mobile.

He felt that the capture of Mobile and occu

pation of much of Texas would practically end the war in
the Southwest.

Halleck told Banks that he saw Texas as a

more important objective.

Abraham Lincoln had urged Hal

leck to send a force to eastern Texas.
persisted.

Still Banks

In several letters he pointed out that his

intelligence pictured Mobile as weak and not likely to
receive reinforcements.

He suggested that Grant send him

troops from his army and that the attack start from
Portersville on Mississippi Sound.

Banks anticipated a

campaign of only thirty days and stated that Grant con
curred in the operation.

Diplomatic considerations

arising from the French takeover in Mexico were uppermost
in the minds of the Union high command, however.

Halleck

instructed Banks to forget Mobile for the time being and
make an immediate move against some point on the Texas
coast.

Banks began making plans in accordance with

Halleck's orders soon after receiving them.

26

Again more

important enemy objectives saved Mobile from an attack.

2^Banks to Halleck, July 23, 1863, ibid., XXVI,
Pt. 1, p. 651; Halleck to Banks, July 24"^ T563, ibid.,
652; Abraham Lincoln to Secretary of War, July 29, 1863,
ibid., 659; Banks to Halleck, July 30, 1863, ibid., 66162; Banks to Halleck, Aug. 1, 1863, ibid., 666; Halleck
to Banks, Aug. 6, 1863, ibid., 672; James A. Padgett
(ed.), "Some Letters of George Stanton Denison, 18541866: Observations of a Yankee on Conditions in
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By the summer of 1863 the naval squadron at Mobile
was suffering a shortage of men.

Buchanan explained to

the Navy Department that discharges, desertions, and ill
ness had reduced his force to the point where he did not
have enough men to man the guns on all of his vessels.
Very few volunteers had joined the squadron, the great
majority of whom had had no experience as seamen.

He

asked Mallory to intervene with the Secretary of War to
permit the transfer of men from the army to the navy.
Maury, recognizing the necessity of cooperation with the
n a v y , asked the War Department to grant Buchanan's
requests:
...The naval force here is very important,
and, as a successful defense of this place
will depend in great measure upon it, I think
it appropriate for me to urge upon the
Department the necessity of aiding the admi
ral of th^sf station in procuring men for his
ships; . ..
Mallory forwarded Buchanan's letter to Davis, who in turn
referred it to Seddon "for attention and such relief as
can be given."

28

Seddon informed Mallory that the War

Department would cooperate in the transfer of men.

Louisiana and Texas," Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
XXIII (1940), 77-79.
27

Buchanan to Mallory, July 16, 1863, O.R., 4, II,
663; Maury to Cooper, Aug. 8, 1863, ibid., 1, XXVI, Pt.
2, pp. 152-53.
28
Mallory to Davis, July 24, 1863, with endorsement
by Davis, July 30, 1863, ibid., 4, II, 662-63.
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By mid-1864 several hundred men from the army units in
the Department of the Gulf had received orders to join
Buchanan's warships.

29

The navy did not stand alone in trying to obtain
men.

Maury remained apprehensive about the safety of

Mobile, as did Johnston.

Both men made efforts to get

troop reinforcements for the city.

Not only was Mobile's

garrison relatively weak, but Maury by early August 1863
had only one general officer remaining in his department.
After repeated requests by Kirby Smith for his services
in Texas, the War Department ordered Slaughter to the
Trans-Mississippi Department.

Slaughter left Mobile for

Havana aboard a blockade runner and eventually got to
Texas on another blockade runner.

30

Seeking to increase

his available forces, Maury asked Cooper to return to
Mobile the infantry brigade which Buckner had sent to
Bragg in April 1863— if it could be spared.

The War

Department answered that no troops could be sent from
Tennessee then or in the forseeable future.

29
30

Seddon to Mallory,

Johnston

[Aug. — , 1863], ibid., 697.

Smith to Cooper, June 10, 1863, ibid., 1, XXVI,
Pt. 2, p. 43; Smith to Cooper, June 16, 1863, ibid., 56;
Cooper to Maury, July 7, 1863, Letters and Telegrams
Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 38,
p. 324; Cooper to Slaughter, July 17, 1863, ibid., 333;
"Abstract from returns of the Department of the Gulf,"
Aug. 1, 1863, O . R . , XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 130; Brigadier
General Hamilton P. Bee to Captain Edmund P. Turner,
Sept. 10, 1863, ibid., 219.
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wrote to Governor Shorter to request that he send troops
to Mobile.

Shorter replied that he had no volunteers or

militia which he could send to the city.

Few volunteers

had responded to Davis' June call, and the governor
reported the militia severely depleted in numbers.

There

appeared to be no chance of reinforcements for Mobile.

31

About the middle of August 1863 Maury again antici
pated that the enemy would make an attack against Mobile.
Information came to him which indicated troop and ship
concentrations at Ship Island.

He succeeded in pushing

the work on his defensive lines because the planters had
sent more laborers to the city than earlier in the year.
Leadbetter ordered his men to strengthen the walls of
Fort Grant and to place a rifled cannon there to improve
the fort's firepower.

A foundry in Mobile turned out two

cannons per week, and Maury planned to reopen another
foundry which had closed.

The Confederate command still

needed a large amount of ammunition for the guns in the
defenses, but Maury had accumulated food supplies suffi
cient to subsist 10,000 men for four months.

In response

to information sent to him by Maury about a possible

^ M a u r y to Cooper, Aug. 1, 1863, O . R . , XXVI, Pt.
2, p. 130; Colonel H. L. Clay to Maury, Aug. 19, 1863,
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector Gen
eral, Chap. I, Vol. 38, p. 380; Johnston to Shorter,
Aug. 2, 1863, O. R . , XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 136; Shorter to
Johnston, Aug. 4, 1863, ibid., 139.
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attack, Johnston made three of his brigades available to
Maury if needed.

He stationed one brigade at Meridian

and the two others at Enterprise— all with easy access
to Mobile via the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.

32

While expecting an attack, Maury remained confident
of his ability to defend Mobile successfully.

Leadbetter

had made good progress in strengthening the walls of the
redoubts surrounding the city.

Anticipating that the

enemy would move by land either from the Pascagoula area
or Pensacola, Maury felt that relief forces could cut
the supply lines of the enemy to either place and help
check any attack.

The Confederate command still needed

long-range cannon at Mobile, and Maury asked Johnston for
three 20-pounder Parrott guns which he had promised to
send to the city.

Maury did not want to employ one wea

pon— the land mine— in the defense of Mobile, however.
In early August 18 63, Brigadier General Gabriel J.
Rains, who had designed these anti-personnel devices,
had arrived in Mobile to confer with Maury about possible
use of mines.

After discussing the matter with Maury but

32Maury to Cooper, Aug. 8, 1863, O . R . , XXVI, Pt.
2, p. 153; Leadbetter to Robertson, Aug. 5, 1863,
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12,
p. 296; Maury to Cooper, Aug. 13, 1863, O . R . , XXVI, Pt.
2, p. 160; Maury to Cooper, Aug. 13, 1863, ibid., 161;
Maury to Ewell, Aug. 13, 1863, ibid., 163; Johnston to
Maury, Aug. 13, 1863, ibid., 164; Maury to Johnston,
Aug. 13, 1863, ibid., 164.
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getting nothing accomplished, Rains proceeded under
orders from Richmond to Charleston.

Maury remained unim

pressed with Rains' ideas:
General Rains has gone away with his gimcracks; he was not at all practical; every
thing I received from him was vague and
visionary.
Despite Maury's expressed confidence, he still
attempted to get more troops for his garrison.

He asked

Johnston to send one of the brigades designated to go to
Mobile to the city as soon as possible.

He argued that

the new situation would be healthier and more cheerful
for the men.

Maury did not want any Alabama troops sent

to him if men from other states stood available.

Two of

his Alabama regiments on duty at Mobile suffered from
desertions, and Maury blamed this on the influence of the
men's despondent friends and relatives.

He expressed

particular interest in getting to Mobile men of Louisiana
units which had served artillery batteries at Snyder's
Bluff and Vicksburg.

Many of these men had served under

Maury at the former place, and he knew how good they
were.

As soon as the authorities declared these men

exchanged, Maury wished them ordered to him:

"...the

^ M a u r y to Johnston, Aug. 24, 18 63, O . R . , XXVI,
Pt. 2, pp. 179-80; Special Order No. 145, Headquarters
[Department of the West], Aug. 3, 1863, ibid., 136; Para
XIV, Special Order No. 198, Adjutant and Inspector Gen
eral's Office, Aug. 20, 1863, ibid., XXVIII, Pt. 2,
p. 297.
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y e a r of alertness and frequent practice at Vicksburg
made them very dexterous in sinking ships."

34

As August 1863 drew to a close, the defensive stance
of Mobile seemed fairly good.

Maury and his command

still had several shortages in supplies facing them,
however.

Subsistence stores coming into the city did not

keep pace with supplies issued.

Maury asked Johnston to

allow him to gather more foodstuffs along the Mobile and
Ohio Railroad in Mississippi even though the area stood
outside his department.

He also complained that he still

did not have enough shells and powder for his artillery
pieces.

To improve the readiness of his field artillery,

Maury ordered his men to impress horses in and around the
city to fill out the teams.

Johnston ordered Brigadier

General Samuel B. Maxey's brigade of seven regiments from
Enterprise to Mobile in response to Maury's request of
the twenty-fourth.

Several of Maxey's regiments encamped

at Hall's Mills, while the bulk of the brigade went to
Portersville on the coast.

The addition of these troops

gave Maury approximately 6,400 men to defend the city.
He wrote to Richmond:

"With a proper garrison and a

Maury to Johnston, Aug. 24, 1863, ibid., XXVI,
Pt. 2, p. 179.

proper supply of ammunition I believe Mobile can sue
cessfully resist any attack of the enemy."

35

Maury to Cooper, Aug. 28, 1863, ibid., LII, Pt. 2,
p. 519; Maury to Johnston, Aug. 31, 1863, ibid., XXVI,
Pt. 2, p. 190; Orear to Carrie Orear, Aug. 29, 1863,
Weaver Collection; Johnston to Hardee, Aug. 31, 1863,
O . R . , XXX, Pt. 4, p. 572; F. Jay Taylor (ed.), Reluctant
ReEel: The Secret Diary of Robert Patrick, 1861-1865
(Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1959),
126; "Abstract from returns of the Department of the
Gulf,..for August, 1863," O.R., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 191.

CHAPTER VII
"... THE TREES FALLING ALL AROUND..."
Concern for a proper garrison and supporting force
for Mobile again occupied the minds of Maury and Johnston
in September 1863.

Johnston reported to Richmond on the

strength of the garrison.

His estimate of 10,000 men

being needed for an adequate defense agreed with that of
Maury.

In addition to the two brigades which he had pre

viously earmarked to support Mobile, Johnston told Cooper
that two brigades at Newton, Mississippi, would also go
to the city if the enemy attacked.

These four brigades,

along with 1,200 to 1,500 local defense troops, would
give Maury a supporting force of approximately 6,750 men.
Johnston still did not think this would be enough men to
combat a large besieging army.

Maury asked the War

Department to order Brigadier General John C. Moore to
Mobile to command Maxey's brigade, as Maxey had received
orders to go to the Trans-Mississippi Department.

He

also repeated his request to Johnston to send Louisiana
artillerists to man his heavy guns.

Finally, Maury

expressed a desire to have the Missouri brigade which
had served at Vicksburg.

In requesting the Louisiana and

Missouri troops, Maury stated again a conviction of his:
168
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"I think it very important to have troops belonging to
distant localities."^
The Mobile defenses appeared in satisfactory shape
and required very little work during the month of
September.

Leadbetter's engineers enlarged Battery

Gladden on its left flank so that they could place two
more cannons in it.

To honor the memory of the Missouri

soldiers killed in the war, Maury ordered the Choctaw
Point Battery renamed Missouri Battery.

Along the line

of works surrounding Mobile, the engineer laborers toiled
to thicken the walls of the various redoubts.

This work

became so routine that the overseers and engineers allowed
the slaves to slack off on their duties.

Their actions

forced Leadbetter to order the engineers to remain at the
fortifications throughout the work day and to threaten to
recommend the overseers for conscription if they con
tinued to neglect their duties.

Near Fort Morgan the

engineers placed more torpedoes in the main ship channel.
At Grant's Pass Lieutenant Glenn and his men expanded the

■^Johnston to Cooper, Sept. 4, 1863 , O.R. , XXVI, Pt.
2, pp. 201-202; Maury to Cooper, Sept. 5, 1863, Tele
grams Received, Secretary of War; Maury to Ewell, Sept. 7,
1863, O. R . , XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 211; Maury to Hardee, Sept.
24, 1863, Letters and Telegrams Received, Department of
Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana; Ewell to
Maury, Sept. 30, 1863, in Telegram Book, July 4, 1863May 6, 1864, p. 138, Joseph E. Johnston Papers, Library
of the College of William and Mary.
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walls of Fort Grant to accommodate six heavy guns and
2
bombproof shelters for barracks and storerooms.
Fort Grant again became the site of an engagement
with Federal gunboats on September 13, 1863.

Company D,

21st Alabama Infantry, previously stationed at Fort Mor
gan, had joined the garrison in late August.

About 10

o'clock A.M. the gunboats Genesee, Jackson, and Calhoun
sailed up toward the earthwork to test its strength and
opened fire after anchoring.

A Confederate gunboat and

transport stationed near Fort Grant changed their posi
tions to avoid being struck.

The Confederate gunners

opened up with their own guns in reply to the enemy fire,
but the range was so great that none of their shots
struck the vessels.

This exchange continued almost with

out interruption until almost 4 o'clock in the afternoon,
when the Federal gunboats disengaged and steamed back
toward Ship Island.

Although the gunboats had thrown

approximately 175 shells at the little fort, only fifteen
struck the island, and none did any damage.
stationed at Fort Grant wrote:

2

A soldier

"The only loss on our

"Report of operations for the defense of Mobile,
Ala., for the month of September, 1863," O . R . , XXVI,
Pt. 2, pp. 274-75; Para I, General Orders No. 235, Head
quarters Department of the Gulf, Sept. 8, 1863, quoted in
Daily Tribune, Sept. 8, 1863; unsigned report dated
"Alabama, September 1863," in Jefferson Davis Papers,
Duke University Archives, Durham, North Carolina; Leadbetter to Pillans, Sept. 1, 1863, Letters Sent, Engineer
Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 342.

171
side was a poor innocent rat that got killed in trying
to make its escape out of the magazine."

3

On September 25, 1863, Colonel William Llewellyn
Powell, commanding the lower bay defenses with head
quarters at Fort Morgan, died in Mobile after a long
illness.

Powell's death saddened Maury and placed him

at a loss as to how to replace Powell.

He praised

Powell's ability and efficiency as an officer:
...His loss is irreparable.
He had peculiar
qualifications for the position he occupied
and was a man o| very rare combinations of
good traits....
During Powell's illness Maury had allowed the senior
officer at Fort Morgan, Colonel George A. Smith of the
1st Confederate Infantry, to command Powell's brigade
but wanted a permanent replacement.

On the same day that

Powell died, Brigadier General Francis A. Shoup, having
received orders earlier in the month to report for active
duty at Mobile, arrived.

Maury assigned Shoup to

3
Commander W. H. Macomb to Bell, Sept. 15, 1863,
O.R.N., XX, 584; Lieutenant Commander George A. Bigelow
to Macomb, Sept. 13, 1863, ibid., 584-85; "Abstract log
of the U.S.S. Genesee, Commander Macomb, U.S. Navy,
commanding," ibid., 585; Roll for July and Aug. 1863,
Record of Events Cards, Company D, 21st Alabama Infan
try, Compiled Service Records; "Company D, 21st Ala.
Regt.," to Editor, Sept. 16, 1863, quoted in Daily
Tribune, Sept. 19, 1863.
^Maury to Cooper, Sept. 28, 1863, O . R . , LII, Pt. 2,
p. 532; Maury to [Johnston], Sept. 29, 1863, Letters
and Telegrams Received, Department of Alabama, Missis
sippi, and East Louisiana.
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command Powell's brigade because of his experience as an
artillery officer.

Shoup had begun his Confederate ser

vice as a lieutenant of artillery and had commanded Gen
eral William J. Hardee's artillery at Shiloh.

Maury did

not, however, intend Shoup's assignment to be permanent
as he felt "the command is hardly equal to his
rank."

5

[Shoup's]

In October Maury renamed the fort at Grant's

Pass Fort Powell in memory of its former brigade
commander.6
The engineers conducted only limited operations in
the Department of the Gulf during October 1863.

A change

in the position of chief engineer of the department at
least partially accounted for the slowdown.

Leadbetter

left Mobile to become Bragg's chief engineer and superin
tend the construction of fortifications on Missionary
Ridge southeast of Chattanooga.

To replace him, the War

Department ordered to the city Lieutenant Colonel Victor

Maury to Cooper, Dec. 21, 18 63, O . R . , XXXI, Pt.
3, pp. 851-52, Para XXII, Special Order No. 212, Adju
tant and Inspector General's Office, Sept. 7, 1863,
ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 212; Para VIII, Special Order No.
43, Headquarters Department of the Gulf, Sept. 25, 1863,
ibid., XXXI, Pt. 3, p. 852; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in
G r a y ; Lives of the Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge;
Louisiana State University Press, 1959), 276; Maury to
[Johnston], Sept. 29, 1863, Letters and Telegrams
Received, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East
Louisiana.
^Para II, Special Order No. 251, Headquarters
Department of the Gulf,
Oct. 28, 1863, quoted in Adver
tiser and Register, Oct. 30, 1863.
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von Sheliha, a former Prussian army officer and most
recently Buckner's chief of artillery.

Von Sheliha

would remain chief engineer at Mobile for most of the
remainder of the war.

7

The engineers, with assistance

from the infantry, began felling all of the trees between
the two lines of earthworks surrounding the city.

They

also began cutting down the trees for about one mile out
from the first line of trenches.

This tree removal would

provide a clear field of fire for all of the redoubts and
lesser works.

One officer participating in this project

wrote his wife:
...it is only when I see all these hands chop
ping that I fully realize the expression, 'The
forest disappeared beneath the settlers a x e , '
for I must say it is pheasant to see the trees
falling all around....
All of the engineering operations at Mobile cost the
Confederate government a good deal of money.

By October

1863 these expenditures had begun causing some concern in
Richmond.

7

Leadbetter had estimated in January that he

Para I, Special Order No. 38, Headquarters Depart
ment of Tennessee, Oct. 23, 1863, O . R . , XXXI, Pt. 3,
p. 581; Para VIII, Special Order No. 241, Adjutant and
Inspector General's Office, Oct. 10, 1863, quoted in Com
piled Service Record of Victor von Sheliha; Para VI,
Special Order No. 75, Headquarters Department of the
Gulf, Oct. 20, 1863, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf,
Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 433; Rives to Von Sheliha, Nov. 7,
1863, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap.
Ill, Vol. 4, p. 89.
q
Orear to Carrie Orear, Oct. 3, 1863, Weaver
Collection.
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would need $700,000 to complete his work.

At that time,

however, the Engineer Bureau could send him only $50,000
because Congress had not acted on the Bureau's appro
priations request.

Leadbetter1s expenditures had reached

$600,000 by June, and yet he had not been able to com
plete the defenses.

For the next few months Leadbetter's

estimates of funds required averaged $300,000.

The

Treasury Department notified the Engineer Bureau that it
could place no more than $850,000 per month to the
Bureau's credit.

Lieutenant Colonel A. L. Rives wrote

Gilmer that because Mobile's appropriation took up more
than one-third of this total he feared "the remainder
will scarcely suffice to meet the expenditures necessary
9
in other quarters."
In a letter to Leadbetter, Rives
pointed out that the expenditures at Mobile had already
greatly exceeded those at Charleston, and he urged "the
strictest economy in future operations."'*’^

However, the

9
Rives to Leadbetter, Jan. 22, 1863, Letters and
Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 2, p.
231; Gilmer to Leadbetter, June 15, 1863, ibid., Vol. 3,
p. 104; Rives to Gilmer, Oct. 24, 1863, ibid., Vol. 4,
p. 46.
■^Rives to Leadbetter, Oct. 16, 1863, ibid., Vol. 4,
p. 21. These engineering funds paid for such things as
hire of mechanics, compensation for slave labor, hire of
wagons and animals, and hire of vessels.
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estimates of funds needed continued to average $300,000
for the remainder of the year.'*''*'
Maury had to look again for a commander for the
lower bay forts in early October 1863.
and had to reliquish his command.

Shoup became ill

When Maury learned

that Colonel Edward Higgins had been declared exchanged
after his capture at Vicksburg, he asked Davis to pro
mote Higgins to brigadier general and order him to Mobile
to command both the lower bay and harbor defenses.
Higgins had served as a midshipman in the United States
Navy prior to the war and had entered Confederate service
as a captain of artillery.

As lieutenant colonel of the

22nd Louisiana Infantry he had commanded Fort Jackson and
Fort St. Philip below New Orleans during Farragut’s
attack on the Crescent City.

Later he commanded the

defenses at Snyder's Bluff, and during the long siege of
Vicksburg had charge of the river batteries.

Maury thus

thought his service had given him skill in defending
fortifications against ships.

During a visit by Davis to

Mobile in late October, Maury again requested that the
president promote Higgins and assign him to Mobile.

On

Maury's recommendation, Davis initiated the necessary

^ E s t i m a t e of funds required for Engineer Service,
Mobile, Dec. 1863, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf,
Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 523; Estimate of funds required
for Engineer Service, Mobile, Jan. 1864, ibid., 534-35.
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orders concerning Higgins.

The latter had arrived in

Mobile and assumed command by late November.

12

In early November 1863 Maury attempted to get
approval from the War Department to accept into Confed
erate service one or more companies of Creoles (free
Negroes)

from Mobile.

The department had turned down an

earlier request by Maury on the reasoning that Negroes
could not be organized as soldiers.

He did not think the

authorities in Richmond fully recognized the status of
Mobile's Creoles.

In his dispatch, Maury pointed out

that these people had enjoyed all of the privileges and
immunities of United States citizens since the cession of
Mobile to the country.

Most of the white people of the

city did not look upon them as Negroes.

Maury intended

to drill the Creoles as heavy artillerists, and he stated
that they seemed anxious to enter Confederate service.
Seddon replied to Maury's request by saying that Negroes
could serve only as laborers or in support jobs.

Maury to Cooper, Dec. 21, 1863, O . R . , XXXI,
Pt. 3, pp. 851-52; Maury to Colonel George W. C. Lee,
Oct. 8, 1863, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 542; Arthur W. Ber
geron, J r . , "They Bore Themselves With Distinguished
Gallantry:
The Twenty-Second Louisiana Infantry," Lou
isiana History, XIII (1972), 253-82; Daily Tribune, Oct.
25, 1863; Davis to Seddon, Oct. 29, 1863, in Dunbar
Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His
Letters, Papers and Speeches, 10 vols. (Jackson, Miss.:
Department of Archives and History, 1923), VI, 69;
Special Order No. 30, Headquarters Third Brigade, Nov.
28, 1863, Orders, District of the Gulf.
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Political considerations dictated Seddon's stand:

"Our

position with the North and before the world will not
allow the employment as armed soldiers of negroes."

13

Troops once again left Mobile for another theater in
late November 1863.

Bragg at Missionary Ridge had been

trying since late October to get reinforcements for his
army.

To accommodate Bragg, Davis promised to get two

brigades from Johnston in Mississippi and suggested that
Bragg exchange troops with Maury to obtain larger
regiments.

Johnston agreed to send two brigades to

Bragg for temporary service.

One of the brigades he

chose was that of Brigadier General William A. Quarles,
fdrmerly Maxey's, then stationed at Mobile.

Maury

expressed willingness to send two of his regiments to
Bragg if he could get some heavy artillerists to replace
them.

He stated particular interest in having the 1st

Alabama Infantry, which had manned heavy guns at Port
Hudson, and the 1st Tennessee Heavy Artillery.

Johnston,

however, advised Maury against giving up any troops to
Bragg since replacements were probably not available.
Maury heeded this advice, and only Quarles' brigade
departed from Mobile's garrison.

13

The remnants of the

Cooper to Maury, Sept. 28, 1863, Letters and Tele
grams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol.
38, p. 458; Maury to Cooper, Nov. 7, 1863, with endorse
ment by Seddon, Nov. 24, 1863, O.R., 4, II, 941.
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Tennessee artillery regiment did arrive in Mobile in
December and received assignment to the Apalachee
14
batteries.
Maury made some interesting comments about Mobile in
a candid letter written in late November 1863.

He felt

that the city was a very pleasant one but that the quiet
situation caused men stationed there to lose easily their
soldierly habits.

The people of the city acted hospit

ably but had not really felt the war's impact.

Maury

ventured the opinion that Mobile had been fortified at
Vicksburg's expense.

Heavy guns which could have been

used at Vicksburg had gone to Mobile where they probably
would receive little, if any, use.
for doubting an attack on Mobile.

Maury gave two reasons
First, he did not

think B a n k s ' army was in any condition to attack due to
its repeated defeats in Louisiana and Texas during the
fall and early winter.

Second, Maury expressed confi

dence that the defenses around the city and harbor could
hold off any assault.

He predicted:

"I do not think

^ D a v i s to Bragg, Oct. 23, 1863, O . R . , LII, Pt.
2, p. 547; Davis to Bragg, Oct. 29, 1863, ibid., 555;
Ewell to Maury, Nov. 20, 1863, ibid., XXXI, Pt. 3, p.
723; Maury to Ewell, Nov. 21, 1863, ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2,
p. 431; Johnston to Bragg, Nov. 22, 1863, ibid., XXXI,
Pt. 3, p. 739; Johnston to Maury, Nov. 22, 1863, ibid.;
Field and Staff Roll for Apr. 30, 1863-May 1, 1864,
Record of Events Cards, 1st Tennessee Heavy Artillery,
Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who
Served in Organizations from Tennessee.
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they will attempt Mobile until they have an army of
40,000 men, a large fleet of ironclads and about ninety
days liesure

[sic] for them."

15

By early December 1863 Von Sheliha found that the
rations issued to the Negro laborers at Mobile had
become insufficient.

The men received only three-quarters

of a pound of beef a day, no corn meal, and few other
victuals.

Von Sheliha recognized the necessity for

larger ration amounts and requested aid from the commis
sary department.

After receiving assurances of increased

supplies, Von Sheliha issued orders establishing an
improved schedule of rations which included one pound of
beef daily, one pound of pumpkins daily, one and a quar
ter pounds of corn meal daily, ten pounds of rice per
hundred rations eight days in fifteen, fifteen pounds of
peas per hundred rations seven days in fifteen, and four
and a half pounds of salt per hundred rations daily.

He

ordered scales set up in each quarters area to weigh the
rations.

Von Sheliha charged his overseers with seeing

not only that the slaves receive the proper rations but
also that the food was prepared properly and distributed
fairly.

If the overseers failed to follow these

instructions, commissaries had authorization to purchase

■^[Maury] to [Sterling Price], Nov. 29, 1863, in
James W. Eldridge Collection, Henry E. Huntington
Library, San Marino, California.
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necessary rations and deduct their price from the over,
16
seers' wages.
For several weeks during December 1863, Maury had
the services of an additional general officer.

Brigadier

General John C. Moore reported for duty at Mobile on the
tenth.

Maury had specifically requested Moore on two

occasions and wanted to place him in command of Maxey's
brigade.

Instead of ordering Moore to Mobile for that

purpose, the War Department obtained the promotion of
Colonel William A. Quarles to take over the brigade.

On

November 23 the Department finally ordered Moore from
his command in the Army of Tennessee to report to Maury.
The latter general assigned Moore to command the Eastern
Division of the Department of the Gulf and the part of
the department west of Dog River.

When the War Depart

ment realized that both Shoup and Moore had received
orders to Mobile, Cooper instructed Maury to retain the
former and send the latter back to the Army of Tennessee

*1 /T

Von Sheliha to Garner, Dec. 4, 1863, Letters Sent,
Engineer Office, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 504; General
Order No. 2, Engineer Office, Department of Mobile [sic],
Dec. 9, 1863, quoted in FitzGerald Ross, Cities and Camps
of the Confederate States, ed. by Richard B. Harwell
TlJrbana! University of Illinois Press, 1958), 162.
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despite M a u r y 's request to keep Moore and send Shoup to
■

Mississippi.

17

Rumors of a planned attack on Mobile again reached
the city in December.

Maury repeated his request to

Johnston to send him the artillerists who had become
prisoners at Port Hudson and Vicksburg as soon as they
received their exchange.

He needed these experienced

soldiers to garrison his batteries rather than the infan
trymen who then served the guns.

If these regiments got

orders for Mobile, Maury felt that their absentees would
return and that new recruits would fill their ranks.
Besides this concern over the lack of veteran troops,
Maury also expressed concern that he did not have suffi
cient food and ordnance supplies to withstand a siege.
He admitted in a letter to Cooper that he expected the
enemy fleet to run successfully past Fort Morgan and Fort
Gaines if an attack came.

He expressed much the same

feeling to Beauregard at Charleston but said he would do
his best to obstruct the channel.

17

Maury asked Beauregard

Para II, Special Order No. 117, Headquarters
Department of the Gulf, Dec. 10, 1863, O . R . , XXXI, Pt.
3, p. 852; Maury to Cooper, Sept. 9, 1863, ibid.;
Maury to Cooper, Dec. 31, 1863, ibid., 851-52; Para
XXXIII, Special Order No. 278, Adjutant and Inspector
General's Office, Nov. 23, 1863, ibid., 741; Maury to
Cooper, Dec. 19, 1863, ibid., 848; Cooper to Maury, Dec.
19, 1863, ibid.; Maury to Cooper, Dec. 20, 1863, ibid.,
849; Cooper to Maury, Dec. 23, 1863, ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2,
p. 527.
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to come to Mobile to help in the defense of the city if
the situation at Charleston permitted him to get away.
He recognized the success Beauregard had had in South
Carolina and wished to use his knowledge in the defense
of Mobile.'*'®
In anticipation of the feared attack, Von Sheliha
pressed the work being done on Mobile's defensive works.
The troops cutting down trees around the city redoubts
completed this task and chopped the timber into firewood.
Von Sheliha had enough Negro laborers coming in from the
plantations that the small number of soldiers working on
the defenses could return to their commands, but he hoped
to get even more slaves.

He knew that he had to keep

construction going to make the defenses absolutely
complete.

Like Maury, Von Sheliha realized that the

masonry forts alone could not prevent an enemy fleet with
ironclads from entering the bay.

After consultations

with Maury, Gilmer, Buchanan, and Beauregard, Von Sheliha
decided to construct an earthwork battery on the west
bank of the main ship channel between Port Morgan and
Fort Gaines.

He also planned to obstruct the channel

further with torpedoes, ropes, and sunken timbers.
Continued construction on Fort Powell rendered that bay

1ft
Maury to Cooper, Dec. 11, 1863, ibid., XXVI, Pt.
2, p. 499; Maury to Ewell, Dec. 12, 1863, ibid., 500-501;
Maury to Beauregard, Dec. 17, 1863, ibid., 510-11.
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entrance secure.

Closer to the city, Von Sheliha's men

reconstructed and expanded four bay batteries— McIntosh,
Gladden, Huger, and Tracy.

The line of city entrench

ments appeared closer to completion, but it did not sat
isfy Von Sheliha because of its proximity to the city.
He began construction of a third line of fortifications
between the two existing lines.

This new line would

include nine large redoubts, according to Von Sheliha's
plans.

By late December, only Redoubt A and Redoubt B ,

which flanked Stone Street Road, were m

progress.

19

Von Sheliha and his engineers faced some criticism
and complaints despite the good work they did on Mobile's
defenses.

Planters in the interior of Alabama voiced

most of the complaints, which centered around the use and
treatment of slave laborers.

In a letter to Governor

Thomas H. Watts, Von Sheliha answered the criticisms.
The planters alledged first that the engineers kept the
slaves in Mobile beyond the sixty-day period for which
they had been impressed.

Von Sheliha pointed out that

he retained no Negroes longer than sixty days and that,
in fact, he had counted the days spent in travel to and

1Q

Von Sheliha to T. H. Watts, Dec. 13, 1863, ibid.,
501-503; Orear to Carrie Orear, Dec. 1, 1863, Weaver Col
lection; Para VI, Special Order No. 121, Headquarters
Department of the Gulf, Dec. 14, 1863, LHA Collection;
Rives to Von Sheliha, Dec. 18, 1863, Letters and Tele
grams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 4, p. 242.
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from Mobile as a part of the impressment period.

The

second complaint stated that the slaves received mis
treatment while in the city.

Although he admitted that

some abuses still existed, Von Sheliha referred Watts to
orders issued setting standards for the feeding of the
Negroes.

He also said that the cotton presses used as

barracks had been improved and that workers made shoes
and clothing for the slaves to wear.

In closing, Von

Sheliha hinted at a plan to replace the impressment sys
tem with a permanent engineering corps of Negro labor
ers, a plan which, if successful, would eliminate further
criticisms of the engineers.

20

This idea of a corps of Negro engineers received
more extensive treatment in a letter Von Sheliha wrote to
Senator Clement C. Clay of Alabama.

Von Sheliha outlined

briefly the disadvantages of the impressment system.
When the slaves were sent to Mobile, they left the plan
tations without necessary clothing and shoes.

Many

Negroes received discharges quickly because they were
unfit for the duties required of them, while others
received discharges due to illness.

The engineers then

had to instruct the laborers who remained in the compli
cated tasks of military engineering.

20

This period of

Von Sheliha to Watts, Dec. 13, 1863, O . R . , XXVI,
Pt. 2, pp. 503-504.
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teaching took so much time that the slaves spent very
little of the sixty-day impressment period on productive
labor on the earthworks.

Even during training and actual

work, the process of acclimatization often reduced the
amount of effective work the slaves could perform.

In

addition to the disadvantages mentioned, the impressment
system cost a lot of money.

The government paid not only

for the transportation, hire, and support of the laborers
but for the hire of agents and clerks to maintain the
system.

To these costs, the authorities might have to

add compensation to planters for their slaves who died
while at Mobile.
The advantages to be gained by the organization of
an engineer-laborer corps were four in number, according
to Von Sheliha.

First, such an organization would enable

chief engineers to carry out all of their plans
successfully.

For example, Von Sheliha estimated that if

he had a proper standing labor force he could complete
the work at Mobile so that it would "not only stand a
most minute criticism" but that it would "stand any
siege."

22

Second, an engineer corps would work more

21

Von Sheliha to Senator Clement C. Clay, Dec. 29,
1863, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill,
Vol. 12, pp. 525-26.
22Ibid.; Von Sheliha to Watts, Dec. 13, 1863, O.R.,
XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 503.
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efficiently than impressed laborers.

Third, the

government would save a considerable amount of money.
Fourth, the creation of a labor corps would eliminate the
shortcomings and hatred of the impressment system.

Von

Sheliha suggested also that his idea extend to hospital
nurses and teamsters.

This would free many men who could

bear arms from what he called "an inactive, unsoldierlike
service."

23

.
Von Sheliha's plan showed merit, and it is

perhaps unfortunate that the Confederate authorities did
not follow up on it.
Maury found himself faced with dissatisfaction
among a part of the troops of his command in late Decem
ber 1863.

Some of the men of the 57th and 61st Alabama

Infantry regiments at Pollard contemplated laying down
their weapons and going home, hoping to bring the end of
the war closer.

Predominently conscripts from the poor

counties of northern Alabama, these men felt little
affinity with the Confederate cause.

They had set

Christmas Day as the date for the mutiny.

The regi

mental field officers learned of the plot, however, and
by personal persuasion prevented any mutiny.

Maury

began looking into the situation as soon as he learned

^"^Von Sheliha to Clay, Dec. 29, 1863, Letters Sent,
Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, pp. 525-26.
John Forsyth supported a proposal similar to Von Sheliha's in an editorial.
Advertiser and Register,
Nov. 13, 1863.
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of it and ordered Brigadier General James H. Clanton,
commanding at Pollard, to investigate matters thoroughly
and make a full report.

In his own report to the War

Department, Maury recommended that these two units and
his other Alabama regiments be sent to other theaters in
exchange for weakened but veteran units.

He thought

active service away from their homes and alongside
seasoned troops would eliminate the mutinous feelings of
24
these Alabama soldiers.
The feelings of discontent among Clanton's brigade
broke out into overt action in early January 1864.
Sixty men of the 57th Alabama mutinied on January 5
while on picket duty.

One of their officers arrested all

of the men, and Clanton sent them to Mobile for trial.
Clanton ferreted out the ringleaders of the plot and
succeeded in quieting the situation.

Maury remained

concerned about the morale of Clanton's troops and
repeated his request to have them transferred.
asked the War Department to transfer Clanton.
ston seconded Maury's recommendations.

He also
Joe John

Seddon and Davis

approved M a u r y 's request and ordered Clanton to duty

24

Maury to Seddon, Dec. 28, 1863, O . R . , XXVI, Pt.
2, pp. 548-49; Brigadier General James H. Clanton to
Maury, Dec. 26, 1863, ibid., 549; Colonel William G.
Swanson to Clanton, Dec^ 26, 1863, ibid., 549-50; Major
C. J. L. Cunningham to Captain R. S. Abercrombie, Dec.
26, 1863, ibid., 550.
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in northern Alabama.

The 57th Alabama received orders

to report to Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk's army in
Mississippi, while the 61st Alabama moved to Virginia.
Clanton subsequently performed adequate service, and the
two infantry regiments served creditably until the end
* 4
-u w a r .25
of
the
In early January 1864 information reached both
Mobile and Richmond that the enemy planned to attack the
Gulf city.

Maury contacted Polk and Johnston to ask for

reinforcements.

Polk immediately ordered two artillery

units to Mobile and requested that Johnston return to him
some of the brigades sent to the Army of Tennessee in
November 1863.

Johnston did not want to give up any men

and referred the matter to Davis.

The latter ordered two

brigades— Baldwin's and Quarles'— back to Polk for use in
protecting Mobile.

26

Maury also contacted Polk about

Maury to Seddon, Jan. 11, 1864, ibid., 551-52;
Clanton to Garner, Jan. 6, 1864, ibid., 552; Clanton to
Garner, Jan. 7, 1864 (three items), ibid., 553; Johnston
to Davis, Jan. 11, 1864, ibid., XXXII, Pt. 2, pp. 543-44;
Cooper to Johnston, Jan. 14, 1864, ibid., 555; Johnston
to Cooper, Jan. 15, 1864, ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2, p. 553;
Polk to Colonel Thomas M. Jack, Jan. 28, 1864, ibid.,
XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 629; Paras XV and XVI, Special Order
No. 32, Headquarters [Department of Alabama, Mississippi,
and East Louisiana], Feb. 1, 1864, ibid., 651; "Organi
zation of troops in the Department of Alabama, Missis
sippi, and East Louisiana," Mar. 10, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3,
p. 604; Brewer, Alabama, 668-69, 673.
2 fi
Davis to Maury, Jan. 9, 1864, in Rowland (ed.),
Jefferson Davis, VI, 147; Polk to Maury, Jan. 10, 1864,
O.R., XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 542; Polk to Davis, Jan. 10,
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obtaining supplies for his troops.

Approximately three

hundred cannons of various sizes stood in the Mobile
defenses, but none of them had more than 250 rounds per
gun.

While Maury had 130,000 pounds of salt meat and 400

beef cattle available, he desired to obtain more pork.
He hoped to save as much of his current reserves as
possible and bring in the pork when a siege seemed
imminent.

27

As Maury began to receive troop reinforcements for
his garrison, he endeavored to persuade the city's noncombatants to leave Mobile.

Even with the urging of

Mobile's newspapers, the people did not depart in large
numbers.

Maury correctly realized that the enemy would

have actually to begin operations against the city itself
before the civilians would leave.

28

The first

1864, ibid.; Polk to Johnston, Jan. 10, 1864, ibid.;
Johnston to Davis, Jan. 11, 1864, ibid., 543-44; Maury
to Polk, Jan. 12, 1864, ibid., 549-50; Para I, Special
Order No. 13, Headquarters Department of Alabama, Mis
sissippi, and East Louisiana, Jan. 13, 1864, ibid., 553;
Davis to Johnston, Jan. 14, 1864, ibid., 554; Cooper to
Johnston, Jan. 14, 1864, ibid., 554-55; Seddon to Maury,
Jan. 14, 1864, ibid., 557.
27Maury to Polk, Jan. 13, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt.
2, pp. 552-53; "Statement of the number, caliber, and
position of the guns in the Department of the Gulf, Jan
uary 11, 1864," ibid., 547-48.
28

Maury to Polk, Jan. 12, 1864, ibid., 549; Maury to
Polk, Jan. 16, 1864, ibid., 565-66; Advertiser and Regis
ter, Jan. 17, 1864.
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reinforcements to reach Mobile were the men of Brigadier
General Francis M. Cockrell's Missouri brigade.

The 1st

Louisiana Heavy Artillery Regiment followed them shortly
afterwards.

These two units received assignments to the

redoubts and entrenchments of the city works.

Both units

impressed Maury and the civilian population by their
soldierly appearance and discipline demonstrated in a
military review held soon after their arrival.

The bri

gades of Baldwin and Quarles reached Mobile from Dalton,
Georgia, in late January and moved into camp at Dog River
Factory.

With the addition of all of these troops, Maury

had approximately 12,000 men to defend Mobile.

29

Von Sheliha continued to push his engineers in their
work to improve Mobile's defenses.

He proposed to estab

lish two ironclad floating batteries to obstruct the main
ship channel into the bay rather than attempt to con
struct an earthwork battery as he had planned earlier.
To secure the floating batteries on the western edge of
the channel, Von Sheliha hoped to anchor them to flats
which he would sink next to the channel.

29

He had his

Diary of Lieutenant William T. Mumford, Jan. 16,
1864, in William T. Mumford Collection, Mobile
Museum Department; Daily Tribune, Jan. 19, 1864; Polk to
Maury, Jan. 22, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 601;
William Pitt Chambers, "My Journal:
The Story of a Sol
dier's Life Told by Himself," Publications of the Mis
sissippi Historical Society, Centenary Series, V (1925),
298; "Abstract from return of the Department of the
Gulf,..." Jan. 20, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 582.
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engineers place floating rope obstructions in the channel
while he worked on his plans, and he submitted his new
proposal and other plans for the Mobile defenses to the
chief of the Confederate Engineer Bureau, General Jeremy
Gilmer.

The latter did not think Von Sheliha would

succeed in establishing his floating batteries and cited
the unstable sand bottoms, strong currents, and unmanage
ability of the structure as difficulties Von Sheliha
might not overcome.

Although Gilmer did not strongly

object to the effort, he urged Von Sheliha to proceed
cautiously and test his floating batteries thoroughly.
As to the new line of redoubts Von Sheliha had begun
around the city, Gilmer suggested that the Prussian
erect the redoubts quickly and perfect them as time
permitted.
A final change in Mobile's command status began tak
ing shape in late January 1864.

The War Department cre

ated the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East
Louisiana on the twenty-eighth of that month to include
all of the areas named in its title.

Both Maury and

Polk, the department commander, assumed that the order
did not affect the status of Maury's command.

Maury con

tinued to use the title "department" on all of his

■^Gilmer to Von Sheliha, Jan. 19, 1864, O.R. ,
XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 577; Von Sheliha to Buchanan, Jan. 15,
1864, ibid., 560-61.

193
reports and returns, and on February 7 Polk issued orders
defining the boundaries of the "Department" of the
Gulf.

31

The War Department informed Maury that his com

mand now comprised a district in Polk's department and
incorrectly stated:
a department

"There is no order constituting such

[meaning the Gulf]."

32

Even though the War

Department had included Mobile and its environs in sev
eral descriptions of Johnston's massive Western Depart
ment while he held command, Johnston still referred to
the area around Mobile as a department.

This uncertain

situation finally reached resolution on April 6, 1364,
when the War Department formally revoked the orders cre
ating the Department of the Gulf and designated Maury's
command as the District of the Gulf.
remained m

This appellation

effect until the end of the Civil War.

33

31

Para II, Special Order No. 23, Adjutant and
Inspector General's Office, Jan. 28, 1864, ibid., 627;
"Abstract from return of the Department of the Gulf,..."
Jan. 20, 1864, ibid., 582; Para I, Special Order No. 38,
Headquarters [Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and
East Louisiana], Feb. 7, 1864, ibid., 692.
^H.
33

L. Clay to Maury, Mar. 5, 1864, ibid., 586.

Para III, Special Order No. 275, Adjutant and
Inspector General's Office, Nov. 24, 1862, ibid., XXXI,
Pt. 4, p. 511; Cooper to Johnston, Aug. 12, 1863, ibid.,
512; Maury to Ewell, Nov. 4, 1863, ibid., XXVI, Pt. 2,
p. 390; Ewell to Maury, Nov. 10, 1863, ibid., 678; Para
XXIV, Special Order No. 81, Adjutant and Inspector Gen
eral's Office, Apr. 6, 1864, ibid., XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 752;
Cooper to Buckner, Feb. 20, 1863, Letters and Telegrams
Sent, Adjutant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 38,
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Despite the confusion caused by the War Department's
January 28 order, it placed Mobile in its proper context
within the strategy for the defense of the western
Confederacy.

p. 92; Ewell to Garner, Nov. 3, 1863, Telegraph Book,
July 4, 1863-May 6, 1864, p. 174, Johnston Papers.

CHAPTER VIII
"...THE PARIS OF THE CONFEDERACY..."
Despite the extensive military preparations and
troop movements going on around them, the people of Mobile
attempted to maintain the lifestyle they had enjoyed
before the war.

To a great extent they seemed successful.

Many observers concluded that the war did not really
touch Mobile to any extent.
after the conflict:

One resident remembered

"Mobile was called the Paris of the

Confederacy, New Orleans having fallen so early in the
fray, and gay indeed it was."'*'

Dances, parties, band

concerts, and parades continued unabated.

Although many

soldiers and citizens enjoyed the social life they found
at Mobile, other people criticized the "hideous reputa
tion" the city had.

A newspaper correspondent assigned

to Mobile wrote:
...I must say the country is likely to con
trast the hard fighting and hard living of her
brave soldiers in Tennessee, Virginia, and
elsewhere, with these holiday doing at
Mobile.
Making obstreperous mirth over more
than two hundred thousand newly made graves of
our kindred and friends, and in the hearing of

"*■[Mary E. Brooks?], "War Memoirs," typescript in
Irwin Collection, Mobile Museum Department.
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the poor sick fellows who crowd our hospitals
in thousands, is not at all to my taste....
In response to the criticism, Mobilians answered:

"But

while we worked and prayed for those who were actually
doing battle for our cause, we felt that it was only
right to make bright the lives of the soldiers and sailors stationed here, or on leave."

3

This bright social life continued down to the last
days of the war, but on occasion the citizens demon
strated that they did feel the impact of the war.

Kate

Cumming recorded in her diary in January 1865 that the
city seemed as festive as it had ever been.

In the

midst of the final siege of Mobile, a local soldier wrote
to his girlfriend:
"Our city is not at all changed in
4
appearance...."
A graphic portrayal of the effect the
war had on the community occurred in late 1862.

There

existed in Mobile a mystic krewe, called the Cowbellions,

2

Caldwell Delaney, The Story of Mobile (Mobile:
Gill Printing Co., 1933), 115-16; Robert Tarleton to
------ , undated, in Sallie L. Tarleton Letters in
possession of Mrs. Grace DuValle, Mobile, Ala., herein
after cited as Tarleton Letters; H. E. Sterkx, Partners
in Rebellion: Alabama Women in the Civil War (Ruther
ford, N. J . : Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,
1970), 162; Montgomery Daily M a i l , Feb. 18, 1863.
3
"War Memories."
4
Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 118-19;
Ciomming, K a t e , 248; Tarleton to Sallie Lightfoot, Apr.
2, 1865, quoted in William N. Still, Jr., "The Civil War
Letters of Robert Tarleton," Alabama Historical Quar
terly, XXXII (1970), 78.
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which paraded through the city every New Year's Eve„
Young men comprised most of the membership of the
society, and they normally exhibited a great deal of
cheerfulness and color.

On the occasion in question,

however, the mood was anything but cheerful.

The few

remaining members dressed in black, and they played the
music of a dirge.

They carried a transparent banner on

which they had written the words "In Memory of Our
Departed Associates."

Everyone who witnessed the spec

tacle was deeply affected and realized that "Mobile has
had her share of sorrow."

5

As can be imagined, soldiers and sailors found
Mobile a very pleasant duty station or site for leave.
Missourian remembered:

A

"...a man could come nearer get

ting the worth of Confederate money there, than any other
place in the department."

g

When members of Kentucky's

famed Orphan Brigade passed through the city, they used
a ruse to try to get around an order confining them to
their camp and to obtain a meal of Mobile's noted
ysters.

The men found themselves face to face with

their brigade commander as they entered the Battle House.

5
.
Ephraim McD. Anderson, Memoirs: Historical and
Personal: Including the Campaigns of the First Missouri
Brigade (St. Louis:
Times Printing Co., 1868), 257-58;
Daily M a i l , Jan. 4, 1863.

g

Anderson, Memoirs, 255.
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To their excuse that they were looking for stragglers,
Colonel R. P. Trabue observed:

"'...you are looking for
7

straggling oysters.

I know what you are up to.'"

Some

soldiers got carried away by the city's atmosphere.

One

group of officers are said to have taken up quarters in
the Battle House and "trained...on a diet of whiskey,
music, and women."

8

Many young officers and enlisted

men, including Brigaider General Thomas H. Taylor, mar
ried Mobile girls.
9
married.

On one day alone ten officers got

The people of Mobile tried to aid the soldiers and
sailors in ways other than providing social entertainment.
In May 1861 Adelaide de Vendel Chaudron and Ellen S.
Walker organized the Mobile Military Aid Society.

This

group of women began by making uniforms for soldiers
in service.

Later they supplied clothing and food to the

families of men who were away at war.

Eventually they

provided assistance to needy soldiers passing through.

7
A.
D. Kirwan (ed.), Johnny Green of the Orphan
Brigade: The Journal of a Confederate Soldier (Lexington: The U n i v e r s i t y o f Kentucky Press, 1956), 48-49.
8

John P. Dyer, From Shiloh to San J u a n : The Life of
"Fightin' Joe" Wheeler (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State
University Press, 1961), 25.
9
Moore to Cousin Blannie, Mar. 7, 1863, Southall and
Bowen Papers; Advertiser and Register, Feb. 20, 1864;
FitzGerald RosiT, Cities and Camps of the Confederate
States, ed. by Richard B. Harwell Turbanal
University
of Illinois Press, 1958), 202.
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The Society originally did their work free of charge,
but in time they had to accept government funds and
private donations to support their efforts.

Other

ladies picked lint and made bandages for the wounded in
nearby hospitals.

Even in the final days prior to the

fall of Mobile, her women were putting together boxes of
provisions for the soldiers fighting in the trenches
across the bay.

The post chaplain, Reverend P. B. Mil

ler, established the Soldiers' Library on Water Street,
equipping it at his own expense and keeping it open
throughout the war.

In the library soldiers could find

"a large assortment of reading matter, books, pamphlets,
magazines and news papers, all conveniently arranged, and
seats and tables for writing."'*'^
This charity the citizens also extended to needy
persons living in the city.

The Military Aid Society in

1862 began providing food and clothes for the families of
men away in service besides meeting their responsibili
ties toward the soldiers themselves.

Another group, the

Female Benevolent Society, provided food, clothing, and
quarters for soldiers' widows and their children.

^ S t e r k x , Partners in Rebellion, 98, 104; Kate Cumming, K a t e : The Journal of a Confederate N u r s e , ed. by
Richard B. Harwell (Baton Rouge!
Louisiana State Uni
versity Press, 1959) , 55; Thad Hold (ed.) , Miss Waring1s
Journal: 1863 and 1865 (Chicago: The Wyvern Press, 1964) ,
l l , 12; Chambers, "My Journal," 301-302.
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A third group of women made it their duty to contribute
clothing to needy children of s o l d i e r s . ^

In order to

assure that poor people of Mobile got needed food, a com
mittee of the city's leading men established the Free
Market in December 1861.

The association collected sup

plies not only from Mobile County but from planters in
the interior as well.

The railroad and steamship compan

ies provided free transportation for supplies coming from
these planters.

When the Free Market first opened,

approximately 800 people got food there.

By early 1863

slightly more than 2,500 people were taking advantage of
the market.

Even though supplies became more expensive

and in shorter supply as the war wore on, the Free Market
continued to serve the poor until Mobile's surrender.

12

Life in Mobile remained relatively normal in other
ways besides its lively social life.

The city government

continued as usual except that the mayor and aldermen
took on added responsibilities such as assisting the Free
Market and aiding the thousands of refugees who crowded
into the city.

Throughout the war the courts in Mobile,

such as the Confederate District Court for the Southern
Division of Alabama, held regular sessions and scheduled

"^Sterkx, Partners in Rebellion, 104.

12
1863.

Advertiser and Register, Jan. 18, 1862, Mar. 26,
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a number of special terms.

All of the city's churches

remained open, and their ministers, like the civil offi
cials, assumed extra duties in visiting the wounded and
the families of soldiers away at war and in conducting
numerous funerals.

Mobile's public schools operated

until the end of the war through liberal contributions
by her citizens.

The shortage of schoolbooks due to the

war received relief when Adelaide de Vendel Chaudron
authored a set of readers and spelling books.

S. H.

Goetzel and Company of the city printed these books.
In many instances the firm used wallpaper for parts of
the books because regular paper was in short supply.

13

The city authorities made every effort to keep
Mobile as clean as possible throughout the war.

Early in

the conflict they ordered the razing of dilapidated build
ings so that new construction could take place.

In

August 1862 Mayor Slough appointed a committee with mem
bers in every ward to supervise the city's sanitary
condition.

The city council had passed an "Ordinance to

Secure Public Health" which allowed the committee to

13

Peter J. Hamilton, Mobile of the Five Flags
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investigate anything that might endanger the people's
health.

This ordinance also required all property owners

or occupants to keep their areas clean.

The authorities

did not always strictly enforce the ordinance.

In Feb

ruary 18 65 citizens reported to the city fathers that
hogs running loose in the streets had damaged the side
walks and other property.

All stock owners received

instructions to lock up their animals, and an Inspector
of Animals supervised the enforcement of stock
regulations.

One woman whose hog the inspector had

seized had to pay $5.00 for an affidavit and $20.00 in
pound fees to get her animal back.

14

The people of Mobile exhibited a great deal of tol
erance toward those among them who held divergent politi
cal opinions.

A Northern-born Union man who lived in the

city throughout the war wrote later that few acts of
oppression occurred during the conflict.

15

One of the

few incidents of tension transpired in October 1862.
Three cases of attempted arson occurred at that time.
Fortunately the fire department extinguished all of the
blazes before they did great damage, but the incidents
made apparent the need for vigilance.

In an editorial,

14
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15
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During the War (Mobile:
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Papers, 1865), [5].
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the Advertiser and Register attempted to identify the
guilty parties:
...The majority of them are probably negroes,
debauched by association with the viler strata
of the white population, but there must be
white men actively engaged in the ijigfarious
schemes which are in operation,...
To aid the city police in patrolling the city, Slough
organized groups of citizens to guard against further
mischief.

For the most part, the city authorities pre

vented any similar o ccurrances.^
Although a detailed analysis of the effect of the
war on slavery in Mobile is beyond the scope of this
study, a few comments on the institution seem appropriate.
By 1860 the percentage of slaves in the Mobile population
had declined to just over twenty-five percent.
women outnumbered slave men.

Slave

A majority of the "heads of

families" in the city owned slaves but most owned only a
small number of Negroes who performed domestic duties.
Businesses or corporations owned the larger slaveholdings
of the city.

This, slavery in Mobile seemed a relatively

benign institution with more contact between whites and
blacks than occurred in the country.

Certainly the white

^ Advertiser and Register, Oct. 25, 29, 1862.
17Ibid., Oct. 29, 1862.

populace did not seem hostile toward the slaves.

18

A

cursory examination of the Mobile newspapers reveals
little evidence that slavery in the city changed signif
icantly during the war.

Certainly no one protested or

expressed fears about the large numbers of slave laborers
in the city working on the fortifications.

Unrest among

or crimes committed by slaves does not appear to have
increased noticeably.

A few violent crimes against

whites and incidents such as the incendiarism mentioned
above did occur but were exceptions to the norm.

The

real changes in white-black relations came after the war,
not during it.

19

Throughout most of the war, the civilian population
of Mobile evaded large outbreaks of disease such as had
happened before 1860.

The efforts at keeping the city

clean undoubtedly contributed to holding down disease.
A smallpox epidemic threatened to erupt in late March
1864, however.

When the authorities discovered the

18
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Oxford University Press,
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States, 1860, Population (Washington, D. C . : Government
Printing Office^ 1864) , 8-10; Isbell, "A Social and
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prevalency of the disease, it was confined primarily to
Negroes in the city.

The Advertiser and Register urged

its readers to seek vaccination.

Mr. O. Kratz, Superin

tendent of Vaccination, opened an office on Jackson
Street to innoculate any persons who presented them
selves to him.

He gave vaccinations between the hours of

9:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M. without charge.

Several days

after the opening of this office, the Advertiser and Reg
ister renewed its appeal to the people to take advantage
of the free vaccinations.

The editorial stated that

smallpox appeared "very prevalent."

20

Apparently

Mobile's citizens heeded the newspaper's advice, because
in mid-April it reported that the smallpox "is rapidly
disappearing, and that the alarm which prevailed a few
weeks ago has subsided."

21

Both civilians and soldiers found good hospital
facilities to treat diseases and wounds.

The five hos

pitals in operation when the war began continued to serve
throughout the war.

In the course of the conflict, as

the number of sick and wounded began to grow, the Confed
erate authorities constructed or transformed older
buildings into at least seven new hospitals for soldiers
and sailors.

20

The United States Marine Hospital opened on

Advertiser and Register, Mar. 25, 29, 1864.

21Ibid., Apr. 13, 1864.
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November 3, 1861, under the name Ross Hospital after
appropriation by Confederate authorities.

This facility,

one of the finest hospitals in the South, could accommo
date 250 patients.

In November 1863 the city authorities

turned over the City Hospital to the Confederate govern
ment to serve as a military hospital.

The military set

aside part of the building, now called Cantey Hospital,
for civilians.

The Sisters of Charity supervised the

wards of the hospital and acted in such capacities as
druggists and stewards.

The three remaining pre-war

hospitals in Mobile remained for use of civilians only.

22

In July 1862 the medical director at Mobile estab
lished a convalescent hospital at Spring Hill near the
city.

Between 70 and 100 soldiers could receive care at

the facility.

One soldier reported that the food at

Spring Hill consisted primarily of "poor beef, corn meal,
coffee, grits, sour bread, small piece of bacon twict
[sic] a week, also some pudding...."

23

This soldier

did have one complaint about his quarters:

22
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...There is one thing I have got acquainted
with since I have bin [sic] here that is
lice....It is a hard matter to keep clean of
them unless you shift your clothes twist
[sic] a week.
They are in the bed clothes.
You are ||rtain [sic] to katch [sic]
them....
The blockade and the needs of other hospitals limited the
supply of medicine available for the Spring Hill and
other facilities at Mobile, but the doctors had access to
some medical supplies.

In many cases doctors and citi

zens used home remedies more often than they would have
in normal times.
As stated, the military increased the number of hos
pitals at Mobile as the war progressed.

On May 14, 1863,

a hotel on Royal Street became the S . P . Moore Hospital.
The Soldiers Rest Hospital opened on July 18, 1863, and
one year later the medical authorities converted it into
a hospital for officers only.

Several days after the

opening of this latter facility, the Nott Hospital began
receiving patients.

Mobile's medical staff converted the

Kennedy House Hotel into the Heustis Hospital October 18,
1864.

On November 23, 1864, the Mansion House Hotel

became Nidelet Hospital, the last medical facility

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., hereinafter cited as Glazener
Papers.
24

Glazener to R. M. Shuford, May 24, 1863, Glazener
Papers.
^Hamilton, Mobile of the Five F l ags, 303-304.
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established by the military in Mobile.

Both of the for

mer hotels required extensive cleaning and renovation but
26
became excellent hospitals.

I have mentioned the hos

pital constructed for Negro laborers working on Mobile's
fortifications.

In December 1864 an inspector made the

following report on this facility:
...I have never seen any place in which Neg
roes are congregated which presented the
degree of cleanliness and neatness comparable
with this establishment. The wards, out
buildings, kitchen, bathroom, even the yard
was policg^ as well as it was possible to
do i t ... .
The charity of the women of Mobile is again apparent
in the aid they gave to the patients in the military
hospitals.

In 1862 a group of women formed the Ladies'

Supply Society.

They had as their goal the furnishing of

food to the soldiers and sailors in Ross Hospital.

Some

of the members of this society took on additional duties
such as cleaning floors, acting as practical nurses, and
making beds.

Dr. Josiah C. Nott, Medical Director of the

Department of the Gulf, praised the society for its many
good works.

Another organization, the Soldiers' Friend

Society, performed services at Moore Hospital similar to

26
Army Argus and Crisis, Jan. 7, 1865; Donald (ed.),
"Alabama Confederate Hospitals," 275-76; Cumming, Kate,
255.

27
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those performed by the Ladies' Supply Society at Ross
Hospital.

One Mobile lady used her own money to estab

lish and equip a convalescent hospital on the grounds of
her home.

Not only did she set up this facility, but she

also spent many hours personally tending to the sick and
28
wounded.

The war had a tremendous impact on Mobile's economy.
Normal economic activities were interrupted and curtailed,
prices rose drastically, and supply shortages existed.
All three of these problems were interrelated and worked
to make life difficult for all segments of the city's
population.

As a port city, Mobile's economy was based

on her merchant community.

The blockade, the diversion

of goods to the armies, and the use of river steamers and
railroads by the military all reduced the trade the mer
chants had enjoyed prior to 1860.

From time to time

exhausted stocks or exhorbitantly priced existing sup
plies forced stores to close.

About the only time the

merchants could do a booming business came following the
arrival of a blockade runner bearing luxury food and
clothing items.

Naturally the situation worsened as the

war progressed and as blockade running came to an end.

28
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Mobile never fully recovered from the effects of the war
and never again acted as an important port as she had
done before 1860.

29

Adapting to the situation as well as possible,
Mobile's civilians.found substitutes for items in short
supply.
clothes.

Homespun replaced finer fabrics in women's
Many people dyed old clothes to make them

appear new.

Referring to the clothing situation, one

Mobilian wrote:
...All the rag-bags have been emptied, and
dresses turned and cut into all kinds of
shapes.
Any and every thing is the fashion;
nothing is lost.
The old scraps of worsted
and flannel are carefully unraveled, carded,
and spun, for making capes and nubies.
The
fact is, it is a kind of disgrace to have
plenty of clothes.
If any one has on a new
silk or calico dress, kid gloves, or any
thing that is foreign, they have^to give an
account of how they came by it.
Both women and men wore hats made from palmetto.

Some

men sported suits made of a mixture of cotton and coe
hair, a combination said to have been waterproof.

From

time to time wood became scarce, and the military
impressed existing supplies.

When lighting oil and

29
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candles became hard to acquire, many people burned pitch
pine knots to provide illumination.

31

Prices for all goods rose in Mobile as they did
elsewhere in the Confederacy due to shortages and the
decreasing value of Confederate currency.

Speculators

often took advantage of the situation to buy large quan
tities of supplies and sell them at exorbitant prices.
In March 1862 a group of citizens asked General Samuel
Jones to establish a tariff of prices to keep the specu
lators from asking too much for the goods they had for
sale.

Jones promptly established the tariff they had

recommended and prohibited large sales of foodstuffs to
one individual or company.

At first the Advertiser and

Register protested J ones1 order as being unfair to the
majority of honest merchants of the city, but, when the
general apprised the paper of the intent of the order, it
came out m

full support of his action.

32
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Once the crisis which had precipitated Jones' order
had passed, the price tariff was abandoned.

Later in the

war the Alabama state government regulated prices of food
stuffs through a commission.

Actually none of these

efforts succeeded because prices continued to go up for
most items.

A currency bill passed by the Confederate

Congress in February 1864 with the intention of increas
ing the value of currency had the effect of raising
prices alarmingly in Mobile.

33

Several examples will

sufficiently demonstrate the rise in prices.

Molasses

sold for twenty-eight cents a gallon early in the war but
had gone up to seven dollars a gallon by the fall of
1863.

Valued at fifty cents a pound in November 1861,

butter increased in value to five dollars a pound by June
1864.

Perhaps the greatest rise occurred in the price of

flour, which went from forty-five dollars a barrel in
October 1862 to four hundred dollars a barrel in January
1865.

34

Under these circumstances, it is not difficult
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to understand why many people in Mobile found it impos
sible to furnish their families with needed food items
even when those items were readily available.
Food shortages in Mobile during the Civil War are
more easily understood by looking at the city's antebel
lum food supply.

The relatively large population of the

city and county meant that the surrounding countryside
could not supply the needs of the people.

No large food

surpluses existed in the interior of the state for trans
port to Mobile.

About the only item that did reach the

city from the interior in significant amounts was corn.
Mobile's major food imports--pork, wheat and flour, corn,
beef, and whiskey— came through New Orleans.

The coastal

trade route from the Crescent City became so well
developed that western produce entered Mobile very
easily.

As I will discuss in the next chapter, the Fed

eral blockade cut off this coastal trade in the summer of
1861.

This forced Mobile to look to Alabama and Missis

sippi for her food supplies, but the plantations and
farms of these states could not furnish pork, beef, corn,
and wheat in quantities sufficient to meet the city's
average annual consumption of those items.

That the

Written in the 1860s," Louisiana Genealogical Register,
XIX (Mar. 1972), 45, 46; Corsan, Two Months in the Con
federate States, 115; Mumford Diary, Jan. 19, 1864;
Daily Tribune, Oct. 23, 1864; Advertiser and Register,
Jan. 29, 1865.
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population of Mobile ate as well as they did is a tribute
to the merchants, planters, and farmers of Alabama.

35

The people of Mobile did not always find necessary
supplies available.

One of the more severe crises

occurred in the winter of 1862 and early spring of 1863.
On December 12, 1862, General Pemberton issued an order
prohibiting the transportation of corn and fodder out of
Mississippi.

The necessity of supplying his army and the

activities of speculators brought about this order.
Because Mobile had drawn much of its corn from the coun
ties of northern Mississippi via the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad, the city stood to suffer as a result of the
order.

The Advertiser and Register quickly asked that

Pemberton or higher authorities modify or rescind the
order.

At the same time Mayor Slough and the president

of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad sent protests to

35
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Professor Hilliard estimates average annual consumption
of the four major food items in the diet of antebellum
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pork, 150 pounds; beef, 25 to
30 pounds; corn, 13 bushels; and wheat, 2 bushels.
Ibid.,
105, 130, 157, 230.
A survey of fragmentary import sta
tistics for Mobile found in extant newspapers reveals
that not enough of the four named foods reached the city
to meet Hilliard's estimates for consumption, especially
in view of the needs of the military and the increased
population because of refugees.
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Pemberton, General Johnston, and the War Department hoping
to open the flow of supplies to the city.

36

Both the War Department and Buckner at Mobile refer
red the protests to Johnston, who was away in Tennessee
and preferred not to interfere in such a distant
situation.

He suggested to Mayor Slough and Governor

Shorter that Mobile look to southern Alabama for her sup
plies in the future.

In view of Johnston's inactivity,

Secretary of War Seddon suggested that Pemberton and
Buckner try to work out the problem together.

37

Pemberton continued to insist, however, that Mobile get
her supplies by way of the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers.
His intransigence prompted Buckner to issue orders for
bidding the shipment of supplies and provisions from his
department.

He also authorized his chief of subsistence

to impress cattle and other stores held by speculators.
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At the same time, Buckner attempted to reassure the public
as to his intentions:
It is not the policy of the Commanding
General to make seizures of private property,
or to prevent shipments from one portion of
the District to another.
Supplies evidently
intended for private consumption will not be
interferred with while in transitu within
this District.
The people of Mobile really suffered the brunt of
this conflict between military authorities, although
some evidence exists that they found certain items in
plentiful supply.

39

To help subsist the populace, the

city's military commanders relaxed restrictions on fish
ing around Mobile Bay.

Fishermen and oystermen normally

could not go outside the confines of the bay, but Gen
eral Mackall issued an order allowing them to go up to
three miles west of Grant's Pass in search of their
catches.

All boats taking advantage of the order had to

register with the army and comply with any regulations

38
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established by the naval commander at Mobile.

In response

to his request, Buckner received permission from the War
Department to sell excess military supplies at cost to
the needy in times of scarcity.

At least a few enter

prising citizens found ways to get around Pemberton's
order.

One man bought a quantity of bacon in Mississippi

and devised an ingenious method of transporting it to
Mobile without having it confiscated.

He bought a six-

foot pine box similar to those used to transport the
bodies of soldiers to their families.

Filling the "cof

fin" with the bacon, he marked the box "John Shoat, 32nd
Alabama Regiment, Mobile, Ala."
reported:

A Montgomery newspaper

"The shoat, or shoats, came to hand without

trouble, and m

good order."

40

Perhaps the most noted response to the supply dif
ficulties came in the formation of the Mobile Supply
Association.

A group of 74 prominent and wealthy gentle

men joined together to organize the association and used
their own money to finance it.

The association had as

its goal the purchase of supplies and the sale of them at
cost to people in the city.

By selling goods at cost

these men could keep prices of all goods down to a

40
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reasonable level.

The Advertiser and Register urged

other patriotic citizens to join the association so that
its capital would increase and its operations could
expand.

At first the agents of the association worked

only along the Alabama and Tombigbee river systems in
collecting supplies.

Association Secretary T. A. Hamilton

appealled to Johnston to permit the purchase of corn in
Mississippi and its shipment on the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad.

Johnston approved the shipment of supplies for

both the Supply Association and the Free Market.

Eventu

ally the organization had agents in many parts of the Confederacy procuring necessities for Mobile's people.

41

The supply shortage came to a head in late March and
early April 1863.

The inability of the military command

ers to settle the matter, newspaper editorials complain
ing of the situation, and reports of signs reading "Bread
or Peace" stuck on street corners in Mobile all prompted

41
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Seddon to act.

42

He approved a plan which Colonel Lucius

B. Northup, Commissary General and head of the Subsis
tence Department, had put forth.

Northup's plan called

for the creation of Chief Commissaries in each state to
supervise the collection, storage, and distribution of
supplies.

In informing Buckner of his decision, Seddon

wrote:
...The course which under the circumstances I
sought to adopt is what appears to me under
any but very exceptional conditions the more
regular and judicious.
It is to confine each
Commander, to subsidiary operations in obtain
ing supplies, to his own Department and to
require of the Commissary General through the
Bureau officers and agents to be active in
all, collecting supplies, accumulating at
Depots and preparing to distribute and meet
requisitions from the various Armies accord
ing to their respective needs....
Northup's plan, the activities of the Mobile Supply Asso
ciation, and improved crop harvests in Alabama eased
Mobile's supply difficulties considerably.
The "bread riot" of September 4, 1863, vividly
demonstrated that some of the people of Mobile continued
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to suffer from shortages of food and other supplies.

On

the morning of that day, several hundred poor women,
armed with hatchets, hammers, brooms, and axes, gathered
on the Spring Hill Road.

Carrying banners reading "Bread

or Blood" and "Bread and Peace," they marched two-by-two
down Dauphin Street into the city.

Thousands of specta

tors watched as the women broke into stores, took out
food and clothing, and distributed their loot amongst
their number.

Available sources indicate that Jews owned

most of the stores broken into, indicating a prejudice
against that class, and that most of the onlookers sym
pathized with the plight of these women.

Maury called

out the 17th Alabama Regiment to put down the riot, but
the men of that unit refused to take action.

The failure

of the military to stop the women left the whole matter
in the hands of the civil authorities.

Mayor Slough made

a speech promising to meet the needs of the rioters if
they would disperse.

A witness related the results of

his effort:
...[the speech] had the desired effect of dis
banding the Amazonian phalanx and sending the
women to their houses, well satisfied with the
result of their foray....
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in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers, Louisiana State Univer
sity Department of Archives and Manuscripts; Orear to
Carrie Orear, Sept. 5, 1863, Weaver Collection; Rix,
Incidents of Life, [9].
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Slough quickly followed up on his promise to the
"bread rioters."

On the same day that the riot occurred,

the mayor addressed an appeal to the citizens of Mobile
to come to the aid of the needy women:
...Their own wants and those of their child
ren are calculated to touch the hardest and
least sympathetic heart.
Let us then, my
fellow citizens, see that these worthy
objects of charity are placed above the reach
of absolute destitution....
Slough asked the people to contribute monetary subscrip
tions to be used to purchase food and clothing for those
needing assistance.

To collect the money and distribute

the supplies, he appointed a fourteen-man Special Relief
Committee.

The committee then appointed a special agent

to purchase goods from city factories for delivery to the
poor.

They also solicited contributions of money or

material suitable for clothing.

Selecting other citizens

to form the Citizens' Relief Association and to aid in
its activities, the Special Relief Committee surveyed the
various wards of the city to locate poor families and
determine their needs.

In the following months, the com

mittee succeeded in alieviating most of the distressing
conditions afflicting Mobile's poor.

46

45 Advertiser and Register, Sept. 5, 1863.
46Ibid., Sept. 14, 1863.
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Supply shortages continued until the end of the war,
but nothing like the two crises just described occurred
again.

Scarcities of meat existed during various

periods, while at other times vegetables and other items
became hard to obtain.

A scarcity of money or interrup

tions in the normal transportation system usually created
these temporary shortages.

In January 1865, for

instance, the military impressed most of the river
steamers to transport its supplies, thus making it dif
ficult to bring in goods intended for the citizens of
Mobile.

When the Federal fleet occupied the bay, its

presence deprived Mobile of one of its luxury foods—
oysters.

Oystermen could bring in a few of the shellfish

from the upper regions of the bay, but high prices kept
these few delicacies out of the hands of most people.
The enemy occupation of the bay also resulted in almost
completely cutting off coffee imports.

These shortages

affected morale as well as stomachs:
...some who did not touch it [coffee] before
the war, talk gravely about its loss as if
their very existence depended upon it, a n d ^
indeed they are quite melancholy about it.

Mumford Diary, Feb. 16, 1864; Daily Tribune, June
5, 1864; Advertiser and Register, Jan” 29, 1865; Cumming,
Kate, 248.
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CHAPTER IX
"...PROFITS EQUAL THEIR RISK..."
Although Mobile occupied a strategic position in the
Confederacy because of her railroad connections, her pri
mary strategic importance lay in her status as a major
port for blockade runners.

New Orleans outranked Mobile

as a port early in the war, as she had before the war,
but the fall of the Crescent City in April 1862 made
Mobile the leading port on the Gulf.

The vessels which

ran the blockade in and out of Mobile took their cargoes
to and from Havana, Cuba, the best base for this trade in
the Gulf.

The trip between Mobile and Havana took about

three days if the runner encountered no problems.

Taking

out of Mobile primarily loads of cotton, the runners
exchanged their cargoes for both military supplies and
items for consumption by the civilian populace of the
Gulf South.

Running the blockade was very dangerous, but

attempts to get by the blockading squadron increased as
the war progressed.

In speaking of the men who engaged

in the trade, one author has written:
...Some of the blockade runners were patriots
who wished to aid the Confederacy, but many
were in the business only for iponey, and they
made profits equal their risk.

"''Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy:
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Blockade runners did not find Mobile an easy port
to enter and leave.

For one thing, access to the bay

was limited and difficult.

Three entrances to the bay

which vessels might use existed.

One of these was a

westward approach near Dauphin Island known as the Peli
can Channel, but its shallow draft precluded its use.
A second entrance, known as the Swash Channel, followed
the shoreline from the east toward Fort Morgan.

Although

less

than twelve feet deep at low tide, the runners used

it a

great deal because once they had gotten into it,

the

blockading fleet found it difficult to cut the runner

out

from

the fleet's normal station.

The Main Channel

extended from near Fort Morgan five miles southward.

At

%

the lower end of this channel stood a bar with twenty-one
feet of water over it.

Blockading vessels could station

themselves at these three entrances and cover them very
easily.

Confederate field artillery could keep the

blockaders far enough away from the Swash Channel to keep
it open most of the time, but the Confederates could do
nothing to protect the other channels.

By stationing

vessels near the bar in the Main Channel, the Federals
could maintain the blockade "more effectually and by a

Relations of the Confederate States of America (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1959), 251-52; Francis B. C.
Bradlee, "Blockade Running During the Civil War," Essex
Institute Historical Collections, LX (1924) , 167; Delaney,
The Story of Mob i l e , 113-14.
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smaller force than at almost any other place of trade on
the coast.
The shallow waters in and around Mobile Bay also
created difficulties for blockade runners.

In the bay

itself the two anchorages used by vessels had little
depth.

Only twelve feet of water covered the anchorage

near the city and eighteen to twenty feet that near Fort
Morgan.

This lack of deep water limited the blockade

running fleet to light-draft sailing vessels for the most
part during the early years of the war.

These schooners

and sloops had to depend on a fair wind to go in and out
of the bay.

Those steamers which did engage in the trade

needed both fair wind and high tides for success.
Naturally many of the sailing vessels and steamers pre
sented no match for the much faster Federal blockaders.
By late 1863, however, new, light-draft, British-built
steamers with engines designed for high speeds dominated
the blockade runners.

These British steamers made fre

quent successful trips through the blockade.

A con

temporary observer noted that one of the vessels appeared
"in her voyages, almost as regular as a mail-packet in
time of peace."

3

2

James Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers
(New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), 132-34.
^Ibid., 132; Marcus W. Price, "Ships that Tested the
Blockade of the Gulf Ports, 1861-1865," American N eptune,
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In presidential proclamations of April 19 and 27,
1861, Abraham Lincoln established a blockade of the ports
of the Confederacy from Texas to Virginia.

The first

Federal ship to appear off Mobile Bay was the steam fri
gate Niagara.

She arrived in the area during the first

week of May 1861.

Her patrol area consisted of the

entire coast between Pensacola and the mouth of the
Mississippi River, so she did not always stand off Mobile
Bay during the month of May.

The U.S.S. Powhatan assumed

the duties of blockading Mobile Bay on May 26.

When she

arrived near the Main Channel, her crew observed a wel
coming signal on the flagstaff of Fort Morgan.

The Con

federate garrison had raised the United States flag,
union down, on the flagstaff under the Confederate flag.
To the editors of the Daily Advertiser, the incident
seemed a "Joke on Lincoln," but the arrival of the Pow
hatan marked the permanent establishment of the blockade
4
of Mobile.

XI (1951), 263; Lieutenant Colonel Stewart to Julia
Stewart, Apr. 21, 1863, Stewart Letters; Victor Von
Scheliha, A Treatise on Coast-Defence (London: E. & F.
N, Spon, 1868), 103.
4
James D. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1769-1897, 10 vols.
(Washington, D. C . : Government Printing Office, 18961899), VI, 14-15; Gideon Welles to Captain William W.
McKean, May 4, 1861, O.R.N., IV, 155; ------ Zantzinger
to Leroy P. Walker, May 8 , 1861, ibid., XVI, 820;
Abstract log of the U.S.S. Powhatan, Apr. 5-June 3, 1861,
ibid., IV, 208; McKean to Welles, May 27, 1861, ibid.,
182; Daily Advertiser, May 28, 1861.
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The Federals gave all of the ships then at Mobile
approximately a month to leave the port with their car
goes before a rigid blockade became effective.

Between

May 4 and 27, thirteen vessels cleared the harbor, most
of them British ships bound for Liverpool.

These vessels

carried on them 28,182 bales of cotton weighing
13,507,240 pounds and 7,555 barrels of turpentine and
resin.

As the "last day of grace" neared, the Acting

British Consul at Mobile, James Magee, arranged with the
commander of the Powhatan to allow a tugboat to pull to
sea the two remaining British ships.

Having secured this

authority, Magee contracted with the captain of the steam
tug Baltic to tow out the two vessels.

These ships

sailed out from the bay on May 31, both having been
boarded by the commander of the Niagara, which had
relieved the Powhatan three days previously.

From May 31

onward any vessel attempting to enter or leave Mobile Bay
would be subject to seizure and the confiscation of her
. .
5
cargo by Federal authorities.

5
Lord Lyons to James Magee, May 8 , 1861, quoted m
J. Thomas Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy
(New York:
Rogers and Sherwood, 1887) , 437-38; Record
Book of Exports of Domestic Produce in Confederate Ves
sels and Foreign Vessels, 1861-1875, passim, RG 36,
National Archives; Magee to Officer Commanding U. S.
Squadron off Mobile, May 27, 1861, O.R.N., IV, 185;
Lieutenant David D. Porter to Magee, May 27, 1861, ibid.;
William Rix, Incidents of Life in a Southern City During
the War (Mobile:
IbervTTle Historical Society Papers,
1865), [6-7], McKean to Welles, June 4, 1861, O.R.N., IV,
196; Abstract log of the U.S.S. Niagara, May 5-June 7,
1861, ibid., 206.
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From early June 1861 until the end of the year, lit
tle activity took place in and out of Mobile except for
some coastal trade with New Orleans.

Even this coastal

g

trade had ended by June 24.

The Confederate government

had not yet arranged to receive supplies from Europe, so
no English or other foreign ships attempted to enter Con
federate ports during much of 1861.

In fact, the first

blockade runner to arrive in the Confederacy reached
Savannah, Georgia, m

September.

7

Besides this general

lack of blockade running, the paucity of potential cargo
for export contributed to the inactivity at Mobile.
Receipts of cotton from the interior fell off dramati
cally once the war started.

The blockade represented one

reason for the low cotton imports.

Of greater importance,

cotton factors in Mobile urged planters not to ship any
cotton to the city.

The Advertiser and Register, sup

porting the factors, asserted that the blockade prevented
it from being shipped and that stockpiles of cotton would

g

Captain Thomas 0. Selfridge to Flag Officer William
Mervine, Aug. 31, 1861, O.R.N., XVI, 647; Price, "Ships
that Tested the Blockade of the Gulf Ports," 267-69.
7
Frank E. Vandiver (ed.), Confederate Blockade Run
ning Through Bermuda, 1861-1865 (Austin; The University
of Texas Press, 1947), xxv.
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prove "a strong temptation to the enemy to organize land
O

and naval armaments for attacking" Mobile.
With the start of the new year (1862) blockade run
ners began attempting to sneak in and out of Mobile Bay.
Most of these vessels successfully eluded the few blockaders stationed near the bay.
so fortunate.

A few, however, were not

On January 20 the Andrieta tried to get

into Mobile, but the U.S.S. R. R. Cuyler sighted her.
The captain of the Andrieta raised the British colors,
ran his ship ashore east of Fort Morgan, and ordered his
men to abandon her.

Federal boarding parties reached the

Andrieta and secured ropes to her.

Shortly afterwards

Captain William Cottrill's company of mounted scouts
reached the beach and opened a heavy fire on the Federals, driving them away from the beached vessel.

The

enemy boarders had done their job, however, and with the
rise in the tide hauled the ship off as a prize.

The

British consul at Mobile attempted fruitlessly to per
suade the commander of the Federal squadron that the
9
Andrieta had not intended to run the blockade.

O

"Weekly Receipts of Cotton at Mobile" as reported
in the Advertiser and Register, June-September 1861;
ibid., Aug. 30, 1861.
9
Bragg to Cooper, Dec. 31, 1861, Telegrams Received,
Secretary of War; Colonel William L. Powell to Captain
D. E. Huger, Jan. 21, 1862, O . R . , VI, 498-99; Lieutenant
Francis Winslow to McKean, Jan. 23, 1862, O.R.N., XVII,
59-60; Magee to Commander U. S. Fleet off Mobile,
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Official Confederate policy on blockade running out
of Mobile began taking shape in the spring of 1862.
Three or four businessmen at Mobile approached General
Sam Jones and his successor in command at Mobile, General
Butler, about taking cotton to Havana so that they could
use it to purchase military supplies for the Confederacy.
Both Jones and Butler expressed reluctance to grant them
permission.

Jones did allow a few small cargoes to go

out, but under restrictions "requiring that the parties
interested, the Captain and Crew, shall be loyal and
indentified

[sic] in interest with the Confederate

States and that the return cargoes shall as far as prac
ticable be composed of munitions of w a r . " ^

The Confed

erate Navy Department signed contracts with two or three
individuals to supply munitions to the government after
taking cotton out of Mobile.

Secretary of War Randolph

encouraged Jones to allow blockade running on the grounds
that it was "good policy to exchange produce for arms and

Jan. 23, 1862, ibid., 62; Captain L. M. Powell to
Magee, Jan. 24, 1862, ibid., 63; Scharf, History of the
Confederate States N a v y , 536.
^ B u t l e r to Bragg, Mar. 29, 1862, Letterbook, Bragg
Papers, Western Reserve; Butler to Bragg, Mar. 31, 1862,
ibid.; Jones to Randolph, Apr. 4, 1862, Telegrams
Received, Secretary of War; Jones to Cooper, Apr. 5,
1862, Letterbook, Bragg Papers, Western Reserve.
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munitions of war" even though "the practice is liable to
great abuse and should not be allowed indiscriminately.""^
The dash of the Confederate raider Florida into the
bay provided one of the most dramatic incidents of the
blockade of Mobile.

She had only recently entered the

Confederate service when her captain, John Newland Maffitt, ran her into the bay on the afternoon of September
4, 1862.

Maffitt intended sailing his ship from Havana

to Mobile so that he could enlist a full crew and procure
complete equipment to fire her guns.

Both he and his

undersized crew suffered from an attack of yellow fever.
When the Florida received her cannons from the British
at Nassau, she had not gotten the rammers, sights,
sponges, and other items necessary to work the guns.

In

order to get by the four Union blockaders guarding the
entrances to the harbor, Maffitt decided to fly the Brit
ish colors and depend on the Florida's resemblance to a
British warship to deceive the enemy.

It seemed a des-

perate gamble but one Maffitt had to take.

12

"^Randolph to Jones, Mar. 26, 1862, Letters Sent,
Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 6 , p. 217; Randolph to
Jones, Apr. 4, 1862, Telegrams Sent, Secretary of War,
Chap. IX, Vol. 34, p. 171; Randolph to Jones, Apr. 14,
1862, Letters Sent, Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 6 ,
pp. 329-30.
12

Extracts from the journal of Lieutenant J. N.
Maffitt, May 4-December 31, 1862, O.R.N., I, 766; Edward
Boykin, Sea Devil of the Confederacy (New York: Funk &
Wagnalls Co., 1959), 109, 116-22.
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Three Union blockaders guarded the main ship chan
nel into Mobile Bay.

As the Florida approached, Com

mander George H. Preble of the ten-gun, steam sloop
Oneida remained unaware that Maffitt's cruiser was any
where in his vicinity.

After successfully bluffing his

way past the two other enemy vessels, Maffitt steamed
directly for the Oneida.

As the Florida began to steam

past the latter ship, Preble fired a shot across her bow.
He then ordered a full broadside when the Florida did not
slow down.

Soon the two other Federal gunboats opened

fire on the Florida.
however.

Maffitt's ruse had paid off,

His vessel ran successfully past her enemies,

and her superior speed kept her ahead of her pursuers.
Despite her lead, however, a hail of shell and shrapnel
struck the Florida.

The chase lasted for two hours.

Maffitt, so ill that he had to be lashed to the rail,
finally took his battered vessel under the guns of Fort
Morgan, where he received a greeting of a twenty-one gun
salute and the cheers of the garrison.
no cheers.

Preble received

Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles relieved

him of command and dismissed him from the service.

The

Navy Department later restored his rank and returned him
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to duty, but not until 1872 did a court of inquiry clear
13
Preble of blame for the escape of the Florida.
After entering the bay, the Florida remained in
quarantine for two w e eks.
city to undergo repairs.

She then steamed up to the
Maffitt began to recruit his

new crew and to equip his vessel fully for service.

By

early January 1863 Maffitt and the Florida appeared ready
to go to sea.

The weather did not favor the Florida's

exit until January 15.
from the north.

On that day a gale began blowing

The Florida started out about 2:30 on

the morning of the sixteenth.
waited for her to come out.

Seven Federal warships
Under the cover of a heavy

mist, the Florida succeeded in passing five of the enemy
vessels before they discovered her.

When Maffitt real

ized that they had seen his ship, he ordered all sails
raised.
knots.

The gale winds drove her forward at fourteen
Only one Federal vessel possessed speed enough

to try to catch the Florida, and she chased the Confed
erate cruiser for three hours, when the Federals lost
sight of their prey and returned to the blockading
squadron.

13

Maffitt once again had eluded the enemy and

Commander George H. Preble to Farragut, Oct. 10,
1862, O.R.N., I, 436-40; [Susan G. Perkins (arranger
& ed.)T, Letters of Capt. G e o . Hamilton Perkins, U.S.N.
(Concord, N. H.:
Ira C. Evans, 1886), 102-103; Boykin,
Sea Devil of the Confederacy, 122-31; Extracts from test
imony taken before a court of inquiry held April 20,
1872, O.R.N., I, 460-68.
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embarked on a notable career of destroying enemy
commerce.

After the war, Admiral David D. Porter wrote

of the entire incident:
...His [Maffitt's] being permitted to escape
into Mobile Bay, and then out again, was the
greatest example of blundering committed
throughout the w a r ....
The success of the Florida in running the blockade
at Mobile graphically demonstrates the inefficiency of
the blockade there during 1862.

An Englishman who

visited the city in the fall of that year reported:
...The people of Mobile seem to drive a
thriving trade with Havannah by running the
blockade— their swift, well-handled steamej §3
going in and out just when they please....
Even some of the blockaders recognized the weakness of
their efforts to guard the bay.

A frustrated sailor

aboard the steamer Susquehanna implied in a letter to a
northern newspaper that many blockade runners were being
allowed to escape and stated:

"If there be a case for

judicial and executive investigation it is here at this

14

Extracts from the journal of Maffitt, O.R.N., I,
767-69; Extracts from the journal of Lieut. John N.
Maffitt, Jan. 13-Apr. 30, 1863, ibid., II, 667-68;
Commander George F. Emmons to Commodore R. B. Hitchcock,
Mar. 12, 1863, ibid., 30-31; Boykin, Sea Devil of the
Confederacy, 132-40; David D. Porter, The Naval History
of the Civil War (New York:
The Sherman Publishing Co.,
1883T7 627 t
15

W. W. Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States
(London: Richard Bentley, 1863) , *114-15.
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post of the Gulf squadron, and it should be inquired
into."

16

Although no conspiracy existed, it is easy to

understand this Federal's feelings.

Available reports on

arrivals and departures from Mobile during the year 1862
show that eighty-three percent of all attempts to run the
blockade succeeded.

17

The situation at Mobile typified

the blockade elsewhere along the Southern coast.

In his

study of blockade running, Frank L. Owsley concluded:
"...for the first year and a half the blockade was noth
ing more than the plundering of neutral commerce en route
to the Confederacy under the cover of a nominal
blockade.
Opposition to running the blockade began to surface
in Mobile in early 1863.

Because of the potential pro

fits in blockade running, owners of various types of
vessels prepared to take their ships out with loads of
cotton.

The Committee of Safety wrote to Governor Shorter

to express their concern about owners of six river and bay

16

New York He r a l d, Feb. 26, 1863.

17

Information on the various arrivals and departures
can be found in Record Book of Exports..., 1861-1875;
Entry of Merchandise, Mobile, 1861-1865, RG 36, National
Archives; Abstracts of Import Duties, Mobile, 1861-1865,
RG 36, National Archives; Bureau of Customs Cargo Mani
fests, Mobile, 1861-1865, RG 36, National Archives;
O.R.N., XVII, XVIII, XIX, passim; Price, "Ships That
Tested the Blockade...," American Neptune, XII (1952),
52-59.
18

Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 232.
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steamers fitting out their vessels to run the blockade.
These citizens felt that the vessels were essential to
the transportation of supplies to the city from the
interior and possibly to furnish engines and machinery
for the construction of gunboats.

If captured, the loss

of these ships would prove a severe blow to the city and
state.

The committee asked Shorter to use his influence

in Richmond to prevent these ships from going out.
Shorter did forward the committee's letter to Secretary
of War Seddon and added his protest to theirs.

Seddon

replied that the Confederate government could not inter
fere with "such legal use of the river steam-boats as the
owners deem judicious."

19

In answer to Shorter's

expressed and the committee's veiled opposition to
exporting cotton, Seddon stated that the Confederate Con
gress had sanctioned blockade running and that the War
Department agreed with that policy.

20

One Mobilian complained that the value of goods
exported through the blockade far exceeded that of goods
imported and that ships coming in brought too few

19

Peter Hamilton to Shorter, Mar. 25, 1863, O.R., 4,
II, 462; Shorter to Buckner, Mar. 28, 1863, ibid., ¥6263; Shorter to Seddon, Mar. 28, 1863, ibid., 461; Seddon
to Shorter, Apr. 7, 1863, ibid., 472-73; Gift to ------ ,
June 10, 1863, quoted in Harriet Gift Castlen, Hope Bids
Me Onward (Savannah, G a . ; Chatham Publishing Co., 1945) ,
T25.
90

472-73.

Seddon to Shorter, Apr. 7, 1863, O . R . , 4, II,
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munitions and staple goods.

Using statistics from the

Customhouse, John E. Murrell informed the War Department
that from May 1862 to April 1863 cotton worth $1,823,000
had gone out of Mobile while the value of imported goods
stood at only $208,168.

This represented a balance of

$1,614,832 against the Confederacy.

Murrell, who had

participated in blockade running himself, expressed
special concern that runners brought too much liquor into
Mobile.

He suggested that the blockade trade, as then

conducted, end or be regulated to benefit the war effort.
To this end he recommended that the government order
half of the space on all outgoing vessels reserved for
government cotton and the same space on returning ships
for government supplies.

Finally, Murrell urged that the

government exclude or severely limit importation of
liquor.

The authorities did not then want to enact the

policies suggested by Murrell, but in March 1864 they did
establish several blockade-running regulations similar to
Murrell's recommendations.

These new regulations derived

from a plan submitted by Murrell's friend Colin J.
McRae of Mobile.

21

The Confederate government did begin taking steps to
insure a more reliable flow of needed supplies.

21

In early

John E. Murrell to Colonel William L. Powell, Apr.
30, 1863, Letters Received, Secretary of War; Vandiver
(ed.), Confederate Blockade Running, xxxv-xxxvi.
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April 1863 Secretary of War Seddon authorized General
Buckner to seize the iron, side-wheel steamer Alabama to
run the blockade for the government.

Once Buckner

impressed the vessel, Seddon expected him to charter her
to a party owning munitions in Havana to bring these sup
plies back to Mobile.

Seddon advised that if, on the

return trip, additional room remained on the Alabama,
the parties involved might include food supplies in her
cargo.

The government already successfully employed

blockade runners at Wilmington, North Carolina.

Seddon

stated that running the Alabama directly under government
control would prove more successful and economical than
if she remained under private control because "the Govern
ment can command more reliable Officers, the best pilots
and secure facilities."

22

The Alabama became a success

ful blockade runner, making at least five trips during
the summer of 1863.
Buckner's successor at Mobile, General Maury,
attempted to continue and even strengthen Buckner's
policy on blockade running.

He contracted at least two

other steamers, the Fanny and the Crescent, to bring in
goods for the Confederate armies.

The War Department

authorized Maury to make similar arrangements with as

22

Seddon to Buckner, Apr. 3, 1863, Letters Sent,
Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 10, pp. 390-91.
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many shipowners as possible.
always succeed, however.

23

Maury's efforts did not

Some shipping firms did not

honor contracts signed by them, and Maury urged the War
Department to annul the contracts.

He also reported:

...I believe that the people concerned in run
ning the blockade will run their ships on
Government account only on compulsion or in
consideration of extraordinary benefits from
the Government, and it is probable that owners
will sell their ships in Havana, and that
future vg^ages will be made under a foreign
flag....
The solution to this problem, as Maury saw it, was for
the government to have its agents in Havana buy suitable
boats and "take the business into its own hands."

25

Both the Alabama and the Fanny ran out of luck on
September 12, 1863.

On that day three Federal gunboats

chased the Fanny as she tried to enter Mobile Bay.

She

attempted to escape into Pascagoula Bay, but her crew set
her afire to prevent her capture and thus destroyed her
cargo.

The Alabama, too, attempted to get into the bay,

but Federal blockaders discovered and chased her.

23

Seddon to Maury, June 8 , 1863, Telegrams Sent,
Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, p. 49; Maury to
Seddon, June 13, 1863, Telegrams Received, Secretary of
War; Maury to Seddon, June 24, 1863, ibid.; Maury to
Cooper, July 16, 1863, O . R . , XXVI, Pt. 2, pp. 112-13;
Seddon to Maury, July 24, 1863, ibid., 121.
24

Maury to Cooper, Sept. 28, 1863, O . R . , LII,
Pt. 2, p. 531; Maury to Cooper, Aug. 28, 1863, ibid.,
518.
^ M a u r y to Cooper, Aug. 28, 1863, ibid., 518.
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They finally captured her near the Chandeleur Islands and
took her to New Orleans.

Maury informed Joe Johnston

that blockade running seemed temporarily at an end at
Mobile because of the loss of these two vessels:

"They

may be regarded as the last of the blockade runners, as
they were the best of them."

26

Indeed, blockade running

at Mobile practically came to an end for the year.
Slightly more than one hundred violations of the blockade
occurred from January to September but less than twenty
after the capture and destruction of these two runners.

27

During 1864, British side-wheel steamers dominated
and revived the blockade running business at Mobile.

The

most prominent of these were the Denbigh, Donegal, and
Mary.

A description of the Denbigh fits almost any of

these vessels which their builders had specifically
designed to run the blockade:
...She was a side-wheeler, schooner-rigged....
She was built of iron, and had a marked draft

Macomb to Bell, Sept. 13, 1863, O.R.N., XX, 583;
Bell to Welles, Sept. 15, 1863, ibid., 584; Maury to
Cooper, Sept. 28, 1863, O . R . , LII, Pt. 2, p. 531;
Maury to Johnston, Sept. 20,' 1863, ibid. , XXVI, Pt. 2,
p. 244; Maury to [Johnston], Sept. 29, 1863, Letters and
Telegrams Received, Department of Alabama, Mississippi,
and East Louisiana.
27

Record Book of Exports..., 1861-1875, passim;
Entry of Merchandise, Mobile, 1861-1865; Abstracts of
Import Duties, Mobile, 1861-1865; Bureau of Customs
Cargo Manifests, Mobile, 1861-1865; Owsley, King Cotton
Diplomacy, 252-53.
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of seven feet, fore and aft.
She had artifi
cial quarter galleries, an elliptic stern, and
a straight stem.
Boats painted white swung
from iron davits on her port quarter and
abreast of her mainmast.
A house with a bin
nacle on top was athwartships, between her
paddle boxes.
Her funnel was painted black,
and there was a bright, copper steampipe at
the after part of it.
She had side houses and
a hurricane deck, with her foremast through
it. Her masts were bright.
Mastheads, tops,
caps, crosstrees,^bowsprit, and gaff were
painted white....
Only the presence of large numbers of Federal warships
off Mobile Bay in February and March 1864 and the capture
of the forts at the bay entrances in August 1864 slowed
and eventually ended the highly successful trade of these
steamers.
The British steamers did not always enjoy easy trips
in and out of the bay.

On the night of January 31, 1864,

the Denbigh ran aground in the Swash Channel east of Fort
Morgan while attempting to get out.

Her crew, aided by

troops from the fort, threw off the cotton with which she
was loaded.

The blockading fleet discovered the Den

bigh's plight and opened fire on her.
wheelhouse but did no damage.
Morgan drove off the attackers.

One shot hit the

Artillery fire from Fort
Several days later, the

steamer Dick Keys succeeded in getting the Denbigh off

28

Thomas H. Dudley to William H. Seward, Oct. 20,
1863, quoted in Price, "Ships that Tested the Blockade..
.," American Neptune, XI (1951), 271.
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and towed her into the bay.

29

The Virgin ran aground in

the Swash Channel on July 9, 1864, trying to get into the
bay.

During the daylight hours of the tenth and the

eleventh, the blockaders fired at the Virgin but did not
hit her.

Confederate soldiers boarded the stranded

vessel to protect her against enemy cutting-out expedi
tions, and finally they got the Virgin off and brought
her into the bay.

30

Another blockade runner did not enjoy the fortune of
the Denbigh and Virgin.

The Ivanhoe ran aground in the

Swash Channel on the night of July 1 during her first
attempt to evade the blockade.

Two companies moved out

of Fort Morgan to protect her and to remove her cargo.
Six or seven Federal gunboats opened fire on the Ivanhoe
after sunrise.

The enemy fleet continued to shell the

steamer for several days, on each occasion the gunners
in Fort Morgan returning their fire.

Although Confeder

ate shells struck several vessels, none damaged the

29

R. M. Thompson and R. Wainwright (eds.), Confi
dential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa F o x , 2 vols.
(New York!
Printed for the Naval History Society, 19181919), I, 344; Advertiser and Register, Feb. 4, Mar. 24,
1864.
^^Ellsworth H. Hults, "Aboard the Galena at Mobile,"
Civil War Times Illustrated, X (April 1971) , 19; Tarleton
to Lightfoot, July 10, 12, 1864, quoted in Still (ed.),
"The Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 69-70, 72;
Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 21, 1864, Tarleton Letters;
Daily Tribune, July 13, 1864.
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Federals very seriously.

On the night of July 5 an expe

dition of four launches boarded the Ivanhoe and set her
afire.

Confederate soldiers on the beach opened up a

strong rifle fire when they discovered the flames.

The

raid destroyed both the bow and stern of the blockade
runner but not her mid-section.

Eventually, Confederate

engineers succeeded in getting the Ivanhoe1s machinery
out of her, but the passage of Farragut's fleet into the
bay ended plans to refloat her.

31

The last steamer to run the blockade at Mobile, the
Denbigh, went out on the night of July 27, 1864.

When

Farragut's fleet concentrated off Mobile Bay prior to
running past the forts, it became impractical for vessels
still at Mobile to get out.

Maury gave some thought,

however, to allowing one steamer to attempt to run out
after the Federals had gotten into the bay.

The War

Department gave its permission for the Heroine to make
the attempt if she could do so safely, but conditions did
not permit her to get out.

Three other vessels— the

"^Hults, "Aboard the Galena," 17-19; Farragut to
Welles, July 6 , 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 355; Sergeant
William J. Byrnes to Captain John T. Purves, July 5,
1864, in John T. Purves Papers, Special Collections
Division, Tulane University Library; Tarleton to Light
foot, July 5, 7, 10, 1864, quoted in Still (ed.), "The
Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 63-64, 6 6 - 6 8 ;
Maury to Cooper, July 7, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 2, p.
693; Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 21, 1864, Tarleton
Letters.

243
Virgin, Red Gauntlet, and Mary— became entrapped at Mobile
besides the Heroine.

Maury ordered the seizure of all

four for use by the military.

The steamers served as

dispatch and transport boats and did good work during the
siege of Spanish Fort and Blakely.

When the army evac

uated Mobile, the blockade runners carried men and sup
plies up the inland rivers of Alabama.

The Confederate

naval commander surrendered them with his other vessels
at the end of the war.

32

Blockade running had proven a highly successful and
profitable business at Mobile and other Southern ports.
Professor Frank Vandiver has concluded that running the
blockade "was perhaps the most successful, large-scale
campaign attempted by the South,"

33

He argues that the

supplies which came into the Confederacy through the
blockade enabled her to wage war longer than she could

Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 28, 1864, Tarleton
Letters; Seddon to Maury, July 20, 1864, Telegrams Sent,
Secretary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, p. 246; Maury to
Seddon, Aug. 4, 1864, Telegrams Received, Secretary of
War; Seddon to Maury, Aug. 5, 1864, Telegrams Sent, Sec
retary of War, Chap. IX, Vol. 35, pp. 224-25; Maury to
Seddon, Aug. 14, 1864, with endorsement by Lieutenant
Colonel Thomas L. Bayne, Aug. 16, 1864, Telegrams
Received, Secretary of War; John Scott to G. A. Trenholm,
Aug. 17, 1864, ibid.; Jeanie Mort Walker, Life of Capt.
Joseph F r y , the Cuban Martyr (Hartford, Conn.:
The J. B.
Burr Publishing Co., 1675),176-78; Bradlee, "Blockade
Running," 155; Scharf, History of the Confederate States
N a v y , 595, 598.
33

Vandiver (ed.), Confederate Blockade Running, xli.
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have done without them and that, given time, blockade
running would have eventually eliminated supply
shortages.

Mobile certainly played an important role in

the business.

Attempted violations of the blockade at

Mobile numbered between 208 and 220.

Slightly more than

eighty percent of these attempts succeeded.

The number

of attempts was exceeded only at Wilmington, Charleston,
and New Orleans, and the percentage of successful
attempts stood as high or perhaps slightly higher at
Mobile than at the other three ports.

34

34

Ibid.; Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 259-60.
The
figures quoted were compiled by the author from most of
the sources cited in this chapter.

CHAPTER X
"THE DAMAGE TO THE FORT WAS VERY TRIFLING."
Mobile figured in Union plans for the early months
of 1864, but only in an indirect way.

The real Union

offensive operation in Mississippi and Alabama during the
months of January, February, and March was a raid by
Major General William T. Sherman's army from Vicksburg to
Meridian, Mississippi.

No one in the Union high command

suggested that their forces attack Mobile.

Major General

Nathaniel P . B a n k s ' troops would have been the men to
have made such an attack, but they had been preparing
since early January for a campaign up Red River to
Shreveport, Louisiana.'*'

Sherman anticipated that when he

reached Merdian the Confederates would think he would
then turn south against Mobile.

He did not have enough

men to attempt an attack on the Gulf city and recommended
that upon their return to Vicksburg his troops go up Red
River to cooperate with Banks.

Sherman thought the Red

River campaign would be a short, decisive stroke that

■^Sherman to Banks, Jan. 16, 1864, O.R. , XXXII,
Pt. 2, p. 114; Halleck to Banks, Jan. 4, 1864, ibid.,
XXXIV, Pt. 2, p. 15; Halleck to Banks, Jan. 11, 1864,
ibid., 55-56; Banks to Sherman, Jan. 25, 1864, ibid.,
145.
245
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"would be the death blow to our enemies of the Southwest"
2
and free troops for a later attack on Mobile.
To attract attention away from his foray toward
Meridian and to keep the Confederates from shifting large
numbers of troops against him, Sherman requested that
Banks conduct a demonstration or feint attack against
Fort Powell.

Such a move would reinforce the idea that

the Federals would make an attack on Mobile.

Sherman

asked Banks to have naval vessels keep up the mock assault
for about a week so that he could make the most of his
stay in Meridian in tearing up the Mobile and Ohio Rail
road in that vicinity.

Banks discussed Sherman's request

with Farragut at New Orleans and urged his cooperation.
Farragut eagerly agreed, probably hoping that the army
would send him some troops for a full-fledged attack on
the forts at the entrance to Mobile Bay.

3

He ordered six

mortar boats at Pensacola readied for the attack on Fort
Powell in cooperation with gunboats already in Missisissippi Sound.
his intentions:

2

Farragut informed the Navy Department of
"I shall therefore amuse myself in that

Sherman to Banks, Jan. 16, 1864, ibid., XXXII, Pt.
2, p. 114; Sherman to Halleck, Jan. 29, 1864, ibid., 260.
3
Sherman to Banks, Jan. 16, 1864, ibid., 114; Banks
to Halleck, Feb. 7, 1864, ibid., XXXIV, Pt. 2, p. 266;
Farragut to Welles, Feb. 7, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 90;
Halleck to Grant, Feb. 16, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 2,
p. 402.
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way for the next month, unless the ironclads should
come o u t ,. .. ..4
On the eve of Sherman's Meridian expedition, Maury
did not seem concerned about an attack on Mobile.

He

reported on January 31 and February 2 that he had not
procured hard evidence of preparations for a land attack.
Rumors and some more conclusive facts reached Maury that
Farragut might try to run his fleet past the outer line
of forts but did not have the vessels necessary for a
successful assault on the bay batteries.

Maury continued

to have his engineers work to improve Mobile's defenses.
Thousands of slaves impressed throughout the state aug
mented the work force in the city.

Ordnance stores

arrived a bit too slowly to satisfy Maury, but he real
ized that given the South's limited resources he got all
that could be spared for his command.

All of the troops

at Mobile appeared to be in good condition and their
morale was high.

To strengthen his outer line, Maury

hoped for success in constructing a battery in the chan
nel between Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines.

He wrote the

^Farragut to Banks, Feb. 11, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 91;
Farragut to Fox, Feb. 8 , 1864, in R. M. Thompson and R.
Wainwright (eds.), Confidential Correspondence of Gustavas
Vasa F o x , 2 vols. (New York: Printed for the Naval History Society, 1918-1919), I, 343; Farragut to Commander
Alex. Gibson, Feb. 8 , 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 91; Farragut to
Acting Volunteer Lieutenant D. C. Woods, Feb. 12, 1864,
ibid., 93; Farragut to Welles, Feb. 7, 1864, ibid., 90.
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War Department:

"This, with obstructions, torpedoes, and

the admiral's fleet, ought to make the passage difficult
to wooden ships."

5

The various defensive works around the city impressed
an Englishman who visited Mobile about this .time and
inspected them.

Of the new line of redoubts being thrown

up by Von Sheliha's engineers, FitzGerald Ross wrote that
they "were perfect models of strength and judicious
arrangement."

g

Each of the redoubts was constructed of

sand and had parapets twenty-five feet wide.

Turf fas

tened to the sand by Cherokee Rose shrubs covered the
revetment, or embankment, in front of each redoubt.

The

prickly nature of the shrubs would prove an additional
obstacle to any enemy troops trying to storm the
fortifications.

Ross stated that when Von Sheliha's line

of earthworks reached completion and all improvements
completed on the bay batteries Mobile would be "one of
the most strongly fortified places in the world."

7

5Maury to Polk, Jan. 31, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt.
2, p. 640; Polk to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Jack,
Jan. 28, 1864, ibid., 629; Polk to Watts, Jan. 28, 1864,
ibid., 629-30; Polk to Major J. C. Denis, Jan. 28, 1864,
Telegrams Sent, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and
East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 236 1/4, p. 21, RG 109,
National Archives; Maury to Seddon, Feb. 2, 1864, O . R . ,
XXXII, Pt. 2, pp. 655-56.
^FitzGerald R o s s , Cities and Camps of the Confeder
ate States, ed. by Richard B. Harwell (Urbana:
University
of Illinois Press, 1958), 195.
^Ibid.
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Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines did not please Ross, however,
because experience at Fort Sumter had shown that modern
artillery could level the old brick forts, making them
dangerous places for men to be stationed.

According to

Ross, both the army and navy commanders at Mobile acknow
ledged that these forts could not stop an enemy fleet
0
from passing them.
Sherman's Union army left Vicksburg February 13 in
its march toward Meridian.

The troops captured Jackson

February 5 and crossed Pearl River two days later.
Polk's Confederates opposing Sherman lacked enough
numerical strength to make a stand and fell back in front
of the Federal advance.

Polk requested that Maury send
• -S'

him two brigades from Mobile if he could spare them and
promised to return them if the enemy attacked Mobile.
The brigades of Quarles, Cockrell, and Baldwin left the
city on February 7 to join Polk.

In return for these

forces, Polk ordered the recently organized 22nd Louisi
ana Consolidated Infantry and three companies of the 1st
Alabama Infantry to Maury.

The men of both units had

experience as heavy artillerists, and Maury had requested
9
them earlier.
The latter general also relieved Shoup of

8 Ibid.,

9

196-97.

Sherman to Brigadier General John A. Rawlins, Mar.
7, 1864, O. R . , XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 175; Polk to Davis,
Feb. 9, 1864, ibid., 335; Polk to Maury, Feb. 2, 1864,
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his duties at Mobile and ordered him to Polk temporarily
as a brigade commander.

To protect his eastern division

against a possible Federal raid from Pensacola, Maury
sent Brigadier General James Cantey's brigade to
Pollard. ^
The troops from Mobile had barely begun arriving at
Meridian when Polk decided to order them back.

In addi

tion to the three brigades mentioned above, Polk sent two
other brigades and the men in a camp for exchanged pri
soners at Enterprise to Maury.
enemy prompted this action.

The movements of the

Sherman reached Morton on

February 8 and began marching toward Meridian the next
day.

Fearing that Sherman's force comprised part of a

combined attack by land and sea on Mobile, Polk wished to
strengthen its garrison, which numbered about 2,500 men.
He had visited Mobile several days before and expressed

ibid., Pt. 2, p. 655; Para IX, Special Orders No. 36,
Headquarters [Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and
East Louisiana], Feb. 5, 1864, ibid., 681; Maury to
Cooper, Feb. 7, 1864, ibid., 692; Chambers, "My Journal,"
299; Para III, Special Order No. 34, Headquarters Depart
ment of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Feb. 3,
1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 663; Daniel P. Smith,
Company K, First Alabama Regiment, or Three Years in the
Confederate Service (Prattville, A l a . : Published by the
Survivors, 1885), 90.
■^Para I, Special Order No. 37, Headquarters Depart
ment of the Gulf, Feb. 6 , 1864, cited in Compiled Service
Record of Francis A. Shoup; Bob ------ to Hunter, Feb. 5,
1864, Hunter-Taylor Papers; Orear to Carrie Orear, Feb.
6 , 1864, Weaver Collection.
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confidence that the defenses looked complete enough to
resist an assault.

Supplies at the city appeared suffi

cient to sustain a large garrison for six months, but Polk
promised Maury to try to send him additional meat and
corn.

In reporting his actions to Richmond, Polk urged

Davis to supply Maury's requisitions for heavy artillery
ammunition.

Polk encouraged Maury to ask the non-

combatants in the city to l e a v e . ^
Maury followed up quickly on Polk's request.

He

informed the people through the newspapers that Mobile
might be attacked and asked everyone who could not parti
cipate in the defense of the city to leave for the
interior.

An editorial in the Advertiser and Register

ventured the opinion that Sherman was unlikely to move
against the city, yet recommended that women, children,
and other non-combatants leave so as not to be "in the
way— an obstacle to the General commanding, and a drawback to the success of the defence."

12

Several days later,

Maury, in a letter to Mayor Slough, made the observation
that few people had left Mobile and urged him to use his

■^Polk to Lieutenant Colonel F. F. Sevier, Feb. 8 ,
1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 695; Polk to Forney, Feb.
9, 1864, ibid., 700; Polk to Maury, Feb. 9, 1864, ibid.,
701; Chambers, "My Journal," 301; Maury to Cooper, Feb.
9, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 701; Advertiser and
Register, Feb. 5, 1864; Polk to Davis, Feb. 9, 1864,
O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 335.
12

Advertiser and Register, Feb. 11, 1864.
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authority to make them go.
portation for the people.

He offered to furnish trans
Slough complied with Maury's

request by appealing to the patriotism of the populace
and pointing out that if they left more food would be
available for the soldiers defending Mobile.

Governor

Watts added his voice to those of Maury and Slough and
made arrangements with planters and townsmen of the
interior to house the refugees.

Hundreds of people

finally left the city, and many of them found a welcome
in Montgomery, where a number of their fellow townsmen
had gone earlier.

13

Confederate authorities in Richmond did not ignore
the possible threat to Mobile.

In particular, Davis

seemed anxious that Sherman's column be stopped before it
could reach the Gulf.

He urged Joe Johnston at Dalton to

send troops to Polk to attack the Federals.

The capture

of Mobile would not only mean the loss of its port and
rail facilities but also that the enemy would have a good
base for operations into the interior of Alabama.
Johnston replied to the president's entreaties by saying
that his army was too weak to aid Polk and hold the
approaches to Atlanta at the same time.

He then suggested

1 3 Ibid., Feb. 16, 1864; Mumford Diary, Feb. 15,
1864; Chambers, "My Journal," 302; Mary Elizabeth Massey,
Refugee Life in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana
State University Press, 1964), 87.
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that Polk assemble all of his cavalry and use it to
harass Sherman's line of march.

14

Seddon telegraphed

Beauregard at Charleston and asked if he could go and
assume command of the defenses at Mobile.

The Creole

general replied that Charleston remained threatened and
that he did not think it proper for him to take over at
Mobile at such a late hour because he did not know the
situation there.

Beauregard offered only to inspect the

defenses and confer with Maury.

The War Department then

ordered Gabriel Rains back to Mobile from Charleston to
work once more with subterranean shells.

15

By February 13, Maury had learned of Farragut's plan
ned attack on Grant's Pass, though he apparently did not
know the attack was only a feint.

He asked the War

Department for 6,000 more men to hold the lines in the
event of a siege.

While he felt that he had a sufficient

supply of commissary stores, Maury requested more ordnance
for his heavy artillery.

In response to Maury's request

■^Johnston to Davis, Feb. 11, 1864, O . R . , XXXII,
Pt. 2, p. 716; Johnston to Davis, Feb. 11, 1864, John
ston Papers; Ewell to Maury, Feb. 12, 1864, O.R., XXXII,
Pt. 2, p. 726; Davis to Johnston, Feb. 13, l!i"6 ¥, ibid.,
L I I , Pt. 2, p. 619; Johnston to Davis, Feb. 16, 1864,
ibid., XXXII, Pt. 2, pp. 751-52.
■^Seddon to Beauregard, Feb. 14, 1864, O . R . , XXXV,
Pt. 1, p. 605; Beauregard to Seddon, Feb. 14, 1864,
ibid.; Para XVII, Special Order No. 38, Adjutant and
Inspector General's Office, Feb. 15, 1864, ibid., XXXII,
Pt. 2, p. 738.
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for experienced engineers, the Engineer Bureau made application for several officers to Seddon.

16

Maury's report

to Seddon on the condition of his outer line did not sound
optimistic.

He found Fort Powell weak and difficult to

strengthen properly.

A determined enemy assault would

probably get through Grant's Pass.

According to Maury,

the defensive posture near the main channel did not seem
very much better:
...The line between Forts Morgan and Gaines is
also very liable from the same causes to be
forced.
The channel is too wide and deep to
defend or obstruct effectually.
The battery
to have been placed in the channel is not yet
quite ready, nor has the admiral yet been able
to move the Tennessee into the lower bay.
The
enemy will probably, therefore, be able to
occupy the lower bay with his fleet of war
ships,j^nd will do so preliminary to the
siege.
Various preparations for the threatened attack occur
red in the city.

Colonel Charles A. Fuller, Post Comman

dant, ordered all saloons and drinking establishments
closed to try to keep soldiers of the garrison as sober
as possible.

Mayor Slough issued a civil order which

Maury to Cooper, Feb. 13, 1864, ibid., XXXII, Pt.
2, p. 734; Maury to Seddon, Feb. 15, 1864, ibid., 739;
Maury to Cooper, Feb. 14, 1864, ibid., 736; Rives to
Seddon, Feb. 15, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engi
neer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 4, p. 428.
17

Lieutenant Colonel William E. Burnett to Judge
D. G. Burnett, Mar. 7, 1864, quoted in New York Daily
Tribune, Apr. 18, 1864; Maury to Seddon, Feb. 15, 1864,
O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 739.
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echoed Fuller's directive.

General Cantey, commander of

the troops in and around the city, required all men in
Mobile who could bear arms to enroll for defense of the
city.

He would force all who did not obey his order to

leave Mobile immediately.

Efforts to procure enough food

to supply the garrison continued.
quantity of bacon from Mississippi:

Polk contributed a
"...it is not well

cured & it may be well to issue the joints at once & to
have the balance packed carefully in a cool place."

18

To

supplement the food coming in from normal sources, Captain
V. M. Byrnes, Post Commissary, asked that citizens leaving
Mobile and unable to take subsistence stores with them
turn these supplies over to his office for use by the
military.

Persons who responded to Byrne's request

would receive receipts and orders which commissaries in
the interior would honor for an amount of stores equal
those turned m

at Mobile.

19

On the morning of February 16, 1864, the anticipated
attack on Fort Powell began.

Six mortar schooners and

18

Special Order No. 6 , Commandant Post, Feb. 10,
1864, quoted in Advertiser and Register, Feb. 11, 1864;
Order, Mayor's Office, Feb. 10, 1864, quoted in ibid.;
General Order No. 22, Headquarters Cantey's Brigade, Feb.
15, 1864, quoted in Daily Tribune, Mar. 8 , 1864; Polk to
Maury, Feb. 16, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Depart
ment of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Chap.
II, Vol. 8 3/4, p. 45, RG 109, National Archives.
19

Notice, Office Post Commissary, Feb. 16, 1864,
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Feb. 16, 1864.
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four gunboats opened fire on the fort at about nine
o'clock that morning.

The Confederates manning the guns

in Powell replied infrequently to the enemy bombardment.
None of their shells struck the Federal vessels.

Most of

the shells hurled at the fort also fell short of their
mark.

A Confederate officer wrote later to his girl-

friend:

"The damage to the Fort was very trifling."

20

At least five Federal shells exploded in the officers'
quarters and completely destroyed them.

Two men in the

fort, one of them Lieutenant Colonel James M. Williams,
commanding the post, received wounds during the attack.
A shell fragment knocked Williams down and stunned him.
He barely escaped being killed according to a newspaper
report:

"The shell grazed the front of his army and body,

entirely tearing away the sleeve and breast of his
coat."

21

At least one Confederate concluded from the

9n

"Abstract log of the U.S.S. Octorara,..." Feb. 16,
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 98; "Abstract log of the U.S.S.
Calhoun,..." Feb. 16, 1864, ibid., 99-100; "Abstract log
of the U.S.S. J. P. Jackson,..." Feb. 16, 1864, ibid.,
101-102; Lieutenant C. E. Ross to Garner, Feb. 16, 1864,
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Feb. 17, 1864; Colonel
George A. Smith to Garner, Feb. 16, 1864, quoted in
ibid., Feb. 18, 1864; Maury to Cooper, Feb. 16, 1864,
O. R . , XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 401; Tarleton to Lightfoot, Feb.
22, 1864, quoted in Still (ed.) , "The Civil War Letters
of Robert Tarleton," 52.
21

Smith to Garner, Feb. 16, 1864, quoted m Adver
tiser and Register, Feb. 18, 1864; Tarleton to Light
foot, F e b . 22, 1864 , quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil
War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 52; Advertiser and
Register, Feb. 20, 1864.
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results of the bombardment that naval fire alone would
not reduce the fort.

22

Heavy winds from the north prevented the Federal
vessels from renewing their attack for a week.

Maury

used the lull to continue his defensive preparations.

He

requested additional artillery shells, powder, and rifle
ammunition from the War Department.

To inquiries from

Beauregard, Maury and Von Sheliha both replied that the
engineers had placed a heavy sand glacis, or cover, around
the walls of Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines to protect the
masonry from the fire of rifled cannons.

Maury continued

to collect food supplies from Polk to provide subsis
tence in the event of a siege.

To assist Von Sheliha in

the construction of fortifications near the city and in
the strengthening of the outer defensive line, Maury
requested the War Department to assign Major General
Jeremy F. Gilmer, Chief of the Engineer Bureau, to Mobile
temporarily.

Finally, to guard against a possible land

ing on the coast, Maury organized a force of sharpshoot
ers from his infantry brigades and sent them with the

^ T a r l e t o n to Lightfoot, Feb. 22, 1864, quoted in
Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton,"
53.
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15th Confederate Cavalry and two field pieces to Bayou
LaBatre.

23

The Confederate high command and Maury divided their
attention between defense of the city and Sherman's move
ments in Mississippi.

Seddon advised Maury to concen

trate his efforts against Sherman in the field rather
than preparing to defend Mobile itself.

The Federals had

reached Meridian on February 14 and sent detachments
south along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Enterprise.
Maury apparently agreed with Seddon's strategy because he
registered no protest cincl or dered Cantey's brigade up the
railroad to prevent any further southward movement by the
enemy.

Polk granted one of Maury's requests and sent the

1st Alabama Infantry to Mobile.

This unit took charge of

the heavy artillery in seven redoubts on the city's outer
line of defenses.

Polk also promised to send the 1st

Maury to Cooper, Feb. 16, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt.
1, p. 401; Beauregard to Maury, Feb. 16, 1864, ibid.,
Pt. 2, p. 754; Rives to Von Sheliha, Feb. 17m 1864, Let
ters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill,
Vol. 4, p. 434; Rives to Beauregard, Feb. 18, 1864,
ibid., 437; Rives to Beauregard, Feb. 22, 1864, ibid.,
445; Para IV, Special Order No. 43, Headquarters Depart
ment of the Gulf, Feb. 17, 1864, quoted in Advertiser
and Register, Feb. 18, 1864; Polk to Maury, Feb. 17,
1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Department of Alabama,
Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 8 3/4,
p. 47; Polk to Seddon, Feb. 18, 1864, O . R . , XXXII,
Pt. 2, p. 763; Cooper to Beauregard, Feb. 18, 1864,
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector Gen
eral, Chap. I, Vol. 40, p. 81; Chambers, "My Journal,"
304-306.
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Mississippi Artillery to Mobile as soon as he could do
so.

Von Sheliha had gathered additional entrenching

tools from Montgomery and put them to use with the force
of slave laborers then coming in from the interior.

By

February 20, Maury had almost 9,300 men under his command
ready for the defense of the city.

Although not a large

army, this force was probably sufficient considering the
enemy forces threatening Mobile.

24

Farragut's mortar schooners and gunboats renewed
their attack on Fort Powell on February 23 and continued
their bombardment the two days following.

On the twenty-

third, the Federal gunners fired slightly more than 300
shells at the fort but caused no damage and no
casualties.

During the attack on the following day, the

Federal vessels threw nearly 375 shells toward Fort
Powell.

Again, few of the shells struck the target, and

those that did had no serious effects.

The Confederate

artillerymen in Fort Powell initiated the action of Feb
ruary 25 by firing on the Federal squadron.

24

Despite the

Seddon to Maury, Feb. 17, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, P t .
2, p. 755; Maury to Polk, Feb. 19, 1864, ibid., 769;
Smith, Company K, 90-91; Edward Young McMorries, History
the First Regiment Alabama Volunteer Infantry C.S.A.
"{Montgomery: The Brown Printing Co., 1904), 72; Jack to
Forney, Feb. 19, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 771;
Rives to Gilmer, Feb. 20, 1864, Letters and Telegrams
Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 4, p. 433;
"Abstract from return of the army in the Department of
the G u l f ,...February 20, 1864,..." O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 2,
p. 785.
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470 shells fired in reply by the enemy, the fort sus
tained less damage than it had the previous day.

The

garrison lost one man killed and two wounded, however.

25

A frustrated Union naval officer wrote to a comrade about
these fruitless attacks:
We are hammering away at the fort here,
which minds us about as much as if we did not
fire— that is, the fort— for the men skedad
dle as soon as the fire is at all brisk,
although they will keep up anything like a
fair fight, as they did with me for two hours
yesterday in the Orvetta, and until the
25
others commenced action, when they retired.
Heavy northerly winds, low tides, and bad weather
prevented Farragut's vessels from renewing their attack
on Fort Powell until February 29, but on that day they
carried out the fiercest bombardment the fort had to
sustain.

They fired some 567 shells that day, but the

attack again had negligible results:
...only 20 [shells] struck the island and 3,
the bombproof, killing or wounding no one and
damaging the Fort so slightly that ten men in

25

Gee to Major D. W. Flowerree, Feb. 23, 1864,
quoted in Advertiser and Register, Feb. 24, 1864; Lieu
tenant Colonel James M. Williams to Flowerree, Feb. 23,
1864, quoted in ibid.; Tarleton to Lightfoot, Feb. 25,
1864, quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of
Robert Tarleton," 54; Maury to Cooper, Feb. 25, 1864,
O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 401; Advertiser and Register,
Feb. 26, 1864; Tarleton to Lightfoot, Feb. 26, 1864,
Tarleton Letters; Maury to Seddon, Feb. 27, 1864, O.R./
LII, Pt. 2, p. 631; Colonel J. C. Ives to Davis,
Feb. 20, 1864, ibid.
26
Captain Percival Drayton to Jenkins, Feb. 24,
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 95.
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ten minutes rg^tored it to its former
condition....
The Confederate gunners fired slightly more effectively
than before.

Despite the bursting of one of their can

nons, the men kept up a steady barrage.

Five shells

struck one of the mortar schooners, forcing her out of
the action.

The commander of the Confederate ram Baltic

wrote to a friend about the engagement:
...I saw some beautiful line shots made...dur
ing the bombardment, and am satisfied at least
one of the mortar schooners would have been
sunk if sailors had been handling it [a can
non] , but unfortunately those who were 2 $orking it knew not how to sight a gun....
Finally at sunset Farragut ordered his ships to break off
the engagement.

The fort's flag remained flying as the

Federal vessels sailed westward.

29

The bombardment of the twenty-ninth convinced Farra
gut that further attacks on Fort Powell would yield no
better results.

He also realized that he could do noth

ing to result in capture of the Confederate forts guarding

Farragut to Welles, Feb. 28, 1864, ibid., 96;
Maury to Seddon, Feb. 27, 1864, O . R . , L I I , Pt. 2, p.
631; Advertiser and Register, Mar. 2, 1864; Tarleton to
Lightloot, Mar. 2, 1§64, quoted in Still (ed.) , "The
Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton," 55.
O O

Farragut to Welles, Mar. 1, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 97;
Maury to Seddon, Feb. 29, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 1, p.
402; Williams to Garner, Mar. 7, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 881;
Simms to Jones, Mar. 5, 1864, ibid., 880.
29
97.

Farragut to Welles, Mar. 1, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
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the entrances to Mobile Bay.

High winds and low tides

had prevented the Federal vessels from getting any
closer than two miles to the fort.

Several ships ran

aground during the two week demonstration and had to be
towed off.

The low water also made it almost impossible

for small boats to land an assault force against the
fort.

Buchanan's small squadron of gunboats had assumed

a position in rear of Fort Powell where they could take
the garrison off or reinforce it.

The ironclad Tennessee

could not get over Dog River Bar, but Farragut mistook
Baltic or another vessel for the Tennessee.

Thinking

the ironclad ready for action, Farragut did not feel he
could run into the bay without monitors or ironclads of
his own.

Lacking troops to cut off the land approaches

to the Confederate forts, the Union admiral decided he
could not attack Mobile Bay successfully and chose to
end his demonstration.

30

Fort Powell had come through this baptism of fire
very well, although particular facets of its defense had
not satisfied the Confederate command.

In each attack

the Confederate guns had been silenced because the weight

30

Farragut to Fox, Feb. 28, 1864, quoted m Thomp
son and Wainwright (eds.), Confidential Correspondence
of Gustavus Vasa F o x , I, 34 5; Farragut to Welles, Feb.
28, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 96-97; Farragut to Welles, Mar.
1, 1864, ibid., 97; Farragut to Jenkins, Mar. 1, 1864,
ibid., 98; Farragut to Banks, Mar. 2, 1864, O.R. ,
XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 12.
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of metal thrown against the fort had made it impossible
for the artillerymen to remain at their stations.

The

Confederate engineers could not strengthen the earth and
sand parapets and traverses so that the men could remain
safely at their g u n s .

None of the torpedoes placed in

the waters west of Grant's Pass exploded even though the
Federal vessels struck many of them.

Later the engi

neers discovered that marine worms had formed clusters
on the tops of the torpedoes and prevented the firing
mechanisms from working.

Despite these disappointments,

the Confederate military authorities remained pleased
with the defense of the fort.

The garrison had lost only

one man killed and five wounded.
2,000

None of the nearly

shells fired at the fort did any damage which the

men could not repair overnight:
...not a single gun had been dismounted, not
a single traverse had been seriously damaged,
nor had the parapet and the bomb-proof lost
any of their strength, all damage done by the
exploding shells being at once repaired b y ^
throwing sand-bags in the open craters....
Major General Gilmer arrived in Mobile on February
24, 1864, to serve on temporary duty under Maury.

He had

helped design many of the defensive works at Charleston,

31Maury to Seddon, Mar. 3, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 1,
p. 402; Victor von Scheliha, A Treatise on Coast-Defence
(London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1868), 36, 38, 229.

264
32
so his experience could prove very useful.

With Maury

and Buchanan, Gilmer visited Fort Powell and Fort Gaines
during the bombardment of the former place.

Later he

reviewed the troops manning the city works and made a
thorough inspection of the land defenses.

He found the

various forts and redoubts strong though incomplete.
Gilmer requested the War Department to order more engineers to Mobile to expedite completion of the works.

33

To strengthen the position at Grant's Pass, he ordered
the construction of small earthwork batteries at Cedar
Point and Little Dauphin Island.

These works would pre

vent the Federals from erecting land batteries there to
use against Fort Powell.

The battery at Cedar Point Gil

mer wanted built around the cedar trees located there to
help conceal it.

By the time Gilmer left on March 9, he

expressed confidence that with a show of naval force to

32

Para XXI, Special Order No. 44, Adjutant and
Inspector General's Office, Feb. 23, 1864 , O.R. ,
XXXV, Pt. 1, p. 640; Advertiser and Register, Feb. 24,
1864.
33Maury to Cooper, Feb. 25, 1864, O . R . , XXXII,
Pt. 1, p. 401; Ross, Cities and Camps, 196-98; Adver
tiser and Register, Feb. 26, 1864; Mumford Diary, Feb.
25', 1864; Rives to Seddon, Feb. 26, 1864, Letters and
Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 4, p.
473; Rives to Gilmer, Feb. 26, 1864, ibid., 474; Rives
to Gilmer, Mar. 2, 1864, ibid., 482; Rives to Maury,
Mar. 3, 1864, ibid., 485.
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back it up, the outer line of defenses at Mobile could
prevent the Federal fleet from entering the bay.

34

Another new general, Brigadier General Richard L.
Page, reported for duty at Mobile about this time to
replace Higgins.

The latter, whom Maury had assigned to

command the outer defenses, became ill in early February
and had to be relieved of command.

Maury requested that

Seddon promote Colonel Henry Maury of the 15th Confederate Cavalry and assign him m

Higgins' place.

35

Davis

instead chose Page as Higgins' replacement and ordered
him to proceed to Fort Morgan.

At the time, Page held

the rank of captain in the Confederate Navy, so Davis
arranged his appointment as brigadier general.

There is

no evidence explaining Davis' choice of Page, but the
new general's background seemed to qualify him for the
position.

A native of Virginia, Page had served in the

United States Navy from 1824 to 1861.

He resigned his

commission when Virginia seceded and helped construct
defenses on the James and Nansemond rivers.
commanded shore batteries near Norfolk.

Later Page

When he received

Davis' order, he held command of the ordnance and

34

Ives to Davis, Feb. 29, 1864, O . R . , LII, Pt. 2,
p. 631; Von Sheliha to Fremaux, Mar. 2, 1864, ibid.,
XXXII, Pt. 3, pp. 577-78; Gilmer to Seddon, Mar. 9, 1864,
ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 637.
35

Advertiser and Register, Feb. 18, 1864; Maury to
Seddon, Mar. 3, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 1, p. 403.
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construction depot at Charlotte, North Carolina, a post
he had ably filled for two years.

36

Page reached Fort

Morgan March 12 and quickly made a favorable impression
on the officers and men of the garrison:
We are very well pleased with our new
general, although he hasn't found out the dif
ference between a fort and a ship yet.
He is
a tall erect old fellow with the air of a man
who has seen service and been accustomed to
exercise command.
A great disciplinarian, but
very quiet and gentlemanly with it all.
He is
vastly preferred to his predecessor the iras
cible Higgins.
The land threat to Mobile ended when Sherman's army
began its withdrawal from Meridian February 20 and crossed
the Pearl River February 24.

38

The duties of the Confed

erate troops around the city became more routine.
Battalion and regimental drills helped improve the

Davis to Captain Richard L. Page, Mar. 3, 1864,
quoted in Dunbar Rowland (ed.), Jefferson D a vis, Consti
tutionalist : His Letters, Papers and Speeches, 10 vols.
(Jackson, M i s s . : Department of Archives and History,
1923), VI, 197; Davis to Maury, Mar. 3, 1864, ibid.;
Davis to Maury, Mar. 5, 1864, ibid., 199; Cooper to
Maury, Mar. 7, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adju
tant and Inspector General, Chap. I, Vol. 40, p. 100;
Ezra J. Warner, Generals in G r a y : Lives of the Confed
erate Commanders (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State Univer
sity Press, 1959) , 227; John T. Scharf, History of the
Confederate States Navy (2nd edition; Albany, N. Y.:
Joseph McDonough, 1894), 143, 553-54, n.l.
"^Tarleton to Lightfoot, Mar. 11, 28, 1864, Tarleton Letters.
"^Sherman to Rawlins, Mar. 7, 1864, O . R . , XXXII,
P t . 1, p . 176.
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discipline and instruction of the men.

At times the vari

ous brigades competed against each other in "match
drills."

Some of the regiments which had manned the

outer line of the land defenses returned to the city and
established camps in the several squares.

The men of

these regiments performed guard duty at various govern
mental or military buildings.

One guard detachment at

the government whiskey depot took advantage of their
assignment:

"...some of the men soon drank enough to

render them boisterous and afterward utterly useless as
guards,..."

39

Food prices remained high and rations for

the soldiers skimpy:

"The troops only receive ten

pounds of meat per month with corn meal and salt."

40

To

try to make up the deficit in food supplies, Maury
ordered that the men plant vegetable gardens between the
lines of fortifications.

The soldiers worked the gardens

and then ate the p r o d u c e . ^

39

Mumford Diary, Mar. 2, 1864; Circular, Headquar
ters Shoup's Brigade, Mar. 7, 1864, Records of the
Department of the Gulf, LHA Collection; Smith, Company K,
91; Chambers, "My Journal," 307, 308.
40

Maury to Seddon, Mar. 3, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt.
1, p. 403; F. Jay Taylor (ed.), Reluctant Rebel: The
Secret Diary of Robert Patrick, 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1959), 143.
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Maury continued to move his units around as the
month of March progressed.

He sent troops from Mobile to

relieve regiments which had been stationed along the
coast to support Fort Powell.

Men of the 1st Alabama

Infantry occupied the battery at Cedar Point and rein
forced the garrison at Fort Powell.

The remainder of

this regiment and the other units on the coast moved into
comfortable tent camps in the nearby pine groves.

Often

the men dredged for oysters to supplement their rations.
One soldier remembered later:

"Under such circumstances,

the duty imposed on the regiment was not regarded as
onerous."

42

Maury ordered three brigades from the sub

urbs of the city to the spacious piney woods near Pol
lard, where Cantey assumed command of them.

While in

transit by boat from Mobile to Tensas Landing, many of
the men occupied their time by shooting alligators sun
ning on the river banks.

Once in camp near Pollard, the

soldiers constructed and occupied cabins.

They found

plenty of good water and fuel nearby and settled down to
picket and drill duty.

42

Most of the troops who remained

Chambers, "My journal," 307-308; M c M o r n e s ,
History of the First Regiment Alabama Volunteer Infantry,
72; Smith, Company K, 91-92.
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at Mobile moved to the larger forts on Von Sheliha's
line, where they camped behind the entrenchments.

43

Work on the various defensive positions continued
while Maury moved his troops around, and the army and
navy commanders attempted to maintain vigilance in case
of another attack.

Von Sheliha found too much diffi

culty in transporting heavy siege artillery to his Little
Dauphin Island battery and decided to arm the work with
Parrott guns on field carriages.

To give Fort Morgan

further protection, Von Sheliha began construction of a
seven-gun water battery at the base of the fort's west
ern face.

The engineers completed three redoubts on the

new land line near the city and moved guns into them.
All of this engineering work required experienced men to
carry it out, so the Engineer Bureau persuaded Seddon to
continue the detail of three civilian engineers who had
worked for the chief engineer at Mobile for several
years.

44

Buchanan, meanwhile, kept all of his gunboats

43

Advertiser and Register, Mar. 20, 1864; Chambers,
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Von Sheliha to Fremaux, Mar. 7, 1864, Letters
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12, p. 604;
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Sheliha to Shoup, Mar. 15, 1864, ibid., 612; Rives to
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neer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 4, p. 590; Rives to Von
Sheliha, Mar. 26, 1864, ibid., 595.
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in the lower bay near Fort Powell, while he attempted to
get the Tennessee over the Dog River Bar.

The poor con

dition of the ram Baltic caused naval constructor John L.
Porter to recommend that workmen strip off her iron and
place it on newer vessels.

Buchanan continued to keep

her in service despite Porter's recommendation and her
own commander's opinion of her:

"...the Baltic is as

rotten as punk, and is about as fit to go to sea as a
mud scow...."

45

^ S i m m s to Jones, Mar. 20, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 884;
Simms to Jones, Mar. 30, 1864, ibid., 886.

CHAPTER XI
"...AN ATTACK IS REALLY IMMINENT..."
The spector of an attack on Mobile raised by Farragut's demonstration in February 1864 caused Von Sheliha
to press his engineering operations, but a shortage of
labor hampered him during much of the month of April.
About the twelfth of that month he had 250 men working on
the city entrenchments.

Companies of soldiers sentenced

to hard labor by courts martial supplemented the slave
force but still did not constitute enough men to conduct
the construction at the rate needed.

Von Sheliha com

plained to the Engineer Bureau that although the yearly
price paid planters for their hands

($360) seemed

liberal, it probably would not suffice to satisfy the
planters even if the government furnished clothing,
quarters and rations.

He recommended conscription as

the only sure way to bring in workers.

Colonel George B.

Hodge, in Mobile on an inspection tour for the War
Department, echoed Von Sheliha's conclusions.^

By the end

^Von Sheliha to Major E. H. Cummins, Apr. 1, 1864,
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 12,
p. 629; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Apr. 2, 1864, ibid., 631;
Von Sheliha to Rives, Apr. 2, 1864, ibid.; Von Sheliha to
RiveS*, Apr. 8 , 1864, ibid., 638; Von Sheliha to Gilmer,
Apr. 12, 1864, ibid., 640; Colonel George B. Hodge to
Cooper, Apr. 13, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt. 3, pp. 779-80.
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of the month, Von Sheliha reported his labor force had
increased.

He also received permission from the War

Department to hire 2,000 slaves, and agents moved into
both Mississippi and Alabama to obtain the needed
workers.

If he could not hire enough laborers, Von

Sheliha had the War Department's permission also to
impress slaves.^
Von Sheliha and his engineers conducted their oper
ations as well as they could.

They concentrated most of

the work done along the lower bay line on Fort Morgan
and Fort Powell because Von Sheliha believed Fort Gaines
in satisfactory condition.

At Fort Morgan, the engineers

completed the water battery and had a redoubt east of the
fort nearly complete.

Recognizing the exposed position

of the parapet guns in Morgan, Von Sheliha ordered the
erection of traverses between each gun to afford some
protection for the gunners.

The engineers added more

sandbags to thicken the fort's magazine.

They also com

pleted the western face of Fort Powell, the earthwork
now being large enough to hold eleven guns.

In the main

^Maury to Jack, Apr. 13, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 3,
p. 787; Von Sheliha to Rives, Apr. 2zF, 1864, Letters
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 2;
Von Sheliha to Colonel F. S. Blount, Apr. 23, 1864,
ibid., 3-4; Von Sheliha to S. H. Linderberger, Apr. 26,
1864, ibid., 11; Rives to Von Sheliha, Apr. 29, 1864,
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill,
Vol. 5, p. 125.
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ship channel, the engineers placed more torpedoes and
sank the first of a series of timber obstructions.

On

the city entrenchments, Von Sheliha's men laid gun plat
forms in four redoubts, continued strengthening of three
others, and began construction of a new redan.

Hodge

had high praise for the fortifications:
...They evince a scientific proficiency in
engineering unsurpassed, if equalled, by any
thing on this continent, and are themselves
the most eloquent evidence of the educated
skill of the_engineer in charge, Lieut. Col.
Von Sheliha.
Maury shifted fresh troops to Fort Gaines to relieve
the men who had garrisoned the post for many months.
Seven companies of the 1st Alabama Infantry moved from
Alabama Port to Dauphin Island.

This regiment and the

30th Louisiana Infantry Battalion did duty in the fort on
alternate days, while two companies of the Alabama regi
ment manned the guns every night.

Although the men of

the garrison did not have much in the way of amusements
to occupy their idle hours, they did eat well.

Using a

large seine and the more standard hook and line, the sol
diers caught a variety of fish, crabs, and oysters.

3

"Monthly report of operations for the defence of
Mobile, Ala., for the month of April, 1864," May 7, 1864,
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16,
pp. 30-31; Von Sheliha to Fremaux, Apr. 22, 1864, O . R . ,
XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 810; "Ammunition report for Fort
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O.R.N., XXI, 894; Hodge to Cooper, Apr. 13, 1864, O . R . ,
XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 779.
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In addition to seafood, the men enjoyed vegetables raised
in a ten acre garden near the fort.

The only real excite

ment on the island during the month of April occurred on
the sixteenth.

A landing party of about 100 men came

ashore on the western end of the island from the Federal
fleet.

A picket guard quickly drove back the invaders.

On the twentieth, the men at Fort Gaines thought they
would witness an engagement at Fort Morgan when a Fed
eral gunboat shelled a party of laborers erecting a
battery near the fort, but the vessel withdrew after
. .
4
firing only a few shots.
On April 13, 1864, Colonel Hodge reported to the
War Department on his inspection tour.

He stated that

he found the troops "well equipped and clad, and evincing
in the precision of their drill and maneuvers a marked
5
and most creditable efficiency."
Their weapons he noted
as being in excellent shape.

Hodge concluded:

"The

4
.
.
.
Edward Young M c M o r n e s , History of the First Regi
ment Alabama Volunteer Infantry C . S .A.- (Montgomery: The
Brown Printing Co., 1904), 72; Roll dated Apr. 30, 1864,
Field and Staff, Record of Events Cards, 30th Louisiana,
Compiled Service Records; Daniel Smith, Company K, First
Alabama Regiment, or Three Years in the Confederate
Service (Prattville, Ala.:
Published by the Survivors,
1885), 92-94.
5
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O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 778.
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entire force compares favorably with any of similar num
bers I have seen in the armies of the Confederacy.
When Hodge began his inspection, Maury had five brigades
numbering 9,300 men, but soon reductions in the garrison
totaling 3,100 men occurred.

Baldwin's old brigade, now

under Brigadier General Claudius W. Sears, left Pollard
on April 11 for Selma, where it once again became part of
Polk's field army.

On the twentieth, Cantey's brigade

began leaving Pollard on their way to join Johnston's
army in northern Georgia.

The War Department ordered

this latter transfer so that Johnston might eventually
gather enough men to enable him to assume the offensive
7
into Tennessee.
Hodge had both negative and positive comments about
the supply departments at Mobile.

He wrote critically of

6Hodge to Cooper, Apr. 13, 1864, O.R., XXXII, Pt.
3, p. 778.
7
Ibid.; Abstract from return of the army of the
District of the Gulf, Apr. 30, 1864, ibid., 860; Maury to
Polk, Apr. 11, 1864, ibid., 771; Brigadier General Claud
ius W. Sears to Jack, Apr. 13, 1864, ibid., 776-77;
Chambers, "My Journal," 313; F. Jay Taylor (ed.), Reluc
tant Rebel; The Secret Diary of Robert Patrick, 18611865 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press,
1959) , 153-54, 156, 159; Johnston to Maury, Apr. 15,
1864, Telegram Book, p. 278, Johnston Papers; Johnston
to Bragg, Apr. 17, 1864, ibid.; Cooper to Maury, Apr. 18,
1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Adjutant and Inspector
General, Chap. I, Vol. 40, p. 223; Orear to Carrie Orear,
Apr. 22, 1864, Weaver Collection; Colonel J. F. Conoley
to Mackall, Apr. 24, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 816;
Ewell to Johnston, Apr. 29, 1F64, ibid., 839-42.
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the quartermaster situation.

The officer in charge of

these supplies did not answer to Maury but had responsi
bility only to the Quartermaster General in Richmond, a
situation which existed almost everywhere in the
Confederacy.

Thus any time the army in Mobile requested

quartermaster supplies, the requisition had to go all the
way to Richmond to receive approval.

Hodge echoed a com

plaint Maury had made to Polk to have the situation
changed.

8

The commissariat seemed in much better shape.

Hodge found enough food supplies in Maury's warehouses
to feed the garrison for six months.

On April 1 the

rations issued to the men had been increased.

One sol

dier commented later that the meat ration went up from
1 1/4 pounds to 1 1/2 pounds a day and bacon from 1/3
pound to 1/2 pound a day.

At least one subordinate com

mander had established a fishery to add variety to his
men's diets.

All of the foodstuffs Hodge found to be of
9
"excellent quality."
The onset of the Atlanta campaign in May resulted in

further inroads in the strength of the Mobile garrison.

®Hodge to Cooper, Apr. 13, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt.
3, pp. 779-80; Maury to Polk, Apr. 11, 1864, ibid.,
772.
9
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tenant Samuel A. Verdery to Captain Edward Durrive,
Apr. 14, 1864, Records of the Department of the Gulf,
LHA Collection.
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On the first, Johnston requested that Reynold's brigade
at Pollard be ordered to join the Army of Tennessee.
Maury complied with the request by sending the brigade
plus an Alabama battery to Dalton.

To replace Reynold's

brigade at Pollard, Maury brought the 1st Alabama Infan
try to Mobile from Fort Gaines and forwarded the regiment
on to Pollard.

There the 1st Alabama had to perform the

guard and picket duty several regiments had done.
Shortly after these troop movements, Polk ordered Maury
to send two regiments to Selma.

Maury ordered not only

these regiments but two field batteries as w e l l . ^
Toward the end of May, Johnston needed more men to rein
force his hard-pressed army.

The War Department ordered

Quarles' Tennessee brigade from Mobile to northern
Georgia.

In addition to the Tennessee regiments, Quarles

took with him the 30th Louisiana Battalion at Fort Gaines
and the 1st Alabama.

Maury sent the 22nd Louisiana Con

solidated Infantry from the city works to Pollard to

Johnston to Bragg, May 1, 1864, O . R . , XXXVIII,
Pt. 4, p. 654; Maury to Polk, May 5, 1864, ibid., 6 6 8 ;
Smith, Company K, 94; Polk to Maury, May 4, 1864, Letters
and Telegrams Sent, Department of Alabama, Mississippi,
and East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 8 3/4, p. 235; Para
XII, Special Order No. 126, Headquarters Department of
Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, May 5, 1864,
O . R . , XXXVIII, Pt. 4, p. 6 6 8 ; Para VII, Special Order
No. 126, Headquarters District of the Gulf, May 5, 1864,
Orders, District of the Gulf; Para VII, Special Order No.
141, Headquarters District of the Gulf, May 20, 1864,
ibid.
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replace the Alabama regiment.

Not only did all of these

soldiers go to Georgia, but Maury also ordered all spare
horses and mules to J o h n s t o n . ^

The departure of these

troops reduced Maury's force by approximately 2,000 men
and left him with an army of slightly more than 4,300
men.

The absence of an enemy threat to the city meant

that the loss of nearly one-third his garrison had little
real impact on Maury's situation, however.

12

Maury established an artillery school in May for the
officers and men of regiments remaining in the District
of the Gulf.

In April he had proposed to the War Depart

ment the establishment of a military academy to train
promising privates to become officers for Confederate
armies in the Southwest, but the law did not permit such
a school.

13

The artillery school opened on May 20 with

details of officers and men from all of the regiments

Para XX, Special Order No. 118, Adjutant and
Inspector General's Office, May 21, 1864, O . R . , XXXXVIII,
Pt. 4, p. 732; Bragg to Johnston, May 21, 1864, ibid.,
LII, Pt. 2, p. 671; Hunter to Stella, May 24, 1864,
Hunter-Taylor Papers; Smith, Company K, 95; Roll for
May and June 1864, Field and Staff, Record of Events
Cards, 22nd Louisiana Consolidated Infantry, Compiled
Service Records; Mumford Diary, May 19, 1864.
12

Abstract of return of the army of the District of
the Gulf, Apr. 30, 1864, O . R . , XXXII, Pt. 3, p. 860;
Abstract of return of the army of the District of the
Gulf, June 30, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 677.
13
317-18.

Maury to Cooper, Apr. 23, 1864, ibid., 4, III,
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in attendance.

Maury hoped the school would provide

needed instruction to officers and men who had never
handled heavy artillery and also act as a refresher course
for those who had.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Beltzhoover

of the 1st Louisiana Heavy Artillery commanded the school
and taught the officers.

Three subordinate officers

instructed the non-commissioned officers and enlisted
men.

Many of the officers resented having to attend the

school, especially since they had manned artillery bat
teries throughout the war.

Besides the lengthy studies

and recitations conducted by Beltzhoover and his instruc
tors, the course included artillery and infantry drill as
well.

Some students did not find the meals served at the

school very nurishing:
...Breakfast, rye coffee and corn bread (of
unsifted m e a l ) ; dinner, corn bread and boiled
bacon, except on three days out of ten, when
molasses was issued in lieu of bacon; supper,
corn bread and rice boiled in the pot liquor
left at noon....
The school continued its sessions until June 27, when it
closed under the false expectation of reopening later at
Fort Gaines.

15

Although no evaluation of the school's

^ M u m f o r d Diary, May 10, 13, 20, 25, 30, 1864; Tar
leton to Lightfoot, May 20, 27, 1864, Tarleton Letters;
Smith, Company K, 94-95.
15

Mumford Diary, June 17, 27, 1864.
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results exist, it must have benefitted most of the offi
cers and men who attended.
A shortage of competent engineer troops and laborers
continued to plague Von Sheliha during May.

He still had

officers out in Mississippi and other areas of Alabama
trying to hire slaves.

An unexpected source of laborers

came in the form of a small group of Negro troops cap
tured by Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest at Fort
Pillow, Tennessee.

The War Department authorized the use

of these runaway slaves on the fortifications provided
their owners received remuneration.

1

Von Sheliha com

plained to the Engineer Bureau that enrolling officers
had conscripted many of his mechanics and other skilled
white laborers.

The Bureau intervened with the War

Department to get the enrolling officers to "interfere
as little as possible with the mechanics, experts &c...
necessary to the prosecution of the operations" of Von
Sheliha at Mobile.

17

One company of engineer troops had

already formed under Captain Leverette Hutchinson in

■^Special Order No. 7, Engineer Office, District of
the Gulf, May 10, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office,
Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 39; Polk to Maury, May 7,
1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Department of Alabama,
Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 8 3/4,
p. 270; Maury to Cooper, May 20, 1864, O . R . , 2, VII, 155;
Cooper to Maury, May 21, 1864, ibid., 156.
^ R i v e s to Von Sheliha, May 21, 1864, Letters and
Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 5,
p. 205.
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the District of the Gulf.

The War Department authorized

a second company but refused to permit Von Sheliha to
organize a third.

The department did allow him to recruit

Captain Jules V. Gallimard's company of sappers and miners
so that it could render efficient engineer service and
suggested he call upon engineer companies organized in
the army of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and
East Louisiana when needed.

18

Admiral Buchanan attempted to conduct a sortie
against the Federal blockading fleet in late May.

His

ironclad ram, the Tennessee, finally got across Dog
River Bar on May 18.

A potentially formidable vessel

with her six Brooke rifled guns, heavy ram, and four
inches of iron plating, the Tennessee was, however, slow
and had exposed tiller chains.

Davis and the Navy

Department had pressured Buchanan to raise the blockade
even though he wished to wait until completion of the
ironclad Nashville.

Accompanied by the Baltic, Gaines,

Morgan, and Selma, Buchanan took the Tennessee down the
bay to an anchorage near Fort Morgan.

On the first

night chosen for the attack, bad weather hampered the
squadron's movements and prevented an offensive.
Tennessee ran aground the next night.

18

The

By the time she

Rives to Captain Leverette Hutchinson, May 28,
1864, ibid., 270; Rives to Von Sheliha, May 21, 1864,
ibid., 205.
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floated off, Buchanan had decided to cancel the attack
because he considered Farragut's fleet too strong.
Farragut had expected the Confederates to come out for
some time and had reinforced the blockading fleet until
it numbered a dozen vessels.

Although the results of

Buchanan's foray down the bay were negative, at least one
army officer supported his cancellation of the attack:
...Everyone thinks the admiral acted most
prudently.
I don't think the younger portion^
of the gunboats fancied the expedition much.
During much of the month of June 1864 several Con
federate officers feared an attack on Mobile.

Maury

reported that Captain J”ames D. Johnston, commander of the
Tennessee, expected Farragut to run into the bay.

He

also stated that every effort to obstruct effectively
the main ship channel had failed.

General Page at Fort

Morgan was also apprehensive and had no confidence in any
of the Confederate warships except the Tennessee.

From

slaves who had escaped from the Federal lines at Pensa
cola, Page learned that the enemy planned to make an

19 .
William N. Still, Jr., Iron Afloat: The Story of
the Confederate Armorclads (Nashville: Vanderbilt Uni
versity Press, 1971) , 200-203; Abstract log of the C.S.S.
Tennessee, May 17-26, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 935; Mumford
Diary, May 19, 24, 25, 1864; Farragut to Welles, May 9,
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 267; Tarleton to Lightfoot, May 18,
20, 27, 1864, quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil War
Letters of Robert Tarleton," 59, 61-62; C. Carter
Smith (ed.), Two Naval Journals: 1864 (Chicago:
The
Wyvern Press, 1964) , 2-3.
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attack on June 18.

When that day passed without an

assault, he became convinced that the Federal move had
only been postponed.

He complained to a friend that he

had only 300 men in the fort, not enough to man all of
the guns, and saw no prospects of any reinforcements.
One of Page's subordinates at Fort Morgan did not share
the general's pessimism and noted that the Federal fleet
did not seem as strong as it had been when the month
began.

The officer concluded:

...General Page persists in thinking an attack
imminent and his mind is so peculiarly consti
tuted that when once an absurd idea gets into
it there is no getting it out excepJjQto make
room for another equally absurd....
The Confederates' fears had some basis in reality
because the Union high command had such an attack in the
planning stages.

Grant had intended that an assault

take place in April to coincide with his Virginia cam
paign and Sherman's northern Georgia campaign.

Banks'

army, which would conduct the attack against Mobile,
suffered delays and defeats in its Red River expedition
that prevented it from complying with Grant's wishes.

21

20

Maury to Cooper, June 3, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 901;
Page to Jones, June 26, 1864, ibid., 903-904; Tarleton
to Lightfoot, June 17, 19, 22, 1864, Tarleton Letters.
21Grant to Banks, Mar. 15, 1864, O . R . , XXXIV, Pt.
2, pp. 610-11; Grant to Banks, Mar. 31, T864, ibid., Pt.
1, p. 11; Grant to Sherman, Apr. 4, 1864, ibid., XXXII,
Pt. 3, pp. 245-46; Grant to Major General David Hunter,
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Once the Red River campaign ended, Grant and Sherman
renewed their requests for a Mobile expedition.

Sherman

wanted only a feint to draw Confederate troops away from
Georgia.

Grant, on the other hand, hoped to see the

city captured so that Federal forces could use it as a
base from which to supply Sherman's armies after they
got deep into Georgia.

Major General Edward R. S.

Canby, new Union commander in the Gulf region, began
making preparations and intended to send Brigadier Gen
eral Andrew J. Smith's troops to make the attack.

This

plan Canby had to abandon when Forrest defeated a Union
force at Brice's Crossroads, and Smith's men moved to
Memphis to help fight Forrest.

Canby suspended subse

quent plans when Grant ordered two divisions from Can
by 's army to protect Washington, D. C . , from a threat by
Confederate Major General Jubal Early's army.

This

second delay meant that the Federals could make no move
against Mobile until some time in July at the very
earliest.

22

Apr. 17, 1864, ibid., XXXIV, Pt. 3, pp. 190-91; Grant to
Banks, Apr. 17, 1864, ibid., 191-92; Grant to Halleck,
Apr. 29, 1864 (2 items), ibid., 331; Halleck to Grant,
Apr. 29, 1864 (2 items), ibid., 331-32.
^ G r a n t to Halleck, June 3, 1864, ibid., Pt. 4, p.
185; Sherman to Major General Edward R. S. Canby, June 4,
1864, ibid., 212; Sherman to Brigadier General Andrew J.
Smith, June 4, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 79; Grant to
Halleck, June 5, 1864, ibid.; Halleck to Canby, June 6 ,
1864, ibid., XXXIV, P t . 4, p. 240; Sherman to Major
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The month of June 1864 proved a period of ups and
downs for Von Sheliha and his engineer operations.

Early

in the month, Colonel S. Crutchfield reported the results
of an inspection tour to the Ordnance Bureau in Richmond.
He found most of the ammunition magazines in the bay bat
teries and city works inadequate for proper storage.

In

almost every case he described the magazines as too
small, while he said a few were damp or poorly
ventilated.

Toward the middle of the month, the Engineer

Bureau authorized Von Sheliha to purchase the right to
cut timber from land near the city works for use as
lumber and fuel.

Under orders from Maury, Von Sheliha

organized his engineer employees into a battalion for
local defense, a move which would result in improved
instruction and discipline.

To a request by Von Sheliha

that it allow him to reorganize Gallimard's company of
sappers and miners and increase its strength to 1 0 0 men,
the War Department replied in the negative.

He could

only raise the company's strength to a total of 64 men.
On June 25 Von Sheliha wrote to Gilmer asking to be
relieved from duty:
...His reasons for making this application are
that he receives no assistance whatever and

General Cadwallader C. Washburn, June 14, 1864, ibid.,
XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 115; Canby to Halleck, June 18, 1864,
ibid., XXXIV, Pt. 4, pp. 438-39; Halleck to Canby, June
2 4 , 1864, ibid., 528; Canby to Farragut, July 1, 1864,
ibid., X L I , Pt. 2, pp. 3-4; Canby to Washburn, July 2,
T$64, ibid., 2 1 - 2 2 .
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yet is expected to accomplish more than any
Engineer could possibly perform with the inad
equate means at his disposal.
The War Department turned down Von Sheliha's request,
however, and he remained at his post in Mobile.
By July 1, 1864, Maury had few troops left in his
command.

In the entire District of the Gulf, only 4,337

effectives remained.

24

Page's brigade, which garrisoned

the three lower bay forts, numbered slightly more than
1,200

men, some 2 0 0 of whom were cavalrymen on picket and

outpost duty.

At Pollard, Colonel Isaac W. Patton had

his own 22nd Louisiana Infantry, a cavalry regiment, and
an artillery battery, in all about 1,100 men.

This force

had responsibility for the protection of the railroad to
Montgomery as well as covering the approaches from Pen
sacola to Mobile.

In early June, Higgins had returned

to Mobile from sick leave and assumed command of the city
works and bay batteries, also known as the artillery
brigade.

Under his command he had 1,100 artillerymen

23

Colonel S. Crutchfield to Gorgas, June 9, 1864, in
Daniel Geary Papers, Mobile Public Library; Rives to Von
Sheliha, June 11, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engi
neer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 5, p. 303; Order No. — ,
Engineer Office, June 15, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer
Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 67; Rives to Von
Sheliha, June 23, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engi
neer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 5, p. 362; Von Sheliha to
Gilmer, June 25, 18 64, Letters Sent, Engineer Office,
Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 71.
24

Abstract from return of troops in the District of
the Gulf, June 30, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 677.
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and 400 local defense troops.

Most of Higgins' men,

having manned many of the water batteries at Vicksburg,
had a great deal of proficiency at operating heavy artil
lery pieces.

Their small numbers meant that they had to

perform a great deal of guard duty in addition to their
normal routine.

Besides having a shortage of troops,

Higgins also had fewer artillery pieces than his
predecessor.

Maury had sent a large number of heavy guns

and mortars to Atlanta for the works there.

25

The Mobile garrison suffered fprther reductions in
strength when the 1st Louisiana Heavy Artillery and 1st
Mississippi Light Artillery regiments left for Meridian
on July 6 .

These two units acted as infantrymen under

orders to assist in opposing a Union force marching east
ward from Vicksburg.

In speaking of the departure of the

troops, one officer wrote in his diary:
almost without a corporal's guard,..."

26

"Mobile is left
Recognizing

Mobile's weakened condition, Confederate authorities in
Richmond sought to find additional troops for the
garrison.

Davis asked Governor Watts to organize state

reserve units for Mobile, and Cooper ordered Major

25

Ibid.; Organization of troops in the District of
the Gulf, June 30, 1864, ibid., 678; General Order No. 1,
Headquarters Commandant of Mobile, June 4, 1864, quoted
in Mobile Evening News, June 10, 1864; Mumford Diary,
June 5, S', July 1, 1864.
^ M u m f o r d Diary, July 5, 1864.
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General Jones M. Withers, commander of the Alabama
Reserves, to send available units to the city.

By mid-

July, some 40 to 50 companies of reserves had moved to
aid Maury.

27

Major General Stephen D. Lee, who had suc

ceeded Polk in departmental command, briefly considered
dismounting some of Forrest's cavalry and sending them to
Mobile, but he realized that such troops would not be
practical there.

Maury, however, remained anxious to

get his two artillery regiments back because of their”
experience "in preparing the redoubts, mounting guns,
&c" and wrote Lee:

"...I know you will hasten them to me

at the earliest moment at which you can spare them."

28

Intelligence reports reaching Maury continued to
indicate that the enemy would soon make an attack on
Mobile, and he made various efforts to prepare for the
assault.
cess:

He did not appear confident of complete suc

"In view of the large naval preparations of the

enemy we may expect Forts Morgan, Gaines, &c., to be cut

^7Davis to Watts, July 7, 1864, O.R., LII, Pt. 2,
p. 687; Cooper to Withers, July 8 , 1864, ibid., XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 695; Davis to Withers, July 11, 1864, ibid.,
LII, Pt. 2, p. 691; Withers to Davis, July 12, 1864,
ibid., 692; Davis to Withers, July 13, 1864, ibid., 693;
Cooper to Withers, July 14, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt. 2,
p. 712; Withers to Cooper, July 14, 1864, ibid.; Withers
to Bragg, July 15, 1864, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 708.
28

Lee to Bragg, July 9, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt. 2,
p. 696; Lee to Bragg, July 10, 1864, ibid., 700; Davis
to Lee, July 11, 1864, ibid., 702; Maury to Lee, July 11,
1864, ibid.
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off, and even reduced."

29

Maury still faced the problem

of too many non-combatants remaining in the city.

To

Lee, Maury complained:
...these people are not Virginians; they do
not desire their city to be defended, and
unless they see a pretty formidable force
coming in here they will give m^^mudi
trouble during my preparations.
While a bit too harsh, Maury's assessment seems to have
been basically correct.

The great majority of the people

undoubtedly wished to see some sort of defense made but
not if it meant a bombardment of the city itself.

An

evacuation or bloodless surrender would allow them to
continue their everyday lives relatively unaffected, and
most of the population probably felt more concern about
protecting their homes and livelihoods than occupation
by the enemy.

A few merchants and businessmen undoubt

edly thought enemy occupation would benefit the city
economically and looked forward to the day when the Stars
and Stripes replaced the Stars and Bars.

29

Maury to Bragg, July 14, 1864, Braxton Bragg
Papers, Duke University Archives, Durham, North Carolina,
hereinafter cited as Bragg Papers, Duke; Maury to Lee,
July 11, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 703.
■?o

Maury to Cooper, July 5, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt.
2, p. 687; Maury to Cooper, July 7, 1864, ibid., 693;
Maury to Lee, July 9, 1864, ibid., 697; Maury to Bragg,
July 14, 1864, Bragg Papers, Duke; Maury to Lee, July 11,
1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 703.

290
Maury requested several things to help in the
defense of the city.

He asked for the impressment of an

additional 5,000 slaves to work on the city's land
entrenchments.

He also sent requisitions to the War

Department for more heavy artillery ammunition.

To this

request, Cooper responded that all of the ordnance stores
which he had asked for had been sent.

Finally, Maury

suggested that, since his information indicated no Union
offensive operations in the near future, the Confederate
forces west of the Mississippi River act to divert Union
troops collecting to attack Mobile.

Davis then sent

word to General Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the
Trans-Mississippi Department, that he should send
available troops east of the river to defeat any enemy
-u
31
moves 4there.
The two artillery units which Maury loaned to Lee
returned to Mobile on July 18, 1864.

These regiments had

served as a reserve infantry force during the battle of
Tupelo, Mississippi, on July 14 and became free to go
back to Maury following the retreat of the Union army.

31Von Sheliha to Rives, July 9, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 698; Maury to Cooper, July 7, 1864, ibid.,
692; Maury to Cooper, July 7, 1864, ibid., 693; Cooper
to Maury, July 8 , 1864, ibid., 695; Maury to Cooper,
July 10, 1864, ibid., 701; Maury to Cooper, July 5,
1864, ibid., 687; Lee to Kirby Smith, July 9, 1864,
ibid., 696; Davis to Lee, July 14, 1864, ibid., 710; Lee
to Kirby Smith or Major General John G. Walker, July 16,
1864, ibid., 714.
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Maury sent both units into the various redoubts in the
city w o r k s .

The men had occupied their stations for only

two days when they again received orders to report back
to Lee at Meridian.

32

This left only one regular army

unit in the city— Colonel Maury's 15th Confederate
Cavalry.

General Maury had moved this regiment from

Pollard to Mobile where it could reinforce Lee, protect
the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, or guard the coast near
Pascagoula.

Detachments of the unit performed provost

duty in the city in the absence of infantry or artillery
troops.

On July 22 the regiment left Mobile to return to

Pollard.

A Union raiding force had moved toward Pollard

from Pensacola on the twenty-first, and Colonel Patton
needed the cavalry unit to help repel the raid.

No regu

lar army units remained in Mobile to defend the city
works.

All guard duty had to fall upon the shoulders of

the local militia.

33

On July 20, 1864, Confederate troops stationed at
Fort Morgan witnessed the arrival of the monitor Manhat
tan to join the Union blockading squadron.

The appear

ance of this monitor, the first of four which would

32

Mumford Diary, July 18, 20, 1864; Para IX,
Special Order No. 202, Headquarters District of the Gulf,
July 20, 1864, Orders, District of the Gulf.
33Maury to Lee, July 11, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 2,
p. 702; Daily Tribune, July 13, 1864; Mumford Diary,
July 22, 1864.
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eventually join Farragut, seemed a further indication
that the Federals planned an attack.

Page responded by

ordering all non-combatants away from Fort Morgan.
Whenever the assault came, believed Maury and some of the
other army officers, one of the weak spots in the
defenses would be Buchanan's squadron.

Maury wrote Bragg

that he did not count very heavily on the navy:
"...their ships are inferior to those of the enemy, and
the long period of inaction has not been promotive of
energy and enterprise."

34

A lieutenant at Fort Morgan

voiced a more severe criticism of the navy in a letter to
his sweetheart:
...I have noticed one peculiarity about our
naval men here, from Admiral Buchanan down to
the last midshipman and that is an unlimited
capacity for getting excited.
They fly off
the handle at the shortest notice and on the
slightest pretext....
This officer also expressed the opinion that the officers
of the Mobile squadron had caused the confusion he saw
in General Page's mind, thus hindering his ability to
command the fort.

36
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Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 21, 1864, quoted m
Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of Robert Tarleton,"
74; Hults, "Aboard the Galena at Mobile," 19; Maury to
Bragg, July 14, 1864, Bragg Papers, Duke.
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Von Sheliha pressed his engineering operations so
that the enemy would not find any weaknesses in Mobile's
various defensive positions.

A continuing shortage of

laborers and a newly developed shortage of tools made his
work more difficult.

At times during July 1864 as few as

fifteen slaves made up the labor force in the city.
Governor Watts responded to M a u r y 's appeal for more
slaves by saying that the planters would only give them
up when troops arrived to take them.

Von Sheliha did get

to use 300 slaves impressed from several salt works, but
these men only remained at Mobile for nine days.

37

Even

if Von Sheliha had had as many laborers as he desired,
he admitted that he did not have enough tools to put in
their hands.

He had sent 1,200 entrenching tools to the

Army of Tennessee, which left him with only 1,500 spades
and shovels.

Von Sheliha preferred not to use the 3,000

picks at Mobile to break ground, as he found plows much
better.

He tried to get 1,000 shovels from the Quarter

master Department's stores in Montgomery, but the

^ V o n Sheliha to Rives, July 11, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 705; Rives to Von Sheliha, July 22, 1864,
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill,
Vol. 5, p. 500; "Monthly report of operations for the
defense of Mobile, Ala., for the month of July, 1864,"
O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 739; Tarleton to Lightfoot,
July 19, 1864, quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil War
Letters of Robert Tarleton," 74.
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Engineer Bureau responded that the Quartermaster Depart38
ment could spare only 2 0 0 .
The engineers made fair progress on the bay batter
ies and city works during July despite the labor and tool
shortage.

Battery McIntosh required no work except

repair of minor damages caused by heavy rains.

Von

Sheliha's men mounted a fifth gun in Battery Gladden and
prepared platforms for two more guns expected to arrive
from Selma.

Because of the battery's isolated location,

Von Sheliha constructed a blacksmith shop there.

To pro

tect Battery Tracy and Battery Huger from an enemy
approach from Pensacola, Von Sheliha proposed the erec
tion of defensive works near Blakely.

Along the line of

city entrenchments, the engineers conducted operations on
six redoubts and three redans.

Eight of the redoubts on

Von Sheliha's new line had guns mounted in them.

The

engineers had not yet begun work on four planned redoubts
or several of the redans to be located between the larger
forts.

Von Sheliha had wanted to place infantry trenches

between all of the redoubts and redans but could not do
much construction of this type.

In a mid-month report to

OO

Von Sheliha to Rives, July 11, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 705; Endorsement of Gilmer on telegram from
Von Sheliha, July 22, 1864, Letters and Telegrams Sent,
Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 5, p. 497; Lieutenant
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the Engineer Bureau on the condition of the Mobile city
defenses and bay batteries, Von Sheliha stated that when
he completed his plans, "Mobile will hold out as long as
. .
39
our provisions last."
Of more concern to Von Sheliha than the upper bay
defenses was the condition of the three forts on the
lower bay line.

Only these works would bear the brunt of

the initial enemy naval attack when it came.

Von Sheliha

assigned Captain Gallimard as engineer in charge of the
entire lower line.

The engineers mounted three guns on

the east face of Fort Powell to protect that fort from
attack from the rear if Farragut's fleet passed Fort
Morgan and Fort Gaines.

To strengthen the approaches to

Powell from Mississippi Sound, the engineers constructed
a row of chevaux-de-frise made of railroad iron in the
waters west of the fort.

Von Sheliha instructed Galli

mard to cease work on batteries at Cedar Point and Little
Dauphin Island because of the shortage of laborers.

At

Fort Gaines, Gallimard's men continued construction of a
new wharf.

The placement of torpedoes in the main ship

channel continued.

By the end of July, 180 torpedoes

floated in three rows across the channel, but a gap of

39

Von Sheliha to Rives, July 11, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 705; "Monthly report of operations...July,
1864," ibid., 740; Daily Tribune, July 27, 1864.

296
226 yards between Fort Morgan's water battery and the
point at which the torpedoes commenced still remained.

40

An attack by a Federal gunboat on July 4 had amply
demonstrated the weakness of Fort Morgan, and Von Sheliha
determined to try to strengthen the fort as much as
possible.

In the attack three shells hit the fort's

outer wall, and one struck the west face of the citadel,
a tall, octagonal, brick structure in the center of the
fort.

Von Sheliha's conclusions drawn from his observa

tion of the shells' effects seem prophetic:
...From the depth to which these shots pene
trated, from the size of the opening they pro
duced, and from the amount of rubbish that
fell, it is obvious that Fort Morgan, in its
present condition, cannot withstand a vigor
ous bombardment.
The guns on the west faces,
if not dismounted by the reverse fire of the
enemy, will fall with the casemates on which
they are mounted.
The high scarp-wall will
be breached by curbated shot.
The citadel
will crumble to pieces from the effect of
either shot or shell, direct or reverse
fire....
The Unites States Army constructed Fort Morgan in 1833
when.none of the heavy rifled guns used by Farragut's
vessels had existed.

40

With cannons like the 100-pounder

Von Sheliha to Gallimard, July 10, 1864, O.R.,
XXXIX, Pt. 2, pp. 707-708; "Monthly report of operations
...July, 1864," ibid., 739; Von Sheliha to Gallimard,
July 11, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 905; Leonard Rudd to Galli
mard, July 12, 1864, ibid.; Gallimard to Neville, July
12, 1864, ibid., 906.
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Parrott, the Federal fleet could stand out of the range
of the heaviest guns in Fort Morgan and pound the fort
to pieces at will.

42

In his instructions to Gallimard, Von Sheliha made
a number of recommendations for improvements on the fort.
To protect the individual guns and their crews, he sug
gested the erection of heavy side and rear traverses.
The engineers also had to build traverses around the
bombproofs and magazines and in front of the main sally
port.

Von Sheliha wanted cribs filled with sand put up

over all faces of the fort's walls liable to receive
direct fire from the enemy's fleet.

This would prevent

the walls from being penetrated by shot and broken into
fragments which would fly through the air like pieces of
shrapnel and also would prevent the walls from being
pounded into rubbish and breached.

Von Sheliha or one of

his subordinates suggested that the citadel be cut down
in height and bombproofed.

One officer's opinion of this

idea may reflect the judgment passed on all of the engi
neer operations in the fort:

"...all are agreed that if

an attack is really imminent the work is most untimely."

42

Ibid.; American State Papers, Military Affairs,
V (22nd Congress, 2nd Session, No. 551), 185; Victor
Von Scheliha, A Treatise on Coast-Defence (London: E. &
F. N. Spon, 18S8), 17.
43Von Sheliha to Garner, July 9, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 706; Von Sheliha to Gallimard, July 10, 1864,

43
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Finally, Von Sheliha wanted the line of earthworks across
the peninsula east of the fort completed.
had already done some work on this line.

The engineers
In his report

to Maury's chief of staff, Von Sheliha predicted that if
the work force increased at Fort Morgan, the laborers
would complete all of the work in fifteen days.

The

slaves did not come in, and most of the critical improve
ments remained undone when Farragut's fleet ran past the
fort on August 5.

44

ibid., 707; Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 19, 1864,
quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of Robert
Tarleton," 74.
44
Von Sheliha to Garner, July 9, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX,
Pt. 2, pp. 706-707; Von Sheliha to Gallimard, July 10,
1864, ibid., 707; Tarleton to Lightfoot, July 12, 1864,
quoted in Still (ed.), "The Civil War Letters of Robert
Tarleton," 71.

CHAPTER XII
"...A PARCEL OF POOR DEVILS COOPED UP IN
A PILE OF BRICKS..."
By late July 1864, Union forces along the Gulf coast
began making final plans for an attack on Mobile Bay.
Concerned that the Confederates would continue strength
ening Fort Morgan, Farragut had urged Canby to send him
some troops so that he could attack the forts before the
Confederates made them too strong.

Even before Canby

agreed to loan the men, Farragut proceeded with his own
preparations.

He saw his objective only as the reduction

of Fort Morgan, Fort Gaines, and Fort Powell, thus seal
ing off blockade running in and out of the bay.

In both

orders and correspondence, Farragut outlined his strategy
to his subordinates.

First, his main attack force—

fourteen wooden gunboats and four monitors— would run
through the main ship channel.

Once inside the bay, the

gunboats had as their objective the destruction or dis
persal of Buchanan's wooden vessels.

Farragut intended

the monitors to attack and capture or sink the ram
Tennessee.

Seven gunboats in the Gulf and five or six

more in Mississippi Sound would assist and protect the
landing of Canby's infantry and artillery on Dauphin
Island.

Farragut considered the capture of Fort Gaines
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essential so that he could supply his vessels in the bay
during further operations.

Following the reduction of

Gaines, the combined Union forces would capture Fort
Powell and Fort Morgan in turn."*"
Canby designated a force of approximately 1,500 men
to operate in conjunction with the navy against the Con
federate forts.

He hoped to reinforce this expedition if

circumstances required it.

Major General Gordon Granger

commanded the Union forces, while Brigadier General
George F. McGinnis held immediate command of the
infantry.

2

.

.

Although precise numbers do not exist, it is

clear that the Confederate troops opposing Granger and
Farragut numbered slightly less than the Union landing
force.

From his headquarters in Fort Morgan, Page com

manded the Third Brigade, District of the Gulf, which
consisted of the garrisons of the three forts.

The gar

rison of Morgan consisted of five companies of the 1st
Alabama Artillery Battalion, two companies of the 1st
Tennessee Heavy Artillery, and one company of the 21st

^Canby to Sherman, July 20, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
380; Farragut to Canby, July 25, 1864, ibid. , 386; Canby
to Farragut, July 26, 1864, ibid., 388; General Order No.
10, U. S. Flagship Hartford, July 12, 1864, ibid., 39798; Farragut to Commodore James S. Palmer, July 18,
1864, ibid., 378.
^Canby to Farragut, July 29, 1864, O . R . , X L I , Pt.
2, p. 449; Canby to Granger, July 31, 18(T4, ibid., XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 216; Christopher C. Andrews, History of the
Campaign of Mobile (New York:
D. Van Nostrand, 1867), 14.
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Alabama Infantry:

in all about 500 men.

Colonel

Charles D. Anderson, 21st Alabama Infantry, commanded
Fort Gaines.

Six companies of Anderson's regiment and

two companies of the 1st Alabama Artillery Battalion,
some 400 men, made up that garrison.

At Fort Powell,

Lieutenant Colonel Williams still held command with a
force consisting of two companies of the 21st Alabama
and a portion of Captain James F. Culpeper's South Caro3
l m a Battery:
a total force of about 140 men.
At daylight on August 5, 1864, lookouts at Fort
Morgan saw Farragut's vessels approaching the main ship
channel.

The admiral used the same tactics he employed

in running the Confederate batteries at Port Hudson:

his

vessels steamed up in pairs, lashed together, with the
more powerful ships on the side facing Fort Morgan.
Between the gunboats and the fort, the monitors had their
station, where Farragut hoped they would silence both the
water battery and parapet guns of the fort.

In approach

ing Fort Morgan, the lead monitor, the Tecumseh, fired a
few shots to test the range to the fort.

3

Shortly after

Page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1,
p. 441; Benjamin B. Cox, "Mobile in the War Between the
States," Confederate Veteran, XXIV (1916), 212; Maury
to Seddon, Aug. 12, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 428;
Williams to Garner, Aug. 7, 1864, ibid., 441; Bernard
A. Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile: From 1814 to the
Present (Mobile: B. H. Richardson, Printer, 1868), 75;
Mobile"Register, Aug. 9, 1908.
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7:00 A.M., when the Union vessels had come within a mile
of the fort, Page ordered his gunners to open fire.

The

Federal squadron took approximately forty-five minutes
to pass the fort.

Page's men fired 491 shot and shell at

the enemy from the fourteen heavy and several lighter
guns which bore on the channel.

Heavy smoke from the

guns on both sides obscured the gunners' vision, and
their fire had very little effect on the gunboats or
monitors and caused few casualties.

One shell did dis

able the Oneida when it struck her boiler, but the
Oneida's consort, the Galena, took her into the bay with
the other vessels.

4

The Confederates did destroy two Union vessels
during Farragut's run into the bay.

Neither of these

vessels, however, fell victim to the fire of Fort Mor
gan's guns.

As stated above, Farragut's four monitors

steamed between the wooden gunboats and the fort with the
ultimate intention of attacking the Tennessee.

The leading

Cox, "Mobile in the War," 212; Hurieosco Austill,
"Fort Morgan in the Confederacy," Alabama Historical
Quarterly, VII (1945), 256-57; Diary of First Lieutenant
James Biddle Wilkinson, Aug. 5, 1864, photostatic copy in
City of Mobile Museum Department; Farragut to Palmer,
July 18, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 378; Page to Maury, Aug. 6 ,
1864, O. R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 435-36; Endorsement of
Maury, Sept. 26, 18 64, on Lieutenant F. S. Barrett to
Lieutenant J. T. E. Andrews, Aug. 20, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
570; Farragut to Welles, Aug. 12, 1864, ibid., 4T6-18;
Lieutenant Charles L. Huntington to Farragut, Aug. 6 ,
1864, ibid., 479.
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monitor, the Tecumseh, proceeded as ordered through the
gap between the Confederate torpedoes and Fort Morgan.
Her commander, T. A. Craven, directed her into the
torpedo field so that he could come to grips with the
Confederate ironclad, but the Tecumseh struck a mine and
sank almost immediately.

Only 21 men of her crew man

aged to escape before she went down.

One historian has

termed the sinking of the Tecumseh "the most completely
disabling blow struck by torpedoes during the entire
5

war."

The side-wheel steamer Philippi became the second

victim of the Confederates.

She attempted to follow the

main attack force into the bay but struck the shoal on
the western edge of the channel.

The Confederate gunners

at Morgan directed a heavy, effective fire into her, and
her commander ordered her abandoned.

A party of men from

the Confederate gunboat Morgan soon boarded the Philippi
and burned h e r .^

^Farragut to Welles, Aug. 12, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
417; Farragut to Welles, Aug. 27, 1864, ibid., 489-90;
Acting Master C. F. Langley and Acting Master Gardner
Cottrell to Farragut, Aug. 6 , 1864 (with endorsements),
ibid. , 569-70; Milton F. Perry, Infernal Machines; The
Story of Confederate Submarine and Mine Warfare (Baton
Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1965) , 161.
/•

Farragut to Welles, Aug. 8 , 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
505-506; Acting Master James T. Seaver to Farragut, Aug.
6 , 1864, ibid., 506-507; Commander George W. Harrison to
Buchanan, Oct. 1, 1864, ibid., 584.
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Buchanan's small squadron added what firepower it
could to oppose Farragut's vessels as they steamed into
the bay.

The gunners delivered a raking fire into the

Federal gunboats which the latter could not return.
When the Federal gunboats finally did open on the Confed
erate squadron, their fire was heavy and accurate.

The

Gaines received several hits below the water line and
began sinking.

Lieutenant John W. Bennett steered his

ship toward Fort Morgan and, about 500 yards from the
fort, ran her onto the beach, where he ordered his men to
abandon her.

The commanders of the Morgan and Selma

attempted to get their gunboats into shallow water after
they witnessed the disabling of the Gaines.

Lieutenant

Peter U. Murphey took his Selma toward the northeast.
The Union gunboat Metacomet, which had cast off from the
flagship Hartford, gave chase.

After the Metacomet dis

abled one of his guns and caused a dozen casualties with
her heavy g u n s , Murphey surrendered the Selma rather than
risk sinking and more casualties.

Commander George W.

Harrison managed to get the Morgan safely under the guns
of Fort Morgan.

That night Harrison ran past the Federal

fleet and reached the safety of the upper bay lines.
officers and crew of the Gaines also escaped to Mobile

The
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during the night in six boats from the Gaines and the
7
Tennessee.
The dispersal of the Confederate wooden gunboats
left only the Tennessee to face Farragut's squadron.
Buchanan had attempted to ram the Hartford and Brooklyn
as they steamed past into the bay, but the ironclad's
inferior speed prevented her from coming close enough to
do anything other than fire her guns into the enemy.
Once inside the bay, Farragut's vessels gathered about
four miles from Fort Morgan and began to anchor.
Buchanan determined to renew the battle and try to sink
one or more of the enemy gunboats.

The latter all raised

their anchors and joined in the fray.

Three gunboats

rammed the Tennessee but caused little damage, though
Buchanan suffered a broken leg when an enemy shell
knocked loose the after port cover and it struck him.
The enemy fire cut the Tennessee's steering chains and
made it impossible for her crew to change her position.
When the ram had her smokestack shot away, she filled
with smoke, and her crew could not answer the increasing
hail of enemy shells.

7

Commander James D. Johnston

Buchanan to Mallory, Aug. 25, 1864, ibid., 576-78;
Harrison to Buchanan, Oct. 1, 1864, ibid., 583-85; Lieu
tenant Paul U. Murphey to Buchanan, Aug. 15, 1864, ibid.,
587-88; Lieutenant John W. Bennett to Mallory, A u g . 8 ,
1864, ibid., 588-90; George S. Waterman, "Afloat— Afield—
Afloat," Confederate Veteran, VII (1899), 16-21.
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finally surrendered the ironclad after an engagement of
about an hour's duration, a fight Farragut called "one of
the fiercest naval contests on record."

8

Casualties in

the small Confederate squadron numbered 12 killed and 20
wounded.

In Fort Morgan, Page lost 1 killed and 3

wounded.

On the other hand, Farragut's vessels suffered

52 killed and 170 wounded, not counting the drownings
9
aboard the Tecumseh.
Farragut's squadron got safely into Mobile Bay
despite all of the efforts made by the Confederates.

In

analyzing the Battle of Mobile Bay in later years, Von
Sheliha presented this conclusion:

Farragut to Welles, Aug. 12, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
417-18; John Coddington Kinney, "Farragut at Mobile Bay,"
in Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buell (eds.),
Battles and Leaders of the Civil W a r , 4 vols. (New York:
Century, 1887) , IV, 379-99; Harrie Webster, "An August
Morning with Farragut at Mobile Bay," in U. S. Navy
Department, Civil War Naval Chronology, 6 vols. (Washing
ton, D. C . : Government Printing Office, 1961-1966), VI,
85-98; H ults, "Aboard the Galena at Mobile," 29-31;
Susan G. Perkins (ed. & a r r .), Letters of C a p t . G e o .
Hamilton Perkins, U.S.N. (Concord, N. H.:
Ira C. Evans,
1886), T30-40; Buchanan to Mallory, Aug. 25, 1864,
O.R.N., XXI, 577-78; Johnston to Buchanan, Aug. 13,
1864, ibid., 579-81; James D. Johnston, "The Ram 'Ten
nessee 1 at Mobile Bay," Battles and Leaders, IV, 401404; R. C. Bowles, "The Ship Tennessee," Southern
Historical Society Papers, XXI (1893) , 291-93; James D.
Johnston, "The Battle of Mobile Bay," ibid., IX (1881),
471-76.
9
"Killed and wounded of Confederate fleet,..."
0.R.N., XXI, 578-79; Harrison to Buchanan, Oct. 1,
T 8 F 4 , ibid., 585; Bennett to Mallory, Aug. 8 , 1864, ibid.,
588; Farragut to Welles, Aug. 8 , 1864, ibid., 407; Gee
to Captain C. H. Smith, Aug. 6 , 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt.
1, p. 442.
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...The Federal attack would not have suc
ceeded— nay, it would even have resulted in
disaster to Admiral Farragut's fleet— had it
been possible to obstruct the channe^between
Fort Morgan and the eastern bank....
The shifting sand of the channel bottom combined with the
tidal flow and strong winds over the bay prevented the
Confederate engineers from either placing piles in the
channel or securing a floating battery there.

All the

Confederates could do was place torpedoes across the
western portion of the channel.

Maury ordered a gap of

400-500 yards left between the easternmost torpedoes and
Fort Morgan so that either Buchanan's squadron or
blockade runners could pass in and out.

He felt safe in

this order because of the more than 20 guns which bore on
the channel from Fort Morgan:

"No vessel yet built could

pass through that channel in daylight."'*''*'
Farragut and the Federals knew of the existence of
the torpedoes and of the gap left in the channel.

In his

orders outlining the plan of attack, Farragut directed
his ships to sail well to the east of the buoy he knew
marked the eastern end of the torpedo field.

To protect

■*"^Victor Von Scheliha, A Treatise on Coast-Defence
(London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1^68), 178.
“^ Ibid., 104-105; Waterman, "Afloat— Afield-Afloat," 17; Captain J. W. Whiting to Maury, Oct. 4,
1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 433; Von Sheliha to Gil
mer, Aug. 6 , 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 559; Endorsement of
Maury, Sept. 26, 18 64, on Barrett to Andrews, Aug. 20,
1864, ibid., 570.
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his wooden vessels as much as possible against the heavy
Confederate fire they had to face, Farragut ordered sheet
chains draped over the ships' sides and sand bags or
chains placed on deck over the ships' engines.

12

The

sinking of the Tecumseh caused Farragut to alter his
plans.

He directed his flagship to the head of the line

and into the torpedo field.

By steaming further to the

west, Farragut avoided having to remain subjected to the
heavy fire from Fort Morgan.

When some of Farragut's

officers had inspected the torpedo line the night before
the battle, they found no torpedoes.

From this evidence

Farragut theorized that the mines had floated in the
water so long that they had become ineffective.
was willing to risk going through them.

Thus he

Events proved

Farragut correct because none of the mines exploded.
Officers on several gunboats reported after the battle
that they had heard numerous torpedo primers snapping as
the vessels passed through the field.

Although one Con

federate torpedo officer felt that few of the Federal
vessels could have gotten into the bay if the gap had
not been left in the torpedo line, the evidence of what
actually occurred when the Federals passed through the
field supports Von Sheliha's assessment:

12

"...had the gap

General Order No. 10, U. S. Flagship Hartford,
July 12, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 397-98; General Order No. 11,
U. S. Flagship Hartford, July 29, 1864, ibid., 398.
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been closed by torpedoes alone, we have our very serious
doubts if it would have made any material difference."

13

Buchanan's small squadron had little more success in
stopping Farragut's ships than did the torpedoes.

The

Confederate tars did their best work and caused the most
damage to the Federal vessels as the latter passed Fort
Morgan and thus were unable to return the fire of the Con
federate gunboats.

Farragut reported that most of his

casualties resulted from shells fired by Buchanan's
ships.

For example, one shell killed 10 and wounded 5

men aboard the Hartford.

Once the Federal squadron got

into the bay, the unprotected wooden Confederate gunboats
did not stand a chance of success against the superior
enemy force.

Only luck allowed the Morgan to escape cap

ture or destruction.

The loss of his gunboats left

Buchanan in a difficult position.

His ironclad was one

of the most powerful ever built, but she lacked speed and
had lost her smokestack during the passage of the Federal
fleet.

In his mind, Buchanan had two options:

to con

tinue the battle and do as much damage to the enemy as
possible before retiring under the guns of Fort Morgan or

"^Farragut to Welles, Aug. 12, 1864, ibid., 417;
Barrett to Andrews, Aug. 20, 1864, ibid., 785-86; Kinney,
"Farragut at Mobile Bay," 390-91; Perry, Infernal
Machines, 161; Daniel B. Conrad, "Capture of the C. S.
Ram Tennessee in Mobile Bay, August, 1864," Southern
Historical Society Papers, XIX (1891) , 74; Von Sheliha,
A Treatise on Coast-Defence, 105.
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to sit back and await what he felt would be the inevi
table destruction of his vessel.

His move clearly sur

prised Farragut and the other Federal commanders.

The

destruction of the Tennessee1s rudder chains foiled
Buchanan's plans to return to Fort Morgan and resulted in
the surrender of the ironclad.

Buchanan might be criti

cized for risking his vessel when it could have proven
more effective as a floating battery at Fort Morgan, but
he was a fighting admiral and pursued the course he
thought correct.

14

The evacuation and destruction of Fort Powell by the
Confederates gave Farragut the route he needed to supply
his vessels in Mobile Bay.

While Farragut's squadron

ran past Fort Morgan, five Federal gunboats in Missis
sippi Sound opened fire on Fort Powell.

Lieutenant

Colonel Williams' garrison replied with the four guns
which faced the Sound.

Only five Federal shells struck

the fort, and none of them did any damage.

The Confed

erates failed to hit any of the enemy gunboats.

This

action lasted about two hours, at the end of which time
the Federals broke off the engagement.

They renewed

their fire about 11:45 A.M. but ceased firing when they
received no reply from the fort.

In mid-afternoon, the

^ F a r r a g u t to Welles, Aug. 12, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
418; Drayton to Farragut, Aug. 6 , 1864, ibid., 425; Con
rad, "Capture of the Tennessee," 75, 80.
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monitor Chickasaw approached Fort Powell from the east
and captured the barge Ingomar, which had been used by
the engineers in working on the fort.

Williams ordered

his men to open on the monitor with a rifled gun on the
fort's south face.

He had two guns on the east face,

but they were exposed because the engineers had not com
pleted the parapet.

Only one shell struck the monitor,

knocking away its smokestack.

The Federal gunners fired

25 shells in reply, and their fire had more effect.
Williams reported the damage his fort sustained:
...A shell entered one of the sally ports,
which are not traversed in the rear, passe^
entirely through the bombproof, and buriedt
itself in the opposite wall.
Fortunately*it
did not explode.
The shells exploding in the
face of the work displaced the sand so
rapidly that I was convinced unless the iron
clad was driven off it would explode my maga
zine and make the bombproof c h a m b e r s u n t e n 
able in two days at the furthest....
Williams found himself in a difficult position and
turned to Colonel Anderson at Fort Gaines for advice.
Anderson told him to evacuate his men if he could not
hold the fort.

15

Convinced that he could not defend the

Perkins to Farragut, Aug. 17, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
500; Lieutenant Commander J. C. P. de Krafft to Farra
gut, Aug. 6 , 1864, ibid., 503; Acting Master G. P.
Pomeroy to de Krafft, Aug. 6 , 1864, ibid., 504; "Abstract
log of the U. S. ironclad Chickasaw,.." Aug. 5, 1864,
ibid., 786-87; Perkins (ed.), Letters of Capt. G e o .
Hamilton Perkins, 140-41; John Kent Folmar, "Lt. Col.
James M. Williams and the Ft. Powell Incident," Alabama
Review, XVII (1964), 127-29; Williams to Garner, Aug. 7,
1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 441-42.
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work against additional attacks by the Chickasaw, Wil
liams marched his garrison out of Fort Powell and blew
up the magazine.

Maury, Von Sheliha, and the Mobile

press criticized Williams' failure to hold Fort Powell,
and Maury relieved him of command pending an investiga
tion of his c o n d u c t . ^

The military tribunal which

looked into the case acquitted Williams and said that he
acted correctly in saving his garrison from an indefens
ible position.

Although restored to duty, Williams did

not receive Maury's permission to take command of his
regiment until December.

17

Fort Powell fell because its

eastern face had no protection against the fire of the
Chickasaw or any of the other monitors.

After the war,

Williams expressed his opinion on the reason for the
weakness of the fort:
"The bay side of Fort Powell had been
left unprotected while our engineers were
engaged in many absurd w o r k s , and some which
deserve a worse name— such as the construc
tion of batteries near Fort Morgan for no

16
Williams to Garner, Aug. 7, 1864, with endorsement
by Maury, Aug. 8 , 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 441-42;
Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 11, 1864, Letters Sent,
Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 164; Adver
tiser and Register, Aug. 9, 10, 1864; Daily Tribune,
Aug. 7, 1864.

17

Maury to Bragg, Sept. 14, 1864 (with endorsements),
O . R . , L I I , Pt. 2, pp. 741-42; Williams to Seddon, Sept.
T4, 1864, Letters Received, Secretary of War; Folmar,
"Lt. Col. Williams," 130-34.
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other purpose than the protection of block
ade runners in the swash channel...."
Available evidence indicates Williams had sufficient sup
plies and a labor force to enable him to throw up at
least a temporary parapet so that he could have defended
the fort for several days.

The surrender of Fort Gaines

on August 6 would still have given Farragut a means of
getting supplies into the bay to his ships, however.

19

The Confederates began making preparations for the
defense of Fort Gaines following the landing of Granger's
Federals late on the afternoon of August 3, 1864.

Maury

was away in Meridian temporarily commanding the Depart
ment of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, and
Higgins acted in his place at Mobile.

When Page learned

that the Federals had landed, he requested reinforcements
so he could attack the enemy force on Dauphin Island.
Higgins had no real force to send Page but did order 200
reserves, local defense troops, and marines from the city
to Gaines.

1 ft

19

He also ordered the 22nd Louisiana to proceed

Quoted in Folmar, "Lt. Col. Williams," 134.

Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 11, 1864, Letters
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 164;
Maury to Seddon, Aug. 9, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1, p.
428.
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from Pollard to Gaines.

20

The initial 200-man reinforce

ment arrived at Gaines on the fourth.

Although subjected

to the fire of a Federal monitor, the disembarkation con
cluded successfully.

The gunners in Gaines replied

briefly to the monitor's fire.

Unfortunately for the

Confederates, their heaviest gun facing the Federal fleet
outside the bay became dismounted during this skirmish.

21

Page did not have enough men to conduct an attack, but
Anderson's men burned their outbuildings and prepared
for siege operations.

Due to problems with its transport

vessel, the 22nd Louisiana did not get away from Tensas
Landing on schedule and consequently did not get to
Fort Gaines before Farragut's fleet got into Mobile Bay.
They did, however, escape becoming prisoners when the
fort fell .22
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Captain Miles D. McAlester to Brigadier General
Richard Delafield, Aug. 20, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1,
p. 410; Maury to Seddon, Aug. 12, T864, ibid., 428;
Maury to Cooper, Sept. 1, 1864, ibid., 429; Higgins to
Cooper, Aug. 2, 1864, ibid., LII, Pt. 2, p. 715; Mumford
Diary, Aug. 5, 1864; Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile, 75;
Roll for July and Aug. 1864, Record of Events Cards,
Company F, 22nd Louisiana Consolidated Infantry, Com
piled Service Records.
21

Farragut to Commander Thomas H. Stevens, Aug. 4,
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 403-404; Second Lieutenant M. C. F.
Denicke to Colonel A. J. Myer, Aug. 4, 1864, ibid., 512;
Abstract log of the U.S.S. Manhattan, Aug. 4, 1864,
ibid., 824; Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile, 75; Andrews,
Campaign of Mobile, 15.
22Maury to Cooper, Sept. 1, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt.
1, p. 429; Granger to Canby, Aug. 5, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
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Granger's men edged in close to Fort Gaines during
August 4 and by midnight had gotten their light artillery
within 1,200 yards of the fort.

During Farragut's pas

sage of Fort Morgan, the Federals opened with these guns
on Fort Gaines.

Granger reported that his fire took the

fort's water battery in reverse and silenced the guns,
but it is unlikely that the Confederates would have even
attempted to fire on the enemy fleet because they had no
guns which could fire that far.

Anderson's men did open

on the Federal batteries but caused no damage.

When the

Tennessee attacked Farragut's fleet, the Confederates
fired a few shots at the Federals with 10-inch columbiads
that faced in that direction.
asking what he should do.

23

Anderson signalled Page

He stated that his fort would

offer little protection to his men if fired on from
Dauphin Island and the enemy fleet.

Page advised Ander

son to do his best and keep up the men's morale.

On the

fourth, Anderson had assured Page that he would resist
the enemy for as long as possible, and he repeated that

521; Roll for July and Aug. 1864, Co. F, 22nd La., Com
piled Service Records.
^ M c A l e s t e r to Delafield, Aug. 20, 1864, O.R. ,
XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 410; Granger to Christensen, Aug. 5,
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 519.
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assurance on the afternoon of the fifth:

"'We will emu-

late our glorious old admiral and do our very best.'"

24

On the afternoon of August 6 , the monitor Chickasaw
steamed to within several thousand yards of Gaines and
opened fire.

Most of the monitor's shells struck the

fort but did not cause any serious damage, but they did
kill several men who lay sick in the post hospital.

25

Anderson again requested guidance from Page, and the lat
ter sent two of his staff officers, Captains Clifton H.
Smith and R. T. Thom, to consult with Anderson.

These

officers left Gaines with the impression that Anderson
would defend the fort to the last.

Shortly after the

captains left, however, Anderson received a letter signed
by all but two of the officers in the garrison asking him
to surrender the fort, which they felt would soon be torn
apart by the enemy's fire, rather than risk further loss
of life in a hopeless situation.

Anderson acceded to his

officers' wishes and asked Farragut for surrender terms
early on August 7.

Page attempted to learn the purpose

of the flag of truce and signalled for Anderson to hold

24Page to Maury, Aug. 8 , 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1,
p. 436.
25

Farragut to Welles, Aug. 8 , 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
414; Abstract log of the U. S. ironclad Chickasaw, Aug.
6 , 1864 , ibid., 787; Page to Maury, A u g ."8 , 1864, 0 - R * r
XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 437; Perkins (ed.), Letters of Capt.
Geo. Hamilton Perkins, 142; Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile,
76-77.
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the fort.

Ignoring Page's signals, Anderson visited

Farragut and Granger aboard the Hartford that evening and
agreed to their terms.

While he was away, Page visited

Gaines in an attempt to stop the proceedings but had no
success.

At 8 o'clock on the morning of the eighth,

Anderson surrendered to the Federal navy.
numbered 46 officers and 818 enlisted men.

The garrison
Twenty-six

guns, a large supply of ordnance stores, and food supplies for twelve months all fell into Federal hands.

26

Anderson's surrender of Fort Gaines brought no less
controversy or condemnation than Williams' evacuation of
Fort Powell.

Page dubbed the surrender a "deed of dis-

honor and disgrace to its commander and garrison."

27

Maury echoed P a g e 's sentiments and said that the men
should have defended the fort.

In a confidential letter

to Braxton Bragg, Maury stated one theory to explain the
conduct of both Anderson and Williams:

*?fi

Page to Maury, Aug. 8 , 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 1,
p. 437; Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile, 77-79; Captain
F. N. Smith, et al, to Colonel Charles D. Anderson, Aug.
6 , 1864, O . R . , LII, Pt. 2, pp. 743-44; Wilkinson Diary,
Aug. 7, 8 , 1864; Farragut to Welles, Aug. 8 , 1864,
O.R.N., XXI, 414; Anderson to Farragut, Aug. 7, 1864,
ibid.; Farragut to Anderson, Aug. 7, 1864, ibid., 415;
Granger to Christensen, Aug. 8 , 1864, i b i d . 574; Page to
Maury, Aug. 8 , 1864, ibid., 561; Maury to Seddon, Aug. 8 ,
1864, ibid., 562.
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I think constant croaking and discussion
of the weakness of that line had greatly pre
pared the minds of the commanders to give it
up, and when the tremendous fleet placed
itself between them and the city*-the Garri
sons were overwhelmed by dismay.
Officers stationed at Fort Morgan were shocked by the sur
render of Gaines.
to his diary:

One lieutenant confided his feelings

"Humiliation and sorrow were in our hearts

but indignation soon expelled from our hearts all other
feelings...."

29

An officer who had not signed the letter

asking Anderson to surrender later defended the colonel's
actions even though he felt Anderson should have waited
until the Federals demanded a capitulation:
...Col. Anderson may have acted injudiciously
in yielding to its [the letter by the offi
cers] request by making the overture to Admi
ral Farragut, but as we are in honor bound to
tell the whole truth, we shall here state
that from the moment that the Federal fleet
succeeded in running the gauntlet of Fort
Morgan and the famous Tennessee had sur
rendered, from that moment the men of Fort
Gaines lost heart....
With the smaller forts captured, the Federals on
August 9 turned on Fort Morgan.

Granger's infantry,

which had received reinforcements from New Orleans,

28
Maury to Seddon, Aug. 8 , 1864, ibid., 426; Maury
to Seddon, Aug. 12, 1864, ibid., 428; Maury to Bragg,
Aug. 14, 1864, Bragg Papers, Western Reserve.

29
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Austill, "Fort Morgan," 259; Wilkinson Diary, Aug.
8 , 1864.
30

Reynolds, Sketches of Mobile, 77-79.
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landed at Navy Cove and began moving toward the fort.
Page chose not to oppose the landing and turned his
attention to preparing his position for a stubborn
defense.

Since the passage of Farragut's fleet, the Con

federate garrison had worked to construct sand traverses
around all of the guns, quarters, and sally port.

Page

telegraphed Jefferson Davis that he planned to hold out
"to the last extremity."

31

The Confederates burned all

of the buildings between the fort and Navy Cove and
cleared the ground as much as possible.

On the afternoon

of the ninth, Farragut and Granger demanded an uncondi
tional surrender of the fort after the fleet had bom
barded it for several hours.

The enemy fire had done no

damage and slightly wounded one man.

Page replied:

"I

am prepared to sacrifice life and will only surrender
when I have no means of defense."

32

By sundown, the

31

Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 17; Farragut to
Canby, Aug. 9, 1864, O.R.N., XXI, 523; Extract from
journal of Captain John B. Marchand, Aug. 9, 1864, ibid.,
821; Page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1,
pp. 438-39; Richard L. Page, "The Defense of Fort Morgan,"
Battles and Leaders, IV, 409; A u s t i n , "Fort Morgan,"
259; Wilkinson Diary, Aug. 9, 1864; Page to Davis, Aug.
7, 1864, O. R . , L I I , Pt. 2, p. 720.
32page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1,
p. 439; Page, "Defense of Fort Morgan," *409; Austill,
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to Farragut and Granger, Aug. 9, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
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Federal troops had moved to within two miles of Fort
Morgan and completed the investment of the place.

33

Nothing of real consequence occurred at Morgan dur
ing the next few days.

Granger pushed skirmishers and

sharpshooters to within several hundred yards of the
fort's walls while his engineers and artillerymen estab
lished batteries and siege approaches.

Within the fort,

officers joined with the men in working on the traverses.
Although everyone was tired, morale remained high.

The

men had provided for the siege by driving a number of
cattle and hogs into the fort to furnish fresh meat.
lieutenant wrote in his diary:

One

"My cow and calf were

browsing in the luxuriant grass in the ditch near me,
happily unconscious of their impending doom."

34

Page

detailed 160 men as sharpshooters under Major Gee, 1st
Alabama Artillery Battalion, to meet any attack.

From

time to time these men exchanged shots with the Federal
sharpshooters.

The Tennessee, now manned by Federal

sailors, and Farragut's three monitors opened fire on the
fort on August 13 and continued the bombardment sporadi
cally through the next day.

Page's gunners returned the

33

Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 17; Austill, "Fort
Morgan," 259; Wilkinson Diaxy, Aug. 9, 1864.
34

Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 17; Page to Maury,
Aug. 30, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 439; Wilkinson
Diary, Aug. 10, 1F64; Austill, "Fort Morgan," 260.

321
fire but had no effect on the ironclads.

When one Con

federate saw the shells bouncing off her, he pronounced
the Tennessee impregnable.

The accurate Federal fire had

caused several casualties, and the post adjutant wrote in
his diary:

"The casemates are not safe; the shells have

no respect for them...."

35

Beginning on August 15, the Federal forces on the
peninsula kept up a fairly steady fire on Fort Morgan
with artillery as well as their sharpshooters.

One or

more of Farragut's monitors continued the fire from the
fleet.

The Confederate sharpshooters maintained a spo

radic return fire but had to lie low because of the heavy
and accurate shooting of the Federals.

Except for

several brief bombardments of the enemy camp, Page did
not allow his artillerymen to open on the Federal land or
naval forces.

One of his officers reported that Page

refused to fire because he did not think the Confederate
artillery could effectively retard the enemy advance and
because he feared a heavy bombardment in retaliation.
Many men in the garrison disagreed with Page's policy and
thought it demoralized the soldiers.

Several officers

stated that the occasional Confederate fire did hamper
Granger1s advance:

35

Austill, "Fort Morgan," 260-61; Wilkinson Diary,
Aug. 12, 13, 14, 1864.
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...It is a very fine thing to stand off
cooly, aim the gun as if at target practice,
& fire at a parcel of poor devils cooped up
in a pile of bricks, when there is no danger
in the way, but when §gth sides talk Mr Fed
is rather nervous....
Throughout all of the Federal bombardments, Page moved
about the fort sending officers and men to secure places
while exposing himself a number of times to enemy fire.

37

Life became quite dangerous for the men of the Fort
Morgan garrison, and instances of close calls from death
and heroic actions occurred frequently.

On one occasion,

a 15-inch shell from a monitor tore into a casemate used
as an office and completely or partially destroyed much
of the furniture.

The shell landed at the feet of

several men standing in the office but failed to
explode.

38

On another occasion, a 15-inch shell entered

a casemate used as sleeping quarters for forty men and
exploded.

The explosion miraculously killed no one and

wounded only three.

39

Page's Confederates began holding

prayer meetings every morning at the sally port.

Even

religious services provided no protection because one

"^Page to Maury, Aug. 30, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 1,
p. 439; Austill, "Fort Morgan," 261-64"; Wilkinson Diary,
Aug. 15, 16, 1864.
^Aust i l l ,
38
39

"Fort Morgan," 265.

Wilkinson Diary, Aug. 9, 1864.
Austill, "Fort Morgan," 261.
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morning a shell fragment struck and killed a soldier on
his way to the meeting.

Sentries on the fort's walls

tried to warn their comrades of incoming shells whenever
possible.

In one instance, a man had barely called out

to those below him when a Parrott shell tore his head
off.

40

Despite the hardships, the men kept up their

morale, and relatively few deserted.

An officer summed

up the situation:
...Entirely cut off & with 350 men hemmed in
by a fleet of Forty vessels besides a large
land force, confined in a small circle scarce
large enough to drive a cart in, with a cer
tainty of captivity & perhaps death before
us, resistance is heroism & it is our unani
mous resol^j to sell this Post at a costly
price— ...
By August 21, Granger had twenty-five cannons and
sixteen mortars ready to bombard Fort Morgan.

Joined by

all the vessels in Farragut's squadron, the Federal
artillerymen opened a tremendous fire on the fort.

Page

reported the effect of the hail of shot and shell:

"This

fire disabled all the heavy guns save t w o ,..partially
breached the walls in several places, and cut up the fort
to such an extent as to make the whole work a mere mass

40

Wilkinson Diary, Aug. 15, 16, 1864.

^Austill,
Aug. 15, 1864.

"Fort Morgan," 264-65; Wilkinson Diary,
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of debris."

42

The bombardment had such force that the

Federal soldiers as far away as Fort Gaines could feel the
concussions.

43

.
Fearing that his magazine might be hit,

Page ordered most of his powder destroyed.

He also

directed his men to spike all of the fort's artillery.
The enemy shells set fire to the citadel, and the fire
caused the Federals to increase their barrage, which they
had reduced considerably as night fell.

After consulting

a number of his officers and seeing his men fight a
second fire at the citadel, Page decided on the morning
of the twenty-third to surrender.

The ceremonies occur

red at 2:00 P.M., and a Federal officer recorded this
description of the Confederate commander:
...Page, in a plain suit of citizen's clothing,
looked very stiff....From the starched manner
in which the late lord of Fort Morgan bore him
self, I could well understand w h ^ o u r sailors
had dubbed him "Ramrod Page."...

42
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Page surrendered Fort Morgan because, as he put i t ,
he "had no means left of defense."

45

The enemy's fire,

both from artillery and sharpshooters, and the smoke and
flames from the burning citadel made it impossible for
the Confederates to man their guns or make any kind of
effective reply to the bombardment.

With all of the

casemates at least partially breached, the men had little
protection from the Federal shells.
Sheliha wrote:

After the war, Von

"A bombardment of another twenty-four

hours would have changed the place into a shapeless pile
of rubbish...."

46

Some 600 men and 46 artillery pieces

fell into Union hands when the fort's garrison capitu
lated to them.

Page had lost only about three killed and

sixteen wounded during the siege, but the loss of life
would have mounted if the enemy bombardment had continued.
On the eve of the battle of Mobile Bay, Maury had seemed
disposed to replace Page:
despondent.
these forts.

45

"...General Page is too

He seems to see only the weak points of
We need a bouyant man there...."
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Page, "The Defense of Fort Morgan," 410.
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Following the siege of Fort Morgan, however, Maury could
not fault Page's actions:
...From all that is known of the conduct of
this officer and the garrison under his
orders, it is believed that they nobly strove
to redeem the disgrace upon their arms
inflicted by the hasty and unsoldierlike
surrender of Fort Powell and Gaines.
The operations in Mobile Bay resulted primarily in
the termination of the blockade running at the port.
Canby did not have a sufficient infantry force for a land
campaign against the city, and Farragut's fleet could do
nothing without land support.

Both Sherman and Farragut

expressed opposition to a direct attack on Mobile.

The

general preferred to have a Confederate garrison tied up
there than a Union garrison, while the admiral believed
"it would be used by our own people to flood rebeldom
with all their supplies."

49

It is impossible in the

absence of accurate importation statistics for the Con
federacy to assess the exact impact of the cessation of
the flow of supplies into Mobile, but the Confederate
war effort must have suffered.

The conduct of the Con

federate army and navy commanders involved in the various

48

Maury to Cooper, Sept. 1, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt.
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actions is also difficult to analyze.

Maury probably

made a correct assessment when he wrote that the com
manders and officers of the forts had been psychologi
cally prepared for a surrender by constant talk of the
weakness of the forts.

But Buchanan did what any fight

ing admiral would have done.

He might, however, have

provided more assistance in defending the forts if he had
attempted to keep his squadron, particularly the
Tennessee, under the guns of Fort Morgan.

If Fort Powell

and Fort Gaines had held out longer, they might have
delayed their capture but only by risking the sacrifice
of lives.

CHAPTER XIII
"...TIME IS EVERYTHING TO US N O W . .."
In anticipation of Farragut's passage of the lower
bay forts, Maury and his subordinates made hasty prepa
rations to defend Mobile.

The need for experienced

troops occupied a prominent place in Maury's plans.
Since all of his regular veterans except the 22nd Louisi
ana had rushed into Fort Gaines in time to be captured
there, the need was particularly acute.

Patton's 22nd

Louisiana occupied a half dozen works upon its arrival in
the city.

Maury requested of Bragg that he order the

return of the 1st Louisiana and 1st Mississippi artillery
regiments to Mobile.

The former regiment reached Mobile

from Montgomery on August 6 and took positions along the
city line.

Bragg directed the 1st Mississippi Artillery

to move from Atlanta back to the city.

En route the

regiment's train ran into a landslide between Pollard and
Tensas Landing, and the accident resulted in the killing
or wounding of 87 men.

Instead of keeping the Missis-

sippians in Mobile, Maury ordered them on picket duty
below Blakely on the eastern shore.

Even the officers

and crew of the Gaines found themselves assigned to a bay
battery since their vessel had been destroyed.

All of

these men helped fill gaps the local defense troops and
328
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convalescents could not cover, but Maury still desired
further reinforcements:

"...Veteran troops should be

sent here as soon as they can be spared elsewhere and
they should be troops not connected by any ties with
Mobile.,,;L
Maury appealed to all of the men in Mobile to organ
ize to defend the city.

He ordered Andrew S. Herron and

Thomas J. Judge, both colonels and judges on the military
court, to supervise the organization of these men.
Herron had as his responsibility the Louisianians and
government employees, while Judge had all remaining men.
Maury asked those men who had arms and ammunition to fur
nish them and promised that unarmed men would find wea
pons available.

The city papers urged the city's men to

comply with Maury's request:

"All men within the city

capable of bearing arms, are bound, and will be obliged,
2
to shoulder them."
Maury ordered city defense troops

Bergeron, "The Twenty-Second Louisiana Consolidated
Infantry,8' 207; Maury to Bragg, Aug. 3 , 1864 , O.R. , LII,
Pt. 2, p. 716; Maury to Bragg, Aug. 3, 1864, ibid.; Brig
adier General Daniel W. Adams to Bragg, Aug. 5, 1864,
ibid., 719; Mumford Diary, Aug. 5, 6 , 1864; Rolls for
July and Aug., 1864, Record of Events Cards, 1st Missis
sippi Light Artillery, Compiled Service Records of Con
federate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from Mis
sissippi; Waterman, "Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 21; Maury to
Bragg, Aug. 14, 1864, Bragg Papers, Western Reserve.
2
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which had not gone to Fort Gaines organized into a bat
talion for permanent guard duty under Lieutenant Colonel
Stewart W. Cayce.

Even the men of the city police

department formed themselves into a military company and
elected Mayor Slough as their captain.

Governor Watts

sent available state reserves to Mobile after receiving
requests from Maury and Davis.

These reserves arrived

in the city very slowly, however.

By August 9, Maury

could report only 4,000 troops of all types on duty in
the District of the Gulf.
Because he

3

was exercising temporary

departmental

command, Maury needed a capable subordinate to fill in
for him at Mobile.

He had little confidence in Higgins,

the only other general officer in the district:
"...while he is

well qualified to fight ships, he is pos

sessed of such an infirmity of

temper as

sets thewhole

community, including the officers under him, against
4
him,— " On August 12, Major General Franklin Gardner

3

Special Order No. 228, Headquarters District of
the Gulf, Aug. 10, 1864, quoted in Evening N e w s , Aug. 12,
1864; Para II, Special Order No. 234, Headquarters Pro
vost Marshal's Office, Aug. 10, 1864, quoted in ibid.;
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arrived in Mobile, and Maury requested of the War Depart
ment that it allow him to retain Gardner for temporary
duty.

In a letter to Bragg, Maury explained his request:

"...he will be very useful, and has the confidence of the
people and Troops."

5

Gardner's previous experience at

Mobile and his defense of Port Hudson certainly qualified
him for duty under Maury.

The War Department approved

the latter's request, and on August 17 he assigned Gardg

ner to temporary command of the District of the Gulf.
In addition to a temporary district commander, Maury
wanted two brigade commanders and recommended Colonel
Henry Maury and Major Bryan M. Thomas, the latter then
serving in the Alabama State Reserve.

Thomas received a

promotion to brigadier general and orders to report to
Maury.

Instead of promoting Henry Maury, the War Depart

ment directed Brigadier General St. John R. Liddell to
Mobile.

Liddell had recently crossed the Mississippi

5
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River from western Louisiana, where he had served under
Major General Richard Taylor.

7

Von Sheliha and his engineers concentrated on pre
paring the eastern shore and bay batteries for a possible
attack once they knew Farragut had passed the lower bay
line.

Because the bay batteries had received so much

attention in the past, the Confederates put most of their
energy into work on the eastern shore.

Von Sheliha admit

ted that the defenses there had been neglected and were
unreliable.

He ordered all gaps in the obstructions in

the Apalachee and Blakely rivers closed and the obstruc
tions themselves strengthened.

At Battery Huger, Von

Sheliha mounted five additional heavy guns and thickened
the fort's walls.
new guns also.

He began preparing Battery Tracy for

To support these two works, Von Sheliha

recommended that the navy move either the Huntsville and
Tuscaloosa or three blockade runners mounted with heavy
Q

guns into position near the forts.

He also initiated

7
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constructing works on the heights east of the two batter
ies to protect their land approaches.

Batteries at

Blakely would stand too far north to provide effective
protection alone, so, on the recommendation of Colonel
John H. Gindrat, Von Sheliha chose the site of an old
Spanish fort as the position for another permanent work:
...I propose to countersink our guns command
ing the river, and to protect the battery by
a bastion line in rear.
Time is everything
to us now, and we have to make the best use
of the short^respite the enemy seems willing
to grant....
Maury and Von Sheliha disagreed on the best means of
defending the direct water approaches to the city.

The

former wished to place two ironclad floating batteries
near Choctaw Spit to guard the lower line of obstruc
tions even though these batteries remained uncompleted.
Von Sheliha thought all of the Confederates' firepower
should be concentrated at the upper obstructions.

He saw

the Choctaw Spit position as too isolated and weak to
resist a strong enemy attack.

He persuaded Gilmer to

769; "Report of operations for the week ending Sunday,
August 14, 1864," ibid., 776; Von Sheliha to Gilmer,
Aug. 12, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf,
Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 169; Von Sheliha to Gilmer,
Aug. 13, 1864, ibid., 173.
9Gilmer to Maury, Aug. 6, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 2,
p. 759; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 10, 1864, ibid.,
769; Von Sheliha to Gindrat, Aug. 11, 1864, ibid., 772;
Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 12, 1864, Letters Sent,
Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 169; Von
Sheliha to Gindrat, Aug. 12, 1864, ibid., 170.
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intercede with Maury in behalf of his ideas, but Maury
maintained his position, to which the Prussian had to
accede.Along

the city works and bay batteries the

engineers strengthened and put in order all existing
works.

They placed torpedoes in Garrow's Bend and in the

main channel below the obstructions.

The only operations

of note in this area involved the clearing of land in
front of the outer city line.

Higgins ordered all per

sons living within one thousand yards of the line to
evacuate their homes.

Then Von Sheliha put nearly 200

men to work cutting down all of the trees in this zone.
By mid-August, Von Sheliha expressed confidence that the
works could resist at least any water attack on the

Several things hampered the engineers' efforts to
prepare the city defenses for an assault.

Rainy weather

Garner to Lieutenant Charles C, Simms, Aug. 5,
1864, O.R.N., XXI, 555-56; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug.
6 , 1864, ibid., 558; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 7, 1864,
O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 764; "Report of operations...,"
Aug. 14, 1864, ibid., 775; Gilmer to Maury, Aug. 9, 1864,
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill,
Vol. 5, p. 605; Gilmer to Von Sheliha, Aug. 9, 1864,
ibid.
11Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 9, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 768; "Report of operations...," Aug. 14, 1864,
ibid., 775-76; Para V, Special Order No. 226, Headquar
ters District of the Gulf, Aug. 13, 1864, quoted in Daily
Tribune, Aug. 14, 1864; Mumford Diary, Aug. 8 , 13, 1864;
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neer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 169.
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prevented them from working on certain parts of the city
line.

Von Sheliha's officers had to locate cannons at

various depots, transport them with carriages and chas
sis to the forts, and then mount them.

The most serious

problem continued to be a shortage of necessary laborers.
Von Sheliha's requests for men and attempts to hire the
services of slaves had failed.

He appealed to Governor

Watts to furnish at least two thousand slaves to work on
the defenses:
...Forts Powell and Gaines would be in our
possession yet had my calls and appeals been
heeded.
Mobile will^follow unless planters
send us laborers....
If the planters would furnish these slaves, Von Sheliha
felt he could make the city's defenses tenable within
twenty days.

By mid-month, however, Watts still had not

found the needed laborers.
impress Negroes.

Gilmer advised Maury to

At Von Sheliha's urging, Maury ordered

all engineer work at Montgomery stopped so that the
slaves and tools there could move to Mobile.

Planters in

Clarke, Baldwin, and Monroe counties sent 375 slaves to
the city on August 12 for use by Von Sheliha and his men.

12

"Report of operations...," Aug. 14, 1864, O.R. ,
XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 776; Von Sheliha to Watts, Aug. 4, 1864,
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16,
p. 137; Von Sheliha to Watts, Aug. 13, 1864, ibid.,
175.
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This small contingent still did not meet the engineers'
needs, however.^ ^
The Confederate authorities made other, less impor
tant preparations to defend Mobile.

Maury had no more

luck at this time than previously in getting noncombatants to leave the city.

After the initial alarm

caused by the passage of the forts, the excitement among
the civilians subsided quickly, and their morale remained
high.

Higgins finally ordered all soldiers and sailors

who had families in the city to send them to the
interior.

14

Maury's inspector of field transportation,

Captain John T. Purves, attempted to obtain horses and
mules for field artillery and wagons but found few per
sons willing to sell their animals.

When Purves received

authorization to impress animals, he experienced further

13

"Report of operations...," Aug. 14, 1864, O.R. ,
XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 776; Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 6 ,
1864, ibid., 759; Gilmer to Maury, Aug. 6 , 1864, Letters
and Telegrams Sent, Engineer Bureau, Chap. Ill, Vol. 5,
p. 588; Gilmer to Von Sheliha, Aug. 9, 1864, ibid., 613;
Daily Tribune, Aug. 12, 1864; Evening N e w s , Aug. 12,
1864; Von Sheliha to Watts, Aug. 4, 1864, Letters Sent,
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in ibid., Aug. 14, 1864.

frustration because he had no cavalrymen to assist him.

15

Higgins, spurred by the evacuation of Fort Powell and
surrender of Fort Gaines, issued strict orders pertaining
to defense of the forts and batteries around Mobile.

He

forbade all commanders from communicating with the enemy
without his authority and required them to hold their
works "to the last extremity."

16

Finally, Higgins placed

restrictions on boats and vessels plying the waters of
the upper bay.

Any boats in transit to the eastern shore

had to report to the naval ships anchored near the
obstructions or to Battery Gladden and could not pass in
front of any of the batteries.

Sailing vessels coming

into port from the obstructions had to report to the
officer of the guard at the navy yard.

17

Two small military operations briefly interrupted
the operations conducted by Maury's men.

The first of

these involved an attempt by Maury to relieve Fort
Morgan.

He ordered the 1st Mississippi Artillery, then

15

Purves to Major A. M. Paxton, Aug. 5, 1864, m
Letterbook, Jan.-Oct. 1864, Purves Papers; Purves to
Lieutenant H. L. D. Lewis, Aug. 7, 1864, ibid.; Purves
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Para I, General Order No. 16, Headquarters Hig
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Aug. 12, 1864.
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ibid.
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stationed at Tensas Landing, to begin moving down the
eastern shore with the idea of creating a diversion in
the rear of Granger's land forces besieging Fort Morgan.
He hoped to either force the Federals to break off the
land siege or at least delay its progress.

On August 13,

1864, Brigadier General Alexander Asboth left Pensacola
with 1,400 Federal infantry, cavalry, and artillery on a
march toward the Perdido River.

Maury feared the Federal

move might threaten Blakely and ordered the Mississippians back to a point just south of that place.

Asboth's

Federals returned to Pensacola without having crossed the
Perdido.

Even so, Maury abandoned any further ideas of

trying to relieve Page's men at Fort Morgan because he
did not have enough men to dispatch there and defend the
approaches to Mobile at the same time.

18

On August 15, 1864, Farragut conducted a reconnais
sance of the obstructions below the bay batteries.
Granger accompanied the admiral, and the two planned to
study both the land and naval defenses of Mobile.

Four

gunboats, one of them the former Confederate vessel
Selma, and two monitors moved to within three and a half

18

Brigadier General Alexander Asboth to Christensen,
Aug. 14, 1864, O . R . , XXXV, Pt. 1, pp. 426-27; Mumford
Diary, Aug. 11, 1864; Rolls for July and Aug. 1864,
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O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 2, p. 798; Maury to Bragg, Aug. 27,
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miles of the city.

At 2 o'clock that afternoon, the

Federal gunners opened fire on the bay batteries and the
gunboat Morgan, which was anchored behind the line of
obstructions.

This bombardment continued for two hours

although the Federals did not put out a heavy fire.

The

Confederate batteries did not reply to the Federals, but
the crew of the Morgan did send an occasional shell
toward the enemy.

None of the Federal shots did any dam

age to the Confederate defenses.

At sunset Farragut

ordered his force back down the bay.

He had found the

channel into Mobile completely obstructed.

The Confed

erates had sunk the unfinished ironclad Phoenix in the
only gap which had remained in the line of piles.

In his

report, to the Navy Department, Farragut reported that
unless his men could remove these obstructions there
seemed no possibility of even his light-draft gunboats
getting close to Mobile.

A Vermont native living in

Mobile witnessed the brief action and pronounced this
verdict:
...So effective was this water line, protected
as it was by water batteries, that Farragut's
fleet might as well have attempted topsail
through the Green Mountain range....

19

Farragut to Canby, Aug. 14, 1864, O.R.N., XXI,
528; Farragut to Welles, Aug. 16, 1864, ibid.., 529-30;
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Fox, Aug. 17, 1864, ibid., 530; Abstract log of the
U.S.S. Metacomet, Aug. 15, 1864, ibid., 828; Mumford

340
Von Sheliha and his engineers continued their oper
ations through the end of August.

He received some

opposition in one phase of his work, that of clearing
the land in front of the city defenses.

Various military

headquarters issued orders preventing the axe parties
from cutting down some of the trees.

He requested that

subordinate commanders inform him of any further
exemptions.

The engineers built two new batteries on

the bay shore where they could assist in guarding the
obstructions.

Each of these works contained heavy rifled

guns or columbiads.
Gaines assisted m

The former crew of the gunboat
mounting the guns.

20

Even though

these fortifications and the other bay batteries appeared
in good shape for defensive fighting, some of the garri
sons found themselves in less than an ideal situation.
An officer at Battery McIntosh described his fort:
...The quarters are not very good and very
much crowded.
The water is very bad and

Diary, Aug. 15, 1864; Victor von Scheliha, A Treatise on
Coast-Defence (London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1868), 189-90;
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unhealthy. Most of the garrison are suf
fering from diarrhea....
Von Sheliha did not like the construction or location of
Battery Huger and Battery Tracy but strengthened their
walls and placed heavier guns in them.

These improve

ments he felt would enable the works to put up stiff
resistance to any attack.

22

The problems which Von Sheliha faced, particularly
the shortage of slave labor, weighed heavily on him and
undoubtedly caused him to become somewhat pessimistic.
His letters to Gilmer indicated that he felt that Gover
nor Watts was helpless to aid him and that Maury could
not impress the needed labor.
wrote:

In one communication he

"If not sustained by my Government, I will resign

unconditionally and immediately."

23

Obviously spurred by

Von Sheliha's attitude, Maury asked Gilmer to send
another engineer officer to his district.

Because the

man Maury requested was ill, Gilmer recommended that the
War Department order Lieutenant Colonel Samuel H.
Lockett to Mobile.

21

Lockett at that time held the

Mumford Diary, Aug. 27, 1864.

22

Von Sheliha to Gilmer, Aug. 17, 1864, Letters
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 193;
Von Sheliha to Harrison, Aug. 19, 1864,O . R . , XXXIX,
Pt. 2, p. 782.
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position of chief engineer for the Department of Alabama,
Mississippi, and East Louisiana and had served at Mobile
early in the war.

Von Sheliha outranked Lockett, so Gil

mer got a promotion to full colonel for Lockett.

Gilmer

possibly did not intend for Lockett to supersede Von
Sheliha completely because the former's orders called for
him to continue his duties with the Department of Alabama,
Mississippi, and East Louisiana.

When Von Sheliha

learned of Lockett"'s assignment, he submitted his resig
nation but offered to remain in Mobile until the threat
to the city had ended.
his resignation request.

The War Department turned down
24

In numerous small ways the Confederate authorities
at Mobile continued preparing for the defense of the
city.

Governor Watts closed all of the whiskey and alco

hol distilleries in Mobile County and threatened to
revoke the licenses of any persons who did not obey his
instructions.
alry scouts

24

Gardner formed a special company of cav

(some of whom were Negroes) to watch the

Gilmer to Seddon, Aug. 17, 1864, in Compiled Ser
vice Record of Lockett; Para III, Special Order No. 106,
Headquarters Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East
Louisiana, Aug. 20, 1864, quoted in ibid.; Von Sheliha to
Gilmer, Aug. 20, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office,
Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 16, p. 206; Von Sheliha to Gindrat,
Aug. 20, 1864, ibid.; Von Sheliha to Seddon, Aug. 20,
1864, ibid., 208-209.
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enemy forces at Fort Powell and on Dauphin Island.

25

He

also issued orders restricting personal movement around
the defenses.

One of these orders prohibited persons

from passing outside the picket line toward the enemy
without passports issued by district headquarters.
Another regulation forbade persons from visiting the
various batteries unless they did so on duty.

26

Captain

Purves continued to seek horses and mules but still with
little success.

A citizen living near the city wrote a

friend that, even though the government offered $1 , 0 0 0 to
$2,500 for mules and horses, the people in the vicinity
could not supply their needs.

27

Following a prior recom

mendation by Von Sheliha, Gardner ordered the seizure of
the blockade runners M a r y , Virgin, and Red Gauntlet in
late August.

The Confederates mounted two 6 -pounder guns

25

Daily T r i bune, Aug. 21, 1864; Garnder to Cooper,
Aug. 19, 1864, Telegrams Received, Secretary of War;
Mumford Diary, Aug. 18, 1864.
26

General Order No. 104, Headquarters District of
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of the Gulf, LHA Collection.
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on the Red Gauntlet and ordered her on picket duty near
the eastern shore . ^ 8
Maury's difficulties with the city's non-combatants
did not abate.

Despite Farragut's run into the bay and

the fall of the lower bay line, the civilian population
did not leave Mobile in significant numbers.

Maury

reported that the people seemed in good heart and not
willing to leave.

An aide to Governor Watts wrote Davis

that he found the citizens confident in their generals
and unafraid.

In a letter to his son-in-law, a man liv

ing near Mobile expressed some of the reasons why the
non-combatants would not leave:
...The citizens do not appear to be alarmed..
..Some families are leaving for the up country
but not in a panic.
Most of the women and
children even are determined to remaig^and
risk the dangers of a bombardment....
Some of the people told Maury they would not leave
because they had no place to go.

He wrote to editors of

inland newspapers and asked them to have neighboring

OQ
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planters inform the Mobile papers of available places of
refuge.

The Mobile papers did not greatly aid Maury's

cause, however; they expressed confidence that the city
was safe and that the people should not "trouble themselves with doubts and apprehensions."

30

As August ended and September began, Maury contin
ued looking for troops to defend the city.

Although

Governor Watts urged him to leave Mobile "a heap of
ashes" if he could not hold it, Maury remained confident
that he could conduct a successful defense with enough
troops.

The War Department tried to aid Maury by

requesting that Watts call out as many state militiamen
as possible and send them to Mobile.

State troops alone

would not suffice for Maury's needs, however.

One prob

lem was that these units arrived very slowly from their
scattered mustering places.

More seriously, many of the

men fell ill once they reached the city.

Maury requested

some veteran infantrymen from General John Bell Hood,
commander of the Army of Tennessee.
a brigade of four Alabama regiments

Hood responded with
(some 700 men)

commanded by Brigadier General Alpheus Baker.

When they

arrived at Mobile on August 28, Gardner ordered these
troops to Spanish Fort to defend that position and to

30

Maury to R. G. Scott, Aug. 12, 1864, quoted m
Daily Tribune, Aug. 23, 1864; Editorial in ibid., Aug.
25, 186T;
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picket the eastern shore.

One of Baker's regiments took

up its station at Pollard so that it could guard the
railroad.^
At the same time that he asked Hood for men, Maury
requested Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest to come
south from northern Mississippi with some of his cavalry
if his situation permitted it.

Forrest ordered 2,000 men

to Mobile even though he undoubtedly did not favor such a
}
move.
Before these troops could move southward, Davis
telegraphed Maury that he could best use Forrest's men in
a raid on Sherman's line of communications in Tennessee
and that state reserves would do as well in the trenches
as dismounted cavalrymen.

Maury acceded to the presi

dent's wishes and suspended the movement of Forrest's
men.

32

Lieutenant General Richard Taylor, new commander
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of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Lou
isiana, reached Meridian and assumed command on Septem
ber 6 .

He decided to send Forrest's cavalry into Tennes

see to operate against Sherman's supply lines:

"...it is

better to risk the fall of Mobile than to leave any reasonable efforts and means untried to defeat Sherman."

33

To give Maury some support, Taylor agreed to send one of
Forrest's brigades to Mobile.

Colonel Robert McCulloch

and his brigade, nearly 1 , 0 0 0 strong, moved southward
from Meridian to the Gulf city.

34

Despite these additions, the troop strength in the
District of the Gulf did not satisfy Maury.

Sickness,

still prevalent among the new troops at Mobile, had
reduced the force by about 2,000 men.

The governors of

Alabama and Mississippi withdrew or disbanded militia
units totaling nearly 2,000 more men.

Toward the end of

September, Maury received through Taylor a request by
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Hood for the return of Baker's brigade to the Army of
Tennessee.

Maury explained his situation to Taylor and

stated that he did not feel justified in reducing his
army by detaching Baker's men.

He pointed out that the

unit composed his sole veteran infantry force and held
the important works on the eastern shore.

Taylor sup

ported Maury and passed on word that Baker's brigade
could not be spared.

Maury did agree to send one of his

Alabama cavalry regiments to northern Mississippi to help
guard that region in the absence of Forrest's cavalry.
By the end of September, the effective force in the District of the Gulf numbered only 6,600 men.

35

By the end of September 1864, the engineers at
Mobile had made good progress in preparing the various
defensive works for active service.

They did not have a

great deal of construction to do along the city line
because they had completed most of the redoubts and
redans along it.

Their primary concern here consisted of

dressing up the forts, strengthening their magazines, and
connecting the forts with trenches.

35
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the attention of most of Von Sheliha's work force.

This

position, also known as Fort Sidney Johnston, anchored
Von Sheliha's line to Garrow's Bend and, with Battery
Missouri, Mound Battery, and Battery Buchanan, covered
the water obstructions from the west.

So important did

Von Sheliha feel the completion of this redoubt that he
employed a force of 500 slaves on it day and night.

A

citizen who made a brief excursion along the Shell Road
gave this description of what he witnessed:
...It would be a novel sight to one unaccus
tomed to the presence of the sable race, to
witness the crowds of darkies employed in
building the fortifications.
They are in
such numbers, that they look like ants on the
side of an ant hill.
Just as we passed, the
signal to "knock off" work was given, & they
obeyed the summons with alacrity, forming at
once into companies, to marchfiinto the city,
where they are quartered....
Battery Gladden and Battery McIntosh received minor
repairs and several new g u n s .

The engineers placed one

7-inch Brooke rifle in the latter.

They also prepared a

platform in McIntosh for a 10-inch columbiad.

This fort

seemed susceptible to an attack by enemy launches, so the
engineers used a pile driver to place obstructions in
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front of the work, while they strung a boom out along the
western face.

An officer in the garrison at Battery

McIntosh wrote in his diary that they could not make much
of a defense at the battery unless they received strong
reinforcements.

The men suffered from chills and fever:

"Thirty six men out of three companies are all we have
for duty today."

37

To further strengthen these two bat

teries, the engineers moved two floating batteries to the
vicinity.

They transferred an ironclad battery up from

the lower obstructions and placed it in the channel
between the batteries.

In the rear of McIntosh, the

engineers anchored a wooden battery

(called Camel Bat-

tery) that mounted two 42-pounder rifles.

38

Lockett placed Colonel Gindrat in charge of all
engineer operations east of Tensas River, and Gindrat
made good progress there.

His men did little on Battery

Tracy and Battery Huger except place more earth over
their magazines and keep them clean.

The engineers had

almost completed the main work at Spanish Fort by the end
of September and mounted two guns in it.
the largest of the four redoubts

They finished

(No. 2) on the line in
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rear of Spanish Fort but did not have it ready for guns.
Practically all of Redoubt No. 3 and Redoubt No. 4 they
had pushed toward completion by the end of the month.
The laborers dug more than 250 yards of rifle pits and
cleared the timber for about 300 yards in front of the
entire line.

To aid in an evacuation of the works if it

became necessary, Gindrat's men began construction of a
road through Bay Minette swamp to a point across Apala
chee River from Battery Tracy.

At Von Sheliha's sugges

tion, a portion of Gindrat's force erected a battery at
Blakely and began clearing land for a supporting line
similar to that at Spanish Fort.

In the Blakely and Apa

lachee rivers, the engineers placed additional piles and
constructed rafts to block the streams.

39

These opera

tions in the eastern division completed the basic frame
work of the Mobile defenses, and subsequent work would
only complete or strengthen what the engineers had
already begun.

39

Weekly Report..., Sept. 4, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt.
2, p. 815; Lockett to Gindrat, Sept. 6 , 1864, ibid.,
819; Gindrat to Von Sheliha, Sept. 16, 1864, ibid., 84142; Monthly Report..., Oct. 6 , 1864, ibid., PtT T, p.
794; Von Sheliha to Gindrat, Sept. 6 , 1864, Letters
Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 13, p. 29;
Weekly Report..., Sept. 17, 1864, ibid., 62-63.

CHAPTER XIV
"...STEADY AND ENERGETIC PREPARATIONS ..."
From October 1864 until the commencement of the
final Federal campaign against Mobile in March 1865, the
Confederate command in the city concentrated on strength
ening their defenses and preparing them to meet an enemy
attack.

Maury remained concerned about obtaining a suf

ficient military force to man his numerous works in the
event of a siege.

The small force at his disposal suf-

ferred from various illnesses, primarily chills and
fever, which reduced its effective strength.

In early

October, out of 900 men present, Colonel Patton could
count only 100 men fit for duty in his brigade.

Maury

reported in mid-November that he had only about 700 men
to defend the land lines around Mobile.

By the latter

part of that month, his entire effective force in the
District of the Gulf numbered slightly less than 3,000
men.'*'

He asked the War Department for 4,000 or 5,000

veteran troops, preferably men from states other than

■^Maury to Surget, Oct. 4, 1864 , in Richard Taylor
Papers, Louisiana Adjutant General's Archives, Jackson
Barracks, Chalmette, La.; Maury to Cooper, Nov. 10, 1864,
O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 3, p. 910; Abstract from return of the
army of the District of the Gulf, Nov. 20, 1864, ibid.,
X L V , Pt. 2, p. 632.
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Alabama:

"A few Virginia regiments would be particularly

well suited for a tour of service here."

2

Taylor echoed

Maury's request but recognized that few available units
existed.

He stated that Mobile would fall if attacked

in its weakened condition.

As Taylor anticipated, the

War Department could then find no troops to send to
Maury.

Seddon wrote:

"Re-enforcements cannot under more

pressing exigencies elsewhere be spared for the doubtful
contingency of an unreported attack."

3

The only source from which it seemed that Maury
could draw reinforcements appeared to be Alabama State
Troops.

Practically all of these men then in service had

already moved to Mobile.

The Confederate command finally

agreed to enroll free Negroes in the city for local
defense, but no evidence exists of units forming at this
time.

Taylor urged Maury to allow portions of the mili

tia and reserves to return home for short periods when
he could spare them.

These furloughs, Taylor felt, might

encourage the men to turn out more readily when an attack
4
became imminent.
Maury requested 4,000 more men from

2
Maury to Cooper, Nov. 10, 1864, O.R., XXXIX, Pt. 3,
p. 910.
3

Ibid., with endorsements by Taylor, Nov. 14, 1864,
and Seddon, Nov. 21, 1864, pp. 910-11.
4
Endorsement by Taylor, Nov. 14, 1864, on Maury to
Cooper, Nov. 10, 18 64, ibid., 910; Evening News, Oct. 22,
1864; Surget to Maury, Oct. 1, 1864, Letters Sent,
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Governor Watts and pointed out that necessities elsewhere
made it impossible for regular Confederate units to come
to Mobile.

Taylor also addressed an appeal to Watts.

He

asked the governor to urge the state legislature to pass
laws which would make possible the raising of an adequate
force for Mobile's defense.

Taylor pointed out that the

Gulf coast presented the only threat of invasion of the
state.

Sherman's "March to the Sea" had ended any

threat from the east, while Hood's invasion of Tennessee
had secured the state's northern border.

Until Watts

and the Alabama legislature could act, Taylor searched
his department for men to send Maury.

The only unit he

could find consisted of "galvanized Yankees"— foreigners
who had deserted the Union army— and this unit numbered
only 450 men of dubious reliability.

5

In the waning months of 1864, several general offi
cer changes occurred at Mobile.

Taylor had requested in

September the assignment of Gardner to command of south
western Mississippi and eastern Louisiana, where Taylor
hoped he would succeed in correcting a chaotic situation.

Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana,
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 109.
5
Maury to Watts, Nov. 23, 1864, Letters Sent,
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana,
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 197; Taylor to Watts, Dec. 12,
1864, O . R . , XLV, Pt. 2, pp. 683-84; Lieutenant Colonel
William M. Levy to Maury, Dec. 22, 1864, ibid., 724.
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The War Department acceded to Taylor's request and in
October ordered Gardner to Meridian and to report to
g
Taylor for orders.
Maury also lost the services of
Higgins in October but did so willingly.

Higgins had

left his command without orders in September when he
thought the enemy would attack Mobile, and Maury removed
him from duty.

When Higgins applied to Taylor for rein

statement, Maury informed the latter of Higgins' conduct
and asked that Taylor not allow him to return to Mobile.
Taylor supported Maury in his wishes.

7

In late November

General Gustave Toutant Beauregard, now in charge of all
western armies, ordered Major General Martin L. Smith to
report to Maury for temporary duty commanding the Mobile
defenses.

Maury wrote to Beauregard explaining that he

would assign Smith as temporary commander of the District
of the Gulf while he acted as departmental commander dur
ing Taylor's absence in Georgia.

When Smith arrived at

Mobile, however, Maury decided to make him chief engineer

g
Taylor to Bragg, Sept. 24, 1864, O . R . , LII, Pt. 2,
p. 747; Para IX, Special Order No. 277, Headquarters
District of the Gulf, Oct. 3, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt. 3,
p. 786; General Order No. 126, Headquarters Department of
Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Oct. 4, 1864,
General Orders, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and
East Louisiana, RG 109, National Archives; Mumford Diary,
Oct. 4, 1864.
7
Mumford Diary, Sept. 24, 1864; Surget to Higgins,
Oct. 23, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 3, p. 847.
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of the Mobile defenses and to turn the district over to
Smith only when he

(Maury) had to go outside its

boundaries.^
Von Sheliha and his engineers did a considerable
amount of work on the line of city defer es during the
last months of 1864.

For the most part, they made

repairs and added earth to strengthen walls and magazines
during October and November.

The largest portion of the

labor force of the city works concentrated their efforts
in Redoubt "N" (Fort Sidney Johnston) to ready it for
service against the enemy's gunboats.

Heavy rains, cold

weather, a shortage of workers, limited transportation,
and a shortage of construction materials prevented Von
Sheliha from making the progress he desired.

To help

alleviate the shortage of slave laborers, Taylor author
ized Maury to employ his soldiers in completing the forI
9
tifxcations at Mobile.
In early December Von Sheliha

O
Beauregard to Taylor, Nov. 16, 1864, O.R., XLV,
Pt. 1, p. 1213; Maury to Gardner, Nov. 22, 1864, ibid. ,
1239; Beauregard to Brent, Nov. 26, 1864, ibid., 1248;
Brent to Major General Martin L. Smith, Novi 27, 1864,
ibid., L I I , Pt. 2, p. 791; Maury to Brent, Nov. 28, 1864,
Letters Sent, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and
East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 198; Maury to
Brent, Dec. 1, 1864, ibid. , 206.
g
Weekly Report of Operations for Week Ending Oct. 15,
1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 3, pp. 839-40; Weekly Report of
Operations for Week Ending Oct. 22, 1864, ibid., 850-51;
Monthly Report of Operations for October 1864, ibid., 884;
Weekly Report of Operations for Week Ending Novi 5"7 1864,
ibid., 895; Report of Operations for Week Ending Nov. 12,
1864, ibid., 916; Weekly Report of Operations for Week
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shifted most of his work force to the redans located
between the redoubts on the city line.

He wanted to put

them in good condition so that they could give the neces
sary support to the larger earthworks in the event of an
attack.

The engineers had placed all of the redans in

fighting condition by the end of the month.

General

Smith ordered Von Sheliha to prepare chevaux-de-frise
(sharpened stakes driven at right angles through logs)
for placement in front of the lines to protect them
against infantry assault.

By the end of 1864, the city

line seemed ready for active defense.
The bay batteries required less work than the city
works.

At Battery Gladden the engineers replaced an 8 -

inch gun with a 1 0 -inch gun, made repairs necessitated by
heavy rains, constructed a new wharf, and drove obstruc
tions in the waters in front of the work to stop boat
attacks.

Von Sheliha's men constructed gun pits and

Ending Nov. 19, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 1, p. 1230; Weekly
Report of Operations for Week Ending Nov. 26, 1864, ibid.,
1250; Von Sheliha to Captain W. D. Morris, Nov. 23, 1864,
Letters Sent, Engineer Office, Gulf, Chap. Ill, Vol. 13,
p. 208; Levy to Maury, Dec. 25, 1864, Letters Sent,
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana,
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 247.
■^Weekly Report of Operations for Week Ending Dec.
10, 1864, O . R . , XLV, Pt. 2, p. 678; Weekly Report of
Operations for Week Ending Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 707-708;
Weekly Report of Operations for Week Ending Dec. 24,
1864, ibid., 734; Smith to Lockett, Dec. 29, 1864, Let
ters Sent, Engineer Office at Mobile, Oct. 11, 1864-May
8 , 1865, Chap. Ill, Vol. 11, p. 177.
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mounted two new 10-inch columbiads at Battery McIntosh.
They also brought in additional earth to strengthen the
walls and traverses of the fort.

As was the case at

Gladden, severe storms had eroded some of the sand and
earth at McIntosh and made repairs necessary.

To protect

Gladden's left flank, Von Sheliha ordered an octagonal
floating battery placed 500 yards northeast of the fort.
This battery would mount two guns when completed.

The

engineers also employed two ironclad floating batteries
and a battery constructed on camels

(wooden caissons)—

each mounting several heavy guns— in support of Gladden,
McIntosh, and the bay obstructions.

Because the bay

batteries and eastern shore works had to share a steam
boat for transporting supplies, Von Sheliha could not do
as much strengthening and repair work as he had hoped,
but by the end of December, he had all of the bay bat
teries in fair fighting order."*''*'

1 Weekly Report... O c t . 15, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt.
3, p. 840; Weekly Report...Oct. 22, 1864, ibid., 851;
Monthly Report...Oct. 1864, ibid., 885; Weekly Report...
Nov. 5, 1864, ibid., 895; Report...N o v . 12, 1864, ibid.,
916; Lockett to Major James H. Alexander, Nov. 20, 1864,
ibid., 1229; Weekly Report...Nov. 19, 1864, ijbid., XLV,
Pt. 1, p. 1231; Weekly Report.. .Nov. 26, 1864, i'bid. ,
1250; Weekly Report...Dec. 10, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, p.
678; Weekly Report...Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 708; Weekly
Report... D e c . 24, 1864, ibid., 735; Lockett to Von
Sheliha, Dec. 14, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office,
Mobile, Chap. Ill, Vol. 11, p. 128.
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Of the works on the eastern shore, Battery Huger and
Battery Tracy received less attention than Blakely and
Spanish Fort because the engineers had practically com
pleted the two former forts.

Tracy required only minor

repairs and additional sodding.

Von Sheliha began erec

tion of a new, stronger magazine at Battery Huger.

After

the engineers covered it with about eight feet of earth,
Von Sheliha mounted a gun atop it.

Because Huger lay

closer to the enemy's fleet, making it more vulnerable in
case of an attack, Von Sheliha wanted to make its walls
as strong as possible.
thicken the parapet,

He ordered

his men to raise and

especially on the work's south face.

He also instructed his engineers to place additional sand
on various parts of Huger's interior.

Whenever possible,

Von Sheliha had his labor force place sod on the walls to
cut down on erosion.
in front of Huger to

Likewise, he had them drive piles
reduce damage by tidal action.

Some

limited work remained to be done on Battery Tracy and
Battery Huger, but Von Sheliha and Lockett felt they
could put up a satisfactory defense.

12

12Weekly Report...Oct. 15, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt.
3, p. 840; Weekly Report...Oct. 22, 18(T4, ibid., 851;
Monthly Report... O c t . 1864, ibid., 885; Weekly Report...
Nov. 5, 1864, ibid., 895; Report...Nov. 12, 1864, ibid.,
916; Weekly Report...Nov. 19, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 1,
p. 1231; Weekly Report...Nov. 26, 1864, ibid., 1250;
Weekly Report... D e c . 10, 1864, ibid., P t . 2, p. 678;
Weekly Report... D e c . 17, 1864, ibid., 708.
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For practically all of October and much of November
1864, the Confederate engineers accomplished little con
struction at Blakely.

Maury had ordered them to cease

work on the water battery there to make all supplies
available for use at Spanish Fort.

During October, the

small labor force at Blakely divided its time between
clearing land for the line of redoubts and trenches in
the rear of the water battery and loading barges with
earth and sod for use at Battery Huger and Battery Tracy.
In mid-November, fifty laborers had to be diverted to
make repairs on the Mobile and Great Northern Railroad.
The engineers began more intensive work on the fortifi
cations in December, although some of their men still had
to provide some sod and earth for Huger and Tracy.

By

mid-month Lieutenant E. A. Ford, engineer in charge of
the Eastern Division, could report that he had com
pleted two redoubts on the land line.

This progress did

not please Lockett, however, because he expected Ford to
have all of the redoubts in fighting order before any of
them reached completion.

Ford got two more redoubts

ready for platforms by Christmas and fifty yards of
infantry rifle pits dug.

The engineers would have to do
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considerable work in the new year to have Blakely ready
for troops and all its guns.

13

Lieutenant John T. Elmore, in charge of engineer
operations at Spanish Fort, had plenty of work to keep
his men busy.

The men mounted all of the guns Von She-

liha planned for the main water battery

(called No. 1 or

Spanish Fort) and completed the work's main magazine.
They also strengthened the face of the fort on the land
side and began erecting traverses around the guns.
Redoubt No. 2 (later called Fort McDermott)

received

almost as much attention as Spanish Fort since it was the
largest fort on the land line.

Elmore's laborers

strengthened the fort's walls, placed a thick cover over
its magazine and made the ditch deeper and wider.

By

mid-December, they had completed embrasures for six guns.
Work slackened in late December because of a shortage of
slave labor.

Along the entire land line, the engineers

be^an erecting a line of abatis

(felled trees with

sharpened branches facing the enemy) to protect the
works against an infantry assault.

Smith still saw a

13Weekly Report...Oct. 15, 1864, ibid., XXXIX, Pt.
3, p. 840; Weekly Report...Oct. 22 , 1864 , ibid., 851;
Monthly Report...Oct. 1864, ibid., 885; Weekly Report...
Nov. 5, 1864, ibid. , 895; Report...Nov. 12, 1864, ibid.,
916; Weekly Report... D e c . 10, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 2,
p. 678; Weekly Report... De c . 17, 1864 , ibid., 708; Weekly
Report... D e c . 24, 1864, ibid., 735; Lockett to Lieutenant
E. A. Ford, Dec. 17, 1864, Letters Sent, Engineer Office,
Mobile, Chap. Ill, Vol. 11, p. 139.
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need for a lot of work on the various fortifications as
the year ended.

He recommended light artillery positions

at various points to cover the approaches to the main
redoubts.

He also recognized the need for safe communi

cation routes between the redoubts and from the land line
to a source of fresh water.

As at the city works, Maury

authorized the engineers to use the soldiers stationed
at Spanish Fort to do needed construction.

14

Maury faced no serious enemy attacks in his district
in late 1864, although the Federals did conduct several
raids or feint attacks.

One of these raids occurred in

mid-December and had Pollard as its objective.

A force

of about 800 Negro troops moved from Barrancas, Florida,
with orders to break up the railroad at Pollard.

They

brushed aside the weak Confederate force under Brigadier
General James H. Clanton and reached the village on
December 16.

After destroying part of the tracks and

burning several government buildings, the Federals began
returning to Barrancas.

The Confederates gathered troops

from various locations to oppose the raid.

Liddell took

14Weekly Report...Oct. 15, 1864, O . R . , XXXIX, Pt. 3,
p. 840; Weekly Report...Oct. 22, 1864, ibid., 851;
Monthly Report...Oct. 1864, ibid., 885; Weekly Report...
Dec. 10, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 2, p. 678; Weekly Report...
Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 708; Weekly Report... D e c . 24, 1864 ,
ibid., 735; Smith to Lockett, Dec. 29, 1864, ibid., 74647; Maury to Lockett, Nov. 27, 1864, Letters Sent, Engi
neer Office, Mobile, Chap. Ill, Vol. 11, p. 70.
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a mixed force of infantry and cavalry from Baker's and
Colonel Charles G. Armistead's brigades, respectively,
from Blakely and caught the enemy about six miles below
Pollard, where a running fight began.

The pursuit con

tinued for about thirty miles, ending only because the
Confederates' horses became too exhausted to go farther.
While the Federals admitted losing 81 men killed and
wounded, one Confederate newspaper report placed the
enemy casualties at 200.

Liddell's men captured ten

enemy wagons and much of their supplies.

The Federals

had done little damage to the railroad, and by December
24 repair crews had it in operation again.

15

Two other Federal forays occurred on the western
side of Mobile Bay.

On November 27, 1864, Brigadier Gen

eral John W. Davidson rode out of Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
with a force of about 4,000 cavalrymen, headed for south
ern Mississippi.

Davidson hoped to strike the Mobile and

Ohio Railroad northwest of Mobile and tear up as much of
the track as possible.

A brigade of Louisiana cavalry

men pursued the Federal column but lacked strength enough

15

Brigadier General Thomas J. McKean to Christensen,
Dec. 19, 1864, O . R . , XLIV, 449; Beauregard to Cooper,
Dec. 22, 1864, Tb T d . ; Brent to Taylor, Dec. 14, 1864,
ibid., XLV, Pt. 2, p. 6 8 8 ; Brent to Cooper, Dec. 16,
1864, ibid., 695; Brent to Taylor, Dec. 16, 1864, ibid.,
697; Brent to Cooper, Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 699; Brent
to Beauregard, Dec. 19, 1864, ibid., "109; The Army Argus
and Crisis, Dec. 24, 1864.
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to risk an engagement.

Maury ordered McCulloch to deploy

his brigade and the 15th Confederate Cavalry to oppose
the enemy, and he scraped together a small infantry force
at Meridian to serve under General Thomas.

Rain turned

the roads into quagmires and all the streams and rivers
overflowed their banks.
Davidson's movements.

These circumstances impeded
Only a small detachment of the

Federal force actually threatened the rail line, but
McCulloch's men repulsed the detachment in a skirmish on
December 10.

Unable to cross the Pascagoula River and

fearing the Confederate forces gathering against him,
Davidson decided to take his men to West Pascagoula where
they could get transports to East Pascagoula and be available if further threats were made against the railroad.

16

General Gordon Granger, commanding Union forces
around Mobile Bay, proposed a demonstration against Mobile
from East Pascagoula to force the Confederates to keep
their troops in the city instead of sending them against
Davidson or the troops moving against Pollard.

After

landing at East Pascagoula on December 15, 1864, with
3,000 infantry, Granger began his march toward Mobile.

16

Brigadier General John W. Davidson to Christensen,
Nov. 26, 1864, O . R . , X L I , Pt. 4, pp. 686-87; Davidson to
Christensen, Dec. 13, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 1, pp. 78789; Maury to Cooper, Dec. 15, 1864, ibid., 789;
Flowerree to McCulloch, Dec. 7, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, pp.
661-62.
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He asked Canby to allow him to use Davidson's cavalry,
which had just arrived at West Pascagoula, so that he
could try to destroy part of the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad.

Canby ordered only two regiments to Granger

because he intended to use the rest of Davidson's men in
a raid from Memphis against Hood's communications in
Tennessee.

17

.
The Federal advance halted at Franklin

Creek, about 12 miles from East Pascagoula, without
encountering any opposition.

At Franklin Creek, the

Federals threw up some light entrenchments and began
stripping sawmills in the area of all their lumber.
Granger gave up any plans for a strong push against the
railroad and contented himself with keeping the ConfedTO

erates' attention on him.
To oppose the Federals at Franklin Creek, Maury
ordered a small infantry force and three cavalry regi
ments to the area.

Taylor wanted Gardner to concentrate

all available men from southern and central Mississippi

17

Granger to Christensen, Dec. 3, 1864, ibid., X L I ,
Pt. 4, p. 752; Granger to Christensen, Dec. lT~, 1864 ,
ibid., 853; Granger to Christensen, Dec. 15, 1864, ibid.,
862; Christensen to Granger, Dec. 15, 1864, ibid., 863;
Christensen to Davidson, Dec. 15, 1864, ibid.; Para VI,
Special Order No. 14, Headquarters Cavalry Forces, Mili
tary Division of West Mississippi, Dec. 17, 1864, ibid.,
875.
18

Granger to Christensen, Dec. 17, 1864, ibid., 876;
Granger to Christensen, Dec. 20, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 2,
pp. 291-92.
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and eastern Louisiana and to station them between Merid
ian and Mobile to cooperate with Maury.

One of Taylor's

dispatches expressed his evaluation of the city's status
at this stage of the war.

He regarded "the lines of com

munication with Mobile and the safety of that city as of
vital importance, not only to this department, but to the
maintenance of General Hood m

Tennessee...."

19

Several

skirmishes between the opposing forces at Franklin Creek
convinced Maury that Granger would not advance any far
ther and that he could not attack the Federals success
fully behind their trenches.

He then advised Taylor

that he did not need to send any more men from Gardner's
command toward Mobile.

By Christmas, Maury no longer

saw Granger's force as a real threat to the city.

The

retreat of the Federals on December 26 because of a lack
of supplies confirmed Maury's opinion.

Taylor requested

Governor Watts and Governor Charles Clark of Mississippi
to send available reserves to Maury in case another
threat o c c u r r e d . ^

19

Dabney H. Maury, Recollections of a Virginian (New
York:
Scribners, 1894), 200; Taylor to Brent, Dec. 22,
1864, O.R., X L V , Pt. 2, p. 723; Levy to Maury, Dec. 22,
1864, Ibid., 724-25.
20

Major James E. Montgomery to Christensen, Dec. 19,
1864, O. R . , X L I , Pt. 4, p. 884; Granger to Christensen,
Dec. 21, 1864, ibid., 925; Granger to Christensen, Dec.
27, 1864, ibid.,9 4 1 ; Colonel Henry Bertram to Mont
gomery, Dec. 22, 1864, ibid., XLV, Pt. 1, p. 843; Levy to
Maury, Dec. 27, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 743; Brent to
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The news reaching Taylor from Tennessee certainly
seemed to forebode a future threat to Mobile.

Informing

Maury that he had become "satisfied that Genl. Hood has
suffered a severe reverse," Taylor made the following
prediction:
...for the first time, that Mobile will be
seriously threatened— not immediately, but so
soon as the enemy, having pressed his pursuit
of our army as far south of the Tennessee as
the condition of the roads will permit, shall
be in a position to return the force— somg^
20,000 men— which he obtained from Canby.
Taylor urged Maury "to make steady and energetic preparations for the anticipated movement."

22

He stressed the

importance of completing Mobile's defenses and having
enough mills set up to supply the garrison with corn
meal.

Maury replied that Smith found the works defens

ible and close to completion.

He had six mills with a

total capacity of 2 , 2 0 0 bushels of meal per day, but most
of the corn in the city did not seem fit for issue.
Maury hoped Taylor would send proper supplies in time to
meet the demands of a siege.

Maury also stressed that

the troops then in the city could not make a successful

Taylor, Dec. 30, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 748; Maury to
Levy, Dec. 25, 1864, Brent Collection.
^ C a p t a i n Andrew J. Watt to Maury, Dec. 25, 1864,
O.R., XLV, Pt. 2, p. 734.
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defense against an attack.

Only men from field armies

would constitute "a good and proper garrison."

23

In view of the possible threat to Mobile, Taylor
began shifting troops from Hood's Army of Tennessee to
the District of the Gulf in January 1865.

Brigadier

General James T. Holtzclaw received orders to take his
Alabama brigade of Major General Henry D. Clayton's divi
sion to Mobile to relieve Baker's brigade, which would
replace Holtzclaw's in the division.

Maury preferred to

have a brigade of troops from another state because he
felt they would be less likely to desert and would not be
distracted by being so near their homes.

Still, he did

not adamantly oppose the assignment of Holtzclaw's men to
his district.

When the Alabamians reached the city, he

ordered them to the eastern shore to garrison Spanish
Fort and Blakely.

24

Another of Clayton's brigades—

2^

^Ibid.; Levy to Maury, Dec. 15, 1864, Letters Sent,
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana,
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 225; Endorsement of Major John J.
Walker, Dec. 17, 18 64, on Levy to Maury, Dec. 15, 1864,
Letters and Telegrams Received, Department of Alabama,
Mississippi, and East Louisiana; Maury to Watt, Dec. 28,
1864, Brent Collection.
24

Para I, Special Field Order No. — , Headquarters
Military Division of the West, Jan. 19, 1865, Special
Field Orders, Military Division of the West, RG 109,
National Archives; Bullock to Maury, Jan. 20, 1865, O.R. ,
XLV, Pt. 2, p. 801; Bullock to Maury, Jan. 27, 1865,
ibid., X L I X , Pt. 1, p. 938; Para V, Special Order No. 28,
Headquarters District of the Gulf, Jan. 28, 1865, ibid.,
940; Maury to Taylor, Jan. 25, 1865, Brent Collection;
Maury to Surget, Jan. 27, 1865, ibid.; Maury to Bullock,
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Brigadier General Randall L. Gibson's Louisianians— also
received orders for Mobile.

Gibson's men arrived in

early February and camped m

the city suburbs.

25

Initially Taylor had received permission to retain all of
Lieutenant General Alexander P. Stewart's corps of Hood's
army for use in his department, but he felt that the men
should go to the Carolinas to fight Sherman.

Taylor

retained Major General Samuel G. French's division (now
under Brigadier General Francis M. Cockrell)

for duty at

Mobile and ordered the rest of Stewart's corps eastward.
Cockrell's three brigades occupied a camp on the Shell
Road about five miles below the city.

In all, some

3,000 veteran troops had augmented Maury's force at
Mobile.

Feb. 16, 1865, ibid.; History of Company B, 40th Alabama
Regiment, Confederate States A r m y , 1862 to 1865 (Anniston,
Ala. (?): The Colonial Press, 1963), 8 6 .
25

Surget to Maury, Jan. 21, 1865, Letters Sent,
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana,
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 285; Para IV, Special Order No. 19,
Headquarters Army of Tennessee, Jan. 24, 1865, in Com
piled Service Record of Randall L. Gibson; Rolls for
Jan. and Feb. 1865, Record of Events Cards, 1st Louisi
ana (Strawbridge's) Infantry, Compiled Service Records;
Rolls for Jan. and Feb. 1865, Record of Events Cards,
4th Louisiana Infantry, ibid.
26

Robert S. Bevier, History of the First and Second
Missouri Confederate Brigades, 1861-1865 (St,. L ouis:
Bryan, Brand & Co., 1879), 261-62; chambers, "My Journal,"
360; Taylor to Beauregard, Jan. 30, 1865, O . R . , XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 943; Taylor to Maury, Feb. 1, 1865, ibid., 951;
Abstract from Return of the District of the Gulf, Mar.
10, 1865, ibid., 1045.
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In addition to these infantry units, Taylor ordered
approximately 1,500 artillerists to Mobile.

These men

had manned light batteries in Hood's army but had lost
their guns during the disastrous Tennessee campaign.
Taylor intended Maury to use these men as infantry until
he could find guns for them.

Maury, however, planned to

place the men in the works on the city line to man the
siege guns.

Most of the men did receive infantry

weapons, however.

All of the men had to undergo training

and drill in handling heavy artillery and mortars.

The

captain of one battery wrote to his wife that his men
drilled four times a day and worked around the fort the
rest of the day.

The men of Lumsden's Alabama Battery

practiced with their coehorn mortars by firing at targets
set out in the marsh in front of their redoubt.

These

new duties did not satisfy all of the men involved.

The

officers of the Fifth Company, Washington Artillery, for
example, wrote to Joe Johnston asking for a transfer to
his command.

Even the batteries fortunate enough to get

field guns still faced shortages of animals to pull their
guns.

Attempts to find necessary numbers of horses and

mules failed.

27

^ B u l l o c k to Maury, Jan. 31, 1865, O.R. , XLIX, P t .
1, p. 947; Taylor to Maury, Feb. 1, 1865, ibid., 951;
Maury to Taylor, Feb. 3, 1865, Brent Collection; George
Little and James R. Maxwell, A History of Lumsden1s
Battery, C.S.A. (Tuscaloosa: United Daughters of the
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The revival of war spirit which swept the South
following the Hampton Roads peace conference found
expression at Mobile in a mass meeting held at Temper
ance Hall on February 13, 1865.

Forty-six citizens

issued the call for a gathering to "bring to the aid of
our cause and country all the available means at our
disposal."

28

The editor of the Advertiser and Register

supported the call wholeheartedly:
...It is the proper and manly response to the
slavish ultimatum of Lincoln.
It is, we fondly
h o p e , the beginning of a revival in the war
spirit of the country, to end in a united and
undying resolution to resist that ultimatum to
the death and to consecrate anew all we have
of manhood ^ d means to the sacred cause of
Freedom....
Although no attendance figures are available, newspaper
accounts spoke of the meeting as the largest assemblage
ever held in Mobile.

Several persons made patriotic

speeches, and then all the participants approved a series
of resolutions in support of the civil and military author
ities of the Confederacy.

These resolutions included

Confederacy, 1905), 63; Captain Stouten H. Dent to Anna
Beall Young Dent, Feb. 10, 1865, in Dent Confederate
Collection, Auburn University Archives, Auburn University,
Auburn, Ala.; William Miller Owen, In Camp and Battle with
the Washington Artillery of New Orleans (Boston: Ticknor
and Co., 1885) , 420; Captain John B. Grayson to Major
John A. A. West, Feb. 26, 1865, in Compiled Service
Record of John B. Grayson.
28

Advertiser and Register, Feb. 11, 1865.

29
zyIbid.
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support for arming slaves for military service and for
the reinstatement of Joe Johnston to command of the Army
* Tennessee.
m
30
of
In anticipation of an enemy campaign against Mobile,
Taylor and Maury concentrated their efforts on preparing
the city and its defenses for a protracted siege.

Taylor

urged Maury to have a proper supply of foodstuffs on hand
to feed 10,000 men for four months.

In reply, Maury

stated that the quartermasters had failed to accumulate
a sufficient amount of corn and reminded him that he had
no control over supply agents or means of transporting
supplies.

Taylor pointed out that Pemberton at Vicksburg

had been deceived by his commissaries and quartermasters
on the quantity of supplies in that beleaguered city.

He

ordered Maury to have one of his staff officers inspect
his supplies daily and make a report to Taylor.

He pro

mised to aid Maury in removing any obstacle in the way
of accumulating fuel, forage, and other supplies.

Maury

employed the former blockade runner Virgin to bring food
stuffs down the Tombigbee River.

Once subsistence sup

plies reached Mobile, he had them stored in five

~^Ibid., Feb. 15, 1865; "Alabama," The American
Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events of the
Year 1865, Vol. V (New York:
D. Appleton & Co., 1866),
9-10.
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different warehouses located in areas of the city least
likely to be exposed to enemy fire.

31

Maury did not feel that he had an adequate supply of
ordnance stores or small arms ammunition, but a report by
Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Waddy indicated that Maury had
little cause for concern.
the city employing six men.

Waddy found a small armory in
These workmen could repair

between 75 and 100 small arms a week.

Maury's chief of

ordnance had accumulated enough caps, powder, paper, and
other material needed to make 1,000,000 cartridges.
lacked only a sufficient supply of lead.

He

To make up for

the shortage of lead, Maury had made arrangements with
the city government to take up the pipes of the c i t y 1s
water works.

Waddy stated that there was an average of

115 cartridges per man on hand in Mobile.

Some of the

troops, however, did not receive ammunition until early
March.

A soldier of the 46th Mississippi Infantry wrote

in his diary that although his brigade had gotten new
Austrian rifles on its arrival in Mobile, the men did

31

Surget to Maury, Jan. 11, 1865, Letters Sent,
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana,
Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 271; Taylor to Maury, Feb. 5, 1865,
ibid., 312-13; Maury to Surget, Jan. 27, 1865, Brent Col
lection; Maury to Taylor, Feb. 3, 1865, ibid.; Maury to
Taylor, Feb. 7, 1865, ibid.; Maury to Taylor, Mar. 14,
1865, ibid.
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picket duty with empty weapons.

Except for three types

of guns, Waddy reported that most of the 209 heavy artil
lery pieces in the District of the Gulf had an ample
supply of ammunition.

In fact, Waddy discovered that

"in many instances the number of rounds per gun is too
great, or rather, greater than our present limited
resources would authorize."

33

In early March 1865, as it became more evident that
the enemy intended to move against Mobile soon, Maury
issued orders and circulars outlining actions for sol
diers and civilians to take when the attack came.

He

instructed the artillery commanders along the city line
to destroy or remove any buildings, trees, or other
obstacles to the effective fire of their guns.

He

advised those people living outside the works within
range of these guns to move their belongings to a safe
place.

Because a siege would expose the city to heavy

enemy fire and cause a shortage of provisions, Maury
urged all non-combatants to leave if possible and asked
them to as least send their slaves to the interior.

32

Maury to Surget, Jan. 27, 1865, Brent Collection;
Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Waddy to Brent, Jan. 21, 1865,
in George W. Brent Papers, Duke University Archives;
Chambers, "My Journal," 364.
33

Waddy to Brent, Jan. 21, 1865, Brent Papers;
"Tabular Statement of the Artillery in the District of
the Gulf, Mobile, Ala., Jan. 10th, 1865," Palmer Civil
War Collection.
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In compliance with instructions from Taylor, Maury took
steps to send out all government Negroes not necessary
for siege operations.

Also in accord with orders from

Taylor, Maury made preparations to burn all state-owned
cotton within the city limits as soon as a siege began.

34

He expressed confidence in being able to defend the
city:
Our fortifications are strong— our stores
are abundant and good— our troops are veter
ans— and with the cordial support of the
people in all measures required for the public
safety, and, with the blessing-.of Almighty
God, are confident of victory.

34

Circular, Headquarters District of the Gulf, Mar.
3, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Register, Mar. 4, 1865;
General Order No. 8 , Headquarters District of the Gulf,
Mar. 12, 1865, quoted in ibid., Mar. 14, 1865; Surget to
Maury, Feb. 6 , 1865, Letters Sent, Department of Alabama,
Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 14, p.
314; Surget to Maury, Mar. 14, 1865, ibid., 385; Lockett
to Myers, Mar. 14, 1865, Letters Sent, Engineer Office,
Mobile, Chap. Ill, Vol. 11, p. 394; Von Sheliha to Gar
ner, Mar. 16, 1865, ibid., Vol. 13, p. 344; Maury to
Surget, Feb. 10, 1865, Brent Collection; Maury to Taylor,
Mar. 14, 1865, ibid.; Bullock to Maury, Mar. 12, 1865,
Telegrams Sent, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and
East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 196, p. 115.
"^Butler to his sister, Mar. 13, 1865, Butler Family
Papers; Para IV, General Order No. 8 , Headquarters Dis
trict of the Gulf, Mar. 12, 1865, quoted in Advertiser
and Register, Mar. 14, 1865.

CHAPTER XV
"WE HAD TO STAND AND TAKE IT"
The Union high command began making plans for a
serious attack on Mobile in early 1865.

Even then, how

ever, neither Grant nor Halleck saw the city as the chief
objective of a campaign by Canby's forces.

Grant

expected Canby to capture Mobile, if he could take it
without an extensive siege, and then move against Selma
or Montgomery in conjunction with a cavalry force riding
southward from Tennessee.

Mobile would serve only as a

base for these subsequent marches.

If Canby encountered

much delay at the city, he could bypass it and go on to
his real objective:

the industrial area around Selma.^

Grant agreed to send 18,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry
troops from Tennessee to reinforce Canby.

The latter

concentrated approximately 26,000 men of his command at
Barrancas, Florida, and on Dauphin Island.

Because the

fortifications around Mobile itself seemed so strong,
Canby decided to reduce the works on the eastern shore

^Grant to Halleck, Jan. 4, 1865, O.R. , XLV, Pt. 2,
p. 506; Halleck to Canby, Jan. 19, 1865, ibid., XLVIII,
Pt. 1, p. 580; Canby to Halleck, June 1, 1865, ibid.,
X L I X , Pt. 1, pp. 91-92; Halleck to Canby, Jan. 26, 1865,
ibid., 593; Christopher C. Andrews, History of the Cam
paign of Mobile (New York:
D. Van Nostrand,~T 8 67), 2l,
11-32.
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and either move against the city by the Tensas and Ala
bama rivers or cut it off from above.

He ordered the

force at Barrancas, under Major General Frederick Steele,
to march first against Pollard to cut the railroad there
and create the impression of a march toward Montgomery.
Steele began his movement on March 20.

The remainder of

Canby's army began congregating near Fish River and com
menced its march toward Spanish Fort and Blakely on
March 25.^
Maury had only about 9,000 men in the District of
the Gulf to defend Mobile in early March 1865.

3

Despite

the heavy disparity in numbers between his force and that
of the enemy, he and Taylor determined to hold Mobile.
General Robert E. Lee advised Taylor to evacuate the city
if such a strong enemy army moved against it that he
could not defeat the enemy in the field.
he told Taylor:

Nevertheless,

"...the defence of your Department must

^Grant to Halleck, Jan. 26, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt.
1, p. 584; Halleck to Major General George H. Thomas,
Jan. 26, 1865, ibid.; Canby to Halleck, June 1, 1865,
ibid., 91-93; Major General Frederick Steele to Christen
sen, Apr. 12, 1865, ibid., 279; Andrews, Campaign of
M o b i l e , 21-22, 25-26, 31.
2
Abstract from return of the District of the G u l f ,
Mar. 10, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 1045; Dabney H.
Maury, "The Defence of Mobile in 1865," Southern Histori
cal Society Papers, III (1877), 4; Maury to D avis, Dec.
25, 1871, quoted m ibid., 6 .

d

be left entirely to your own judgment."*

Davis agreed

with Taylor's ideas on the importance of holding Mobile
and wrote Lee that he thought the garrison there strong
enough to defend against any attack from the Gulf.

When

Canby's campaign began to develop, Taylor reported to
Lee:

"I am ready to receive any attack he may make at

Mobile."

5

Taylor planned to use Forrest's cavalry to

defeat enemy raids into northern Alabama and then send
Forrest's men south to aid in the defense of Mobile.
However, by the time the cavalrymen disengaged themselves
in central Alabama, Canby had already invested the east
ern shore defenses, so Taylor kept Forrest's forces near
Meridian.

Maury had to do the best he could against

adverse o d d s .6
As I indicated earlier, Taylor and Maury made vari
ous preparations to ready Mobile for a possible siege
throughout the early months of 1865.

Once they became

aware that C a n b y 's army had begun actual operations, the
Confederate authorities issued additional orders to assist

4
General Robert E. Lee to Taylor, Mar. 15, 1865,
Taylor Papers.
~*Davis to Lee, Mar. 22, 1865, O.R. , XLIX, Pt. 2,
p. 1139; Taylor to Lee, Mar. 27, 1865, ibid., 1161.
^Taylor to Lee, Mar. 27, 1865, ibid., 1161; Richard
Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Exper
iences of the Late W a r , ed. by Richard B. Harwell (New
York:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 267-69.
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in the defense of the city.

The post commander, Colonel

Thomas H. Taylor, issued circulars directing all ablebodied men to join local defense units or face expulsion
from Mobile.

Colonel Taylor also called for the organi

zation of free Negroes into local defense companies.
Maury assigned a person to organize the free blacks who
reported for duty and authorized these men to elect their
company officers, as long as the men chosen were white.
By April 8 , one company, known as the Native Guards, had
formed itself.

Although the city's assistant chief of

police served as company commander, the other company
officers were all "Creoles."

7

Maury forbade persons from

going to or from the enemy's lines without special
permission.

Mayor Slough ordered a registration of all

male slaves between 18 and 4 5 years old so they could be
g

located if required for work around the city.
Liddell, commanding on the eastern shore, informed
Maury on March 20 of the enemy landing at Fish River.

7

Circular, Headquarters Military Post, Mobile, Mar.
20, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Register, Mar. 21,
1865; Circular, Headquarters Military Post, Mar. 21,
1865, quoted in Army Argus and Crisis, Mar. 25, 1865;
Para II, Special Order No. 35, Headquarters District of
the Gulf, Mar. 26, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Regis
ter , Mar. 28, 1865; ibid., Apr. 8 , 1865.
g

General Order No. 11, Headquarters District of the
Gulf, Mar. 21, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Register,
Mar. 22, 1865; Order, Mayor's Office, Mar. 21, 1865,
quoted in ibid., Mar. 23, 1865.
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He requested reinforcements to hold the works at Blakely
and Spanish Fort.

To contest the enemy's advance, Maury

sent his entire infantry force across the bay to Liddell.
The latter stationed his men south and east of Spanish
Fort along D'Olive's Creek and planned to give battle on
March 26.

He thought that only a small portion of Can-

by's army was in front of him, and he hoped to attack, and
defeat this detachment before reinforcements could reach
it.

The Federals had a much stronger force than Liddell

anticipated, however.

In addition, instead of advancing

directly toward Spanish Fort, Canby's men began outflank
ing Liddell in the direction of Blakely.

Liddell with

drew most of his force toward Blakely and ordered General
Gibson to assume command of Spanish Fort.

To hold the

lines at the latter place, Gibson had 500 men of his own
Louisiana brigade, 950 men of Thomas' brigade of Alabama
Reserves, and 360 artillerymen:
imately 1,810 men.

a total force of approx

Gibson found six heavy guns, fourteen

field pieces, and twelve coehorn mortars located in the
9
various redoubts at Spanish Fort.

9
Brigadier General Randall L. Gibson to Flowerree,
Apr. 16, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 1, pp. 313-14; Liddell
to Garner, Mar. 20, 1865, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1129; Liddell
to Maury, Mar. 25, 1865, ibid., 1153; Liddell to Maury,
Mar. 26, 1865, ibid., 1157; Chambers, "My Journal," 366;
George Little and James R. Maxwell, A History of Lumsd e n 's Battery, C.S.A. (Tuscaloosa: United Daughters of
the Confederacy, 1905), 65-66; Maury to Surget, Apr. 15,
1865, Records of the Department of the Gulf, LHA
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Soon after the occupation of the works, Gibson con
ducted an inspection of the lines.

He reported later:

"It was apparent that an immense work with the spade,
pick, and ax was before u s , . . . " 10

Gibson ordered his

men to dig rifle pits and strengthen existing works.

The

men constructed bombproofs behind the works to use as
magazines, temporary hospitals, and living quarters:
...We cut down great trees, rolled the trunks
over the mouth, then put a layer of brush and
dirt; then came another layer of heavy logs
crosswise, then a layer of brush and dirt,
until the roof was six to eight feet thick.
To delay the enemy advance and give his men extra time to
dig in, Gibson ordered an attack on the enemy's pickets
on the morning of March 27.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert H.

Lindsay led 550 men in the attack, which broke through
the enemy skirmish line for a short time.

Lindsay's men

fell back after observing the main Federal force fall
into line of battle.

The losses on both sides were

Collection; Maury to Beauregard, June 1, 1865, Dabney H.
Maury Letter, Louisiana State University Department of
Archives and Manuscripts.
Coehorn mortars were small,
bronze mortars used in trench warfare.
10Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O . R . , XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 314.
11

Stephenson,

"Defence of Spanish Fort," 121.
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light, but Gibson's tactics succeeded in slowing the
enemy's a d v a n c e . ^
The Federals did begin easing their lines forward on
the afternoon of the twenty-seventh.

Where Gibson's skir

mishers had entrenching tools, they held their positions
by digging in, but where the men did not have tools, they
had to fall back within the main trench line.

Despite

the cautious advance, the Federals completed the invest
ment of Spanish Fort by nightfall.

Gibson reported his

losses for the day at 5 killed and 44 wounded.

13

Thomas'

Alabama Reserves, most of them young boys, performed well
in the fight.

One veteran, however, felt they did not

protect themselves as well as they might have:
thought it was

"They

'not soldierly,' and they stood up and

were shot down like sheep."

14

During the night, Gibson

12

Andrews, Campaign of Mobi l e , 49-50; Gibson to
Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 1, pp. 31415; Gibson to Liddell, Mar. 26 [27?], 1865, in Randall
Lee Gibson Papers, Louisiana State University Department
of Archives and Manuscripts; Randall L. Gibson to John
McGrath, Sept. 26, 1884, in Randall Lee Gibson Letters,
Special Collections, Tulane University Library; Army
Argus and Crisis, Apr. 1, 1865.
13

Gibson to Liddell, Mar. 27, 1865 (several items),
O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2, pp. 1162-64; Thad Holt (ed.), Miss
W a r i n g 's Journal: 1863 and 1865 (Chicago:
The Wyvern
Press, 1964), 9; Maury to Taylor, Mar. 27, 1865, Brent
Collection; Advertiser and Register, Mar. 26, 1865; Army
Argus and Crisis, Apr. 1, 1865.
^ G i b s o n to Maury, Mar. 27, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2,
p. 1161; Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 122.
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sent off all his horses and wagons.

He asked Maury and

the district ordnance officer for rifle and cannon
ammunition and for whiskey and tobacco for the men.

To

Liddell he sent a request for more entrenching tools.
Gibson expressed a desire to keep the men of Thomas 1
brigade, which Liddell wanted to move to Blakely, because
he did not know whether or not the enemy would assault
his lines the next morning.
retain the men temporarily.

Liddell allowed Gibson to
15

During March 28 and 29, the Federals contented them
selves with erecting batteries and advancing their skir
mish line.

A Confederate officer wrote in his diary that

the enemy siege lines were about 1 ,0 0 0 - 1 , 2 0 0 yards from
the trenches, while the enemy skirmishers had worked
their way to points from 250-300 yards of the Confederate
lines.

The Confederate artillery remained superior in

its fire to that of the Federals during these two days.
To protect the gunners from enemy sharpshooters, the
engineers constructed screens over each embrasure.

15Gibson to Liddell, Mar. 27, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt.
2, p. 1162; Gibson to Liddell, Mar. 27, lS"65, ibid., 1163;
Circular, Headquarters Forces at Spanish Fort, Mar. 27,
1865, in Record Books of Brigadier General Daniel W.
Adams' and Brigadier General Randall L. Gibson's Brigade,
Chap. II, Vol. 304, p. 301, RG 109, National Archives,
hereinafter cited as Adams-Gibson Record Books; Gibson
to Liddell, Mar. 27, 1865 (two items), ibid., Vol. 302,
p. 359; Gibson to Maury, Mar. 27, 1865 ,~"lbid. , 361;
Gibson to Myers, Mar. 27, 1865, ibid., 362.
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These screens consisted of steel plates two feet by three
feet square and about one-half-inch thick:

"...they were

so secured to the inner faces of the embrasures that they
were quickly lowered and raised as the gun ran into battery or recoiled."

16

Maury visited Spanish Fort on the

twenty-eighth and decided to begin strengthening the gar
rison with troops from Blakely.

Under orders from Maury,

Liddell directed one regiment from Holtzclaw's brigade to
move to Spanish Fort and relieve one of the Alabama
reserve regiments.

Liddell also ordered a detachment of

sharpshooters armed with Whitworth rifles to Gibson.

17

March 30 saw only dissultory firing by sharpshooters
and a few artillery pieces.

The Federals did succeed in

pushing some of their pickets to points within 50 yards
of the Confederate pickets.

Much of the artillery fire

on this day centered on Battery Huger and Battery Tracy.
These two forts had added their firepower to that of the
redoubts around Spanish Fort from the start of the siege.

^ Army Argus and Crisis, Apr. 1, 1865; Diary of a
Confederate officer, M a r . 2F, 29, 1865, quoted in
Andrews, Campaign of Mob i l e , 6 8 , n. 2, 77, n. 1; Maury
"Defence of Mobile," 12.
"^Maury to Taylor, Mar. 28, 1865, 4 P.M., Brent Col
lection; Lewis to Holtzclaw, Mar. 28, 1865, Letters Sent,
Eastern Division, District of the Gulf, Chap. II, Vol.
99, p. 43, RG 109, National Archives; Lewis to Cockrell,
Mar. 28, 1865, ibid.; Liddell to Gibson, Mar. 28, 1865,
ibid., 1 0 0 .
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The Federals began erecting a heavy battery on the north
shore of Bay Minette to bombard the two forts and suc
ceeded in virtually ending steamship communication
between Huger and Tracy and Mobile.

18

Maury paid another

visit to Spanish Fort on the thirtieth and again recog
nized the need to reinforce Gibson.

The garrison had

lost approximately 320 men through March 30.

Maury

ordered Holtzclaw's and Colonel Julius A. Andrews' bri
gades from Blakely to Spanish Fort to relieve the remain
ing Alabama Reserves.

Two steamers transferred the men

during the night of the thirtieth.

Gibson assigned

Holtzclaw to command of the two brigades, which then made
up his left wing.

19

The Federal sharpshooters became particularly obnox
ious on March 31.

Their fire struck down several men,

including Maury's chief of artillery. Colonel William E.

18

Confederate diary, Mar. 30, 1865, quoted in
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 80, n. 2; Army Argus and
Crisis, Apr. 1, 18(T5.
19

Confederate diary, Mar. 30, 1865, quoted m
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 80, n. 2; Liddell to Gibson,
Mar. 30, 1865, quoted m ibid., 80, n. 1; Report of cas
ualties to Mar. 28, 1865, dated Mar. 29, 1865, Gibson
Papers; Casualty report, Mar. 29-Apr. 8 , 1865, AdamsGibson Record Books, Chap. II, Vol. 302, p. 397; Special
Order No. 6 , Headquarters Forces at Spanish Fort, Mar.
31, 1865, ibid., Vol. 304, p. 305; Lewis to [Holtzclaw],
Mar. 30, 1865, Letters Sent, Eastern Division, Gulf,
Chap. II, Vol. 99, p. 46; Liddell to Maury, Mar. 31,
1865, Telegrams Sent, Eastern Division, District of the
Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 77, RG 109, National
Archives.
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Burnett, who was conducting a reconnaissance of the
enemy's lines with Gibson.

The latter requested 400

"Beauregard screens" to protect his own sharpshooters.
These "screens" were wooden embrasures covered by sand
bags and had been invented by Beauregard at Charleston.
Maury reported that the "screens" provided "great security
to the sharpshooters."

20

Gibson decided active measures

would also be needed to protect his men.

He ordered a

bombardment of the nearest enemy force, which lay about
150 yards outside the Confederate lines, and asked for
volunteers to conduct a sortie against this force that
night.

Captain Clement Watson, Lieutenant A. E. Newton,

and fifteen volunteers from Gibson's brigade rushed the
Federal rifle pits just after dark.

They succeeded in

capturing one captain and 21 men and drove back the rest
of the enemy force without any loss to their own party.
Maury formally congratulated the men for their "brilliant
and successful sortie."

21

20

Confederate diary, Mar. 31, 1865, quoted m
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 87, n. 1; Gibson to Garner,
Mar. 31, 1865 (two items), O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2, p. 1179;
Maury, "Defence of Mobile," 12; Maury, "Defence of
Spanish Fort," Southern Historical Society Papers, XXXIX
(1914), 135.

21

Captain R. B. Stearns to Lieutenant George W.
Shelton, Apr. 16, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, pp. 225-26;
Liddell to Garner, Mar. 31, 1865, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1178;
Army Argus and Crisis, Apr. 8 , 1865; Para IV, General
Order No. 17, Headquarters District of the Gulf, Apr. 1,
1865, Gibson Papers.
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Life for the men in the garrison at Spanish Fort
became more difficult as each day passed.
recalled:

One soldier

"Every day was full of incident, and it soon

got so that we had no rest day or night."

2?
' The men

experienced great danger as well as discomfort:
Artillery duels became of daily occur
rence, our 'head logs' were constantly knocked
down upon us, bruising and crippling us;
squads of sharpshooters devoted their especial
attention to our port holes or embrasures and
poured a steady stream of bulletS 2 through them
from early morn till dewy eve;...
Another veteran remembered that during daylight men could
only move about by crawling through areas where no communication trenches had been dug.

24

The people of Mobile

made liberal donations of many food items and did keep
the men well fed.

Naturally, however, the morale of the

men began to sag, and Gibson urged his officers to cheer
and encourage their men.

He also asked that they set

examples for the men to give them confidence:

"It is

morale that defeats a charge— -it increases as the great
Napoleon said— a resisting power tenfold."

22

Stephenson,

2 3 Ibid.,

24

25

Gibson made

"Defence of Spanish Fort," 122.

122-23.

Waterman, "Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 23.

2 ^"H.A.J." to Editors, Apr. 1, 1865, in Advertiser
and Register, Apr. 4, 1865; Circular, [Headquarters
Spanish F o rt], Apr. 6 , 1865, Gibson Papers; Circular,
Headquarters Forces at Spanish Fort, Apr. 5, 1865, AdamsGibson Record Books, Chap. II, Vol. 304, p. 310.
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frequent visits to the trenches and thereby exposed himself to enemy fire.

26

The strength of the garrison never did please Gibson,
and he frequently asked for reinforcements.

In one letter

to Maury, he stated that his men had wider gaps between
each soldier on the line than they had ever had under
Johnston and Hood in the Atlanta campaign.

Gibson issued

orders and circulars designed to place his men in the
safest positions possible while still maintaining vigi
lance and the ability to respond quickly in case of an
assault.

One order established a force of sharpshooters

for each artillery piece.

Their responsibility was to

keep up a steady fire on the enemy skirmishers to prevent
them from picking off the Confederate gunners.

27

Gibson

tried to get his men to conserve their ammunition as
much as possible.

On April 5, he pointed out that the

men had expended nearly 54,000 rounds in two days and
that at that rate the limited supply of ammunition would

^Waterman, "Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 23; Maury,
"Defence of Spanish Fort," 135.
^ G i b s o n to Maury, Apr. 1, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2,
pp. 1184-85; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 5, 1865, quoted in
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 142, n. 2; Gibson to Maury,
Apr. 6, 1865, Adams-Gibson Record Books, Chap. II, Vol.
302, p. 378; Special Order No. 7, Headquarters Forces at
Spanish Fort, Apr. 3, 1865, ibid., Vol. 304, p. 307;
Circular, Headquarters Forces at Spanish Fort, Apr. 4,
1865, ibid., 308; Circular, Headquarters Forces at
Spanish Fort, Apr. 5, 1865, ibid., 311.
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soon run out.

28

Gibson and Maury both encouraged the men

to collect "solid shot, shell, bullets, and missies of
every description" to send to the ordnance department in
Mobile for recycling.

29

Throughout much of the siege, the Confederate troops
had to bear artillery bombardments by the enemy.

One of

the most severe bombardments occurred on April 4.

Even

in Mobile the people could feel the vibrations of the
shells striking the earth and could hear the reports of
the heavy guns:

"This evening the firing is terrific,

not a moment elapsing between the booming of 'heavy
artillery.'"

30

The cannonading lasted for about two

hours, and Gibson and his artillery officers estimated
the enemy used thirty to forty heavy guns and at least a
dozen mortars.

Redoubt No. 3, manned by veterans of the

Fifth Company, Washington Artillery, of New Orleans,
received the brunt of much of the Federal fire.

Two

shells disabled the redoubt's heaviest gun, an 8-inch

28

Gibson to Maury, Apr. 2, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2,
p. 1192; Circular, [Headquarters Spanish Fort], Apr. 5,
1865, Gibson Papers.
29

Circular, Headquarters Forces at Spanish Fort,
Apr. 2, 1865, Adams-Gibson Record Books, Chap. II, Vol.
304, p. 306; Special Order No. 9, Headquarters [Spanish
Fort], Apr. 4, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 2, pp. 1200-1201.
30

Confederate diary, Apr. 4, 1865, quoted m
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 137, n. 1; Holt (ed.), Miss
Waring 's Journal, 12".
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columbiad named "Lady Slocumb," and the bombardment prac
tically levelled the parapets.

When Maury offered to

relieve the Louisianians with a fresh unit from the city,
Captain Cuthbert H. Slocumb submitted the proposal to his
men and reported b a c k :
...'General, the company, grateful for your
kind intention, desire to hold this position
to the end. ^ respectfully decline to be
relieved.'...
Gibson's left flank became the scene of increasing
enemy activity during the last days of the siege.

The

marshy, densely wooded ground there made it almost impos
sible for the men to erect any kind of earthworks for
protection.

Federal batteries established on high ground

north of this flat dominated the area.

The enemy also

began moving launches to the area so that they could
operate on Bay Minette and the Apalachee River.

A battery

from Liddell's command at Blakely and the gunboats Nash
ville and Morgan provided some relief to Gibson's hardpressed left but increasing numbers of enemy heavy guns
in the area drove these supports back.

Federal Parrott

guns partially disabled the Nashville and kept the

"^Gibson to Maury, Apr./4, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2,
p. 1199; Confederate diary, /Apr. 4, 1865, quoted in
Andrews, Campaign of M obile', 137, n. 1; Waterman,
"Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 23; J. A. Chalaron, "Battle
Echoes of Shiloh," Southern Historical Society Papers,
XXI (1893), 220-21; Maury, "defence of Spanish Fort,"
132.
/
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gunboats from the area during daylight hours.

32

Gibson

developed a plan to attack the enemy troops opposite his
left but cancelled the plan when he could not get an
ironclad to enfilade the Federal flank.

He did station

additional men and two field pieces on his extreme left
to guard against a surprise attack.

Gibson finally got

the assistance of several navy picket boats to help watch
his flank.
By April 7, the enemy had dug almost up to the main
Confederate works around Spanish Fort.

The Federals had

concentrated so much heavy artillery and so many mortars
around the position that the Confederate gunners could
reply but briefly to the bombardment.

To give themselves

added protection, the men of the garrison threw up more
traverses and bombproofs.

Gibson found that the Negroes

at the fort's cooking yard did not have enough work to
keep them busy all day, so he ordered them to the front

32 .
Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O . R . , XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 316; Bennett to Farrand, Apr. 25, 1865, ibid.,
319-20; Lewis to Colonel Isaac W. Patton, Apr. 1, 1865,
ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1184; Gibson to Liddell, Apr. 1, 1865,
ibid.; Confederate diary, Apr. 1, 1865, quoted in
Andrews, Campaign of Mob i l e , 91n.
^ G i b s o n to Maury, Apr. 2, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2,
p. 1192; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 4, 1865, Ibid., 1200;
Liddell to Bennett, Apr. 6, 1865, ibid., 1209; Liddell to
Captain Joseph Fry, Apr. 6, 1865, ibid., 1210; Gibson to
Maury, Apr. 2, 1865, Gibson Papers; Lewis to Fry, Apr. 4,
1865, Letters Sent, Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II,
Vol. 99, p. 53; Liddell to Gibson, Apr. 4, 1865, ibid.,
Vol. 100, p. 98.
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lines to assist in erecting the new defenses and provide
relief for his exhausted soldiers.

Gibson also renewed

his requests to Maury for hand grenades, engineer troops,
subterranean shells, and more Negro laborers.

He warned:

"I must have the things I have asked for within the last
three days, else disaster may happen."

34

A shortage of

ammunition forced Gibson to order the cessation of rifle
fire from the main line except by sharpshooters.

Only

the skirmishers located in advanced rifle pits could con
tinue to fire regularly.

Gibson directed his officers to

make sure these advanced pits had the "Beauregard
screens" and to see that the positions were safe from a
sudden enemy rush.

35

Maury sent Gibson several howitzers, some hand gre
nades , and an undetermined number of laborers on the
night of April 7-8.

Unusually heavy activity by the

Federals early on the eighth prompted Gibson to order
his skirmishers to keep up a steady small arms fire on
the enemy work parties.

He also urged his commanders to

34

Confederate diary, Apr. 7, 1865, quoted in
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 147n; Circular, Headquarters
Spanish Fort, Apr. 7, 1865, Adams-Gibson Record Books,
Chap. II, Vol. 304, p. 314; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 7,
1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2, p. 1214; Gibson to Maury, Apr.
7, 186^,“ ibid., 1215.
35

Confederate diary, Apr. 7, 1865, quoted in
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 147n; Circular, Headquarters
Forces at Spanish Fort, Apr. 7, 1865, Adams-Gibson Record
Books, Chap. II, Vol. 304, p. 314.
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exercise vigilance and monitor all movements on their
fronts:

"Every precaution must be taken to prevent a
r>£
surprise.. . . During the afternoon, Gibson ordered the
men in Fort McDermott to open fire with their artillery
on the Federal working party on their front.

In reply,

the enemy poured such a concentrated fire into the fort
that the Confederates soon had to cease fire.

The Fed

eral shelling disabled one gun and destroyed an ammuni
tion chest.

Gibson decided to test the enemy's strength

and determine his intentions.

Accordingly, he ordered

all of his batteries to be ready to open up at sunset.
His officers would watch the Federal lines closely for
their reaction and prepare the defenses for anything
which might occur.

Gibson feared that "the moment had at

length arrived when I could no longer hold the position
without imminent risk of losing the garrison."

37

Unknown to Gibson, Canby planned a bombardment of
his own for sundown on the eighth.

The Federals had

fifty-three siege guns in position and Canby ordered his

■^Gibson to Maury, Apr. 8 , 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2,
p. 1217; Circular, Headquarters Spanish Fort, Apr. 8 ,
1865, ibid., 1219; Special Order No. 11, Headquarters
Forces at Spanish Fort, Apr. 8 , 1865, ibid.; William Rix,
Incidents of Life in a Southern City During the War
(Mobile: Iberville H T s t o n c a l Society Papers, 1865) ,
(19] .
37

Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O . R . , XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 316; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 8, 1865, ibid., Pt.
2, p. 1218.
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infantry commanders to be ready to exploit any favorable
situation.

38

Gibson's gunners opened first, about 5:30,

but got off only a few rounds before the Federal bombard
ment silenced them.

The enemy fire became so heavy that

the men of the garrison found no safety in their bombproofs and had to find shelter wherever they could behind
their works.

Shells from the Federal fifteen-inch mor

tars caused particular destruction, being able to
penetrate six feet of solid earth, or the strongest
bombproof, before exploding.

One member of the garrison

remembered that the men could see these big shells dropping into the works, but "we had to stand and take it."

39

Few men could recall such a severe hail of shot and
shell.

The enemy musket fire and the dense smoke gener

ated by firing cannons and exploding shells added to the
confusion:
... it was though the mouth of the pit had
yawned and the uproar of the damned was about
us.
And it was not taking away from this
infernal picture to see men, as I did, hop
ping about, 'raving, distracted mad,' the
blood bursting from eyes and ears and mouth,
driven stark^grazy by concussion or some
other cause.

O O

Canby to Halleck, June 1, 1865, ibid., Pt. 1,
p. 96.
39

Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, ibid., 316;
Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 123-25.
^ S t e p h e n s o n , "Defence of Spanish Fort," 124.
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During the bombardment and as darkness fell, the 8 th
Iowa Infantry advanced against the works on Gibson's left.
There they struck Andrews' Texans and drove them from
their positions.

A small force under Captain James A.

Howze of the 14th Texas Dismounted Cavalry charged the
Iowans to try to stop their advance.

When the color

bearer fell, however, the Texans retired with the rest of
the brigade:

"...they were retreating in great confu-

sion, every man pretty much his own commander."

41

The

Federals captured several hundred men and overran 300
yards of trenches.

Lieutenant Alfred G. Clark led the

garrison's 1 0 0 -man provost guard to the scene of action
and delivered a counterattack.

Although Clark fell

mortally wounded, his assault stopped the enemy advance.
The Federals threw up light trenches and awaited further
developments.

Holtzclaw repprted to Gibson that his

force was not strong enough to push the enemy back, and
Gibson decided, in accordance with standing orders from
Maury, to abandon his works rather than risk the capture
of his men.

41

He ordered his brigade withdrawn from the

Colonel James L. Geddes to Captain Fluford Wilson,
Apr. 9, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 1, pp. 275-76, Lieutenant
Colonel William B. Bell to Captain Wilbur F. Henry,
Apr. 9, 1865, ibid., 277-78; Gibson to Flowerree, Apr.
16, 1865, ibid., 316; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 8 , 1865,
ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1218; W. Bailey, "The Star Company of
Ector's Texas Brigade," Confederate Veteran, XXII (1914),
405.
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right, posted part of the men to watch the left, and
stationed the remainder of the brigade in position to
cover the retreat . ^ 2
The men in the various redoubts spiked their guns,
and the entire garrison, including the sick and wounded
and Negro laborers, assembled on the beach.

Maury and

his engineers had made preparations for an evacuation by
erecting a wooden treadway from the rear of Spanish Fort
across the marsh to a point on the Apalachee River oppo
site Battery Huger.

Gibson ordered the men to remove

their shoes and boots and to carry their weapons on their
side away from the enemy.

Filing silently down the

treadway under the cover of darkness, the troops reached
the end of the planks without alerting the enemy to their
movement.

Steamers conveyed the garrison from Battery

Huger to Blakely.

A few men had to travel across the

marsh directly to Liddell's lines.

After a short rest

there, the soldiers travelled on the steamers to Mobile.
There the people first became aware of what had happened.
Many of the citizens expressed disbelief at first:

"Still

I had to believe the evidence of my own eyes, for our

42

Geddes to Wilson, Apr. 9, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1,
p. 275; Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 186F, ibid., 316-17;
Gibson to McGrath, Sept. 26, 1884, Gibson Letters;
Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 125-26; Andrews,
Campaign of Mobile, 155-58.
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soldiers were passing by in squads, from an early hour,
dirty, wet and completely worn out,..."

43

Gibson reported his casualties during the siege of
Spanish Fort as 73 killed, 350 wounded, and 6 missing.
In the final bombardment and assault, he lost 20 killed,
45 wounded, and 250 missing.

The number of men captured

on April 8 may have numbered as many as 325.

44

The Fed

eral losses at Spanish Fort were 52 killed, 575 wounded,
and 30 missing.

45

In his memoirs, Taylor praised the

stand made at Spanish Fort:

"Gibson's stubborn defense

and skillful retreat make this one of the best achievements of the war."

46

Maury echoed this assessment:

...It is not too much to say that no position
was ever held by Confederate troops with
greater hardihood and tenacity, nor evacuated

43 .
Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O . R . , XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 317; Liddell to Gibson, Apr. 8 , lS’65’, ibid. ,
Pt. 2, p. 1219; Gibson to Maury, Apr. 8 , 1865, ibid.;
Stephenson, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 126-28; Maury,
"Defence of Spanish Fort," 131; Maury to Taylor, Apr.
8 , 1865, Taylor Papers; Maury to Taylor, Apr. 9, 1865,
Brent Collection; Holt (ed.), Miss Waring's Journal,
13.
44

Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O . R . , XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 318; Casualty list, Adams-Gibson Record Books,
Chap. II, Vol. 302, p. 397.
45

Comparative statement of killed, wounded, captured,
and missing during the campaign from March 17 to April 12,
1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 102.
46

Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 270.

398
more s k i l f u l l y after hope of further defense
was gone.
Gibson praised all of his officers and men for their
"steady valor and cheerful endurance" and disavowed any
personal recognition:

"...if any credit shall attach to

the defense of Spanish Fort, it belongs to the heroes
whose sleep shall no more be disturbed by the cannon's
roar."

48

The defense of this position for two weeks by

less than 3,000 men against eight times as many Federals
certainly should stand as one of the most heroic episodes
of the war.

47

Maury, "Defence of Spanish Fort," 130.

AO

Gibson to Flowerree, Apr. 16, 1865, O . R . , XLIX,
Pt. 1, pp. 317, 318.

CHAPTER XVI
"...MOBILE WAS LEFT WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE..."
When Canby's army laid siege to Spanish Fort, Liddell
occupied his forces in preparing the lines at Blakely for
an attack.

He also kept scouts out on the approaches

from Plllard to watch for Steele's forces, which he
expected might move against Blakely.

Initially, Liddell

had under his command a small artillery force, Holtzclaw's brigade, and three brigades of Cockrell's division.
The latter units had arrived from Mobile late on March
24, 1865.

As the siege of Spanish Fort progressed, Lid

dell detached Holtzclaw's brigade and Ector's brigade
(under Colonel Andrews) of Cockrell's division and sent
them to Gibson.

He received in exchange Thomas' brigade

of Alabama Reserves.

On April 1, the 1st Mississippi

Light Artillery Regiment, its men armed with rifles,
reported to Liddell.

He thus had approximately 2,700

effectives to defend his works.^

The position at Blakely

^Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted in Maury,
"Defence of Mobile," 8 ; Maury to Beauregard, June 1, 1865,
Maury Letter; James Bradley, The Confederate Mail Carrier
(Mexico, Mo., 1894), 224; Chambers, "My Journal," 367;
Edward W. Tarrant, "Siege and Capture of Fort Blakely,"
Confederate Veteran, XXIII (1915), 457; Liddell to Gar
ner, Apr. 1, 1865, Telegrams Sent, Eastern Division, Gulf,
Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 84.
399
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consisted of nine lunettes connected by rifle pits, the
whole line covering some 3,000 yards.

Advanced rifle

pits, abatis, and land mines helped protect the ground in
front of the works.

Liddell assigned Sears' Mississippi

brigade (Colonel Thomas N. Adaire)
rell's brigade

to the left, Cock

(Colonel James McCown) to the center, and

Thomas' Alabamians to the right.

He did not have enough

men to adequately fill the works, so at some points on
2
the line ten paces separated each soldier.
Steele's Federals did not reach the vicinity of
Blakely until April 1.

Early on that morning, Steele's

cavalry encountered one of Liddell's outposts near Wil
kins' plantation on the Stockton Road, about four miles
north of Blakely.

This outpost consisted of 100 men of

the 46th Mississippi Infantry under Captain J. B. Hart.
The Mississippians watched one regiment dismount and
advance on foot, while another regiment followed closely
behind with drawn sabers and on horseback.

Taking advan

tage of fences and other obstructions, Hart's men fell
back slowly for about one mile.

At that point, the

mounted enemy troops charged and routed the Confederates.
Three officers, 71 men, and the regimental colors all

2
Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted in Maury,
"Defence of Mobile," 8 ; Chambers, "My Journal," 367;
Tarrant, "Siege and Capture of Fort Blakely," 457.
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fell captive to the Federals.

3

The Federal pursuit con

tinued almost up to the Confederate trenches at Blakely.
Colonel McCown's Missourians had also been on outpost,
and he stationed one of his regiments in a ravine across
the road to stop the enemy advance.

The fire of this

unit, supported by artillery in the works, broke the
Federal pursuit and forced them to fall back.
officer wrote:

A Missouri

"'...it must have been a downfall to

their pride to know that they had been whipped and routed
by less than an hundred ragged Missouri infantry.'"

4

Liddell anticipated that Steele would attempt to
storm his lines during the day.

He telegraphed Maury and

asked for 150 rifles for distribution to the artillerymen
who had none.

He ordered Cockrell to put men from his

Missouri brigade in all of the advanced skirmish pits on
his front:

3
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew B. Spurling to Captain
John F. Lacy, Apr. 2, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 311;
Chambers, "My Journal," 367; Confederate diary, Apr. 1,
1865, quoted in Christopher C. Andrews, History of the
Campaign of Mobile (New York:
D. Van Nostrand, 1867),
Flru
^Spurling to Lacy, Apr. 2, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 1,
p. 311; Bradley, The Confederate Mail Carrier, 224-25;
Account of Lieutenant G. W. Warren, quoted m Robert S.
Bevier, History of the First and Second Missouri Confed
erate Brigades, 1861-1865 Tst. Louis: Bryan, Brand &
C o . , 1879), 262.
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...they are the only ones here that can be
relied upon thoroughly,...and therefore it is^
necessary to have the best men in those p i t s .
Thomas received similar instructions, including direc
tions to station six men in each pit.

Liddell informed

Thomas that most of Steele's men were Negro troops who
would not "spare any of our men should they gain posses
sion of our works" and urged him:
...impress upon their [Thomas' men] minds the
importance of holding their position to the
last, and with the determination never to
surrender....
Steele's men did not attack on April 1, but Liddell
attempted to have Ector's brigade returned from Spanish
Fort that night.

Maury, however, decided the Texans

should remain with Gibson.

7

The Confederate skirmishers on the Stockton Road
tried to drive in the Federal cavalry pickets on the
morning of April 2.

Brigadier General John P. Hawkins,

commander of the First Division, U. S. Colored Troops,
quickly threw his men into line of battle.

With a heavy

5

Liddell to Maury, Apr. 1, 1865, Telegrams Sent,
Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 87; Lewis
to Cockrell, Apr. 1, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2, p. 1188.
^Lewis to Thomas, Apr. 1, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2,
p. 1188.
^Liddell to Gibson, Apr. 1, 1865, ibid., 1185; Gib
son to Maury, Apr. 1, 1865, ibid.; Gibson to Maury, Apr.
1, 1865, ibid., 1187; Lewis t o Cockrell, Apr. 1, 1865,
ibid., 1188.
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force of skirmishers in front, the Negro troops advanced
toward the sound of battle.

Confronted by such overwhelm

ing numbers, the Confederates began falling back slowly
toward their main line.

The Federals followed until the

Confederates reached their advanced rifle pits and the
protection of their artillery.

At that point, about a

half mile from the Confederate works, the enemy halted
and began diggins rifle pits of their own.

Several hours

later, Steele's division of white troops took position on
the left of Hawkins' men and began entrenching.

8

Liddell

again feared an attack on Blakely and asked Maury to send
him any light artillery which he could spare and some
coehorn mortars to use on his flanks.

Liddell also

requested the services of the gunboat Morgan to bombard
the Federals' right flank.

The ironclad Huntsville was

in the vicinity, but her guns could not be elevated
enough to fire over the bluff.
q
did not occur.

The attack Liddell feared

O
Major General Frederick Steele to Christensen, Apr.
12, 1865, ibid., Pt. 1, p. 282; Brigadier General John P.
Hawkins to Lacy, Apr. 16, 1865, ibid., 287; Liddell to
Maury, Apr. 2, 1865, ibid. , Pt. 2, p. 1190; Bradley, The
Confederate Mail Carrier, 225.
q .
Liddell to Maury, Apr. 2, 1865, Telegrams Sent,
Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 90; Lid
dell to Maury, Apr. 2, 1865 (three items), O . R . , XLIX,
Pt. 2, p. 1190; Liddell to Farrand, Apr. 2, 1IF65, ibid.
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Two divisions from the force in front of Spanish
Fort joined Steele on the third, and the Federals com
pleted the investment of Blakely.

From the third to the

eighth, they occupied themselves advancing their siege
approaches and erecting batteries.

Liddell's men kept up

a steady fire from their skirmish pits and batteries to
try to slow the Federal work parties.

The ironclads

Nashville and Huntsville and the gunboat Morgan all added
their firepower in defense of the land lines.

Steele

reported that the bombardment of these vessels "was very
harassing and destructive, especially to Hawkins' divi
sion" on the Federal r i g h t . ^

Liddell's artillery suf

fered little inconvenience from the Federals because it
had protection by wooden screens and because the enemy at
first had only a few light guns.

To illuminate the area

in front of their works at night, the Confederate gunners
employed fireballs sent up by coehorn mortars.

These

fireballs enabled the men to keep up an accurate rifle
and artillery fire even after sundown.

Toward the end

of the siege, Liddell received three heavy guns from

"^Steele to Christensen, Apr. 17, 1865, O . R . , XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 283; Bennett to Farrand, Apr. 25, 1863", ibid. ,
320-21; Bradley, The Confederate Mail Carrier, 225.
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Mobile but barely got them mounted in time for use
against the enemy.

11

Activities in the siege of Blakely did not have the
intensity of those at Spanish Fort.

Both sides conducted

occasional operations against each other's advanced rifle
pits.

Usually these skirmishes resulted in few casual

ties and no lasting tactical success.

On the morning of

April 7, for example, Federal troops attacked the pits
held by the Alabama Reserves, but the boy soldiers suc
ceeded in driving the enemy back.

Liddell decided to

retaliate and ordered a sortie for the next morning
before daylight.

About midnight, the Confederate artil

lery opened fire on the Federal lines.

After a bombard

ment of nearly an hour, Lieutenant Colonel Junius A.
Law's 2nd Alabama Reserves charged the enemy pickets.
They got to within 40 yards of the Federal pits before
they received any enemy fire.

At that point, however,

the enemy poured heavy musketry at them and threw them
back with a loss of 15 killed and 22 wounded.

12

When not

"^Liddell to Maury, Apr. 3, 1865, Telegrams Sent,
Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 91; Lid
dell to Garner, Apr. 3, 1865, ibid., 93; Liddell to
Myers, Apr. 5, 1865, ibid., 100; Liddell to Maury, Apr.
3, 1865, quoted in Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 171, n.
1; Liddell to Maury, Apr. 7, 1865, quoted in Ibid., 183,
n. 1 .
12

Maury to Taylor, Apr. 7, 1865, Taylor Papers;
Colonel Charles L. Harris to Major James B. Sample, Apr.
10, 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 261; Lieutenant Colonel
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on the skirmish line, Liddell's men had to use spades and
picks to strengthen their works.

Naturally, all of these

activities sapped the men's energies, and Liddell
requested that Maury send him 100 Negro laborers to
relieve his soldiers from the engineer work.

13

Conditions for the Confederate soldiers at Blakely
were similar to those at Spanish Fort, but some differ
ences did exist.

The men apparently had no extensive

system of bombproofs to use as quarters at Blakely.

In

fact, one officer wrote his mother that the soldiers
lived in caves and holes and were generally exposed both
to enemy fire and the elements.

This same officer asked

his mother to have a servant gather up rags to send to
Blakely:

"We fire constantly & the men have literally

nothing to wipe out their rifles with...."

14

As if the

regular rifle and artillery fire by the Federals were not
dangerous enough, Blakely's garrison suffered from the
fire of sharpshooters as well.

Zalmon S. Main to
1865, ibid., 264;
Andrews to Lacey,
Brigadier General
ibid., 284.

Liddell reported that

Captain Riel E. Jackson, Apr. 10,
Brigadier General Christopher C.
Apr. 8 , 1865, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 282;
Kenner Garrard to Lacey, Apr. 8 , 1865,

13

Liddell to Maury, Apr. 7, 1865, quoted in Andrews,
Campaign of Mobile, 183, n. 1.
■^Captain J. L. Bradford to mother, Apr. 8 , 1865,
typed copy in Confederate Pension Application file of
Mrs. Sallie Slatten, Louisiana State Archives and Records
Service.
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these sharpshooters could hit men at the wharf from
behind the Federal lines.

Captain J. L. Bradford of the

1st Mississippi Light Artillery related that a sharp
shooter's bullet struck one of his men in the head and
killed him instantly.

Bradford himself had barely

escaped death when a bullet hit him near the heart but
was stopped by two letters folded in his pocket.

In

spite of all the dangers and privations, the men main
tained high mor a l e :
...If we only had plenty of ammunition we
could hold the dogs at bay forever, but we are
stinted, & they will gain on us little by lit
tle I fear.
The Federal artillery began a heavy fire on Blakely
on the morning of April 8 in conjunction with the bom
bardment of Spanish Fort.

Liddell had planned an artil

lery barrage of his own to start at 8 P.M.

The enemy

replied briskly to his fire, and he found that his guns
could not silence those of the enemy.

A masked battery

of heavy Parrott guns opened on the Confederate naval
squadron during the afternoon.

The Morgan received sev

eral hits, one near the waterline, and had to withdraw
when her ammunition ran out.

15

The Nashville also ran out

Liddell to Gibson, Apr. 5, 1865, Telegrams Sent,
Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 100; Brad
ford to mother, Apr. 8 , 1865, Slatten Pension Application.
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of shells and fell back even though she had not been
struck.

X6

Liddell ordered his gunners and skirmishers

to fire, with the aid of fireballs, on the enemy on the
night of the eighth to help cover the evacuation of
Spanish Fort and to discover the intentions of the enemy
on his front.

On the morning of April 9, the Federals

renewed their bombardment in preparation for an assault.
This bombardment did little damage except to dismount
two guns.

Liddell issued orders for his men to prepare

for an attack.

17

Following the evacuation and fall of Spanish Fort,
Canby began shifting his forces there toward Blakely and
ordered Steele to be prepared to assault Liddell's lines.
The attack opened at 5:30 P.M., and the four Federal divi
sions which had been in the trenches since April 3 all
advanced simultaneously.

With a shout the Federals

rushed forward and drove Liddell's skirmishers back to
their main line.

A short time only had expired before

■^Bennett to Farrand, Apr. 25, 1865, O . R . , XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 321; Liddell to Maury, Apr. 8 , lSeB", ibid., Pt.
2, p. 1217; Lewis to Cockrell and Thomas, Apr. T~, 1865,
Letters Sent, Eastern Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 99,
p. 60; Jeanie M. Walker, Life of C a p t . Joseph F r y , the
Cuban Martyr (Hartford, Conn.:
The J. B. Burr Publish
ing C o ~ 1875), 180-84.
■^Liddell to
p. 1222; Lewis to
Lewis to Cockrell
Andrews, Campaign

Maury, Apr. 9, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 2,
Cockrell, Apr. 9, 1865, ibid., 1222-23;
and Thomas, Apr. 8 , 1865, quoted in
of Mobile, 188, n. 2.
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the enemy force carried the entire line of works.

Many

Confederates surrendered at that point, while others fell
back to the wharf before being captured.

Some 3,700 men

fell into enemy hands, but between 150 and 200 managed to
escape to the naval squadron by swimming or floating on
pieces of wood.

All three Confederate brigadiers— Lid-

dell, Cockrell, and Thomas— surrendered.

18

The Federals

lost fairly heavily in the assault— 105 killed and 466
wounded.

Total Federal casualties during the siege of

Blakely numbered 116 killed, 655 wounded, and 4 missing.

19

Maury had planned to evacuate the Blakely garrison on the
night of the ninth, but he did not pull the men out on
the night of the eighth with the Spanish Fort garrison
because he felt Liddell could hold out throughout the
^
20
next day.

1R

Canby to Halleck, June 1, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 1,
pp. 97-98; Bennett to Farrand, Apr. 25, 1865, ibid.,
321-22; Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted in M a u r y ,
"Defence of Mobile," 8 ; Bradley, The Confederate Mail
Carrier, 225; Tarrant, "Siege and Capture of Fort
Blakely," 457-58; Ephraim M c D . Anderson, Memoirs: His
torical and Personal; Including the Campaigns of the First
Missouri Brigade (St. Louis:
Times Printing Co., 1868) ,
399-400; Bevier, History of the First and Second Missouri
Confederate Brigades, 21T5-67.
19

Consolidated report of casualties from March 25 to
April 10, 1865, Army and Division of West Mississippi,
O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 1, p. 101; Consolidated statement of
killed, wounded, captured, and missing during the cam
paign from March 17 to April 12, 1865, ibid., 102.
20

.

Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction:
Personal Experiences of the Late W a r , ed. by Richard B.
Harwell (New York:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 270-71.
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The fall of Blakely left only the small garrisons
at Battery Huger and Battery Tracy to prevent the Fed
erals from moving through the rivers toward Mobile.

Two

hundred men of Companies B and K f 22nd Louisiana Infantry,
and Company C, 1st Mississippi Light Artillery, held Bat
tery Huger.

Major Washington Marks, commander of Huger,

had eleven guns in his work.

At Tracy, 120 men of Com

panies G, H, and I, 22nd Louisiana, manned the five guns
of that fort, and Captain Ambrose A. Plattsmier had
charge of Tracy.

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Brown com

manded both Huger and Tracy until April 3, when he
reported to Maury as inspector of artillery.
then assumed direction of the two forts.

21

Major Marks
Both garri

sons fired their guns in support of Spanish Fort in the
first few days of the siege of that place, but a short
age of ammunition in the works led Maury to order the
men not to fire throughout the remainder of the siege.
From March 31 to April 8 , the two forts endured daily
bombardments from an enemy Parrot gun battery on Bay
Minette and occasional fire from the Federal fleet in
Mobile Bay.

The enemy shells did little damage to the

^Waterman, "Afloat— Afield— Afloat," 23, 55; Lid
dell to Patton, Apr. 3, 1865, Telegrams Sent, Eastern
Division, Gulf, Chap. II, Vol. 100, p. 93.
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earthern walls, and the men filled shell holes and
strengthened the parapets with sandbags floated down to
the forts on flatboats at night.

22

Colonel Patton of the 22nd Louisiana took his four
companies from the Spanish Fort garrison and assumed
command of Huger and Tracy on April 9.

The men in the

forts had to hold those positions at first to prevent the
Federal fleet from cutting off retreat from Blakely and
later to prevent the enemy from interfering with the
evacuation of Mobile.Maury gave Patton
use his guns:

"'Open

permission

all your guns upon

,
to

the enemy,keep

up an active fire, and hold your position until you
receive orders to retire.'"
fire not only of the guns
the fleet but some of
and Fort McDermott.

23

The Louisianians faced the

in the Bay. Minette battery and

the guns abandoned

at Spanish Fort

The men kept up a heavy, accurate

fire against the Federal land batteries from April 9-11.
The men endeavored to expend every round they had before

22

Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted in Maury,
"Defence of Mobile," 9-10; "Ebenezer R. F. S." to Editor,
Mar. 31, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Register, Apr. 4,
1865; Confederate diary, Apr. 2-7, 1865, quoted in
Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, 135, n. 1, 136n, 137, n. 1,
143, n. 2, 145, n. 1.
23Liddell to Patton, Apr. 8 , 1865, O.R., XLIX, Pt.
2, p. 1219; Mumford Diary, Apr. 9, 1865; wTlliam Rix,
Incidents of Life in a Southern City During the War
(Mobile: Iberville Historical Society Papers, 1865),
[20]; Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted in Maury,
"Defence of Mobile," 10.
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they had to abandon their works.

On the night of the

eleventh, Maury sent a staff officer to Patton with
orders to retire.

The first steamer sent to pick up the

-

men ran aground at Conway Bayou, but a second vessel suc
ceeded in bringing the men off.
before leaving.

They spiked all the

Maury wrote later:

guns

"These garrisons

fired the last cannon in the last great battle of the war
for the freedom of the Southern states."

24

.
A Unionist

living in Mobile expressed his admiration for the defense
of Huger and Tracy:

"Never was a devoted garrison more

bravely defended, and never was
of scientific gunnery...."

[there] a finer display

25

In Mobile, Maury had begun preparations for a siege
about the time the Federals invested Spanish Fort.

On

March 30, he declared the city to be in a state of siege,
which enabled the military to arrest and hold suspicious
persons.

Taylor issued orders forbidding non-combatants

from visiting the city without permission from his head
quarters but removed this restriction after five days.
Maury notified slave owners that they had to remove all
their slaves-from the city.

Those persons not complying

with these instructions faced the seizure and enrollment

24

Mumford Diary, Apr. 9-11, 1865; Waterman, "Afloat—
Afield— Afloat," 55; Maury to Davis, Dec. 25, 1871, quoted
in Maury, "Defence of Mobile," 10.
25

Rix, Incidents of Life,

[20].

*
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of their slaves in government service.

The state of

siege enabled the post commandant to close all saloons
and drinking establishments in Mobile.

Finally, the

military began gathering up all cotton in the city for
burning.

Major William H. Ketchum impressed every dray

he could find and hauled the bales out to a plain north
of Mobile.

A citizen reported:

...Going home, one day, I was surprised to see
bales of cotton tumbling from the attic win
dows of some of the best mansions in the city
....Almost everybody had secreted a little of
that commodity in their homes to serve their
wants when t^g Confederate money should
collapse....
The losses suffered at Spanish Fort and Blakely
caused Maury to begin planning for the evacuation of
Mobile.

Not only had the casualties in the two garrisons

cost Maury half of his effective force, but a consider
able amount of artillery and small arms ammunition had
been expended.

Forrest's defeat in central Alabama

removed any real hope of relief.

In a telegram to

26
Para II, General Order No. 15, Headquarters Dis
trict of the Gulf, Mar. 30, 1865, Gibson Papers; Major
Joseph D. Sayers to Colonel Thomas Taylor, Mar. 31, 1865,
Letters Sent, Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and
East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 14, p. 423; Surget to T.
Taylor, Apr. 5, 1865, Telegrams Sent, Department of Ala
bama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, Chap. II, Vol. 11,
p. 63; General Order No. 16, Headquarters District of the
Gulf, Mar. 31, 1865, quoted in A m y Argus and Crisis,
Apr. 8 , 1865; Circular, Headquarters Military Post,
Mobile, Apr. 1, 1865, quoted in Advertiser and Register,
Apr. 2, 1865; Major William H. Ketchum to T. Taylor, Apr.
20, 1865, Brent Collection; Rix, Incidents of Life, [20].
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Taylor, Maury stated that he would be unable to hold
Mobile for even a day if the enemy attacked it.

27

With

so many men tied down defending Spanish Fort and Blakely,
the city had long had only a few artillerymen and home
guards manning the works.

An officer at Battery Gladden

recognized the susceptibility of the defenses to assault:
...The Federal Comr. has displayed a great
want of knowledge by not landing on this side
of the bay some time since.
The entrance to
the city has always been open....
Maury stated in later years that he would have been
unable to hold the city for long if Canby had moved
directly against it rather than operating on the eastern
shore.

Canby might even have bagged most of Maury's

army:
...The city was level and exposed throughout
the whole extent to fire from any direction.
There were near 40,000 non-combatants within
its lines of defence, whose sufferings under
a siege would soon have paralyzed the defence
by a garrison so small as ours was; and the
early evacuation would have been inevitable,
while it would have been exceedingly diffi
cult of accomplishment....
The ringing of alarm bells broke the stillness of
the city on the morning of April 10.

The bells pealed

27

Maury to Surget, Apr. 15, 1865, Department of the
Gulf Records, LHA Collection; Maury to Beauregard, June
1, 1865, Maury Letter; Maury to Taylor, Apr. 9, 1865,
Taylor Papers; Bullock to Maury, Apr. 10, 1865, ibid.;
Maury to Taylor, Apr. 10, 1865, ibid.
op
Mumford Diary, Apr. 10, 1865.
29

Maury, "Defence of Mobile," 1-2.

to call out the local defense troops so they could par
ticipate in preparations for the evacuation.

Maury had

about 18 steamers at the city, and the home guards and
regulars began loading them with ordnance and commissary
stores.

The soldiers appropriated the drays which had

carried cotton out of the city and used them to move the
stores to the landing.

The men put some supplies on the

few railroad cars remaining in the city.

Many of the

troops departed that day, while Maury kept a small infan
try and cavalry force in the city as a rear guard.

A

number of sick and wounded soldiers could not be evac
uated, so the authorities arranged to place these men in
the City Hospital and Marine Hospital under the care of
the Sisters of Charity.

Maury hoped the men would not be

molested by the enemy while under the care of this
religious order.

30

The cloudy, dismal weather conditions

reflected the feelings of many of the city's residents:
...Never have I experienced such feelings as
now take possession of m e — perfectly miser
able, as may be imagined.
Every body is

30

Thad Holt (ed.), Miss Wari n g 's Journal: 1863 and
1865 (Chicago:
The Wyvern Press, 1964), 13; Mumford
Diary, Apr. 10, 1865; Ketchum to T. Taylor, Apr. 20,
1865, Brent Collection; Account of Sister Gabriella,
quoted in Oscar H. Lipscomb, "The Administration of John
Quinlan, Second Bishop of Mobile, 1859-1883" (unpublished
master's thesis, Catholic University of America, 1959),
92.
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excited and running around, gathering what
information they can....
Fortunately, the depression did not spread to the sol
diers:

"Amidst all the reverses, the men seem to be in

good spirits."

32

On April 11, the removal of men and supplies con
tinued, and the few remaining officers and men prepared
to disable the artillery and ammunition which they could
not get out.

Confusion marred the orderly conduct of

these operations.

The local defense troops did not sur

render their weapons and seemed ill disposed to obey any
orders by regular officers.

Lieutenant Daniel Geary took

it upon himself to put out of order the forts on the city
lines.

He requisitioned spikes and had them distributed

to the various batteries for spiking the guns.

He

instructed the battery commanders to dump their ammunition
into the moats, burn the gun carriages, and set the bombproofs afire.

33

The garrisons of the bay batteries

evacuated their works last.

At Battery Gladden, the men

emptied their powder into the bay, threw shells into the
water, and broke all tools.

Rather than spiking their

^ M u m f o r d Diary, Apr. 10, 1865; Holt
W a r i n g 1s Journal, 13.
32
33

(ed.), Miss

Mumford Diary, Apr. 10, 1865.

Maury to Taylor, Apr. 11, 1865 (several items),
Taylor Papers; Holt (ed.), Miss Wari n g 's Journal, 14;
Diary, Apr. 11, 1865, Geary Papers.
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guns, the soldiers threw the elevating screws and wheels
into the bay, which prevented the enemy from using the
guns.

Some delay occurred in evacuating the men because

the engineers and Negro firemen on several steamers
deserted.

The soldiers had to collect wood and navigate

the steamers as best they could.

Finally, the last of

the garrisons steamed away from the wharf:

"Mobile was

left with great reluctance by both officers and men.

The

. .
34
men, though low-spirited, behaved well...."
Maury left Mobile early on the morning of April 12
with the rear guard of 300 Louisianians commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay.

Maury left Gibson behind

with Lieutenant Colonel Philip B. Spence's 12th Missis
sippi Cavalry Regiment and a section of an artillery
battery.

This rear guard left Mobile about 11 A.M. and

set fire to the cotton bales piled up north of the city.
A citizen reported that when the cavalry had departed
from the scene of the confligration, the home guards or
municipal officials rang the alarm bells so that the
people could rush out and try to save some of the cotton.
They reportedly saved nearly 1,500 of the 3,500 bales
which the military had stacked up.

34

Rix, Incidents of Life,
11, 1865.
35

35

Maury's commissary

[21]; Mumford Diary, Apr.

Maury to Taylor, Apr. 12, 1865, Taylor Papers;
Maury to Surget, Apr. 15, 1865, Department of the Gulf
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officer had turned over to Mayor Slough some supplies for
distribution to the poor of the city.

A young lady

described the scene which occurred after Spence's caval
rymen left the c i t y :
...each one of that class [the poor], help
ing herself freely, and endeavoring to carry
off as much as possible— each one tries to
be first, and consequently much scuffling
and rioting ensues— ...
Eventually some home guards and armed citizens restored
order.
Canby ordered two divisions under Granger to cross
Mobile Bay and occupy Mobile.

Granger's men landed at

Catfish Point, about five miles below the city, at
10:30 A.M., and Granger sent a dispatch to Slough demand
ing the unconditional surrender of Mobile.

At noon,

Slough and several citizens rode down the Shell Road in
a carriage to near the Magnolia Racetrack.

With a large

sheet as a flag of truce, Slough informed Granger that
the Confederate troops had left the city, and he formally

Records, LHA Collection; Maury, "Defence of Mobile," 8;
Maury to Beauregard, June 1, 1865, Maury Letter; Ketchum
to T. Taylor, Apr. 20, 1865, with endorsements by Taylor,
Apr. 20, 1865, Brent Collection; Maury to Taylor, Apr.
13, 1865, ibid.; Rix, Incidents of L i f e , [21].
^6Maury to Taylor, Apr. 12, 1865, Taylor Papers;
Rix, Incidents of L i f e , [22] ; Holt (ed.) , Miss W a r i n g 's
Journal, 15.
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surrendered to the Federals.

37

A regiment from Granger's

force occupied the town during the afternoon and raised
the United States flag over the customhouse.

About sun

down, a small number of Confederate cavalry scouts made
a quick raid on the city and captured several Federal
soldiers.

Granger then ordered an entire brigade into

Mobile to occupy the former Confederate works.

One

citizen described the entry of these soldiers:
...The city was resonant with every patriotic
refrain, from the Star Spangled Banner to John
Brown's Soul is Marching On. Every one real
ized for the first time, as he listened to the
'tramp, tramp' of the orderly files, that 'the
b o y s ' had c o m e .
Indeed, it was only the strains of tunes like
"Yankee Doodle" and the cheers of the Federal soldiers
that made many citizens realize that Mobile had finally
fallen to the enemy:

"...I began to realize what had

and was taking p l a c e , as before that, I had been so much

Granger to Christensen, Apr. 24, 1865, O.R., XLIX,
Pt. 1, p. 143; Granger and Thatcher to Slough, Apr. 12,
1865, ibid., 144; Slough to Granger and Thatcher, Apr. 12,
1865, ibid., 144, 146; Maury to Taylor, Apr. 13, 1865,
Brent Collection; Holt (ed.), Miss War i n g 's Journal, 15;
Peter Joseph Hamilton, A Little Boy in Confederate
Mobile (Mobile: Colonial Mobile Book Shop, 1947), 26;
C o x , ^Mobile in the War Between the States," 210.
38
Brigadier General Elias S. Dennis to Captain
Robert G. Curtis, Apr. 22, 1865, O . R . , XLIX, Pt. 1, p.
175; Cox, "Mobile in the War Between the States," 210-11;
Rix, Incidents of Life, [24].
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excited that I hardly had time for thought...."

39

Three

days after Lee's surrender at Appamattox Courthouse, the
war ended for the Gulf city.

Many days, however, would

elapse before life in Mobile returned to a semblance of
normality and even longer before she recovered something
akin to her former status.

Twelve days after the surren

der of Mobile, a northern newspaper correspondent penned
the following description of what the war had brought
the ci t y :
The city is a sad picture to contemplate.
The stores look a thousand years old.
They
wear something of the appearance of the old
castles to be seen in some of the countries
of Europe.
They are empty and forsaken,
except here and there an old man seated like
some faithful sentinel at his post.
Shelves
are forsaken of their silks, and occupied
only with the flies and the dust.
The people
look sad and sorry.
The best people of the
city are poor, and poorly clad.
There is no
money save the scrip of the confederacy.
The
people are distressed.
No money except coin
and greenbacks will pass.
They have little
of the former— none of the latter. We have
witnessed such sorrow over this order of
things as we do not desire again to behold.

39
Holt (ed.), Miss W a r i n g 1s Journal, 15.
40

Cincinnati Daily Commercial, May 10, 1865.

EPILOGUE
The defense of Mobile was an integral part of the
southern war effort.

Jefferson Davis certainly recog

nized Mobile's strategic position in the Confederacy and
strove to keep competent, trustworthy men over the terri
torial command which included the city.

He needed gen

erals at Mobile who would not only push the construction
of strong defenses but who would also be selfless when
called upon to send men or supplies to other points.

So

long as Mobile's commander recognized the city's place in
the Confederacy's overall war strategy and acted accord
ingly, it made little difference whether he directed an
independent department or a subordinate district.

The

president and the War Department would see that he
received needed supplies and that he would have enough
men to defend the city if those men were not required
elsewhere.

The command at Mobile could not have been an

easy one to hold, however.

It required patience both

because of the demands frequently made upon it for men
and supplies that might be needed to defend the city and
because the position offered no opportunities for active
service which might lead to promotion.

All of the men

who commanded at Mobile deserve credit for accepting
their role and performing their job capably.
421

For four y e a r s , the best engineering minds in the
Confederacy— Leadbetter, Von Sheliha, Lockett, and Gilmer—
planned, designed and supervised the construction of defen
sive works around Mobile.

Thousands of slaves toiled,

sweated, and suffered to erect the earthworks.

Engineer

troops and Negro laborers struggled to place cannons in
the forts, obstruct the rivers around the city with pil
ings, and float deadly torpedoes in those rivers and Mobile
Bay.

Weeks and months of work went into arming and

strengthening the two masonry sentinels guarding the
entrance to the bay.

With the resources available to

them, the Confederates did everything possible to con
struct proper defenses for the area.

Despite all these

preparations, however, the Mobile defenses fell fairly
easily to the enemy— Fort Powell in one day, Fort Gaines
in two days, Fort Morgan in fifteen days, Spanish Fort and
Blakely in fifteen days, Battery Huger and Battery Tracy
in three d a y s , and the bay batteries and city lines with
out a fight.

Yet the Mobile defenses served a useful pur

pose through most of the war because they undoubtedly
helped deter an enemy attack.

Thus, the tons of earth

and masonry and hundreds of heavy guns kept the port open
for vital blockade running activities and kept functioning
the strategic railroad lines through the city.

The fall

of Mobile early in the war might well have been a
crippling blow the Confederate war effort.
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APPENDIX
Mobile Confederate Military Commands
The following chart traces the chronological evolu
tion of the military territorial commands that had the
responsibility for the defense of Mobile and includes the
names of commanding officers.
Confederate forces at Fort Morgan
Expanded to include Fort Gaines, G r a n t 's Pass,
and approaches to Mobile in April 1861.

Placed

in District of Alabama September 12, 1861.
Colonel William J,. Hardee, March 28 , 1861.
Colonel Henry Maury, June 18, 1861.
District of Alabama
Created September 12, 1861.

Placed in Depart

ment of Alabama and West Florida October 14,
1861.

Designated Army of Mobile January 27,

1862.
Brigadier General Jones M. Withers, September 12,
1861.
Department of Alabama and West Florida
Established October 14, 1861.

Discontinued

June 27, 1862, and included in Department No.
2 (Western Department).
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Major General Braxton Bragg, October 14, 1861.
Brigadier General Samuel Jones, March 3, 1862.
Brigadier General Thomas J. Butler (temporary),
March 29, 1862.
Brigadier General Samuel Jones, April 2, 1862.
Brigadier General John H. Forney, April 28, 1862.
District of the Gulf
Established July 2, 1862, as part of Department
No. 2 (Western Department).

Transferred to

Department of the West, November 24, 1862.
Known as Department of the Gulf June 8 , 1863January 28, 1864.

Merged into Department of

Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana
January 28, 1864.
Brigadier (later Major) General John H. Forney,
July 2, 1862.
Brigadier General William W. Mackall

(temporary),

December 14, 1862.
Major General Simon B. Buckner, December 23, 1862.
Brigadier General James E. Slaughter

(temporary),

May 8 , 1863.
Major General Dabney H. Maury, May 19, 1863.
Major General Franklin Gardner (temporary), August
17, 1864.
Major General Dabney H. Maury, September 6, 1864.
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